In the middle ages 257

of choosing the most worthy. Such election appHes

to the monarch, and also to his ministers in the gov-

ernment, whom Thomas includes in his composite

form of government without defining their func-

tions.

Finally, Thomas lays down a condition for the

exercise of popular election : it is necessary that the

people be sufficiently informed on the issues at

stake, and in consequence they must undergo a

political education, an education in citizenship.

Thus, in agreement with Augustine, he says: "If

the people have a sense of moderation and respon-

sibility, and are most careful guardians of the com-

mon weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a

people to choose their own magistrates for the gov-

ernment of the commonwealth. But if, as time

goes on, the same people became so corrupt as to

sell their votes, and entrust the government to

scoundrels and criminals, then the right of appoint-

ing their public officials is properly forfeited by

such a people, and the choice devolves upon a few

good men."^*^ We see here again, as always, how

our fundamental principle comes into play: popu-

lar suffrage must contribute to the realization in

the state of the good of all. If popular suffrage

itself is detrimental, its exercise must be sus-

pended.

zoSumma Theol., lagae, q. XCVII, art. 1.

258 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

How does the sovereign power, whatever it be,

carry out its functions? According to scholastic

philosophy, the essential attribute, which enables a

government to fulfil its mission, is the power to

establish laws. To establish laws for others is, in-

deed, the most natural form of order.

The theory of human law, in the page of Thomas

Aquinas, is intimately bound up with his psychol-

ogy and ethics and metaphysics; and it forms part

of an original whole which can be called briefly

"the system of laws."^^ Human or positive law,

lecc humana seu positiva, has a twofold aspect;

namely, the jus gentium, which belongs to all peo-

ples alike, and the jus civile, civil law, which be-

longs properly to a single state as such. In either

case, this human law is simply a derivative from

natural law; and natural law in turn is only the

application — to man as a natural creature — of the

eternal decree of the uncreated wisdom, lex aeterna.

With regard to the question now before us, it

will be sufficient to say that the law of nature, or

natural human right, is that totality of regulations

which rests upon the fundamental perfection of the

human being; this does not change and cannot

change, because it abides in the mutual relationship

between the essence of God (the solitary support

of all reality) and His creatures. Thomistic phi-

21 Summa Theol, la2ae, qq. XC-C.

In the middle ages 259

losophy sums it all up in this formula: the natural

law is a participation in the eternal law, — lex nat-

urcdis est partidpatio qiiaedam legis aeternae.^"^ It

follows, then, that each human individual bears in

himself a totality of rights and of duties, which are

the expression of his nature, — that is to say, of his

status as a reasonable being. It also follows that

the natural precepts of this law, the principles of

social order, are the same for all men and for all

time, and that to destroy them would mean the de-

struction of man himself. Positive, or human, law

cannot violate them. For, as Thomas says, in so

far as human law disagrees with the law of nature,

it is no longer a law, but a corruption of the law;^^

it is placed outside the scope of human legislation.

The human law, indeed, draws its strength, its

raison d'etre, only from natural law, — of which it

is the echo, so to speak, the lengthening out, the ful-

filling. Direct applications, evident corollaries of

the social nature of man, belong to the jus gentium,

(that which is right for all nations) such as "justice

in buying and selling and other similar things, with-

out which social life would be impossible.""*

But there are less obvious and more remote con-

sequences of the natural law; and there are appli-

cations which Vary, according to the concrete cir-

cumstances peculiar to each state. It rests with

22 Ibid., q. XCI, art. 2.

23 Ibid., q. XCV, art. 2.

24 Ibid.

260 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

the government of particular groups, to determine

these; and this is done under the form of positive

law. For example, the natural law demands that

the malefactor be punished ; but it does not indicate

the method or form of punishment, — whether he

ought to be punished by fine or by prison or by

death.^^ It is left to the wisdom of human law to

set right the implications of natural law.

Thus, securely linked with the law of nature, all

human law is bound up with reason, which is the

basis of being human. "Human law is an ordi-

nance of reason for the common good, made by him

who has care of the community, and promulgated."^В®

VI

To be sure, the state described by Thomas Aqui-

nas is an ideal, or theoretical conception. As such

of course it could not be realized in practice in any

complete sense; for real societies are too complex

to conform to any set or uniform scheme. But with

this reservation, it seems fair to say that the great

European states, which were all then in process of

formation, attempted from their several angles to

realize in fact some such system of "limited mon-

archy" as Thomas outlines. For example, the

France of Louis IX, in which the transmission of

power, resting upon the popular will, was modify-

2!5 Tbid.

28 Quacdam ratioiiis ordinatio ad homim (011111111110 ct ah co qu'

curain communitatis habot, proniiilgata. Ibid., q. XC, art. 4.