In the middle ages 229

good of the individuals. For Aristotle the prime

duty is to be a good citizen, and to increase one's

civic virtue. But for the scholastic philosopher the

prime duty is to give to life a human value, to be a

good man, and the state should help each of its

members to become such.

It follows from this teaching that as against the

state the individual should hold himself erect, con-

scious of his crown of rights, which the state can-

not infringe upon, because their validity is derived

from the worth of personality itself. These are

"the rights of man." Their foundation is the law

of nature, that is to say, the essence of man and the

eternal law, — the eternal relations which regulate

the order of beings in conformity with the decrees

of uncreated wisdom. These are the right to pre-

serve his Hfe, the right to marry and to rear chil-

dren, the right to develop his intellect, the right to

be instructed, the right to truth, the right to live in

society. These are some of the prerogatives of the

individual which appear in the thirteenth century

declaration of the rights of man.^

Thus, scholastic philosophy justifies from an

ethical point of view the conception of the worth of

the individual, as against the central power. But

we see at once how it also conforms to the feudal |

temperament. For, knight and baron and vassal

and citizen had all been consumed for two centu-

ries past with the idea of living each his own life.

9 Thomas Aquinas, Swmma Theol., lagae, q. XCIV, art. 2.

230 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

IV

But, in its turn, the ethical doctrine rests upon a

metaphysical foundation. Why, indeed, does the

human person possess the right to realize his happi-

ness, of which no state can deprive him? Meta-

physics replies: because human personality alone

is a genuine substantial reality. On the other

hand, any group whatever, the state included, is

not a real being ; it is simply a group of human per-

sons (midtitudo hotninum) ,

This doctrine interested the jurists and the can-

onists as much as it did the philosophers. Since its

nature is such as to throw light upon the political

mentality of the period, let us consider briefly the

conceptions of the jurists and theorists in civil and

canon law. This will be a helpful preliminary to

dispose of, before passing to the conclusions of the

philosophers.

The legalistic theorists simply took over from

Roman law the concept of the corporation (uni-

versitas) and applied it, — as civil theorists to the

state, and as canonists to the Church. Now, the

Roman corporation (universitas) is notliing hut an

association of individuals. To be sure, it is the

seat of private rights, and it can possess and acquire

property; but, as Savigny has emphasized, it is not

a real person, and in consequence it has no soul, nfl

intelligence, no will. The Roman jurists were too

realistic, too amenable to common sense logic, to