In the middle ages 89

are concerned with onl}^ a particular group of ex-

istences, the point of view (objectum formale) un-

der which they include this group of existences is

also restricted; it is not applied to other categories

of the real.

But, — and this is the second point — the detailed

examination of the world for which the special sci-

ences take up particular positions does not suffice

to satisfy the mind ; after the detail it demands total

views. Philosophy is simply a survey of the world

as a whole. The man of science is like a stranger

who would explore a city bit by bit, and who travels

through its avenues, promenades, museums, parks,

and buildings one after the other. When at last

he has wandered over the city in all directions,

there will still remain another way for him to be-

come acquainted with it ; from the height of a plat-

form, from the summit of a tower, from the basket

of a balloon, from an aviator's seat, the city would

disclose to him another aspect, — its framework,

plan, and relative disposition of parts. But that

way is the way of the philosopher, and not of the

scientist. The philosopher is thus the man who

views the world from the top of a lookout and sets

himself to learn its structure; philosophy is a syn-

thetic and general knowledge of things. It is not

concerned with this or that compartment of exis-

tence, but with all beings existent or possible, the

real without restriction. It is not a particular but

a general science. General science or philosophy

90 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

constitutes the second stage of knowledge. It is

human wisdom (sapientia) , science par excellence,

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This generality has a twofold aspect; for in two

ways the general character of philosophy is op-

posed to the special character of the particular

sciences. In the first place, instead of dealing with

one department of reality, philosophy plunges into

the inimcnsity of the real, of all that is. Its mat-

ter (material object) is not general of course in the

sense of an encyclopedia (as was supposed in the

early Middle Ages by Isidore of Seville and by

Rhabanus Maurus, or by Vincent of Beauvais in

the thirteenth century) into which is thrown pell-

mell, and in a purely artificial order, a formidable

array of information in regard to all that is known

and knowable. An encyclopedia is not a science

and does not pretend to be. If philosophy deals

with all reality it does so by the way of viewing

things in their totality. But, in the second place,

these total views are possible only when the mind

discovers, in the totality of reality, certain aspects

or points of view which are met with everywhere

and which reach to the very depths of reality. To

return to the technical scholastic language, with

which we are familiar, its formal and precise object

is the study of something that is found everywhere

and which must he general because it is common to

everything. Philosopliy is defined as the under-