
- •FOREWORD
- •CONTENTS
- •1. INTRODUCTION
- •1.1. BACKGROUND
- •1.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT
- •1.3. OBJECTIVE
- •1.4. SCOPE
- •1.5. USERS
- •1.6. STRUCTURE
- •2. CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT — PREPARATORY PHASE
- •2.1. PLANNING
- •2.2. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
- •2.3. ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
- •2.4. MAIN CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
- •2.5. LICENSING MANAGEMENT
- •2.6. PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT
- •2.7. CONSTRUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
- •2.8. SECURITY
- •3.1. OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS (SITE AND HQ) AND MAIN ACTIVITIES DURING CONSTRUCTION
- •3.2. MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
- •3.3. COORDINATION OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES
- •3.4. CATEGORIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION WORK PACKAGES
- •3.5. PROJECT SCHEDULING AND CONTROL DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE
- •3.6. QUALITY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
- •3.7. CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION
- •3.8. SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
- •3.9. DEVELOPING A HUMAN RESOURCES PLAN
- •4.1. CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION PROCESS
- •4.2. TURNOVER PROCESSES
- •4.3. PRESERVING REFERENCE DATA, MATERIAL CONDITIONS, KEEP TEST MATERIAL
- •5.1. CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- •5.2. COUNTRY SPECIFIC LESSONS LEARNED
- •5.3. COUNTRY REPORT SUMMARY
- •6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- •REFERENCES
- •ABBREVIATIONS
- •Glossary
- •I–1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION
- •I–2. LESSONS LEARNED
- •II–1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF BELENE NPP
- •II–2. LESSONS LEARNED
- •IV–1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF NPP
- •IV–2. LESSONS LEARNED
- •IV–3. PROJECT MANAGEMENT – CONSTRUCTION PHASE
- •V–1. CONSTRUCTION APPROACH
- •V–2. COMMISSIONING SCHEME
- •V–3. GRADING OF HEPCO’ INVOLVEMENT
- •V–4. PROCESS OF TURNOVERS
- •V–5. COMMISSIONING FOR SYSTEMS AND PLANT TURNOVER
- •VI–1. STATUS OF NPP IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
- •VI–2. CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT ISSUE
- •VI–3. LESSONS LEARNED
- •VII–1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF NPP
- •VII–2. LESSONS LEARNED
- •VIII–1. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF DESIGN SOLUTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF RUSSIA
- •IX–1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION
- •IX–2. LESSONS LEARNED
- •BIBLIOGRAPHY
- •CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
If nuclear specific practices are not recognized and understood by the sub-contractors at the time of contract signature, difficulties are to be expected at a later stage. It has been noted that:
—The real competence of manufacturers and sub-contractors is not easy to judge through auditing only;
—Evaluation of the manufacturer’s ability at the shop/factory is important;
—The vendor needs to ensure not only their sub-contractors uphold the nuclear quality standards but that its subcontractors in turn require the same nuclear quality standard throughout the entire supply chain.
The Owner/Operator needs to have means to ascertain that the issues specific to nuclear safety and quality management, and the respective controls are properly agreed upon in each contract between the vendor and its subcontractors, including the entire supply chain.
5.3.5.Commissioning and operation
The transfer of responsibility and knowledge from the construction teams to the commissioning teams and on to operational staff can be facilitated by appointing commissioning and operations teams early and actively encouraging collaboration. Making equipment suppliers and installers responsible for the work and having commissioning staff as members of their team ensures that the right expertise is made available in a timely way, experience is gained and knowledge transferred. Ensuring that foreign material is prevented from entering the process systems and taking measures, prior to nuclear power generation, to reduce the corrosion products that could circulate through the core, will reduce radiation fields and operator dose that arise from subsequent operation of the plant. A lack of cleanliness during commissioning of either circuit can result in problems several decades into operation.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Experience has shown that nuclear projects have faced challenges similar to other complex mega projects with additional specific issues. The major conclusions and recommendations are as follows:
—Assign high priority to safety and quality over cost and schedule;
—A regulatory framework should be established before launching the nuclear power project and the regulatory process is rigorous for nuclear power plants;
—First of a kind projects are more challenging, complex, and costly than follow on replica plant;
—Establish a high qualified project management team;
—The design must be mature, and licensing issues resolved prior to start of construction and sufficient project pre-planning done;
—Ensure that sub-contractors are of high quality and experienced in nuclear construction or are taught the necessary special skills and requirements for quality, traceability and documentation;
—Establish and maintain good communications with the public;
—The QA programme for the nuclear power industry is more stringent than for other industries. The QA programme interfaces the design, procurement, construction, manufacturing, installation and commissioning functions;
—The systematic generation, preservation, verification and administration of documentation is of a vital significance supporting the license configuration and traceability of the design and safety parameters for future modifications;
—Nuclear reactor’s life time cost is concentrated upfront as capital cost, and therefore delays in construction may become intolerable in terms of both lost revenues and interest on the capital;
—Security has a special significance at nuclear power plants and should be taken into consideration during the construction.
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REFERENCES
[1]U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Nuclear Power 2010, MPR-2627, Construction Schedule Evaluation, Revision 2, MPR Associates, US DOE, Washington D.C. (2004).
[2]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Project Management: A guidebook, Technical Reports Series No. 279, IAEA, Vienna (1998).
[3]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS R-3, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[4]PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge — PMBOK® Fourth Edition, PMI, Newtown (2008).
[5]PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Construction Extension to the PMBOK® Guide Third Edition, PMI, Newtown (2007).
[6]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Managing the First Nuclear Power Plant Project, IAEA-TECDOC-1555, IAEA, Vienna (2007).
[7]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Invitation and Evaluation of Bids for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, No. NG-T-3.9, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
[8]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Risk Management: A Tool for Improving NPP Performance, IAEA-TECDOC-1209, IAEA, Vienna (2001).
[9]PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Project and Program Risk Management: A Guide to Managing Project Risks and Opportunities, PMI, Newtown (1992).
[10]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
[11]PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Practice Standard for Earned Value Management, PMI, Newtown (2005).
[12]PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Practice Standard for Work Breakdown Structures, PMI, Newtown (2001).
[13]RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY, Construction Inspection Programme, Licensing and Regulatory Oversight of new Nuclear Build Workshop in Helsinki and Olkiluoto, Petteri Tiippana, STUK, Helsinki (2008).
[14]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations, IAEA-TECDOC-1329, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[15]PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Construction Extension to the PMBOK® Guide Third Edition, PMI, Newtown (2007).
[16]INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Management Systems for Facilities and Activities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[17]PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge — PMBOK® Fourth Edition, PMI, Newtown (2008).
[18]TVO Press Release 21/04/2010 http://www.tvo.fi/www/page/3405/
[19]Fennovoima Press Release 06/05/2010, http://www.fennovoima.com/en/pressreleases/
[20]LAAKSONEN, J., Regulatory oversight of Olkiluoto 3 (EPR) construction lessons learned, 20th International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, Espoo (2009).
[21]THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, Engineering the future, Nuclear Lessons Learned, published by the Royal Academy of Engineering on behalf of Engineering the future, ISBN 1-903496-60-8, London (2010).
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ABBREVIATIONS |
ABWR |
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor |
CAR |
Construction Assurance Report |
AE |
Architect Engineer |
ATP |
Authorization to Proceed |
BBS |
Budget Breakdown Structure |
BOP |
Balance of Plant |
CAT |
Construction Acceptance Test |
CHT |
Cold Hydro Test |
COD |
Commercial Operation Date |
COTS |
Commercial of the Shelf |
EPC |
Engineering Procurement Construction |
EPR |
European Pressurized Water Reactor |
FSAR |
Final Safety Analysis Report |
HFT |
Hot Functional Test |
I&C |
Instrumentation and Control |
ILRT |
Integrated Leak Rate Test |
INIR |
Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review |
IRSS |
Integrated Regulatory Review Service |
MDEP |
Mutual Design Evaluation Process |
NCR |
Non-Conformance report |
NSSS |
Nuclear Steam Supply System |
OSART |
Operational Safety Review Team |
PAT |
Power Ascension Test |
PC |
Procurement and Construction |
PIP |
Project Implementation Plan |
PNSC |
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee |
PSAR |
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report |
QA |
Quality Assurance |
QC |
Quality Control |
RCS |
Reactor Coolant System |
SAT |
Standby Auxiliary Transformers |
SIT |
Structure Integrity Test |
SG |
Steam Generator |
STUK |
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority from Finland |
TG |
Turbo Generator |
TWG |
Test Working Group |
WBS |
Work Breakdown Structure |
CSA |
Canadian Standards Association |
ASME |
America Society Mechanical Engineers |
AEC |
Architecture, Engineering, Construction |
INCOSE |
International Council Of Systems Engineering |
P&ID |
Process and Instrumentation Diagrams |
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