In the middle ages 247

community as much as do the artisan and the

farmer and the common laborer. Thomas Aquinas

expressly teaches that every virtuous action (in the

realm of nature or of grace) can enter into the con-

stitution of general or legal justice (justitia gener-

alis vel leg alls) ; for virtue here adjusts, with an

eye to the common welfare, the relations of order

maintaining in the conduct of the various members

of the community.^*

This conception assumes special significance, — a

significance characteristic of the social order in the

thirteenth century — when one reflects upon the

Prince as charged with making effectual this virtue

in the justitia legalis. It is he who possesses the

virtue of justice by right of headship (architect-

onice) , and in an eminent manner, whereas his

8" See Summa Theol, 3a2ae, q. LVIII, art. 5, for the important

text in this connection. "Manifestum est autem quod omnes qui sub

communitate aliqua continentur, comparantur ad communitatem

sicut partes ad totum; pars autem id quod est, totius est; unde et

quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. Secundum

hoc ergo bonum cujuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem hominem

ad seipsum, sive ordinantis ipsum ad aliquas alias personas singu-

lares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinat justitia.

Et secundum hoc actus omnium virtutum possunt ad justitiam perti-

nere, secundum quod ordinant hominem ad bonum commune. Et

quantum ad hoc justitia dicitur virtus generalis. Et quia ad legem

pertinet ordinare ad bonum commune, . . . inde est quod talis

justitia praedicto modo generalis dicitur justitia legalis, quia scilicet

per eam homo concordat legi ordinanti actus omnium virtutum in

bonum commune."

248 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

subordinate possesses it only in administrative de-

pendence and secondarily.^" The Prince is custos

justi, the guardian of what is just; he is justum ani-

matum, the personification of what is just.*" He is

the peace-maker of society. By virtue of this title

he is qualified to direct the activities of his subordi-

nates, to bid men to pray or to battle or to build or

to farm, — always for the greatest common good.*"

If, nevertheless, he who governs fails to be in-

spired with this sense of the public good and aban-

dons himself to a selfish and capricious use of

power, then he must be regarded as a tyrant.

Every treatise, written for the use of princes and

future kings, exhibits a dread of the tyrant who

allows his own personal advantage to override the

good of the group. Dante reserves a special place

in his hell for tyrants, by the side of brigands and

assassins.

Each establishes an entire system of guarantees

to preserve the state against tyranny, which is so

opposed to its nature. Some of these guarantees

are preventive. Thus, Thomas in the De Regi-

mine Ptincipiwi, would have the people, — for the

^^ Ibid., art. 6. "Et sic est (justitia legalis) in principe prin-

c'lpaliter et quasi architectonice ; in subditis autem secundario et

quasi administrative."

8"^ Ibid., art. 1, ad quintum.

8'' The same principle was invoked by ecclesiastical authority in

laying upon the Prince the duty of suppressing heresy. The bonum

commune, as it was understood in the thirteenth century, required

that man's end in the divine economy should be safeguarded and

that thfrefore the Prince should rigorously check any error which

might lead astray the members of the community.