
- •Security methods. Kerckhoff’sPrinciple
- •3)Cryptographic methods of protection of the information
- •Legislative measures
- •Administrative measures Kerckhoff’sPrinciple
- •2.Tasks of cryptography
- •Impossibility to refuse authorship .Sender needn’t have possibility no refuse his authorship.
- •7.Polyalphabetic Ciphers
- •Viginere cipher
- •Description of the cipher
- •10. Symmetric cryptosystem. Des
- •11. Symmetric cryptosystem. 3des
- •12 Symmetric cryptosystem. Aes
- •13.Block cipher modes
- •14. Stream ciphers. Prg
- •Itself synchronous stream cipher
- •15. Stream ciphers. Rc4
- •16. Public key crypto. Rsa
- •17 Public key crypto.Diffie-Hellman
- •20. Protocols. Definitions.Rules of communication.Types of protocols.Problems.
- •21.Secure Protocols. Three types of Protocol
- •22.SecureElections. Simplistic Protocol #1,2
- •23.SecureElections. Voting with Blind Signatures
- •6.1 Secure Elections
- •Voting with Blind Signatures
- •24SecureElections.Election with two organization
- •Voting with Two Central Facilities
- •25.Digital Cash Protocol
- •26 Key management. Certification problem. Certificate
- •27 Authority. X.509. Certificate Hierarchy
- •28 Pgp. Key Management in pgp. Pgp’s Web of Trust. Idea.Key Schedule.Standard ansi x9.17. Working with pgp
- •30.One way functions. Properties.Collision-resistance.Example.
- •31.One way functions md5 algorithm
- •32.One way functions sha algorithm. Sha-256, sha-384, and sha-512.
- •Tasks of cryptography
20. Protocols. Definitions.Rules of communication.Types of protocols.Problems.
A protocol is a series of steps, involving two or more parties, designed to accomplish a task;Rules of communication.
Protocols have other characteristics as well:
— Everyone involved in the protocol must know the protocol and all of the steps to follow in
advance.
— Everyone involved in the protocol must agree to follow it.
— The protocol must be unambiguous; each step must be well defined and there must be no
chance of a misunderstanding.
— The protocol must be complete; there must be a specified action for every possible
situation.
A cryptographic protocol is a protocol that uses cryptography.
Types:
Basic Protocols;
Intermediate Protocols
Advanced Protocols
EsotericProtocols
Problems:
Trust - will Alice and Bob really trust a faceless arbitrator atsome unknown location on the network?
Cost – extra hardware/software/processing required
Delay – sending messages to an arbitrator will slow downthe transaction
Bottleneck – every transaction will involve the arbitrator
Vulnerability – the arbitrator is likely to be the target of anyattack, since if successful, the rewards will be substantial
21.Secure Protocols. Three types of Protocol
Additional property
it should not be possible to do more or to learn more thanis specified in the protocol
In designing secure protocols, we need to answer to questions:
What is the threat model, and is it realistic?
Does the protocol handle it correctly?
Three types of Protocol.
Arbitrated Protocol:
Protocol requires the participation of a disinterested trusted third party
disinterested – no allegiance to either partyno vested interest in the outcome
trusted – everybody accepts that what he says is true
Adjudicated Protocol
Third party (again disinterested and trusted) only called in when disputes arise
Self-enforcing Protocol
Protocol is designed to work between two mutually untrustworthy and unreliable parties
22.SecureElections. Simplistic Protocol #1,2
The ideal protocol has, at the very least, these
six requirements:
1. Only authorized voters can vote.
2. No one can vote more than once.
3. No one can determine for whom anyone else voted.
4. No one can duplicate anyone else’s vote. (This turns out to be the hardest requirement.)
5. No one can change anyone else’s vote without being discovered.
6. Every voter can make sure that his vote has been taken into account in the final tabulation.
Additionally, some voting schemes may have the following requirement:
7. Everyone knows who voted and who didn’t.
Simplistic Voting Protocol #1
(1) Each voter encrypts his vote with the public key of a Central Tabulating Facility (CTF).
(2) Each voter sends his vote in to the CTF.
(3) The CTF decrypts the votes, tabulates them, and makes the results public.
The CTF has no idea where the votes are from, so it doesn’t even
know if the votes are coming from eligible voters. It has no idea if eligible voters are voting more
than once.
Simplistic Voting Protocol #2
(1) Each voter signs his vote with his private key.
(2) Each voter encrypts his signed vote with the CTF’s public key.
(3) Each voter sends his vote to a CTF.
(4) The CTF decrypts the votes, checks the signatures, tabulates the votes, and makes the results public.
This protocol satisfies properties one and two: Only authorized voters can vote and no one can vote more than once—the CTF would record votes received in step (3). Each vote is signed with the voter’s private key, so the CTF knows who voted, who didn’t, and how often each voter voted.
The problem with this protocol is that the signature is attached to the vote; the CTF knows who voted for whom.