72 The law of aoency.

for an indemnity against the liability incurred by him,

and for a broker's commission. Lindley, J., whose judg-

ment was affirmed in the Court of Appeal, held that the

plaintiff was entitled to recover, seeing that the trans-

action upon which the claim was based was not a real

" time bargain," or " agreement to pay differences," and

therefore not a wagering contract within the provision

of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18. In giving judgment,

Lindley, J., said ; " A real " time bargain " is, I suspect,

a very rare occurrence : Grizeiuood v. Blane (1851), 11 C.

B. 52G, affords an instance of one, and Cooper v. Neil

(1878), W. N. 128, as understood by the jury, affords

another. But what are called " time bargains " are in

fact the result of two distinct and perfectly legal bargains ;

namely, first a bargain to buy or sell ; and, secondly, a

subsequent bargain that the first shall not be carried

out ; and it is only when the first bargain is entered into

upon the understanding that it is not to be carried out,

that a " time bargain " in the sense of an unenforceable

baro'ain is entered into."

It seems from the evidence given in this case, and also

from an affidavit sworn by some of the leading members

of the Stock Exchange in the later case of In re Flumhly,

Ex parte Grant (1880), 13 Ch. D. G67, that real "time

bargains," or " agreements to pay differences," are unknown

upon the Stock Exchange ; and it therefore appears that the

findings of the juries in the cases of Grizewood v. Blane,

uhi Hupra, and Cooper v. Neil, uhl supra, were incorrect,

tliey misunderstanding the evidence brought before them.

We find the following statement in the affidavit sworn

In the case of In re Plmnhhj, id/I supra : " Contracts on

the Stock Exchange are never for payment or receipt of

" dilfcrenccs." All contracts, bargains, and transactions on

the Stock Exchange are real transactions for cash, or for a

day named, contemplating and compelling the actual transfer

or ilclivery, and tlu' [)a)'ing tor stocks or shares the subject

niGHTS OF AN AGENT AGAINST HIS PRINCIPAL. 73

thereof; which transfer or delivery and payment can

only be avoided and rendered unnecessary by a new and

equally real bargain, on the one part to accept and pay

for on the same day, and on the other part to transfer

or deliver an equivalent amount of the same stocks or

shares."

But though real " agreements to pay differences " are

unknown and impossible on the Stock Exchange, they are

Very common in the so-called " bucket shops," kept by

outside brokers. These brokers are themselves the real

principals in these wagering transactions, which are abso-

lutely null and void as coming within the provision of

8 & 9 Vict. C. 109, s. 18 — vide the cases of Beggio V. Steven

^ Company, and Strachan v. Universal Stock Exchange,

at p. 69, ante; also In re Gieve (1899), 1 Q. B. 784 C. A.,

& 17 T. L. R. 251.

The Gaming Act of 1892 does not in any way affect

the decision in Bridger v. Savage (1885), 15 Q. B. D.