Victim status.

Under Article 34, only applicants who consider themselves victims of breaches of the Convention can apply to the Court. The term ‘victim’ is interpreted autonomously and irrespective of domestic rules such as those concerning interest in or capacity to take action (see Gorraiz Lizarraga and others v. Spain, no. 62543/00, § 35, ECHR 2004 III). The concept does not require the existence of injury (see, inter alia, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, § 27). Interpretation of the term ‘victim’ is liable to evolve in the light of conditions in contemporary society and it must be applied without undue formality (Gorraiz Lizarraga and others v. Spain, no. 62543/00, § 38, ECHR 2004 III). The Court has accordingly held that victim status may be linked to the merits of the case (Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, § 63, ECHR 2005 VII).

Direct victim. The act or omission in issue must directly affect the applicant (Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 III, § 36). On a case by case basis the Court has accepted appeals from ‘potential’ victims – that is, persons who could not complain of direct violations. An applicant cannot claim to be a victim in cases where s/he is partially responsible for the alleged violation (Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, no. 51358/99, 12 December 2006).

Indirect victim. When there is a personal and specific link between the direct victim and the applicant, the Court accepts an individual application from a person who is considered an indirect victim. Under Article 2, see an application from the victim’s wife (McCann and others v. the United Kingdom) or from a dead man’s nephew (Yaşa v. Turkey); under Article 3, an application from the mother of a man who disappeared while in custody (Kurt v. Turkey), whereas the brother of a man who had disappeared was not considered a victim (Çakıcı v. Turkey).

The victim’s death does not automatically mean that the case is struck out of the Court’s list. It is for persons with claims through the deceased – close relatives or heirs, but see Thévenon v. France (struck out of the list) for non-entitlement of a universal legatee – to decide whether to pursue the case or not and up to the Court to assess whether it is appropriate to continue its examination for the purpose of protecting human rights (Karner v. Austria, in contrast, Fairfield and others v. the United Kingdom). It is vital, however, that grievances are considered transferable (see Marie-Louise Loyen and Bruneel v. France, mentioned above and, in contrast, Sanles Sanles v. Spain, Biç and others v. Turkey). The applicant must be able to justify his or her status as a victim throughout the proceedings (Bourdov v. Russia). Many cases are struck out of the list because the applicant ceases to have victim status (domestic settlement of the case after the admissibility decision: Ohlen v. Denmark (struck out of the list) or after a Chamber judgement Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia). Nevertheless, the mitigation of a sentence or the adoption of a measure in favour of the applicant will only remove victim status if it is accompanied by explicit or substantial recognition of the violation, followed by adequate redress, Eckle v. Germany; Günter Tews v. Austria; Dalban v. Romania. Victim status may therefore depend on the size of indemnity granted by the domestic courts and the effectiveness (including the promptness) of the remedy affording the award (Scordino v. Italy).

6. The life of application: proceedings at national level, proceedings be­fore the European Court of Human Rights.