In the middle ages 253

king holds it subject to the will of the people, which

of course may change.

There is, then, at the source of the delegation

made by the people to the king, a contract; in the

less developed states this is a rudimentary or im-

plicit will, but in states which have arrived at a

high degree of organization the will is expHcit.

This will can give expression to itself, in a thousand

different ways, each one of them sufficient to render

legitimate the holding of power.

This mediaeval principle of the acquisition of

power by contract is in admirable agreement with

the metaphysical doctrine that the individual alone

is a real substance. Since the state is not an en-

tity, the will of a state is nothing but the result of

the will of all its members; and the state cannot

exist without the mutual trust of the members and

those who are appointed to direct them. Again the

principle is in admirable agreement with feudal so-

ciety and feudal monarchy, which rests entirely

upon the pact, pactum; upon the oath of fealty

which is the religious guarantee of fidelity to the

given word. Are not the pacts between kings and

burgesses, barons and prelates, foundation princi-

ples of the institutions which envelop and assist in

constructing the feudal monarchy? When one of

the contracting parties breaks his agreement, the

other at once withdraws his part in the bargain and

resists. The history of the relations between the

254 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

kings and their feudatories and towns is full of in-

stances of such resistance.

In principle, — as we have said, the delegation of

sovereignty by the people is of the same nature,

whether it be made to a monarch, or to an aristoc-

racy, or to a republic. In a monarchy, there is the

advantage that the power is concentrated; and, as

Thomas points out, the absence of diffusion is more

efficacious (for both good and evil purposes) : FzV-

tus unitiva magis est efficaw quam dispersa et di-

visa.^^ But, he goes on to say, circumstances them-

selves must decide, at any given moment in the po-

litical life of a people, which is the best form of

government; and this supplementary statement

gives to his theory that elasticity which renders it

adaptable to any set of conditions.

IV

Thomas himself, however, shows very marked

preference for a composite form of government,

which he considers the most perfect realization of

this popular delegation, — and we have already con-

sidered that form in general. This mixed system

is that in which the sovereignty belongs to the peo-

ple, but at the same time it is combined with both

an elective monarchy and also an oligarchy to cur-

tail the exercise of power by the monarch. The

general plan of his system is outlined from this

classic text: "Whereas these (that is, the various

15 De Regimine Principum, lib. I, cap. 3.