In the middle ages 235

unity of the individual, — the organic and internal

"indivision' (unum simpliciter) which belongs to

the human person — and the external unity which

is the outcome of social grouping among a certain

number of individuals. Internal unity introduces

coherence within the individual substance, so that

all of its constituent parts or elements have neither

independent value nor existence of their own.

Hence there is a contradiction in the very idea of a

collective-person. Either the members who are

supposed to compose such a collective person, re-

main substantially independent, — in which case

there is no one person but a collection of persons —

or they are dependent of the whole, and then each

member loses his individuality. It is quite different

in the case of the external unity that appears in a

group of persons, since this unity does not affect

the individuality that belongs to each member.

You will ask then: Is the family or the state a

mere nothing? To make such an assertion would

be to overstate the doctrine. For, the uiiity of the

group, of which Thomas speaks, is functional in

character and rests on performing in common cer-

tain human activities, of which each member con-

tributes his share. Such activities are endowed with

reality, but a reality different from the incommuni-

cable and inalienable substantial being which each

member preserves. In towing a barge, the muscu-

lar activities of the men who tow are directed in

common; in a game or a club or any friendly asso-

236 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

ciation, each member places a portion of his activi-

ties at the disposal of the common life, — and in all

of these cases withdrawal is always possible.

But in the family or the community, on the con-

trary, this mutual pooling of activities is imposed

by nature; there can be no such withdrawal, for

certain basic activities of the individual are ab-

sorbed by the community. Indeed, in certain crises,

for the common good and the common safety, the

family or the state can demand the entire activity

of its members. But even so, the man who gives all

his activities nevertheless preserves his individual-

ity. The individual man never surrenders the

sovereignty of his own personality.

This doctrine could not have been stated more

clearly than it was by Thomas Aquinas in these

fine words: "The law should take account of many

things as to persons, as to affairs, and as to times.

For, the community of the state is composed of

many persons, and its good is procured by vaiied

activities /'^^

Accordingly, from the point of view of scholastic

metaphysics, there is no difference between the

unity of a group of men towing a barge and the

unity of the family or of the state or even of a whole

18 Bonum autem commune constat ex multis, et ideo oportet quod

lex ad multa respiciat et secundum personas et secundum negotia

et secundum tempora. Constituitur enim communitas civitatis ex

multis personis et ejus bonum per rmiltiples actiones procuratur.

Summa Theol, la2ao, q. XCVI, art. 1.