In the middle ages 237

civilization. The only question of difference is that

which attaches to the excellence of the activities

displayed. The proper functioning of the state de-

pends upon the diversity of activities, and a state

becomes more perfect, as does a whole civilization,

in proportion as these activities are more com-

plete, more varied, and more intense. The honum

commune^, the commonwealth which the state has

to provide, results from the sum total of activities

performed to unite and to harmonize.

These considerations make clear how one can

speak at the same time of the unity of the civiliza-

tion of the thirteenth century and of the pluralism

which is so basic in their thought. The unity of a

civilization is the result of common aspirations,

common beliefs, common sentiments both moral

and artistic, common language, common organiza-

tion of life; and such a unity is no more than a com-

munity of activities. At the same time, unity of

substance, or physical unity, belongs to each of the

numerous personalities which are the agents of this

civilization, and to them only."

19 Through failure to perceive this distinction between the unity

of order and the physical unity, many historians deny individualism

in the Middle Ages, and misconceive that fundamental teaching of

thirteenth century metaphysics, — "nihil est praeter individuum."

Thus, struck by the unitary character of the civilization, Mr. E. Bar-

ker writes: "We can hardly say that the Middle Ages have any con-

ception of the state. The notion of the state involves plurality, but

plurality is ex hypothesi not to be found." See, "Unity in the

Middle Ages," in The Unity of Western Civilization, p. 112, ed.

238 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

In this thomistic and scholastic view, the group

life acquires dynamic meaning. It rests upon a

sharing of activities for the good of all. Possessing

all a similar human nature, with its train of inalien-

able rights, the individuals present the greatest di-

versity in their talents, their faculties, and the ac-

tivities which result from them. Equal in human

nature, men are unequal in capacity for action f^

such is the metaphysical law which governs the

play of the social group, in all of its degrees.

VI

After this precise and substantial argument, to

which the whole body of scholastic philosophers of

the thirteenth century subscribe, it is easy to give

just value to a certain favourite comparison of that

age, — a comparison to which publicists, canonists,

legalists, theologians, and even poets, frequently

recur, for the purpose of explaining the problem

of the individual in relation to the group. It is

the comparison of the state with the human body.

John of Salisbury works out the comparison in de-

tail, and he likens each member of the human body

Marvin, Oxford, 1915. This statement is preceded by this other

erroneous assertion: "The prevalence of Realism, which marks

mediaeval metaphysics down to the end of the thirteenth century,

is another Platonic inheritance, and another impulse to unity. The

universal i.i and is a veritable thing in which the particular shares

and acquires its substance by its degree of sharing." Nothing is

more contrary to scholastic philosojjhy of the thirteenth century.

20 Cf. ch. IX, iv and vii.