§ I. General Rales,

So far we bave dealt with the admissibility of evidence in

relation to contracts in writing. We now come to deal with

the rules of construction which govern the interpretation of

the contract as it is found to bave been made between the

parties.

(i) The first rule to lay down is that words ,are to be (1) Words

understood in their plain and literal meaning. And this rule stood^n^^'^

is followed even though its consequences may not have been ^^^^^ p^^*"

, , , meaning.

in the contemplation of the parties, subject always to admis-

sible evidence being adduced of a usage varying the usual

meaning of the words, and subject to the next rule which we

proceed to state.

(2) 'An agreement ought to receive that construction Maiianr. May.

which will best effectuate the intention of the parties to be

collected /rom the whole of the agreement ;* 'Greater regard Ford v. Beech,

is to be had to the clear intention of the parties than to any

particular words which they may have used in the expression

of their intent'

These two rules would seem sometimes to be in conflict, (2) Subject

but they come substantially to this; men will be taken to ^f ij^^ention

have meant precisely what they have said, unless, from the ^^J™ ^^

whole tenor of the instrument, a definite meaning can be ment.

collected which gives a broader interpretation to specific

words than their literal meaning would bear. The Courts

B

249

INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT.

Part IV.

General

purport of

rules of

construc-

tion.

will not make an agreement for the parties, but will ascer-

tain what their agreement was, if not by its general purport,

then by the literal meaning of its words. Subsidiary to

these main rules there are various others, all tending to the

same end, the effecting of the intention of the parties so far

as it can be discerned.

Thus Courts, both of Law and Equity, will correct obvious

mistakes in writing and grammar.

They will restrain the meaning of general words by more

specific and particular descriptions of the subject-matter to

which they are to apply.

They assign to words susceptible of two meanings that

in A. & E. 326. which will make the instrument valid. Thus in Haigh v,

Brooksy a document was expressed to be given to the

plaintiffs * in consideration of your heir^ in advance ' to J. S.

It was argued that this showed a past consideration, but the

Court held that the words might mean a prospective advance,

and be equivalent to ' in consideration of your becoming in

advance,' or * on condition of your being in advance.'

They will construe words most strongly against the party

who used them. The principle on which this rule is based

seems to be that a man is responsible for ambiguities in his

own expression, and has no right to induce another to con-

tract with him on the supposition that his words mean one

thing while he hopes the Court will adopt a construction

by which they would mean another thing, more to his

advantage.

Fowkes V.

Manchester

Assurance

AssociatioOt

3 B. 81 S.

at p. 929.