Добавил:
ivanov666
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз:
Предмет:
Файл:The Great War. Part II
.pdf
THE GREAT WAR
with hand, this was no longer so. That great German army which
two years before held every possible advantage that its prolonged
preparation and busy factories could give it, had now, as General
von Arnim’s report admits, fallen into the inferior place. It was
a magnifi cent achievement upon which the British nation may well
pride itself, if one may ever pride oneself on anything in a drama so
mighty that human powers seem but the instruments of the huge
contending spiritual forces behind them. The fact remains that after
two years of national effort the British artillery was undoubtedly
superior to that of the Germans, the British Stokes trench-mortars
and light Lewis machine-guns were the best in Europe, the British
aeroplanes were unsurpassed, the British Mills bomb was superior
to any other, and the British tanks were an entirely new departure
in the art of War. It was the British brain as well as the British heart
and arm which was fashioning the future history of mankind.
XIII.
THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE
November 13, 1916
The last effort – Failure in the north – Fine work of the Thirtyninth, Fifty-fi rst, and Sixty-third Divisions – Surrounding of German Fort – Capture of Beaumont Hamel – Commander Freyberg –
Last operations of the season – General survey – “The unwarlike
Islanders”
THIS considerable British victory may well have a name of its
own, though it was merely an extension of gigantic effort upon the
Somme. The fact, however, that it was fought upon the banks of
a small subsidiary stream, and also that it was separated by a month
or more from any other serious engagement, give it a place of its
own in the narrative of the War. It has already been shown at the
conclusion of the chapter which deals with the fl ank operations by
the Fifth Army, commanded by Sir Hubert Gough, that the British position after the capture of the Schwaben and other redoubts
which defended the high ground to the north of Thiepval was such
that the guns were able to take the German front line to the north
of the Ancre in enfi lade and almost in rear. Under such circumstances it might well seem that their trenches were untenable, but
their position, although diffi cult, was alleviated by the fact that
they had been able partly to fi nd and partly to make a series of
excavations in the chalk and clay soil of the district which of the
gave them almost complete protection against the heaviest shell-
262
THE GREAT WAR
fi re. Whole battalions led a troglodytic life in subterranean caverns
from which they were trained to rush forth upon the alarm of an
infantry advance. It was clear, however, that if the alarm should
be too short their refuges might very easily become traps, as has
so often been the case in the German lines of defence. The safety
from shells is dearly paid for when a squad of furious stormers with
Mills bombs in their hands and death in their faces glare in from
the door. Their minds were kept easy, however, by the knowledge
that broad fi elds of barbed wire, so rusty and so thick that they
resembled ploughland from a distance, lay between them and the
British. A very large garrison drawn from seven divisions, one of
them being the 2nd Guards Reserve, held this dangerous salient in
the German line.
For the attack General Gough had mustered two Army Corps
of six divisions, three of which, forming the Second Corps, were to
advance from the south under General Jacob, having the almost impassable mud slopes of the Ancre in front of them. Three others of
the Fifth Corps, under General E. A. Fanshawe, were to storm the
German line north of the Ancre. This latter movement was to be
directed not only from the new British positions, but also from the
old lines as far north as Serre. The advance from the west divided
the enemy’s gun-power, and distracted his attention from the south,
so that its failure and the loss which that failure involved, were part
of the price paid for the victory.
After a two days’ bombardment, which started on November
11, and which uprooted the greater part of the German wire, the
actual attack was made at six in the foggy, misty morning of November 13. It is inconceivable that the Germans were not standing to arms, since dawn had long been the hour of doom, and the
furious drum-fi re was certainly the overture to a battle. The thick
weather, however, shrouded the British movements, and the actual
263
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
rush of the infantry seems at the end to have been a surprise. Both
in the western and southern advance, which covered respectively
5000 and 3000 yards, every refi nement of artillery barrage which
years of experience could suggest was used to form such a downpour
as would protect the assailants, and beat the German rifl emen and
gunners back into their burrows.
Of the three divisions which attacked the old German line from
the west, the most northern was the Thirty-fi rst, with as objective
the second and third German line, and to form a defensive fl ank between Gommecourt and Serre. This division, which contained some
splendid North-country battalions from great Yorkshire towns, advanced with great intrepidity. So skilful was the barrage arranged
that the 12th East Yorkshires on the left and 13th East Yorkshires
on the right (10th and 11th East Yorkshires in reserve), belonging to the 92nd Brigade, had little diffi culty in reaching the German front line, which was quickly mopped up. The going between
the fi rst and second line was so heavy, and the German snipers so
numerous, that the barrage got ahead of the advancing waves, but
after a sharp rifl e fi ght the second line was captured, which was the
fi nal objective of the left (12th East Yorkshires) battalion. The 13th
East Yorkshires, whose fi nal objective was the third German line,
had a very severe fi ght before reaching that position. Owing to the
failure of the division on the right of the 13th East Yorkshires to get
forward, the Germans later on put in several heavy bombing counter-attacks against their right fl ank, which eventually drove them
back to the second line, where they took up their position alongside the 12th, and for the remainder of the day repulsed numerous
counter-attacks. As soon as the 12th East Yorkshires on the left had
reached their objectives they consolidated it, and with the aid of the
93rd Brigade, to whom was attached the Machine-Gun Sections of
the Lucknow and Sialkote Cavalry Brigades, beat off a very strong
264
THE GREAT WAR
counter-attack which developed about 9:30 A.M., practically wiping
it out and several minor ones during the day.
At 2:30 P.M. the German bombardment against the 92nd became very intense, and was kept up till 5:30 P.M., in spite of which
the 12th and 13th East Yorkshires stuck to their gains. It was only at
9 P.M. when the Divisional General saw that there was no prospect
of the division on the right advancing that the 12th and 13th were
ordered to fall back to their original line.
The experience of the Third Division upon the right or south of
the Thirty-fi rst was a very trying one. There is a strip of Picardy between those lines from Serre to the Ancre, where more Britons have
given their lives for their country and for the cause of humanity
than in any area in this or any other war. Twice it has been the scene
of tragic losses, on July 1, and vet again on November 13, though, as
already said, it is well in each case to regard the general result rather
than the local tragedy.
Once again the Third Division gave itself freely and unselfi shly
for the common cause. In this case, also, the cause of the scanty results lay in the heavy ground and the uncut wire. In the case of the
76th Brigade, which may be taken as typical of its neighbours, it advanced to the immediate south of the 93rd, and experienced even
more diffi cult conditions. The 2nd Suffolks and the 10th Welsh
Fusiliers were in the van, but the 8th Royal Lancasters and 1st
Gordons came up in support, the whole thick line of men clustering in front of the wire and endeavouring to hack a way. Sergeants
and offi cers were seen in front of the obstacle endeavouring to fi nd
some way through. Here and there a few pushful men, both from
the 76th Brigade and from the 9th upon its right, did succeed in
passing, but none of these ever returned. Finally, a retreat was ordered through a pelting barrage, and even in their own front-line
265
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
trenches the troops were exposed to a furious shell-fall. It was an
unfortunate business and the losses were heavy.
Immediately upon the right of the Third Division was the Second Division, which attacked with the 5th and 6th Brigades in
the van, the latter being on the immediate fl ank of the Third Division, and sharing in the obstacles which faced that division and
the check which resulted from them. The immediate objective was
the great Munich Trench lurking within its far-fl ung spider-web of
wire. Although all of the 6th Brigade save the right-hand battalion
were brought to a stand, and wound up in their own trenches, the
5th Brigade got well forward and might have got farther had it not
meant the exposure of their left fl ank. In the evening the 99th Brigade, the victors of Delville Wood, were brought up with orders to
form a defensive fl ank to the north, while they furnished two battalions for a farther advance to continue the success gained by the
5th Brigade. In the early morning of November 14 these two units,
the 1st Rifl es and 1st Berkshires, advanced in a proper November
fog, which caused some misdirection, and eventually the failure of
the attack, for two smaller trenches were carried under the impression that each was the Munich. Some ground and prisoners were,
however, gained, but not the main objective.
Meanwhile, to return to the narrative of the previous day, a very
different tale was to be told of those divisions which were operating
farther to the south, where the ridge between Serre and Beaumont
Hamel sheltered the attack from the formidable German gun-power at Pusieux and Bucquoy in the north.
Of the three divisions attacking from the south the Thirty-ninth
was to the south of the Ancre, the Sixty-Third Naval Division upon
its left on the north bank of the Ancre, and the Fifty-fi rst Highland
Division still farther to the left opposite Beaumont Hamel. The task
of the Thirty-ninth Division was to clear out the Germans who held
266
THE GREAT WAR
on to the Hansa line, the last German trench system between the
British front and the river. Their chief protection was the almost incredible condition of the ground, which consisted of tenacious mud
of varying and occasionally of dangerous depth. Munitions could
only be got across it upon pack-horses, on special paths. In spite
of these diffi culties, the Thirty-ninth Division carried the lines of
trenches and the village of St. Pierre Divion as well, the resistance
being far from heroic. The attack was made by the 117th Brigade,
which advanced with such speed that the front waves, consisting
of the 16th Rifl e Brigade upon the right and the 17th Sherwood
Foresters upon the left, were into the German trenches before the
barrage could fall. It did fall, however, and did great harm to the
supports, both the 17th Rifl es and 16th Sherwoods losing heavily,
especially the former. The British line was pushed right up to the
river, and the survivors of the garrison – some 1400 in number –
were compelled to lay down their arms. This attack to the south of
the river was an isolated, self-contained operation, apart from the
larger and more serious movement on the north bank.
The right of the main assault was carried out by the gallant Sixty-third Royal Naval Division, whose emergency baptism of fi re at
Antwerp has been mentioned in this narrative, though its subsequent splendid services at GallipolI have not come within its scope.
After the evacuation of GallipolI and the subsequent redistribution
of the eastern army, at least three fi ne divisions, the Eleventh, the
Forty-second, and the Naval, besides the splendid Australian and
New Zealand infantry, were transferred to the French front. This
action of the Ancre was the fi rst opportunity which these volunteer
sailors had had of showing upon a large European stage those qualities which had won them fame elsewhere.
The Naval Division attacked to the immediate north of the
Ancre, having the river upon their right. The lines of assault were
267
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
formed under cover of darkness, for the assembly trenches were
inadequate and the ground occupied was under direct observation
from the German lines. The division in this formation was a thick
mass of 10,000 infantry on a front of about 1600 yards with a depth
of 300. Fortunately, the screen of the weather covered them completely, and there was little and random shelling during the night,
but the men were stiff and chilled by their long vigil, during which
they might neither speak nor smoke. At last, just before dawn, the
crash of the barrage told that the hour had come, and the lines
moved forward, keeping well up to the shower of shrapnel which
crept on at the rate of 100 yards in fi ve minutes, searching every
hollow and crevice of the ground.
The fi rst objective was the enemy’s front-line system of triple
trenches. The second was a road in the hollow behind called Station
Road, with trenches on either side of it. The third was the trenches
which fringed the village of Beaucourt. The fourth, which was only
to be attempted after the third was consolidated, was the village itself, which lies among trees upon the north side of the river.
The advance of the 189th Brigade on the right of the Naval Division, consisting of the Hood, Hawke, Nelson, and Drake battalions,
was comparatively easy, as they were partly protected from fl ank fi re
by the dead ground formed by the low-lying northern slope down
to the river. With great dash and vigour they carried the successive
lines of trenches, and before mid-day they were consolidating the
third objective with the village in their immediate front.
A much more diffi cult task confronted the centre of the advance,
consisting of the left half of the right brigade, and the right half
of the 188th Brigade, which contained the 1st and 2nd Battalions of
Marines, the Ansons and the Howes. In the very track of their course
lay a formidable German redoubt, bristling with machine-guns, and
so concealed that neither the observers nor the bombardment had
268
THE GREAT WAR
spotted it. This serious obstacle caused heavy losses to the central
attack, and as it completely commanded their advance it held them
to such cover as they could fi nd. The left of the advance got past the
redoubt, however, and reached the sunken road, where they were in
close touch with the Scotsmen upon their left. Thus at this period of
the advance the Naval Division formed a deep curve with its right
wing well forward, its centre held back, and its left wing nearly as far
advanced as its right. The mist was so thick that it was very diffi cult
to tell from the rear what was going on in the battle, but the 190th
Brigade held in reserve was aware that some hitch had occurred, and
pushing forward in the hope of retrieving it, found itself involved
in the fi erce fi ghting round the redoubt, where it also was exposed
to heavy loss. This brigade, it may be mentioned, was not naval, but
contained the 1st Honourable Artillery Company, the 4th Bedfords,
7th Royal Fusiliers, and 10th Dublins. The German fort could not
be reduced, nor could progress be made in the centre in face of its
machine-guns; but the infantry, which had passed it on either side,
extended along the Sunken Road behind it, and joined hands so as
to cut it off. The whole German second line was then in their possession, and the right third of their third line as well. The enemy still
held fi rm, however, in the centre of the fi rst-line system, and showed
no signs of weakening, although they must have known that British troops were in their rear. An attempt was made to re-bombard
this portion of the line, but it was diffi cult for the gunners without
aerial observation to locate the exact portion of the line which still
remained with the enemy, and there was great danger of the shells
falling among our own infantry. About three in the afternoon the
conclusion was reached that it was better for the time to leave this
great pocket of Germans alone, cutting them off from either escape
or reinforcement.
269
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
The 111th Brigade from the Thirty-seventh Division was therefore sent up, battalion by battalion, along the river-bank until it
passed the central obstacle and reached the Sunken Road. Thence
the 13th Rifl es were sent forward with orders to reach the advanced
line, where the Hoods and Drakes, somewhat reduced in numbers
but not in spirit, were lying in front of Beaucourt. It was dark before these changes could be made. The Rifl emen, when they had
attained their position, rested their right upon the Ancre, and prolonged their left, clearing the Germans out in that direction. This
movement to the left was strengthened in the early morning when
the 13th Rifl e Brigade and the 13th Royal Fusiliers of the same brigade came up to join in, whilst the H.A.C. also advanced and took up
a position on the right of the naval men.
About seven o’clock the assault upon the village was ordered,
under the direction and leadership of Commander Freyberg of the
Hoods, already twice wounded, and wounded once again before his
task was fi nished. Sailors and Rifl emen rushed forward at the signal, and dashed with fi erce impetuosity over the German line and
down the streets of the hamlet. The Honourable Artillery Company
upon the right joined in the charge. It was completely successful,
the houses were rapidly cleared, the dug-outs taken, and many hundreds of prisoners secured. The Rifl emen emerging on the farther
side of the village immediately dug in under the direction of their
only remaining company offi cer. A footbridge was at the same time
thrown across the Ancre, so as to connect up with the Thirty-ninth
Division on the south.
The German redoubt had held out manfully until its line of retreat was entirely cut off, and even then showed signs of continued
resistance. The tanks had already won such a position in the army
that they had become one of the last resources of the commander
who was in diffi culties. During the night of November 13 three of
270
Соседние файлы в предмете [НЕСОРТИРОВАННОЕ]