- •§1. Place op contract in jurisprudence. 3
- •§ 2. Obligation.
- •§2. Place of contract in jurisprudence. 5
- •§2. Place of contract in jurisprudence. 9
- •§ 2. Acceptance must he absolute, and identical ivith the terms
- •§ I. Agreement,
- •§ 3. II proposal which has not been accepted does not affect the Till accept-
- •§ 5. It proposal may lapse otherwise tJian by revocation as
- •§ 6. Proposal and Acceptance need not necessarily he written Contracts
- •§ 7. A proposal need not be made to an ascertained person,
- •§ I. Contracts of Record.
- •§ 2, Contract under Seal,
- •§ 3. Simple Contracts required to be in writing.
- •§ 4. ConsideItATiaN.
- •§ I. Political or Professional Status,
- •§ 2. Infants,
- •§ 3. Married women.
- •§ 4. Corporations.
- •§ 5. Lunatic and drunken persons.
- •§ 2. MlSbepbesentation.
- •§ 3. Fraud.
- •§ 4. Duress.
- •§ 5. UamuE Influence.
- •§ I. Nature of Illegality m Contract.
- •§ 18 Upon Stock ExchiEknge transactions is well summarised in the
- •§ 2. Effect of Illeoalitt upon Contracts in
- •§ I. Assignment by act of the parties.
- •§ 2. Assignment of contractual rights and liabilities by
- •§ I. Froof of Document,
- •§ 2. Evidence as to /act cf Agreement.
- •§ 3. Evidence as to the terms of the Contract,
- •§ I. General Rales,
- •§ 2. Rvlea 0/ Law and Equity as to Time and Penalties,
- •§ I. Waiver.
- •§ 2. Svhstituted Contract
- •§ 3. Provisions for DischcMrge,
- •§ 1. Position op pabties whebe a Contbact
- •§ 2. Forms of Discharge bt Breach.
- •§ 3. Eemedies fob breach of Contract.
- •§ 4. DiSghaboe of RiOht of AcTion abisiNa
§ 2. Svhstituted Contract
Substituted A contract may be discharged by an alteration in its
terms which, in effect, substitutes a new agreement for the
how differ- old one. The difiPerence between this and the first-mentioned
waiver ; mode of discharge by agreement lies in the fact that the first
is a total obliteration of the contract, the second is a sub-
stitution of a new bond between the parties in place of the
old one.
And it operates as a recission in this way, that if it does
not in terms express an intention that the original contract
should be waived, it indicates such an intention by the intro-
may be an duction of new terms or new parties. The change of rights
discharge; Ai^d liabilities, and consequent extinction of those which
before existed, forms the consideration on each side for the
new contract.
but the im- But the intention to discharge the original contract must
must be distinctly appetu:, from the inconsistency of the new terms
clear. ^j^jj ^jjg qJj ones. If there be a mere postponement of
performance, for the convenience of one of the parties, the
contract is not thereby discharged.
How differ- The question has often arisen in contracts for the sale and
postpone- delivery of goods, where the delivery is to extend over some
for^nce^^ time. The purchaser requests a postponement of delivery,
then refuses to accept the goods at all, and then alleges that
the contract was discharged by the alteration of the time of
performance ; that a new contract was thereby created, and
that the new contract is void for non-compliance with the
17th section of the Statute of Frauds.
But the Courts have always recognised Hhe distinction
between a substitution of one agreement for another, and
Chap. I. § a. BY AGREEMENT. 25 1
a voluntary forbearance to deliver at the request of another,' Hickman v.
•^ , ^ , ' Haynes, L. R.
and will not regard the latter as affecting the rights of the *° ^- ^- ^^
parties further than this, that if a man asks to have perform-
ance of his contract postponed, he does so at his own risk.
For if the market value of the goods which he should have
accepted at the earlier date has altered at the later date,
the rate of damages may be assessed, as against him, either
at the time when the performance should have taken place, o^iev.Eari
*^ '^ ' Vane, L. R.
and when by non-performance the contract was broken, LpRfa^fe.
or when he ultimately exhausted the patience of the vendor *^* '
and definitely refused to perform the contract.
The contract is discharged by alteration of its terms when
(a) what is to be done is so far altered as to be inconsistent
with it and to amount to a new contract, or (6) when a new
party is substituted for a previous one by agreement of all
three.
A good illustration of the first of these modes of discharge (a) Substi-
is afforded by the case of ThomhUl v, Neats. A undertook g ^ ^ ^^
certain building operations for JT, which were to be completed ^^''
by a certain date, or a sum to be paid as compensation for
delay. While the building was in progress an agreement
was made between the parties for additional work, by which
it became impossible that the whole of the operations
should be concluded within the stipulated time. It was
held that the subsequent agreement was so far inconsistent
with the first, as to amount to a waiver of the sum stipulated
to be paid for delay.
A contract may be discharged by the introduction of new (b) Substi-
parties into the original agreement, whereby a new contract ties.
^ Willes, J., in giving judgment in the Exchequer Chamber in the
case of Ogle r. Earl Vane^ holds that by the forbearance on the part of l. R. 3 Q. b.
the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, to insist upon delivery of ^^
the goods at and after the time for the performance of the contnict,
an agreement arose which, though fur want of consideration for the for-
be<arance it could not furnish a cause of action, was nevertheless capable
of affecting the measure of damages. He calls it an Accord without a
Satisfaction. As to the nature of Accord and Satisfaction, see p. 306.
2^2 DlSCHARaE OF CONTRACT. Part V.
is created, in which the terms remain the same but the
parties are different.
This may be done either by express agreement such as
See Part III. was dcscribcd in a previous chapter, or by the conduct of
Cfl< 11» S« Z|
p- ^- the parties, indicating acquiescence in a change of liability.
If A has entered into a contract with X and J/, and
X and M agree among themselves that M shall retire from
the contract and cease to be liable upon it, A may either
insist upon the continued liability of Jf, or he may treat
the contract as broken and discharged by the renunciation of
his liabilities by one of the parties to it.
If however A, after he becomes aware of the retirement
of M from the contract, continues to deal with X as though
no change had taken place, he will be considered to have
entered into a new contract to accept the sole liability of X,
and will not be entitled to hold M to his original contract.
2 M. & w. 484. The case of Hart v. Alexander illustrates this rule. The
plaintiff employed the defendant with other members of
a firm as his bankers; the defendant retired; notice, in
various forms, of his retirement from the firm was shown to
have reached, or to have been accessible to, the plaintiff, who
nevertheless continued to employ the firm. Finally, the firm
became bankrupt : the plaintiff sued the defendant as liable to
him upon the original contract, as being one of the members
of the firm whom he had retained as his bankers. The jury
found that the defendant's retirement was sufficiently brought
to the notice of the plaintiff, and as the firm had nevertheless
been continuously employed by liim, the Court held that a
new contract had been formed between the plaintiff and the
firm of which the defendant was no longer a member. * I
apprehend the law to be now settled,' said Parke, B., * that if
one partner goes out of a firm and another comes in, the
debts of the old firm may, by the consent of all the three
parties — ^the creditor, the old firm, and the new firm — ^be
transferred to the new firm/ Thus a change of liabilities,
Chap. I. § 3. BY AGREEMENT. 2^^
accepted by the plaintiff, rcBcinded the original contract by
the creation of a new one to which the defendant was not
a party.