1. Answer the questions.

1. What did the Master and Officers state in giving evidence to an investigation into a grounding?

2. Why did the Master abort the approach to the Pilot Station?

3. What discussion took place between the ship and the Marine Manager?

4. When did the vessel again commence the approach to a port?

5. What was the vessel experiencing after passing the Fairway buoy?

6. Why did the vessel come into contact with the seabed?

7. What critical point was overlooked in the findings of the investigation?

2. Explain the following terms.

1. Grounding _______________________________________________________________

2. on swell height____________________________________________________________

3. shallow patches____________________________________________________________

4. rolling ___________________________________________________________________

5. the swell was reduced_______________________________________________________

6. a ‘dry run’ with a break off point_______________________________________________

7. the bow pitching 1.5 m_______________________________________________________

8. the vessel was not rolling or heaving but yawing.__________________________________

3. Decide if these statements are True or False. Correct the wrong ones.

1. The Master had not sent an email asking if the Pilots had any limitations on swell height for entering._________

2. The maximum wind speed for entering was 40 knots.________

3. The Master and officers did not undertake a safety evaluation of the port approaches.______

4. They identified hazards excluding shallow patches, fishing boats and swell .________

5. The Master was concerned on the of arrival.________

6. He undertook a ‘dry run’ in the approaches.________

7. The rolling did not become severe._________

8. The Master aborted the entry because the Pilot was not underway to meet the vessel.______

9. The Marine Manager insisted on the vessel to continue moving into the harbour that morning.____

10. The Master stated that it would be safer to enter._____

11. The vessel was rolling about 2 degrees.________

12. At 1728 two pilots boarded the vessel.____

13. The Pilots suggested a ‘dry run’ with a break off point 1 mile (or 2 miles) from the fairway buoy._________

14. The master did not agree to continue entry into port._______

15. After passing the Fairway buoy the ship started yawing some 9 dergees to starboard and 6 degrees to port._______

16. The vessel began rolling about 5 degrees to port and starboard.____________

17. The Pilots reported to the investigating team that the vessel was rolling or heaving but not yawing.________

18. At 1816 the vessel later the vessel touched bottom twice._______

19. The Master and Officers were arrested._________

4. Complete an incident report (see annex) covering the following items.

1. Description of the situation;

2. Direct causes, root causes of the incident;

3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

5. Hull and Machinery – danger or failure of ship and/or its own equipment

The legal requirement to demonstrate that the vessel was seaworthy effectively means that an owner has to be able to prove thar, for the particular trade in which the vessel is involved, her hull, machinery and equipment are properly maintained, and that there are on board, sufficient stores, provisions, bunkers etc.

CASE STUDY

The subject vessel was a chemical tanker, on passage from Swansea to Gothenburg and Fredericia. She was loaded with 990 MT of ethanol and isopropanol. She sailed from Swansea on 12 December, 1981.

On 13 December, the vessel met severe heavy weather with winds up to force 10. During the morning of 14 December, the wind increased to force 11. The vessel passed through the Dover Straits, and at 0648 hours, the Sandettie NE buoy was seen close on the starboard bow. The vessel's helm was put immediately hard over to port, but this failed to have any effect on her set. At 0650 hours, a bump was felt on her starboard quarter followed by an explosion and abnormal noises from the engine room.

It was assumed that the propeller had touched the chain of the buoy. The 2nd engineer, on duty in the engine room, promptly advised that the main engine gear box was vibrating and that smoke was issuing from the stern gland. He requested that the engine be stopped.

On stopping the main engine, an inspection was made of the main engine gear box, and it was observed that the gearbox casing had been completely fractured just above the holding down bolts. It was also noted that the propeller was being turned by water movement. In addition an inspection was made of the stern tube seals. These appeared to be intact as there was no evidence of leakage into the engine room.

A mayday call was sent by radio at 0655 hours requesting immediate tug assistance. The call was answered by the Dover and French coastguards, and another vessel in the vicinity agreed to stand by until a suitable tug arrived.

Attempts were made by the ship's engineers to secure the shafting, but these were unsuccessful due to heavy seas turning the propeller. A constant watch was kept on the vessel's position. Due to the strong WSW wind causing the vessel to drift towards Fairy Bank and the anticipated change in the current direction, the master decided to anchor. At 0750 hours the port anchor was let go with the Fairy Bank buoy bearing 105 degrees, at a distance of two miles.

The vessel made radio contact with a tug steaming from Dunkirk at 1100 hours. The master of the tug requested agreement of the service being rendered under Lloyd's Open Form of salvage agreement¹. This was accepted by the master, and the tug came alongside at 1105 hours, at which time the standby vessel was released.

The master explained to the tug master that prior to commencement of tow, the vessel's propeller shaft would need to be secured to avert the possibility of the propeller turning (due to movement through the water), and causing failure of the stern tube seals. To assist this operation, the tug master was requested to hold the vessel's head to windward. Connection of the tow was completed at 1227 hours, and by 1235 hours, the tug had hauled the vessel's head to windward. The ship's engineers then secured the propeller shaft and gear box using timber, wires and bottle screws.

This work was completed by 1740 hours when the port anchor was weighed, and towage towards Dunkirk commenced. The vessel arrived in berth at Dunkirk at 2400 hours, following which the tug master boarded, and the redelivery certificate was signed by the master.

The following morning, the master attended the offices of the tug owners and signed Lloyd's Open Form of salvage agreement. Security was lodged by the owners with Lloyd's (£220,390 for the ship and freight and £29,610 for cargo).

On 15 December, a surveyor, appointed on behalf of hull underwriters, accompanied by another surveyor, acting on behalf of the classification society, and owners' superintendent, made an examination of the damage to the M.E. gear box. A diver was employed to inspect the vessel's bottom and stern area. The diver's report showed that two blades of the four bladed propellers were damaged, one of them damaged severely.

It now became apparent that the vessel's cargo would need to be discharged before the vessel could be repaired. As Dunkirk had no facilities for storage of the alcohol, it would become necessary to tow the vessel to a suitable port. Enquiries revealed that there were alcohol storage tanks available in Antwerp. A contract was arranged with the owners of the salvage tug for towage to Antwerp.

The classification surveyor agreed to permit towage, provided that the propeller shaft and gear box were secured in order to prevent the propeller turning during towage. The work was completed on 16 December, and the vessel left Dunkirk at 1145wheels were chipped and hammered, the flexible coupling was damaged, the intermediate shaft bearing brasses were fractured and distorted, three propeller blades were damaged to varying degrees, the tail shaft was bent, and finally, the tail shaft coupling bolts were damaged.

In view of the extensive damage, the gear box needed to be replaced. Enquiries revealed that a suitable gear box was not immediately available. The manufacturers of the original gear box agreed to deliver a new gear box by the end of March, 1982. The damaged gear box and coupling were removed from the vessel on the 23 December and delivered to the gear box manufacturers in order that some of the undamaged parts could be used in the new gear box.

The vessel remained in dry-dock until 29 January during which time all repairs apart from the work connected with the gear box and flexible coupling were undertaken. She was then placed alongside a lay-by berth awaiting arrival of the new gear box. In view of the anticipated delay to the vessel, arrangements were made to charter a substitute vessel for delivery of the cargo to its destination. Loading of the cargo into the substitute vessel was carried out on 8 January. The cargo was delivered at Gothenburg on 11 January and at Fredericia on 12 January. The new gear box and repaired flexible coupling were delivered to the yard on 27 March and fitted into the engine room. Installation of the gear box and realignment of the main engine were completed on 8 April. Following satisfactory engine trials and class approval, the vessel left Antwerp at 1648 hours the same day.

Under the terms of the Lloyd's Open Form of salvage agreement, negotiations were subsequently opened between various lawyers representing the ship and freight, cargo, and the tug owners. The parties agreed to a salvage settlement of £100,000 plus the costs of the salvors' lawyers of £2,918.57. This amount of £102,918.57 was apportioned between ship and freight and cargo on the basis of the value adopted during negotiations, and the relative amounts were settled by the respective parties.

1. Answer the questions.

Where was the Sandetti NE buoy seen at 0648 hours?

What did the helmsman do which had no effect on the vessel’s set?

What incident occurred?

What kind of damage did the gearbox sustain?

What was wrong with the propeller?

What kind of agreement did the tug request for her service?

How did the tug help the vessel?

Who made an examination of the damage to the M.E. gear box?

Was it possible to discharge the vessel’s cargo?

Why was the vessel towed to Antwerp?

Who attended the vessel after she had been dry-docked?

What salvage settlement did the parties agree to?

2. Translate the expressions from English into Russian.

The vessel’s helm was put ... hard over to port;

the gearbox casing … been completely fractured;

the propeller was turned by water movement;

secure the shafting;

avert the possibility of the propeller turning;

the port anchor was weighed;

security was lodged by the owners;

a specification for repair… was drawn up;

submit repair quotations;

the gear teeth… were chipped and hammered;

1. satisfactory engine trials;

agree to a salvage settlement.

2. 3. Say the dates, times and prices from the text. What do they refer to?

4. The dates: 12 December 1981; 18 December; 11 January; 29 January; 27 March; 8 April.

5. The times: 0655 hours; 1100 hours; 1105 hours; 1235 hours; 1740 hours; 2400 hours.

6. The prices: £220,390; £29,610; £100,000; £2,918.57; £102,918.57.

7. 4. Put in the words from the box to describe the incident with the vessel.

8. quarter leakage movement tube

9. port buoy gear casing starboard propeller stern box

After the vessel had passed through the Dover Straits, at 0648 hours the Sandetti NE buoy was seen close on her ____________ bow. The helmsman put the helm hard over to ____________ but this had no effect on the set. Two minutes later a bump was felt on the vessel’s starboard ____________ followed by an ____________ and abnormal noises from the engine room. It appeared that the propeller had touched the chain of the ____________. The main engine ____________ box was vibrating and the smoke was issuing from the ____________ gland. The engine was stopped. During the inspection of the main engine gear ____________ it was observed that the gearbox ____________ had been completely fractured just above the holding down bolts. It was also noted that the ____________ was being turned by water ____________. In addition an inspection was made of the stern ____________ seals. These turned out to be intact as there was

no evidence of ____________ into the engine room. 5. What is hull and machinery insurance about? Put

the sentences in the correct order of events from the text. The first event is given. Translate the sentences orally.

_____ The master of the vessel attended the offices of the tug owners and signed Lloyd's Open Form of salvage agreement.

_____ The amount of £102,918.57 was shared between ship and freight and cargo on the basis of the value adopted during negotiations, and the relative amounts were settled by the parties.

_____ After the vessel was dry-docked, she was attended by the hull underwriters' surveyor and owners' superintendent who found a lot of damages to the ship’s machinery.

_____ Security was lodged by the owners with Lloyd's (£220,390 for the ship and freight and £29,610 for cargo).

_____ A surveyor on behalf of hull underwriters, another surveyor on behalf of the classification society, and owners' superintendent made an examination of the damage to the ME gear box.

_____ Under the terms of the Lloyd's Open Form of salvage agreement, negotiations were opened between various lawyers representing the ship and freight, cargo, and the tug owners.

___1__ The master of the tug requested agreement of the service being rendered under Lloyd's Open Form of salvage agreement and this form was accepted by the master of the vessel.

_____ The parties agreed to a salvage settlement of £100,000 plus the costs of the salvors' lawyers of £2,918.57.

6. Complete an incident report (see annex) covering the following items.

1. Description of the situation;

2. Direct causes, root causes of the incident;

3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

6. Fire. Explosion

This type of incidents involves machinery spaces or the living accommodation and the cargo being carried.

CASE STUDY

Case study - 1. Premature Reopening of Fire Area Causes Re-ignition

While underway a towing vessel with 6 crewmembers on board experienced an engine room fire. The chief engineer was in the engine room when the fire broke out. The only exit was an accommodation ladder which was in the path of the oil spray fire. The chief engineer exited through the fire, which ignited his clothing. The other crewmembers, who had also been alerted to the fire, discovered the chief engineer and extinguished the flames on his clothing. Nonetheless, the chief engineer suffered burns on more than 90 percent of his body.

As a first response, the crew released CO2 from the vessel's fire suppression system into the engine room and extinguished the fire. After observing a noticeable reduction in heat and smoke, the Master reported that the fire was extinguished and crewmembers opened the doors to the vessel's superstructure and began de-smoking it. However, this action compromised the fire boundary by allowing CO2 to escape and fresh air to enter the interior of the vessel, which caused the fire to reflash and rage out of control, consuming most of the tug's superstructure. The crew had to abandon ship and were later rescued by SAR resources.

The vesse's chief engineer was fatally injured, and the 5 remaining crewmembers suffered minor injuries.

Findings of the report:

- the engine room fire was probably caused by the ignition of lubricating oil that sprayed from a fatigue-fractured fitting on one of the main engine's pre-lubrication oil pumps onto the hot surface of the main engine's exhaust manifold.

Contributing to the extent of the fire damage was the crewmembers' compromise of the fire boundaries when they prematurely began de-smoking the vessel's superstructure.

The inability to completely secure the engine room’s fire boundaries also exacerbated the consequences of the fire.

The abundance of the flammable material throughout the vessel was also a contributing factor to the severity of the fire.

1. Answer the questions.

Where did the fire break out?

Why did the Chief engineer’s clothing ignite?

How did the crew members extinguish the fire?

Why did the fire reflash and rage out of control?

Who reported that the fire had been extinguished?

How was the crew rescued?

2. Choose the correct variant.

1. There were …. exits from the engine room

a) several b) less than two c) no

2. The crew ….

a) closed the engine room’s doors to prevent fresh air to enter the interior

b) opened the doors to evacuate the engine room

c) opened the doors to the vessel’s superstructure to de-smoke the engine room

3. The chief engineer …..

a) died because of numerous burns b) suffered minor injuries c) suffered serious injuries

4. The fire was caused by ….

a) smoking in prohibited area b) oil waste left unwatched c) oil ignited on a pump and sprayed onto the ME’s exhaust manifold

5. Once the fire area has been closed and the CO2 released….

a) it is advisable to open it only 12 hours after activating the gas installation

1. b) it is strictly prohibited to open it until SAR resources render the assistance

2. c) it is advisable not to open it until you are absolutely certain that all the heat has been removed.

6. Complete an incident report (see annex) covering the following items.

1. Description of the situation;

2. Direct causes, root causes of the incident;

3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

Case study - 2. Bagged Copra Fire

(Copra is the dried meat, or kernel, of the  HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coconut" ﾵcoconutﾧ used to extract coconut oil)

Bagged copra was being loaded from a wharf at a minor Asian port on to an open-decked self-propelled barge. During the three-day loading operation, there were brief rain showers, and even though loading was suspended at these times, the cargo was not covered from the rain. The bags were stacked against the bridge-front bulkhead almost as high as the wheelhouse and subsequent athwartship rows of bags were added from aft to forward ending at the bow door. When loading was nearly complete with about 3000 bags of copra (approx 250 tonnes) on board, a fire started within the cargo and rapidly spread throughout the consignment. Firefighter road tankers came quickly to the wharf but water jets from their fire engines proved inadequate to extinguish the fierce blaze. The worried harbour authorities forced the barge to cast off from the berth, leaving it to drift in the harbour with no assistance. The master and crew were unne Finally, after about two days' drifting, the fire burnt itself out and barge was towed to a repair facility.

The cause of the fire could not be reliably established but it is likely to have originated either from a carelessly thrown cigarette butt or, as it is known to do, the copra wetted by rain could have self-heated to spontaneous combustion. As the cargo was fully exposed to air from all sides, the fire spread rapidly. Foam could have been more effective in firefighting, but in the absence of a properly equipped firefighting tug, and once the barge was cast adrift, it was out of reach for the local fire trucks that had the means to generate foam.

Lessons learn

Bagged or bulk copra should only be stowed inside holds or compartments that are fitted with fixed firefighting systems. Open deck stowage should be avoided as it poses a serious fire hazard.

Answer the questions.

What was the biggest mistake in the stowage of bagged copra?

Is it correct to give deck stowage to dry cargo which can be easily wetted?

What consequences may such stowage lead to in adverse weather?

What put the master and the crew in grave danger?

Why do you think was it better to use foam to extinguish bagged copra fire?

Will it be reasonable and justified to take legal action against Port Authorities who endangered the crew by forcing them to cast off from the berth?

2. Explain the following terms.

an open-decked self-propelled barge ____________________________________________

bridge-front bulkhead _________________________________________________________

fierce blaze __________________________________________________________________

to cast off from the berth _______________________________________________________

open deck stowage _______________________________________________________

Match the synonyms.

wharf a) self-ignition

1. athwartship b) conflagration

to cast off c) shipment

2. fierce blaze d) serious

consignment e) across

3. grave f) to let go the lines

4. combustion g) quay

Choose the correct answer.

5. Bagged copra must be loaded :

on deck

into holds

in tanks

in reservoirs

6. Copra is liable to produce heat when:

wetted

stowed

in contact with metal surface

heated and exposed to air

The worried harbour authorities forced the barge to:

make fast alongside

cast off

1. exhibit NUC shapes

stay adrift

The harbour authorities' act was careless because:

2. the barge didn't complete loading

the cargo was improperly stowed

3. the master and the crew were endangered

another ships were waiting for vacant berth

4. Dry cargo such as copra may be loaded during adverse weather if :

the LOI is issued

5. it is covered with tarpaulins

the Bill of Lading states that

the shipper agrees

1. 6. Complete an incident report (see annex) covering the following items.

2. 1. Description of the situation;

3. 2. Direct causes, root causes of the incident;

4. 3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

5. Case study - 3. Collision and Explosion Kills Nine

1. Several vessels, including Ship A and Ship C, were in a traffic lane heading about 130 degrees true. Ship B was in the process of crossing this traffic lane in order to integrate the opposite-bound lane. Visibility was good and seas were light.

On the crossing vessel, Ship B, the 3rd officer was OOW. The Chief Officer (CO) and the 2nd officer were present on the bridge too, as was a helmsman. The CO was plotting targets on the ARPA radar to assist the OOW. The Master was also on the bridge from time to time monitoring the traffic. Initially, the 2nd officer was setting up the GPS units, but afterwards he was chatting and joking with the OOW and CO in addition to catching up with some work on the chart table. The 2nd officer’s presence appears to have been a source of distraction to the OOW and the CO.

The OOW on Ship B stated they would allow Ship A to pass ahead. The OOW on Ship A expressed surprise at this, as he had initially expected Ship B to alter course to port to join the traffic lane. When Ship B’s OOW then declared their intention to alter course to starboard, Ship A’s OOW considered this as an acceptable course of action for a crossing situation.

Later, the OOW of Ship A had identified that a close quarters situation was continuing to develop with Ship B. He expressed concerⁿ on the VHF radio several times; a bigger alteratioⁿ of course to starboard by Ship B was urgently required.

At 20.45, the CO on ship B informed the OOW that one of the targets was a false echo. This was an incorrect assumption and could easily have been clarified by vi^sual observation. In fact, the bridge team had mistaken Ship C, also in the traffic lane, for Ship A, and assumed the actual echo of Ship A was a false echo. In the final ^minutes before the collision, the team on Ship B also mistakenly identified a fourth ship as Ship A. At 20.52 a collision occurred between Ship A and Ship B; Ship B was at about 11kt (full ahead manoeuvring) and Ship A was at 13.5kt (full ahead sea speed).

A massive explosion occurred on Ship A as a cargo tank ruptured and naphtha was spilt and ignited. The ignited spill engulfed the sea surrounding the two vessels.

On Ship A, nine crew members were killed and other crew members injured. Three crew members were injured on board Ship B. Both vessels incurred substantial fire and structural damage as a result of the collision.

Shockingly, of the many vessels in the vicinity at the time of the accident only one stopped to assist.

Some of the findings of the official report were as follows:

- This collision highlights the importance of effective, well-managed lookout techniques with correct implementation of the COLREGs in as bold and timely a manner as possible.

- This case also highlights the importance for vessels to avoid becoming severely restricted by other vessels so as to limit their ability to comply with the COLREGs. Adequate contingency room should always be left to provide an escape route should other vessels appear not to be complying.

- The bridge team on vessel B were continually distracted their lookout duties by laughing and joking on the bridge among themselves and also with other crew members on the bridge.

- Ship A was considered to be a false echo by the Ship B team, who also mistook Ship C for Ship A. Greater emphasis on comparing ships observed visually against the information presented by the electronic navigation aids was required.

- Small and arbitrary alterations of course were made by Ship B without knowing what effect the actions would have.

- There was no use of the ‘Trial Manoeuvre' function on the radar of Ship B. The team proceeded with indications of low CPAs and without realising the steady compass bearings with Ship A.

Lessons learned

-Both vessels were proceeding at full speed at the time of collision, yet one of the safest of time-proven tactics is to slow down when unsure of the developing situation or of the intentions of the opposite party.

-Keep the bridge clear of chit chat and business unrelated to navigating the ship when in high risk areas, high traffic areas or at all other times when maximum concentration is needed.

-Course alterations should be as bold as possible so as to make your intentions known to the other vessels.

-When two ships in your vicinity collide and explode, do your best to stay safe but also render what assistance you can to the fellow mariners involved. Do not sail away as if nothing had happened.

1. Answer the questions on the text.

What area were ships A, B and C in?

What were the intentions of Ship B?

How many crewmen were on the bridge of Ship B?

What was the 2nd officer of Ship B doing on the bridge?

Why was the OOW of Ship A surprised?

Why did the Ship A’s OOW express concern on VHF?

What incorrect assumption did the Ship B’s CO make?

What other ship did the bridge team on Ship B identify as Ship A?

What disaster occurred on Ship A as a result of the collision?

What kind of accident occurred on Ship B as a result of the collision?

Choose between two vessels – A and B – to state what actions each of them performed.

She was crossing the traffic lane in order to join the opposite lane. __B__

She was following the traffic lane heading about 130 degrees true. _____

She stated she would allow the other vessel pass ahead of her. _____

She declared her intention to alter course to starboard. _____

She identified a closequarters situation with the other vessel. _____

1. She confused the echoes of two other ships assuming one of them false. _____

2. She was proceeding at a full ahead manoeuvering speed. _____

3. She was proceeding at a full ahead sea speed. _____

4. Which of t^he officers below did the following actions?

5. Master Chief Officer 2nd Officer 3rd Officer (OOW) – Ship B

OOW – Ship A

1. He expressed surprise that the other vessel would allow them to pass ahead. Ship A’s OOW

2. He was on the bridge from time to time monitoring the traffic. _______

3. He informed the other vessel that they would alter course to starboard. _______

1. He thought that the other vessel would alter course to port to join the lane. _______

   1. First he set up the GPS unit; then he did some work on the chart table. _______

   2. He was sure a bigger alteration of course to starboard by the other ship was urgent. _______

   3. He plotted targets on the ARPA radar to assist the OOW. _______

   4. He identified a closequarters situation developing with the other ship. _______

   5. He distracted the other officers from their look-out duties by chatting and joking. _______

   6. He expressed concern on the VHF radio several times. ______

   7. He was informed that one of the targets was a false echo. _______

2. He confused the targets of two other vessels in the lane. _______

4. Analyze t

he situation given in the text and state your arguments due to the following poi

1. nts:

non-compliance with COLREGs by all ships involved. Complete the following table

2. The type of the shipThe number/the name of the violated RuleThe incorrect actions undertaken by the ship

3. 5. Complete an accident report (see annex) covering the following items.

1. Description of the situation;

4. 2. Direct causes, root causes of the incident;

3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

Part 4

PEOPLE RELATED INCIDENTS

Ship operators owe a duty to ensure the safety of persons on board the vessel. This duty extends beyond the physical limits of the vessel to areas where the safety of persons off the vessel is affected by the vessel’s operation and tasks carried out by the crew, e.g.mooring operations, discharge with ship’s crane and similar situations. As regards the people whose safety is to be ensured, this is not limited to crew members, but extends to passengers, shore personnel and even unathorised persons on board such as stowaways. This type of incidents include personal injuries to crew, passengers, third parties; illness of crew, passengers, third parties; employ

ment – Labour disputes and disciplinary procedures (trade disputes on board the vessel, ITF – International

Transport Workers Federation – disputes; strikes by shore personnel), disciplinary procedures, drug smuggling; stowaways; refugees; piracy.

People related incidents represent a significant slice of the total claims, by number and by value, which are handled by P&I Clubs, accounting for 40% of all claims.

CASE STUDY

Case study – 1. Mooring accident

1. Read the text. Analyze the situation yourself. Afterwards compare your opinion with the expert assessment.

The vessel was preparing for departure and the mooring parties were standing by forward and aft. The master gave the order to let go all lines and the 2nd officer, who was at the forward mooring station, gave the order to let go both headlines. One of the Abs who was working in front of the mooring winch put the mooring line on a hook on the roller bollard instead of around the roller, which was the normal procedure. An OS was operating the mooring winch but he couldn’t see the AB who was handling the line because of the large mooring winch.

For some unknown reason the 2nd officer gave the order to heave in both headlines while one of them was still attached to the shore bollard.It’s imperative that the person in charge of the mooring operation has complete situational awareness.

The headline tightened very quickly and it came off the bollard hook and hit the AB hard in the waist. The AB was wearing correct PPE equipment (helmet, safety shoes, coverall and gloves) bit this didn’t protect hi

m against the snap from the mooring rope. The master believed that the main reason for the accident was because the mooting team wasn’t vigilant enough. Mooring accidents are unfortunately not uncommon but can usually be avoided if the mooring team follows correct procedures and work as a team with clearly defined duties. It is imperative that the mooring team involved is aware of risks which should be defined in the risk assessment.

WHAT? AB hit by mooring rope during departure 1 WHY? The mooring line was still on the shoreside bollard when the order to heave in was given by the 2nd officer, causing the line to snap and hit the AB in the waist. 2 WHY? AB had put the mooring line on the hook of the roller bollard instead of aroung the roller bollard. 3 WHY? The mooring party had poor situational awareness as no party member recognized the risk of the mooring line on the hook. 4 WHY? The mooring party didn’t follow the company’s risk assessment and mooring procedures. 5 WHY? The company hasn’t been able tp implement a safety culture onboard the vessel which follows risk assessment and procedures. Consequences: The AB received injuries to his back and is unlikely to be able to resume sea duties

____________________________________________________

4. Complete an accident report (see annex) including the following items.

1. De^scription of the situation;

2. Direct causes, root causes of the accident;

3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

Case study – 2. Series of mis-steps end in the sea

A vessel was underway in darkness having just disembarked the pilot. Winds were modest at B6 and there was a swell of about three metres. Air temperature was a cool 8C. The bosun, assisted by three other crew, was bringing on board and securing the pilot boarding arrangements. The bosun descended to the lower platform of the accommodation ladder to disconnect the latching mechanism which secured the pilot ladder to the accommodation ladder.

After the bosun had pulled up the lower section of the pilot ladder and placed it on the accommodation ladder, he asked one of the assisting crew to heave up the accommodation ladder. Each time the crew tried to hoist the ladder, it descended rather than moving up. After a few attempts, the crewman stopped the operation, but at this time a noise was heard and the crew realized the accommodation ladder was now hanging vertically down. The bosun could not be seen; he had not been wearing a lifejacket or a lifeline. A life ring and light were thrown into the water and the bridge informed.

Despite many hours of the searching using their rescue boat, the vessel itself, the pilot boat and other boats in the area, the bosun could not be located. His body washed ashore three weeks later.

The investigation found it probable that when the ladder was mistakenly lowered (instead of raised), the weight of the ladder transferred from the hoisting wire to the latching mechanism. The mechanism failed under a load that it was not designed to hold, and the resulting shock load on the wire caused failure and free fall of the lower end of the accommodation ladder, leaving it in the vertical position.

The investigation also found it probable that the non-permanent air hose connections for powering the hoist/lower function of the accommodation ladder, which were unmarked, were mistakenly inversed when connected initially, hence the lowering action achieved when the crew wanted to hoist

Additionally, it was found that the wire on the failed accommodation ladder was in fact only 55 long instead of the manufacture’s recommended 67 metres. This probably caused undue stress and further undermined the wire’s integrity, especially considering that at least two wraps were needed on the drum at maximum payout.

The investigation further found that the bosun was working in contradiction to the company procedure for this operation, having neither life jacket nor safety line. None of the other crew working with the bosun had interjected to advise him of these shortcuts.

1. Answer the questions.

1. When did the pilot disembark?

2. What were the weather conditions?

3. Did the bosun perform the job without any assistance?

4. Where did the bosun place the pilot ladder?

5. What did the assisting crew have to do to avert the disaster?

6. Did the crew manage to fulfill the bosun’s order?

7. How did the bosun appear in water?

8. What means were used in search and rescue operation?

9. Why did the mechanism fail?

10. What was the recommended length of the accommodation ladder?

2. Explain the following terms.

1. A vessel underway___________________________________________________________

2. pilot boarding arrangements____________________________________________________

3. accommodation ladder_________________________________________________________

4. latching mechanism____________________________________________________________

5. pilot ladder___________________________________________________________________

6. to heave up____________________________________________________________________

7. hoisting wire__________________________________________________________________

3. Decide whether the statements are True or False. Correct the wrong ones.

1. The pilot has just embarked the vessel._____

2. The sea was rough and there was a heavy swell._______

3. The bosun tried to perform the operation alone.____

4. The bosun asked one of the assisting crew to lower the accommodation ladder._______

5. Life saving appliances were used to help the bosun.______

6. The bosun and the crew complied with the company procedure for this operation._______

4. Complete the following statements.

1. The accommodation ladder was mistakenly__________________________________________

2. The non-permanent air hose connections for powering the hoist / lower function of the accommodation ladder, which were unmarked, were_____________________________________

3. The accommodation ladder was in fact only 55 long instead of_____________________________________________________________________________

4. The bosun was working without___________________________________________________

5. Find in the text all life saving appliances. Name them, describe their function

6. Complete an accident report (see annex) covering the following items.

1. Description of the situation;

2. Direct causes, root causes of the accident;

3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

Case study – 3. Darkened workplace and an unprotected hazard to fatality

A gas tanker was moored at a shipyard and personnel were busy preparing for maintenance. The shipyard had issued permits to enter tanks which, in theory, meant the tanks were adequately ventilated and illuminated. During a preliminary inspection it was found that a maintenance hatch cover had become dislodged from the deck in the lower tank dome and had fallen 17 metres to the bottom of a cargo tank, leaving the maintenance hatch open and unsecured.

Work inside the tank started the next day. One of the tasks was to recover the maintenance hatch cover. Instructions were issued to the crew to be extra vigilant on account of the unsecured open hatch in the lower dome; none of them had entered this tank before but the bosun and AB had previously entered similar tanks.

The bosun, the AB and an OS began by lowering equipment to recover the hatch cover into the lower tank dome. The AB then went into the lower tank dome. He was not sure where the maintenance hatch was located so he used his torch to get an overview. When he had located the hatch, he started to rig the recovery equipment about 3 metres from the opening.

The bosun followed close behind. He looked around to locate the opening in the deck then joined the AB. No lighting had yet been rigged up in the tanks but both men carried portable lights and felt comfortable that these would provide sufficient light for the time being. Both men were working on preparing the equipment, with their backs to the entrance ladder.

The OS followed a few munites later carrying a hand-held torch. The bosun heard the OS as he started to climb the ladder but after one or two minutes he realized the OS was not with them. He shone his light around the space to locate the OS but he was nowhere to be seen. The bosun then went over to the open hatch and looked into the tank. He saw the OS lying immobile at the bottom of the tank 17 metres below.

Within 10 minutes the victim had been brought out on deck and first aid was administered. The victim was brought to a nearby hospital but he was subsequently declared dead.

Lessons learnt:

- Even if the paperwork is done, the permits to enter tanks were completed, always ensure the required safety measures are actually in place before starting the work. Proper lighting and a barrier around the open maintenance hatch would have prevented the fatality.

- We tend to get with on the work without first analyzing the workspace for possible hazards. Before starting a task ask yourself, “What needs to be done here to make the workspace safe?”

- The ordinary seaman was apparently aware of the open and unsecured maintenance hatch when he entered the tank, but he didn’t know where in the tank the hatch was located; he had never been inside a cargo tank before. Familiarization with the space and the hazard would have helped him to avoid the accident.

- Hand-held lights are no substitute for cluster lighting arrangements. Always work in a properly illuminated space.

1. Answer the questions.

1. Where was the tanker moored?

2. What was discovered during the preliminary inspection?

3. What were the instructions issued to the crew?

4. Who participated in the recovery of the maintenance hatch cover?

5. Had they entered this tank before?

6. Who went into the lower tank dome?

7. What were the actions of the AB after he had got an overview using his torch?

8. Under what conditions did the bosun and the AB have to carry out their job?

9. Where did the bosun discover the OS?

10. What could have prevented the fatality?

2. Decide whether the statements are True or False. Correct the wrong ones.

1. The permit to enter the tanks does not imply the sufficient illumination._______

2. The maintenance hatch cover was shifted from the deck in the lower tank dome._________

3. The bosun and AB had previously entered this tank and were familiar with the accommodation.

________

4. The lighting was enough for the AB to detect where the maintenance hatch was located._______

5. The first aid was administered right in the tank._______

6. Hand-held lights could be used instead of cluster lighting arrangements. _______

3. Match the words from column A with the appropriate words from column B to form the collocations and use them in sentences of your own.

A B

Preliminary torch

Maintenance ladder

Recovery arrangements

Portable inspection

Sufficient equipment

Entrance lights

Hand-held hatch

Cluster lighting lights

4. Complete an accident report (see annex) covering the following items.

1. Description of the situation;

2. Direct causes, root causes of the accident;

3. Remedial actions and recommendations.

Case study - 4. Work aloft without precautions proves fatal

The loaded vessel was underway and rolling moderately in the swells. A crew member was performing maintenance on the free-fall lifeboat; a lashing turnbuckle for the lifeboat had corroded and the job involved rust removal and painting of the turnbuckle. No work permit had been issued for this job, since the work would take place at a height of just over one metre and in an area secured by railings.

While completing the turnbuckle job the crew member noticed the forward hook for the free-fall lifeboat needed lubrication. This job was at height so he asked another crew member to assist him by steadying a ladder he had already positioned on deck below the lifeboat to reach the hook. The height from the deck to the hook was 4.8 metres; the ladder was 5 metres long and was equipped with rubber feet at the bottom of each leg, but these were heavily worn.

Apart from the steadying effort of the assisting crew member, the ladder was not otherwise secured and was made more unstable because both feet were not in firm contact with the deck.

According to the assisting crew member, who had apparently voiced his concerns about the safety issues involved with the task, the other crew member insisted on continuing without a safety line or permit to work aloft. The assisting crew member held on to the lower part of the ladder while the other crew member climbed up. When the crew member had climbed part of the way up the ladder it suddenly slipped on the deck. The assisting crew member was unable to keep it steady, and the victim fell and ended up motionless on the deck next to the ladder.

The alarm was raised and first aid was administered to the victim. Two and a half hours later, before shore rescue could arrive, the victim stopped breathing. He was later pronounced dead.

Lessons learned

1. Never work aloft without a work permit and without taking the proper precautions to prevent falling.

2. If you are in doubt about safety insist on stopping the work and re-evaluate. Get a second opinion from your superiors.

3. Use your equipment properly. Ensure that ladders are properly secured against tipping and the weight evenly distributed on the supporting legs.

1. Answer the questions.

1. How can you evaluate the external factors which could affect the accident?

2. What was the job of the crew member?

3. Why wasn’t work permit issued for this job?

4. Did the crew member complete his task?

5. Why did he decide to do another job?

6. What assistance did he need? Why?

7. Was the ladder out of order?

8. In your opinion, was a safety line a must for the crew member when working aloft?

9. Why did the crew member fall down?

10. What preventive measures should be taken to avoid the accident?

2. Match the words from column A with the appropriate words from column B to form the collocations and use them in sentences of your own.

A B

1. Remove A. maintenance

2. Position B. work permit

3. Perform C. safety line

4. Corrode D. precautions

5. Issue E. a ladder

6. Secure F. nest

7. Take G. a turnbuckle

8. Raise H. an alarm

3. Comment on the following factors which could cause the accident:

- weather conditions;

- lack of safety culture;

- negligence of the crew;

- no supervision.

4. Complete an accident report (see annex) including the following items.

1. Description of the situation;