In the middle ages 251

nas, who gave to the droit social of the thirteenth

century a remarkable consistency, — which he im-

posed on his contemporaries and his successors. It

was Thomas who also influenced his friend, Wil-

liam of Moerbeke, to translate into Latin the Poli-

tics of Aristotle.

To understand the political system of Thomas,

we must distinguish two distinct aspects of the

problem. On the one hand, in any state, — what-

ever its degree of perfection — there is the question

of the seat of sovereignty. On the other hand,

there is the question of this same sovereignty in

the state which he believes to be the most perfect.

As regards the first question. In any state

sovereignty arises from collectivity and belongs to

all the people, that is to say, to the masses made

up of individuals. Since it is the people who con-

stitute the state, and it is for the good of all the

citizens that sovereignty should be exercised, it is

logical to conclude that God has entrusted to the

collectivity itself the power of ruling and legislat-

ing. Thus the doctrine of the "sovereignty of the

people" is not a modern discovery at all; it is in di-

rect harmony with the leading idea of the scholas-

tic political philosophy, that individuals are the only

social realities, and that therefore, the state is not

an ^entity outside of them. By a new link, then, this

doctrine binds the droit social to metaphysics and

ethics.

But the body of citizens is too numerous, too un-

252 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

formed, too fickle, to exercise by itself the power

which has been assigned to it by divine decree. Ac-

cordingly, it in turn, delegates this power. Usu-

ally they commit it to a monarch; but not neces-

sarily, — for the people may also delegate it to an

aristocratic or to a republican form of government.

If the people delegate it to a monarch — and that

is the common mediaeval illustration — he repre-

sents the group and holds power for the group;

ordinm'e autem aliquid in honum commune est vel

totius multitudi7iis, vel alicujus gerentis vicem to-

tius multitudinis.^^

The monarch, therefore, is only a vice-regent.

This is so literally true that (as we have already

seen in the De Regimine Pjincijnim) precautions

were usually recommended, when a vice-regent was

to be selected. Indeed, as Thomas says," "among

a free people who can make laws for themselves,

the consent given popularly to certain practices,

constantly made clear by custom, has more weight

than the authority of the prince ; for the latter holds

the power of legislating only so far as he represents

the will of the people." So, the power is transmit-

ted, by this successive delegation from God to the

people and from the people to the monarch. It is

the entire collectivity which is the original subject

of the power. The people possess it by a cerВ±in

natural title, which nothing can destroy; but tlie

^3 Summa. TheoL, la2ae, q. XC, art. 3.

i^Ibid., q. XCVII, art. 3, ad tertium.