Was the Suez crisis instrumental in changing attitudes towards the British Empire?
Introduction
Historian, academic and commentators have longed argued that the Suez crisis in 1956 was in part one of the most fundamental turning point for the British Empire and significant contributors to changing of attitude to ward the empire’s demise.
This report put forward the view that Suez crisis was fundamental to the changing of international attitude towards the British Empire. To back up this view, this report will gives an analysis of arguments focusing on economic diplomacy, domestic and international opinion of the conflict, of which are base on articles, books and commentary written on the issue and a conclusion to this effect.
Economic Diplomacy
The option to start at War and having the money to fund this war are intrinsically linked together from a rational point of view. Britain and US have longed have a financial and social relationship, where the US would provide the funds to back the British overseas foreign policy and protection of her interest (Kelly and Gorst, 2000; Reynolds, 2001). Historian and academic writer, such as Knuz (1991), Hahn (1991) and Verbeek, 2003 sources have presented the arguments that the US Government has used economic diplomacy on Britain and her allies at the time to force an end to the conflict because of its control over IMF, World Bank and its own economy, and British did not have control over its own. To highlight this difference; First, Knuz (1991) source explained that the in 1956, the US has post world war 11 reserves of US$ 22 Billion compared to Britain’s US$ 2.4 Billion to kick start its economy. This has indicated the wide gap of funds available between the US and the British and how it the British might come to be dependent on the US to fund overseas conflict and also cash to stimulate its local economy. Knuz (1991) source further suggested that the British Empire did not have any other countries that it could borrow from, and this I believe would make Britain dependency so significant, and left the Empire in a vulnerable position to be manipulated. Obviously, the British who has undeniable access to the US financing in the past, was now arguably ‘sure’ that this financing would still be available and since the US would had back them their foreign policy in the past, there was no doubt that the British would counting on its friend the US to support her.
Second, at the time of the conflict the British economy was not in good health, the economy was struggling from post-war recovery; the strong sterling makes British export less competitive internationally, and the domestic economy was still susceptible to financial turbulences due to lack of financing and investment according to Knuz (1991), Eden (1956), Verbeek (2003) sources. When the US had threaten Britain with economic sanction if Britain failed to ended the conflict on its demand, as point out by the these sources (Knuz, 1991; Verbeek, 2003; Hahn, 1991), arguably, the proposed sanction against Britain, if taken by the US would totally ruin the British economy and the financing available to continue fund of the conflict, and based on evidence that eventually comes to light after the conflict has proven this. For examples, British Government documents, the estimated defences budge amount to £1.6 Billion, and this would anticipated to rise to £1.7 Billion in the following year if the conflict continues (Parliamentary paper, April 1957) and according to the at the time the British Government was strongly concern about the financial, and economic impact of the conflict. Sandy’s White Paper in April 1957, the Government perception and outlook at the time is that the internal strength of the economy is linked with the British external influential role in the world, and the any military defence should take in account the economic and financial constrains. These views presumably have led to the reviewed the defence budget.
Reynolds (2001) source put forward the argument that the, the views expressed under the Sandy White paper was reflects Britain defence policy change that would ultimately, see defence spending reduce from 10% to 7% of GDP and the Suez crisis was the mean and not the principal cause. He put forward further view that the document is merely showing Britain revaluation of her international position in a cost effective way, presuming with her world dominance still in tacked. This seems to be in contradiction with Kunz, (1991) arguments who postulate that Britain could have brook off the relationship with America if she were financially independence.
Clearly, in my view, arguably from an unbiased position, Reynolds arguments would not hold much ground. It has been advocated that the conflict was start because Britain was in her view protecting and defending her national interest according to Verbeek (2003), Reynolds (2001) and Gorst (1997), and to be pressured end the conflict by another country that is suppose to be a friend with the threat of economic sanction imposition, has raised two questions; (1) Why the does the British surrender to the pressure of economic sanction threats? (2) Why the US use the economic sanction as a mean to force an end to the conflict? In an effort to show further light on the concept, I will answer the questions as follows: for (1); this is because the Britain was totally reliant on US funding through loans; directly or indirectly from the financial institutions of the IMF and World Bank. Furthermore, the US domestic economy was necessary for the British to export their product and services. (2) The US realise the financial control it has over the Britain and realise that it was, the only feasible and effective tool to use as a leverage to bring the conflict to end.
Others sources have argued that the Suez crisis has provided the US with the perfect opportunity to challenge the colonial presence and influence in the region, and present itself as a better alternative because of its growing dominance at the time and in effect undermining the British Empire (Marsot, 2007; Hahn, 1991; The Cambridge History of Egypt, 2008).
Suffice to say that the economic diplomacy card used by the US, was effective as the Britain end the conflict and withdrew her force, as Britain could not financial survive with the US help. Therefore, Britain failure to defend her interest because of the US would withhold funding that is necessary for the financing of the conflict and the domestic economy has fundamental change the world’s perceptions of her dominance and ability to wage conflict.
The Suez crisis therefore plays an influential role to the changing of attitude toward the British Empire, as the event has highlight the Empire economic dependency and vulnerability and in effect moulded international perceptions about the Empire prominence in the world.
Domestic opinion
In Britain the Suez conflict has sparks strong criticism from all aspect of the British society that sum up the post-war Britain perceptions of their Empire. The Times report has show the deep political division on the conflict, The Conservative led government did not enjoy full cross party support for the conflict. This was evidence with the opposition labour party public objection to the war, citing any action should come from the UN Security Council instead of Britain. The opposition party favoured a negotiation and reach some form of settlement with the Egyptians (The Times, 1956). This I view as an indication of what some ruling elites perceived the new role of the Empire should be; one that is less confrontational and seeks to solve disagreement with diplomacy. The young people of Britain arguably, also seem to be supporting the non-confrontational view in solving the conflict, the media report also reflect these sentiments, according to the Times report, students from leading universities protest against the government policy in the Middle East. The report further shows that this anti-government protest did not reflect the entire view of the nation, as some of the public views’ were in agreement with the government defensive policy, of which lead to some altercation with other students who support the government.
In addition, public dissatisfaction with the conflict did not ends here, other social and business institutions were voicing strong objection according to media report in the Times, these include trade associations, trade unions, Church leaders and Church institutional bodies calling for a “positive policy and the rule of international law to be upheld under the UN”, amid fears that the conflict could increase tension and widen the conflict. Looking at the cross spectrum of society that have expressed their anti-government feelings, It is clear to me that public perception in general has changed of how they perceived the Empire base on how the Empire should defends itself because of the Suez conflict. Historian such as Shaw (1996) has viewed the public disagreement, as the Anthony Eden led government inability and failure to adequately get the British view out in the media and galvanise public and international support for the conflict. According to Shaw (1996) Britain has learned from this mistake, and future conflict such as the Falklands war, Britain mould public and international option in supporting the conflict.
The British public opinion of the conflict gives a clear picture of what they viewed the British Empires global role and position to be at the time, and base on media reports and arguments this has indicated their feelings toward Empire to be one of dissatisfaction and bullying. The argument seems to point to the notion that the Empire should play a less aggressive role in settling disagreements with other nations.
International Opinion
In regards to international opinions on the conflict, media report in the Times has shown a strong disapproval with global communities such as; India, Indonesia, Germany and the US. India label the conflict as “a flagrant violation of the United Nation Charter”, the commonwealth nation was not concerns about the conflict threats. India response and to the crisis arguably, I believe has shown further light on the fact that the world’s new perception of the Empire role should be less dominant, and the prevailing of international law should now take president in solving conflicts with nations, and not unilateralism.
The US, criticism and economic threat sanction, came as a total surprise for the British according to the Reynolds (2001), and Kelly and Gorst (2000) sources. The media reports published in the Times has shown US commentators’ view of the Britain role in the conflict, of which was viewed as “suspicious” and “deceptive” in nature, and the public concerns’ that levied hope in the US Government to resolve the conflict. This confirms Shaw (1996) argument of the media’s role in shaping public option. At suggested by Kunz, (1991) source, the American government arguably did not wish to alienate the moderate Arab opinion or to be seen as sanctioning the acts of the former colonial powers of the regions.
This gives further evidence, that the US government and public have a new view of what Britain roles should be and it was against the idea of imperialism throwing its weight about and bullying small nations. Furthermore, Shaw (1996) and Hahn (1991) sources point to the view that adverse media criticism of the conflict, has led the UN to get involved. Britain has found itself in a predicament, it could not let the Nasser, the Egyptian leader claim victory and it did not want be seen as undermining the power the UN, and thus reaching a settlement will Egypt now become necessary and unavoidable.
Conclusion
Whilst it is clear that the Suez crisis was not the only contribution to the demise of the British Empire, the crisis can be view as one of the fundamental invent that bring about a turning point in how the world’s perceptions were collectively expressed, about how the Empire power in the world should be of which lead to the Britain taking a less dominant role in global and the eventual demise of the empire.
Reference
Primary
Eden, A. Sir (1956) “Thoughts on the great position after Suez”, 28 December 1956, The Impact of the Crisis, The Times, 4th February 1960.
Gorst, A., and Johnson, L. (1997) The Suez Crisis, Routledge, Oxon.
Reynolds, D. (2001) One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945, W.W. Norton, London.
Parliamentary Paper (1957) Defence: Outline of Future Policy, April 1957, CMD 124.
Shaw, T. (1996) Eden, Suez and the mass media: Propaganda and persuasion during the Suez crisis, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London.
The Times (1956) Over the Brink, 1st November 1956.
The Times (1956) ‘Students Clash over Suez’ and ‘Protests after Suez Sermon’, November 2, 1956
The Times (1956) ‘India Condemns Anglo-French Action: Fear of an extended war, October 31, 1956.
The Times (1956) Angry comment in US: stream of wild accusations, ‘trickery and deceit’, November 1, 1956.