It would, moreover, seem that this principle of

ratification by mere acquiescence will even apply in cases

where the relation of principal and agent does not

exist at all between the parties — vide Bigg v. Strong

(1857), 3 Sm. & Gif. 592, smOl Father gill v. Phillips (1871),

L. R. 6 Ch. 770.

Where the unauthorized act of an agent is a tort, the

principal, if he ratifies it, makes himself liable for it.

Bird v. Broivn (1850), 4 Ex. 786, & 14 Jur. 132;

here it was laid down that where a party, professing to

act by the authority of another, does that which prima

facie amounts to a trespass, if the other party afterwards

adopts his act, the professed agent is treated as having

acted by his authority, and the other party becomes a

trespasser unless he can justify the act. Also, that where

an act, which if unauthorized would amount to a trespass,

has been done in the name and on the behalf of another,

without previous authority, a subsequent ratification may

enable the party on whose behalf the act was done to take

advantage of it, and treat it as having been done by his

direction ; but, that this doctrine must be taken with the

qualification that the act of ratification must take place

at a time and under circumstances when the ratifying

party might have himself lawfully done the act which he

ratifies.

Hilherg v. Eatton (1864), 2 H. & C. 822; here it was

held that, where a principal had ratified the unauthorized

purchase by his agent in Africa of a ship which the vendor

had no right to sell, he was liable for conversion, though

at the time he ratified he was ignorant of the unlawfulness

of the sale.

20 The law of agency.

Freeman v. Bosher (1849), 13 Q. B. 780; here, however,

a landlord was held not liable for the trespass and eon-

version of his agent (a broker), who in distraining had,

without the landlord's authority, unlawfully removed a

fixture. For though the landlord received the proceeds of

the sale of the fixture with the rest of the proceeds of the

distress, he did not know that any trespass or conversion

had been committed, and the Court, therefore, considered

that he had not ratified the agent's unlawful act.

It seems that the distinction between the last two

cases is, that in Hilhery v. Hatton the act of the agent

was in itself altogether unlawful ; whereas in Freeman v,

Bosher the act was in itself lawful, and the principal at

the time he received the proceeds of the sale did not know

that there had been any irregularity or unlawfulness in

its execution. That this is the real distinction between

the two cases in question is shown by the " ratio decidendi "

in Leivis v. Bead cC- others (1845), 14 L. J. Ex. 295.

The Infants' Relief Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 62),

section 2, provides, " No action shall be brought whereby

to charge any person upon any promise made after full

age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon

any ratification made after full age of any promise or

contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall

not be any new consideration for such promise or ratifica-

tion after full aofe."

( 21 )

CHAPTER II.

AUTHORITY OF AGENTS.

The extent of an agent's authority may either be defined

by express agreement; or it may be implied from the

conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the business

for which the agent is employed.

With regard to their authority agents may be divided