Introduction

1. The original distracted driver case is due to David Armstrong. See his (1968), p. 93.

2. Cases 2 and 3 are to be found in Dennett (1991).

3. See Rosenthal (1986).

4. John Searle discusses a case of this sort in his (1992), pp. 14-165.

5. For more here, see Tye (1993b).

6. The claim that seeing an object requires that the object visually look some way to the perceiver is given an extended defense in Dretske (1969).

7. For the purposes of illuminating the concept of P-consciousness, it is not necessary that these hypotheses express metaphysical possibilities. Mere conceivability suffices. See Block (1993).

8. Penfield (1975) describes epileptics who have petit mal seizures while driving or walking. According to Penfield, these patients become automata during the epileptic disorders: they continue what they are doing in a purely mechanical, automatic way without any consciousness. This claim is echoed by Searle in his (1992). It seems unreasonably strong, however, to conclude that there is no consciousness at all. Granted, there is no /-consciousness, and only limited D- and R-consciousness, but what reason is there to suppose that the patients have no P-consciousness? Interestingly, in his description of the patients, Penfield does not allude to any sensory impairments. See Block (1995).

9. One putative solution to the binding problem at the neurological level is that there is a common neuronal oscillation (40 MHz) that binds together the relevant neural events. This is known as the 40 MHz hypothesis. See Crick and Koch (1990).

10. One such effect is the McGurk effect. Here, seen lip movements can alter which phoneme is heard for a particular sound.

Chapter 1

1. I don't believe that this is really possible. For more, see (14)-(16) of this chapter.

2. For a deeper reason why phenomenal unity is not to be identified with introspective unity, see (14)-(17) and section 1.4 of this chapter.

3. For a defense of the claim that split-brain subjects have phenomenally disunified experiences, see chapter 5.

4. This claim is one that the sense-datum theorists would have endorsed, although they would have insisted that the things apparently outside are really immaterial surfaces or sense-data rather than physical surfaces. After all, sense-datum theorists were at pains to distinguish the act of sensing from the thing sensed. G. E. Moore (1903) is the modern father of trans­parency.

5. There are dissimilarities. In typical cases of seeing-that, background beliefs play a role in generating the propositional state of awareness. This is not so in the case of introspection. For more here, see Tye (2000), chapter 3.

6. Not everyone accepts this claim. On the view of events elaborated by Jaegwon Kim (1976) and Alvin Goldman (1970), the event of x's F-ing G-ly is a complex entity consisting of x and the property of F-ing G-ly. This has the con­sequence that at the time at which (S*) is true, there are four relevant simulta­neous events: Jones's writing painstakingly and illegibly, Jones's writing painstakingly, Jones's writing illegibly, and Jones's writing. Intuitively, how­ever, events do not individuate in this hyper-fine-grained way.

7. I am not suggesting here that object-unity is the same as phenomenal unity. See paragraph (5) earlier in this chapter.

8. For an elucidation of what it is for a content to be nonconceptual, abstract, and poised, see Tye (1995, 2000). For further critical discussion and replies, see the web symposium on Tye (2000) at http://host.uniroma3.it/ progetti/kant/field/tyesymp.htm.

9. For a discussion of split brains, see chapter 5. In my view, it is a mistake to suppose that the perceptual consciousness of the split-brain subject is always divided after the commissurotomy. Indeed, it is a mistake to sup­pose that even in the highly specialized circumstances in which split-brain subjects typically behave anomalously, their consciousness is invariably divided.

10. Actually, what really happens is that when one feels the stick, it no longer looks bent: touch corrects vision. But this does not matter for present purposes, so let us ignore it.

11. I do not deny that perceptual experiences sometimes have conceptual contents too.

Chapter 2

1. See Noordhof (2000).

2. The representational content of pain is more complex than this. See pp. 56-60 below. For the moment, the complications may be ignored.

3. Again, this oversimplifies.

4. Or as qualities of those qualities. To clarify this point: in having the pain experience, one experiences certain localized qualities as bad or unpleas­ant. These localized qualities along with their unpleasantness are the quali­ties to which one's attention goes, if one is told to introspect one's pain experience. Unpleasantness is a quality of the former qualities in the given context. (For more on the affective side of pain, see later in this chapter.) Compare this with the case of experiencing red as pleasing in one context, that of a particular painting with various other complementary back­ground colors, but not as pleasing in another, that in which the red clashes with the background.

5. For useful summaries here, see Melzack and Wall (1983), Price (1999, 2000), and Chapman and Nakamura (1999).

6. The claim that pain essentially has a certain sensory character been dis­puted by Maurat Aydede (2001) via an appeal to some recent scientific find­ings by Ploner et al. (1999). Unfortunately, Aydede's position is unfounded. Ploner et al. demonstrated the loss of pain sensation with continuing pain affect in a 57-year-old male, who had undergone a right-sided postcentral stroke. They did not demonstrate the continuing experience of pain without the sensory component, however. In response to certain painful stimuli, the patient described the emergence of a "clearly unpleasant" feeling in an extended area "somewhere between the fingertips and the shoulder" that he wanted to avoid. But he was unable to describe the experience further. Moreover, he rejected suggestions from a word list containing 'warm', 'hot', 'cold', 'touch', 'burning', 'pinprick-like', 'slight pain', 'moderate pain', and 'intense pain'.

7. Cf. Armstrong (1962).

8. I do not mean to suggest here that one cannot have a stabbing pain unless one has the concept of a dagger. Pains, in my view, are nonconcep- tual representations.

9. The suggestion that the pleasingness of orgasms is part of their repre­sentational content is made in Tye (1995b). It is also the view taken by Andrew Melnyk (1999).

10. Thus tissue damage that is not experientially represented is not pain.

11. The same view of itches and tickles is adopted in Armstrong (1962).

12. This feeling typically elicits the desire or urge to eat, just as the feeling of pain typically causes the strong desire that it cease.

13. According to Ramachandran, this experiment worked on about half of the twenty people he tried it on.

14. Let me emphasize: I do not mean here that each pain is essentially felt within the actual body of the owner. Rather each pain is felt within a region that is felt by the owner to lie inside his body.

15. There is also the earlier worry about whether there is a maximal or overall experience at all. See p. 22.

Chapter 3

1. See Rock (1983) for other examples. Interestingly, Rock has shown that items sensed only tactually are experienced as different, when their orien­tations are changed. This results in the items' not being recognized in the unfamiliar orientations.

2. It is worth noting here that experiments with luminous rods show that vertical rods typically continue to look vertical even to tilted observers. Thus, the actual orientation of the torso is not of crucial importance to the apparent verticality of the rods. The key, it seems, is the direction of the pull of gravity on the torso.

3. Assuming there is normally no error in our experiences in such cases.

4. This case is inspired by Dennett (1978), and similar to one presented in Dainton (2000), p. 66.

5. Closure under conjunction is discussed in chapter 1, pp. 36-37 and chapter 2, p. 66.

6. For a still more extreme imaginary case in which it is for the subject as if two different worlds are present, see Dainton (2000), pp. 67-70.

7. I do not wish to deny that in some cases, thoughts have associated images of a nonauditory sort (e.g., visual images) that contribute to the phenomenology.

8. Brought to my attention by Bill Lycan.

9. Cf. Lycan (forthcoming).

10. One difference from the case of pains, itches, etc. is that (arguably) we allow moods to exist even at times at which they are not experienced. This is reflected in a difference in the use of terms for moods. We apply such terms not only to experiences but also, on occasion, to state types repre­sented by experiences even at times when those types are not experientially represented.

Chapter 4

1. The memory account could be complicated in various ways. But none that I have seen is satisfactory. For objections, see Lockwood (1989). And with the complications, the claim to have the most parsimonious account goes out the window anyway.

2. This point is made by Dennett (1991), p. 114.

3. As with the first proposal above (in paragraph (8)), or one possible ver­sion of it, about the times of experiences relative to the specious presents they represent.

4. Whether it does so permanently afterward or whether the split con­sciousness is restricted to those times at which the subject is in the appro­priate experimental situations need not concern us just yet. See chapter 5.

5. What if even during deep sleep, there is always some consciousness? Then there is but one extended period of consciousness throughout the person's lifetime, and one stream or extended experience, the content of which during deep sleep is vastly impoverished in comparison to its con­tent during normal waking moments.

6. I do not deny that often thoughts are associated with visual and kines- thetic images.

7. I am in agreement here with Dainton (2000), p. 131. Chapter 5

   1. Sperry described his subjects as each having "two free wills in one cra­nial vault." Roland Puccetti (1973) takes the even stronger position that reflection on the split-brain cases shows that we are all composites of two minds and two persons!

   2. For more here, see my (1993c).

   3. This is the view of Bayne and Chalmers (2003).

   4. Blindsight has been discussed by a number of philosophers. See, e.g., Heil (1983), Dennett (1991), McGinn (1991), Tye (1993a, 1995b), and Block (1995).

   5. Some philosophers have suggested that, in fact, blindsight subjects really have unconscious beliefs with respect to the blind field while remaining fully phenomenally conscious (see, e.g., Heil 1983). This is problematic for two reasons. First, there is no reason to think that there is anything wrong with the mechanism of introspective awareness in such subjects. The brain damage, after all, is located in the geniculo-striate pathway and the occipi­tal cortex (the locus of visual sensations). Second, if the beliefs are present, introspected or not, then why don't they play any rational role in guiding behavior?

   6. Nothing in this view of visual experience compels the admission that the ways in which we conceive of things can never have any effect on how they phenomenally appear. Conceiving of a scene in one way rather than another may sometimes influence how we break it up cognitively into spa­tial parts, for example, and the shapes we then experience may not be the ones we would have experienced under a different conceptualization. But the sensory experiences of those shapes do not require shape concepts. As just noted, they are nonconceptual.

   7. Of course, visual recognition, seeing that something is an F, does demand possession (and application) of the concept F, even where F is a shape. In cases of this sort, however, there are two elements at play: the basic visual experience and the judgment it elicits. The judgment is concep­tual; the experience not. So, the states are really hybrid.

   8. This being so, there is no real mystery about the function of phenomenal perceptual consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness, in the case of per­ceptual experiences, has as its purpose to enable creatures to recognize things in the world and to behave appropriately toward them by channel­ing information about them from the senses to the centers of reasoning and action. See Tye (1996b).

   9. Others who have discussed the question of whether phenomenal unity is nontransitive include Lockwood (1989), Hurley (1998), and Dainton (2000).

Chapter 6

1. Cf. Lewis (1976).

2. According to epistemic theorists (Sorenson 1988, Williamson 1994), vagueness is a matter of ignorance. On this view, the fuzziness of Everest's boundaries is a reflection of the fact that we do not know exactly where the boundaries lie. Our conceptual mechanisms are simply not equipped to make the necessary fine-grained discriminations. Epistemic theorists thus grant that some molecules are neither definitely inside nor definitely out­side Everest, but they insist that this is only in the sense that some mole­cules are not known to be inside and not known to be outside either. Stronger versions of the epistemic view hold not merely that the dividing line is not known but also that it cannot be known. Again, this seems very counterintuitive. Our ordinary concept of a fuzzy boundary is one of a boundary that is nonepistemically fuzzy. Intuitively, not even God knows where Everest's boundaries lie any more than God knows which hair the addition of which turns a man who is bald into one who is not. To be sure, there is a sense of the operator 'definitely' that is epistemic, as, for example, when I say, on hearing of a photo-finish in a hundred-meter race, "If s not definite yet whether NN won," meaning that it isn't publicly known yet whether NN nudged out the other runners for the victory. But there is also a nonepistemic sense of 'definitely', as when 'Definitely p' is correctly inferred from 'It is a fact that p'. In having epistemic and metaphysical senses, the operator 'definitely' is like the operator 'possibly'. And intu­itively, it is the metaphysical sense that is relevant to the claim that there are objects such that it is indefinite just where their boundaries lie.

3. Lewis adopts the counterintuitive position that there are no things with vague boundaries in large part because he is persuaded by Peter Unger's Problem of the Many (1979), which he takes to generalize from Unger's case of a cloud to all the manifest objects of commonsense. He comments: "Once noticed, we can see that [the Problem of the Many] is everywhere, for all things are swarms of particles. There are always outlying particles, questionably parts of the thing, not definitely included and not definitely not included. So there are always many aggregates, differing by a little bit here and a little bit there, with equal claim to be the thing. We have many things or we have none, but anyway not the one thing we thought we had. That is absurd" (1993). I find this line of argument unconvincing, and I have offered criticisms of it elsewhere (Tye 1996c).

4. It certainly seems reasonable to suppose that Evans himself intended that 'a' and 'b' be taken to be precise designators for vague objects, although he did not actually say this. After all, his target is the philosopher who believes that the world itself is vague, not the philosopher who believes that vagueness resides in how language latches on to the world.

5. Material in brackets added.

6. Cf. Copeland (1995), p. 87.

7. What I say here is similar to, and influenced by, what Sainsbury says (1995, pp. 74-75) about the identity 'That watch is the watch I sent for repair'. On this point he and I are in agreement.

8. Likewise, of course, for the description 'the club meeting at t' and later'.

9. In my (2001), I took the view that (11) is false, even in the case in which the new members have no relevant intentions. I now think that the argu­ment I gave there for this conclusion is flawed.

10. These points undermine the following objection (by Keith Hossack) to my overall view on vagueness and identity. There is a cloud in the sky. If there are vague objects, then this cloud is one of them. Call it 'Fred' (so that 'Fred' is a precise designator for a vague object). Water droplets in Fred's vicinity are made to disappear, one by one. At the end of the process, Fred no longer exists. Intuitively, there is a time, somewhere in the middle of the removal process, at which it is indeterminate whether Fred exists. But this demands that it be indeterminate whether Fred is identical with one of the things that exist. And that contradicts my claim that there are no indefinite identity statements with precise designators for vague objects.

My response to this line of reasoning is to say that it involves a non sequitur. Existence at a time is not the same as existence simpliciter. Existence at time t is a property (expressible in the predicate 'x exists at t'), and, as the case of Fred shows, it does indeed admit of borderline cases. But it does not follow from this that it is indeterminate whether Fred exists, period. After all, there is an object that 'Fred' denotes, namely, Fred. So, there is no indeterminacy either in whether Fred is identical with one of the things that exist.

Appendix

1. As should be clear from remarks made throughout this book. See espe­cially chapter 1, pp. 22-25.

2. This claim, it is worth noting, fits well with the linguistic constructions that are naturally employed in connection with such awareness. To talk of our being aware of the phenomenology of an experience or of how an expe­rience "feels" is to use a generic perceptual verb ('aware of') followed by an abstract noun ('the phenomenology') or an interrogative nominal ('how the experience feels'). In cases of this sort, where there is a perceptual verb, the abstract noun or interrogative nominal typically stands in for a factive clause so that what is being described is (a species) of awareness of some fact. For example, if I am described as hearing the answer to your question or as seeing who is at the door, I do not satisfy the description merely by hearing the sentence that is the answer or seeing the person who is at the door. I must be aware that the given sentence is the answer to your ques­tion, that the given person is the one at the door. In short, I must be aware of some appropriate fact. Likewise in the case of awareness of the phenome­nal character of a current experience. For more on this, see Dretske (1993).

3. I ignore here the case of phantom limb sensations, for which there is no relevant limb to feel.

4. The terms 'Fregean' and 'Millian' in this context are due to Chalmers (forthcoming).

5. So, my representationalism is not intended to have the status of an a pri­ori conceptual truth. For more on phenomenal concepts, see my (1999) and (forthcoming, 2003b).

6. In Tye (1995), I took a hybrid position; in Tye (2000) my position is Millian.

7. Dan Stoljar made this point in conversation.

8. In saying that the context is phenomenal, I am assuming that colors are among the qualities of which humans are directly aware. Not everyone accepts this assumption. See, e.g., Shoemaker (1996a). For criticisms of Shoemaker's position, see Tye (2000).

9. See Bradley and Tye (2002).

10. For an example, see Peacocke (1992), p. 118.

11. These asymmetries are noted in Shoemaker (forthcoming).

12. For detailed discussion and criticisms of this theory along with my replies, see the web symposium at http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/ field/tyesymp.htm. See also the shorter symposium on Tye (2000), in my (forthcoming, 2003a).

For a more elaborate taxonomy of possible representationalist posi­tions, see Chalmers (forthcoming)

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.Index

Absent qualia hypothesis, 8 Access consciousness, 9 disunified (split-brain patients), 112, 121-125 Amputees. See Phantom limb

experiences Anesthetization, and body image, 44

Apple, unity of experiences of, 18 Arm-movement example, 32 Attention, and introspection, 10 Auditory linguistic images, 80 and thought, 72-73, 79-80 Automaton, split-brain patient as,

112, 117 Awareness introspective, 5, 22-25, 95-96 and bundle theory, 134 in representationalist account, 165

Bayne, T., 20-21

Beer-and-ham-sandwich example, for one experience view, 26-27 Beliefs contradictory, 115-116 and visual experiences, 175 Benchley, Robert, 82 Binding problem, 12

Bird-watcher (case), 2, 6 Black's/BLACK'S club (example), 161-162 Blindsight, 121-123, 124, 125 Block, N., 123-124, 125 Bodily experience, 68 and perceptual consciousness,

68-78 unity of, 49, 62-66 Bodily sensations, 49 of heat, 61 hunger pangs, 61 itches, 60-61 orgasm, 58-59

pains, 50-58, 59-60 (see also Pain) tastes, 58, 68-69 thirst, 61 tickles, 60 tingles, 61 touch, 68-69 Bodily unity, problem of, 62-66 Body image, 43-49. See also General bodily feeling and conscious thoughts, 81 and experience of contact, 69 malleability of, 62 Body transplants, and personal identity, 135-137, 149

Brain, disembodied (examples), 71-75

Brain transplant with split brain, 149-151

Brief Encounter, The (case), 3, 6,

9-10 Broad, C. D., 92

Bundle theory of person, 133-134 objections to, 138-140 and subject-of-PF theory, 142 and unity of experience, 107 Buried-alive/roller-coaster example, 76-78, 118-119

Camus, P., 43-44 Carnap, Rudolf, 106-107 Casey, K., 55 Chalmers, D., 20-21 Cloud-and-droplets example, 29 Colored phi phenomenon (red-green flashes), 90-91, 96-97

Concrete individuals, and

phenomenology, 168-169 Consciousness and Cartesian ego theory, 133 cases of, 2-5 and epileptics, 177n. kinds of access consciousness, 9, 112, 121-125

D-consciousness (discriminatory consciousness), 6, 8, 9 I-consciousness (introspective consciousness), 5-6, 7, 9, 10, 177n.8

P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness), 7-11, 121-124, 126-129, 183n.8 (see also Phenomenal consciousness) R-consciousness (responsive consciousness), 6, 9 single subject of, 118

and stream metaphor, 105 (see also Streams of consciousness) as unified, xiv, 1 (see also at Unity) Conscious experiences. See

Experience(s) Conscious thoughts, in unity with perceptual and bodily experiences, 78-81 Contradictory beliefs, and split-

brain patient, 115-116 Copeland, Jack, 158 Corpus callosum, 109. See also

Split-brain patients Creature consciousness, 9

Dainton, Barry, 90 Dennett, G., 1, 56, 71 Deny, G., 43-44 Descartes, Rene and ego theory of person, 133 and unified consciousness, 1 Designators

rigid and precise, 151-156 vagueness of, 155-156 Diachronic unity, 86-95 Disassociation, reactive, 56 Discriminatory consciousness (D-consciousness,), 6 as creature consciousness, 9 without P-consciousness, 8 Disembodied-brain examples, 71-75 Distracted Philosopher, The (case), 2, 5

Disunified access consciousness, in split-brain patients, 112, 121-126 Disunified experiences, in

hallucinations and illusions, 37-38

Disunified phenomenal

consciousness, and split-brain patients, 126-129, 134, 135

Dog, sleeping (case), 4, 10-11 Do-re-mi (musical scale) example,

87-88, 94, 97, 99-100, 106 Dreamer, The (case), 4, 10 Dretske, Fred, 24

Eagleman, D., 91-92 Ego theory of person, 133, 153-154 objections to, 134-138 Emotions, 81. See also Moods, felt Epileptics, and consciousness, 177n.8

Evans, Gareth, 153-154, 155, 157,

159, 162-163 Everest, Mount, as vagueness example, 156, 157, 158, 183-184n.3 Experience(s)

bodily, 68-78 (see also Bodily

sensations) disunified, 37-38 individuation of through time,

34, 98-99 and introspection, 22-25, 95-96 one experience view, 25-35, 39-40

for bodily experience, 65-66 and individuating of experiences through time, 98 and perceptual-bodily unity, 76 PANIC (poised, abstract, nonconceptual, intentional content) of, 176 as maximal PANIC states, 40, 99 perceptual phenomenal or subjective

aspects of (case), 3-4, 8 presentness in, 86 redundancy in generation of,

127-128 unity of, 17-41 of unifying relation, 21-22 Experience, unity of. See at Unity

Experienced present. See Specious

present(s) Externalist representationalism, 167, 174-175

Feeling(s). See also Bodily sensations phenomenal or subjective aspects

of (case), 3-4, 8 physical basis of, 8-9 as private, 50

of succession, vs. succession of feelings, 86, 102 Felt moods, 81-84 persistence of, 85-86 Flash-lag illusion, 91 Fregean representationalism,

167-168 Fuzzy logic, 160

General bodily feeling, 43, 48, 63 as torso-relative, 48-49 unity of, 47

and unity of bodily experience, 64 Gestalt unity, 13 and McGurk effect, 178n.10 Glass partitions metaphor, 22-24 Gregory, Richard, 44, 45

Hallucinations and concrete individuals, 168-169 disunified experiences in, 37-38 in "Haunted" Graveyard case, 5, 11 and introspective awareness, 24 phantom limb pain as, 54 and phenomenal content, 36 and representation, 64 and unity of experience through time, 98 Handwriting example, for one

experience view, 25-26 "Haunted" Graveyard, The (case), 5, 11

Headache, discontinuous (case), 3, 6-7

Heat, feeling of, 61 Here experience of, 70 world in relationship to, 75 Hume, David, on unity of experience, 102, 105 and bundle theory of person,

107, 133 Hunger pangs, 61 Hybrid representationalism, 168, 169, 172-174

Identity, personal. See Person and

personal identity Illusions disunified experiences in, 37-38 of feeling someone else's nose, 61-62 flash-lag, 91

and phenomenal content, 36 "Impossible figure," 38, 39 "In," and pain, 51-52, 53 Individuation of experiences,

through time, 34, 98-99 Infinite regress, in problem of unity of conscious experiences, 21-22 Internalist representationalism, 167 International Association for the

Study of Pain, 50 Introspection and act of attention, 10 and awareness of experience,

22-25, 95-96 and displaced perception, 24 Introspective awareness, 5 and bundle theory, 134 Introspective consciousness (I-consciousness), 5-6 as creature consciousness, 9 and epileptics, 177n.8 without P-consciousness, 7, 10

Introspective unity, 13 vs. phenomenal unity, 20 Inverted qualia hypothesis, 8 "Is," of identity vs. of composition,

142-143 Itches, 60-61

Jackson, Frank, 170 James, William, 86, 102, 104

Kant, Immanuel and phenomenal unity, 20 and subject unity, 12-13 and unified consciousness, 1

Leibniz's Law, 29, 154, 157-158, 162 Lewis, David, 155-156, 157, 160 Linguistic auditory images, 80 and thought, 72-73, 79-80 Logical Structure of the World, The

(Carnap), 106 "Looks" talk, 35, 169-172

Macbeth, disunified dagger experience of, 37, 38, 80 Mach, Ernst, 173 Madame I (patient with lost body image), 43-44, 45, 62, 69,

73. 74

Materialist form of ego theory on

person, 135-138 Maund, Barry, 63 Maximal PANIC states, 40, 99 McGurk effect, 178n.10 Melzack, R., 55

Memory, short-term phenomenal, 87

Miller, I., 89-90

Millian representationalism, 168,

172, 173, 174 Monet-painting example, 47-48 Monty Python viewing example,

73. 75

Moods, felt, 81-84 persistence of, 85-86 Movie analogy, 99 Multiple experiences, and problem

of unity, 17-21 Multiple personality disorder and bundle theory of person,

138-139 and persons as material

substances, 137-138 and single brain as more than one

person, 142 and split brains, 111-112, 113-116 Musical scale (do-re-mi) example, 87-88, 94, 97, 99-100, 106

Nagel, T., 117-120, 125 Neurophysiological unity, 12 Neuropsychology, and unified

consciousness, 1 Nonreductive strong

representationalism, 167 Nontransitivity of phenomenal unity, 113, 129-132

Object unity, 11-12

and phenomenal unity, 19 One experience view, 25-35, 39-40 for bodily experience, 65-66 and individuating of experiences

through time, 98 and perceptual-bodily unity, 76 Order of representations, vs.

represented order, 90 Orgasm, 58-59

Pain(s), 50-58, 59-60 affective component of, 55-56, 57-58

and belief production, 175-176 and causal sense of "in," 51-52 and consciousness, 3, 7 localization of, 63

physical basis of, 9 and projection, 63-64 Painting example, 47-48 PANIC (poised, abstract,

nonconceptual, intentional content) states, 176 maximal, 40, 99

Parfit, Derek, 134, 135, 147-148, 160-161 Party Animal, The (case), 4, 6 Peacocke, Chris, 173 Perception, and consciousness, 2 in Distracted Philosopher case, 2 Perceptual consciousness and bodily experience, 68-78 D-consciousness as, 6 (see also Discriminatory consciousness) Perceptual experience(s) phenomenal or subjective aspects

of (case), 3-4, 8 presentness in, 86 redundancy in generation of,

127-128 unity of

and one experience view, 25-35, 39-40

as problem, 17-25 and synchronic phenomenal unity, 36-41 Person and personal identity bundle theory on, 133-134 objections to, 138-140 and subject-of-PF theory, 142 and unity of experience, 107 ego theory on, 133, 153-154 objections to, 134-138 problem cases for body transport, 147-148 radical discontinuity between life stages, 150-153, 162 split-brain subject, 111-112, 115-117, 143-144

Person and personal identity (cont.) split-brain transplants, 148-151 teletransportation, 144-148 as subject of distinct psychological framework (PF), 140-143 and unity of experience, xiv through time, 102-104 vagueness in, 154-163 PF. See Psychological framework Phantom limb experiences, 45-46 as misrepresentation, 49 and pain, 54 as representing bodily disturbances, 61 Phenomenal character, attended

and unattended, 10 Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness), 7-11, 183n.8

and blindsight, 122-124, 125 without D-consciousness, 8 disunified (split-brain patients),

126-129, 134, 135 and hypotheses of inverted and

absent qualia, 8 without I-consciousness, 7, 10 and object unity, 12 Phenomenal flow, 108 Phenomenal look, 169-172 Phenomenal memory,

short-term, 87 Phenomenal succession, 101 Phenomenal unity, 13, 15, 20, 36,

84, 107 direct and indirect, 100 vs. introspective unity, 20 nontransitivity of, 129-132 as relation between qualities

experienced, 102 synchronic (of simultaneous

experiences), 19, 35, 36-41, 84 and wine taster example, 27

Phenomenal unity relation, 95, 107, 152-153. See also Unity of experience through time and moods, 83 nontransitivity of, 113 Phenomenological unity, 19, 20-21

of bodily experiences or sensations, 49, 63, 66 and sense-specific experiences, 28 Phenomenology and concrete individuals, 168 of occurrent thoughts, 79-80 technicolor, 8 of thinking, 80 Poised, abstract, nonconceptual, intentional content (PANIC), 176

maximal, 40, 99 Pot-and-statue example, 30-31, 31, 40, 48

PPC (principle of presentational

occurrence), 89-90 Precise designator, 155-156 Present, specious. See Specious

present(s) Presentational occurrence,

principle of (PPC), 89-90 Presentness, 86

Psychological framework (PF),

141-143, 146, 148 and radical discontinuity between life stages, 150-152, 162 and split-brain transplant,

149-150 and teletransportation, 144,

145-148 Putnam, Hilary, 79

Qualia, hypotheses on of absent qualia, 8 of inverted qualia, 8

Qualities in bodily experiences, 66 in "looks" talk, 169-172 and pain, 55, 179n.4 and phenomenal concepts, 168 and phenomenal succession, 101

phenomenal unity of, 36 direct and indirect, 100 unity as relation between, 102

Ramachandran, V. S., 61-62 Reactive disassociation, 56 Red-green flashes experiment (colored phi phenomenon), 90-91, 96-97 Red-square-and-green-triangle

example, 39-40, 40-41 Reductive strong

representationalism, 167 Referred pains, 54 Reid, Thomas, 140 Rene (multiple personality

patient), 137-138, 138-139 Representationalism

(representational approach), xvi, 84, 165-176 and bodily sensations, 61 and phantom limbs, 61 externalist, 167, 174-175 Fregean, 167-168 hybrid, 168, 169, 172-174 internalist, 167 Millian, 168, 172, 173, 174 and pain, 52-54, 64 representational content of, 58, 59 strong, 166 nonreductive, 167 reductive, 167 weak, 166 Represented order, vs. order of representations, 90

Responsive consciousness (R-consciousness), 6 as creature consciousness, 9 Reynolds, Mary, 138, 139, 141, 142 Rigid designator, 155 Roller-coaster/buried-alive example, 76-78, 118-119

Sacks, Oliver, body-image

experience of, 45 Sejnowski, T., 91-92 Sellars, Wilfrid, 21 Sensation, bodily. See Bodily

sensations Sensation, streamlike quality of, 85. See also Streams of consciousness Sense-datum theorists, 178n.4 Sequence of experiences. See Unity

of experience through time Shoemaker, Sydney, 21 Simultaneous experiences, phenomenal unity of, 19. See also Synchronic phenomenal unity Single experience. See One

experience view Sleep, and consciousness, 104, 182n.6

and dreaming (cases), 4, 10 and pain (case), 3, 7 Sleeping Dog, The (case), 4, 10-11 Smells, 69-70 Sounds, 69-70 Spatial unity, 12 Specious present(s), 87-92,

99-100 overlapping, 92-95 and phenomenal unity, 100 Sperry, Roger, 109 Split-brain patients, 109-113 and disunified access

consciousness, 112, 121-125

Split-brain patients (continued) and disunified phenomenal

consciousness, 126-129, 134, 135 generally unified consciousness

of, 126, 128-129 as indeterminate number of

persons, 112, 117-120 and multiple personality disorder,

111. 112, 113-116 and nontransitivity of

phenomenal unity, 129-132 and Parfit on ego theory, 134, 135 and personal identity, 111-112,

115-117, 143-144 and phenomenal unity, 20 and simultaneous phenomenal

disunification, 37 as unconscious automatons, 112, 117

and unity of experience through time, 102-104 Split-brain transplant example,

149-151 Star Trek television series, and

teletransportation, 147 Statue-and-pot example, 30-31, 31, 40, 48

Strawson, Galen, 104-105, 107 Streamlike quality of sensation, 85 Streams of consciousness, 104-106, 107-108

and bundle theory of person, 139

Carnap on, 106-107

and split-brain patients, 104,

111. 113, 126, 128

Strong representationalism, 166 nonreductive, 167 reductive, 167 Subjects of consciousness and action, persons as, 140, 143 Subject unity, 12-13 on bundle theory, 134 (see also Bundle theory of person) on ego theory, 133 (see also Ego

theory of person) higher-order, 13 Succession. See also Unity of experience through time experiencing of, 106 of feelings, vs. feeling of

succession, 86, 102 phenomenal, 101 representation of, 101 Synchronic (of simultaneous

experiences) phenomenal unity, 19, 35, 36-41, 84

Tastings, 58, 68-69 Technicolor phenomenology, 8 Teletransportation, 144-148 Thirst, 61 Thought(s) in auditory linguistic image,

72-73, 79-80 sequence of, 85 in unity with perceptual and bodily experiences, 78-81 Tickles, 60

Tingling sensations, 61 Torso

and experience of here, 70 and general bodily feeling, 48-49

viewpoint related to, 71 Touch, 68-69

Transitivity, phenomenal unity's

lack of, 129-132 Twin Earth and PFs, 142

and phenomenology of occurrent thought, 79-80

Unconscious automaton, split-brain patient as, 112, 117 Unity of consciousness, 1

Unity of experience, xiv of bodily experience, 49 problem of, 62-66 and handwriting example, 26 kinds of Gestalt unity, 13, 178n.10 introspective unity, 13, 20 neurophysiological unity, 12 object unity, 11-12, 19 phenomenal unity, 13, 15, 20, 36, 84, 107 (see also Phenomenal unity) subject unity, 12-13, 133, 134 Unity of experience through time, 95-101

and assumption of individual

experiences, 107 examples of, 85-86 and Hume, 102, 105, 107, 133 and personal identity, 102-104 and presentness, 86 and specious present, 87-95, 99-100

and stream(s) of consciousness, 104-106, 107-108 Carnap on, 106-107 Unity of general bodily feeling, 47 Unity of perceptual and bodily experiences, occurrent thoughts, and moods, 67-68 conscious thoughts in, 78-81 and moods, 83-84 perceptual-body unity, 68-78 Unity of perceptual experience at a time and one experience view, 25-35, 39-40 (see also One experience view) as problem, 17-21 difficulties in, 21-25 and synchronic phenomenal unity, 36-41

Unity of persons, 133, 134.

See also Person and personal identity

Vagueness epistemic theorists on,

183-184n.3 in personal identity, 154-163 Vesuvius, Mount, as identity

example, 30 Viewpoint, for vision, 71-72 Vision, and bodily experience,

70-72 Visual experience and beliefs, 175 and continuous consciousness

(case), 4, 7 and introspection, 23-24 as unified experience, 28-35 viewpoint of, 71 Visual system, unifying function of, 11-12

Waterfall effect, 38

Weak representationalism, 166

Wiggins, David, 149

Wine Taster, The (case), 2-3, 6

Wine tasting, unity of experiences

in, 18, 19, 27, 31, 32-33, 34-35 Writing example, for one experience view, 25-26

Zadeh, L., 160 Zombies, 9