
- •Introduction for English Version
- •Toshiaki Enomoto
- •Foreword
- •Table of Contents
- •Xj nsra, Japan
- •X;;; nsra, Japan
- •Chapter 5
- •Chapter 6
- •Chapter 1 General
- •History of Nuclear Power Plant Development
- •Experiences in Nuclear Power Generation and Safety Research
- •Comparison of Schemes of Nuclear and Thermal Power Generation
- •Effective Reactor Fuel Loading
- •Reactor Self-Regulation Characteristics
- •Reactor Decay Heat
- •Confinement of fPs
- •Reactor Steam Conditions
- •Safety Design Principles for npPs
- •Prevention of Occurrence of Abnormal Conditions (Level 1)
- •Figure 1.4.1 Defense-in-Depth philosophy
- •Prevention of Expansion of an Abnormal Event (Level 2)
- •Prevention of Abnormal Release of Radioactive Materials and Mitigation of Consequence (Level 3)
- •Emergency core cooling system
- •Confinement of radioactive materials by five barriers
- •Outline of Laws, Regulations and the Regulatory Framework
- •Domestic Framework
- •Permit to establish a power generating reactor
- •Sanction of the construction plan
- •Approval of technical specifications
- •Regulations after start of commercial operation
- •Iaea Safety Standards
- •Figure 1.5.4 Structure of iaea safety standards
- •Chapter 2 Systems of bwr Nuclear Power Plants
- •General Design Philosophy
- •Fuel Rods
- •Reactor Core
- •Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
- •Engineered Safety Features
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Other Systems
- •Plant Layout
- •Plot Plan
- •Grade level planning
- •Configuration of the buildings
- •Road planning
- •Pipe conduits and electric cable conduits planning
- •Construction area planning
- •Harbor and water intake/discharge planning
- •Other considerations
- •Main Buildings and Auxiliary Buildings
- •Figure 2.2.2 Overall plant layout of a bwr npp
- •Reactor building
- •Turbine building
- •Figure.2.2.7 Main building arrangements (two-unit site)
- •Main control room (Control building)
- •Radioactive waste treatment facility building
- •Service building
- •Exhaust stack
- •Advanced boiling water reactor (abwr) plant arrangement
- •Nuclear Reactor and Core
- •Fuel Rod and Fuel Assembly
- •Structure of fuel rod and fuel assembly
- •Figure 2.3.1 9x9 Fuel assembly (a type) and fuel rod structure (example)
- •Fuel rod and assembly designs
- •Reactor and Reactor Core
- •Structure of reactor and reactor core
- •Figure 2.3.4 Internal structure of a reactor pressure vessel (cut out view)
- •Vessel (rpv)
- •Incore monitor housing
- •Hpcf sparger top Fuel guide—
- •Reactivity control system
- •Core Design
- •Figure 2.3.20 Control rod with the maximum reactivity worth
- •Core stability
- •Operation and management of the core
- •Primary Coolant System
- •System Summary
- •Primary loop recirculation (plr) system
- •Main steam (ms) system
- •Feed water (fdw) system
- •Key Components
- •Reactor pressure vessel (rpv)
- •Figure 2.4.3 Control rod drive mechanism and in- core monitor housing
- •Recirculation pumps
- •Safety relief valve (srv)
- •Turbine System
- •System Summary
- •Main Turbine System and Auxiliary Equipment
- •Iypes of nuclear plant steam turbines
- •Steam turbine
- •Moisture separator and heater
- •Electro-hydraulic turbine control (ehc) unit
- •Main Steam System and Condensate Feed Water System
- •Main steam line and turbine bypass system
- •Steam extraction system and feed water heater drain system
- •Condenser and circulating water system
- •Condensate and feed water system and condensate cleanup system
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Reactor Instrumentation and Control System
- •Plant control system
- •Reactor neutron monitoring system (nms)
- •0 Source range monitor (srm) 4 detectors q Power range monitor (prm) 43x4detectors
- •Main Control Room
- •Structure and functions of control panels
- •3BbBia3b3jjsbj5ca;nS1ss!aacBa3caoanoDaj3j;|
- •Remote shutdown system (rss)
- •Emergency operational facilities
- •Process Instrumentation System
- •Reactor process instrumentation system
- •Figure 2.6.14 Reactor water level and pressure instrumentation
- •Radiation monitoring system
- •2.7 Engineered Safety Features
- •Design Policy of Engineered Safety Features
- •Basic safely philosophy
- •Philosophy to prevent occurrence of serious incidents
- •Philosophy to mitigate serious incidents
- •Emergency Core Cooling System (eccs)
- •Roles of the eccs
- •Criteria for design and evaluation of eccs
- •Design policies for the eccs
- •Eccs configuration
- •Eccs configuration of an abwr
- •Reactor Containment Facility
- •Roles of reactor containment facility
- •Primary containment vessel (pcv)
- •Containment spray system (css)
- •Flammable gas control system (fcs)
- •Standby gas treatment system (sgts)
- •Reactor containment facility of an abwr
- •Reactor Auxiliary Systems
- •Residual Heat Removal (rhr) System
- •Operating modes
- •System functions and configuration
- •Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (rcic) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Reactor Water Cleanup (cuw) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Key components and features
- •Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (fpc) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Figure 2.8.8 cuw pump (canned motor type)
- •Reactor Building Cooling Water (rcw) System and Reactor Building Cooling Seawater (rcws) System
- •System functions and configurations
- •Key components and features
- •Figure 2.8.10 Basic concept of rcw and rcws systems (example)
- •Fuel Handling and Storage System
- •Spent fuel storage pool
- •Cask pit
- •Refueling machine
- •Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems
- •Gaseous Waste Treatment System
- •Figure 2.9.1 a typical flow sheet of gaseous wastes treatment system (Example of a 1,100 mWe bwr plant)
- •Liquid Waste Treatment System
- •Solid Waste Treatment System
- •Generator excitation system
- •Major Transformers and Switchyard System
- •Major transformers
- •Switchyard system
- •Plant Auxiliary Power System
- •Plant auxiliary power supply system
- •Emergency diesel generator system
- •Direct current (dc) power supply system
- •Instrumentation and control power supply system
- •Plant Auxiliary Systems
- •Plant Water System
- •Plant water treatment system
- •Make-up water system
- •Auxiliary Steam System (House Boiler System)
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Compressed Air Supply System
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (hvac) System
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Figure 2.11.6 Outline of hvac system of the turbine building
- •Figure 2.11.7 Outline of hvac system of the main control room
- •Fire Protection System
- •Key equipment
- •Advanced bwr (abwr)
- •Design Principles
- •Enhanced safety and reliability
- •Figure 2.12.2 Reactor buildings (a 1,100 mWe bwr and an abwr)
- •System design
- •Advanced core
- •Reactor system
- •Reinforced concrete containment vessel (rccv)
- •Turbine system
- •Enhanced Safety
- •Improved reactor shutdown capabilities
- •I turbine driven reactor feedwater pump||
- •Figure 2.12.8 abwr safety features
- •Enhanced reactor cooling capability
- •Enhanced capability for containing radioactive materials
- •Overall safety
- •Figure 2.12.10 abwr eccs (three divisions)
- •Enhanced Operability and Maneuverability
- •Improved monitoring and maneuverability
- •Enhanced operability
- •Chapter 3 Systems of pwr Nuclear Power Plants
- •General Design Philosophy
- •Fuel Rods
- •Reactor Core
- •Engineered Safeguard Systems
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Other Systems
- •Plant Layout
- •Plot Plan
- •Intake and discharge structures
- •Switchyard
- •Reactor building and reactor auxiliary building
- •Turbine building
- •Water supply and treatment system
- •Radioactive waste storage building
- •Cask storage building
- •Harbor facilities
- •Access control system
- •Equipment Arrangement
- •Reactor building
- •Reactor auxiliary building
- •Turbine building
- •Fuel handling and storage building and facilities
- •Plant Layout Considerations
- •Building composition
- •General requirements of plant layout design
- •Decontamination Pi t
- •Isolation Valve
- •2 Loop Plant
- •3 Loop Plant
- •Figure 3.2.7 Buildings configurationn of nuclear power plants in japan
- •Figure 3.3.1 Schematic of fuel assembly and fuel rod
- •Structure of the fuel rods and fuel assemblies
- •Design of fuel rods and fuel assemblies
- •Figure 3.3.2(2) Support grid structure (2)
- •Reactor and Reactor Core
- •Structure of reactor and reactor core
- •Dynamic characteristics of the nuclear reactor
- •Core stability
- •Reactivity control
- •Figure 3.3.13 Critical boron concentration vs. Burnup (hot full power (hfp), all rods out)
- •Power distribution control
- •Figure 3.3.15 Reactivity worth of control group bank d (beginning of cycle, hot zero power, no xenon; example 4-loop core)
- •Figure 3.3.16 Structure of primary neutron source assembly
- •Figure 3.3.17 Structure of secondary neutron source assembly
- •Core management
- •Reactor Coolant System
- •Outline
- •System summary
- •System functions
- •Main Components
- •Reactor vessel
- •Steam generators
- •Pressurizer
- •Vertical u-lube type heat exchanger 7.D8 mPa [gage]
- •17.16 MPa (gage]
- •Reactor coolant piping
- •Reactor coolant pumps
- •IVol. Seal
- •Turbine System
- •Outline
- •Main Turbine and Its Appurtenances
- •Characteristics of Nuclear Power Plant Turbines
- •Turbine types, blade designs and steam cycles
- •Structures of turbines
- •Table 3.5.2 Turbine type and applicable output
- •Turbine governor system
- •Turbine steam inlet valves
- •Turbine protection system
- •Main Steam System
- •Main steam safety and relief valves
- •Main steam isolation and check valves
- •Turbine bypass valves
- •Condensate, Feedwater System and Other Related Systems
- •Condensate, feedwater system
- •Auxiliary feedwater system
- •Circulating water system
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Reactor Instrumentation and Control System
- •10 5 Neutron Source Range Trip Point
- •Figure 3.6.1 Out-of-core nuclear instrumentation range of measurement
- •High Neutron Flux {Power Range High Selling)
- •Sleam Generator Feedaler Flow Level tl *
- •Interlock
- •Reactor
- •Turbine Load Neutron Flux Level
- •Injection Pump Actuation
- •2/4 Logic
- •Figure 3.6.6 Pressurizer pressure protection and control system
- •Reactor control system
- •Figure 3.6.11 Feedwater control system
- •Main Control Room
- •Composition of main control board
- •Methods for monitoring and operation
- •Alarm system
- •(1) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (system screen)
- •(2) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (control screen)
- •(3) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (screen monitors only)
- •Operator assisting system
- •Plant operation management
- •Reactor shutdown panel outside the main control room
- •Emergency support plan
- •Process Instrumentation System
- •Primary system
- •Secondary system
- •Radiation Monitoring System
- •Process radiation monitors
- •Area monitors
- •Radiation measurement during accidents
- •Engineered Safety Feature
- •Systems and Their Functions
- •Emergency core cooling system (eccs)
- •Reactor containment facility
- •Containment spray system
- •Annulus air clean-up system
- •Safety component room air clean-up system
- •General points
- •Emergency Core Cooling System (eccs)
- •Functions
- •System configuration
- •Reactor Containment Facility
- •Functions and configuration
- •Functions and structure of the different containment vessels
- •External shield building
- •Annulus
- •Containment Spray System
- •Function
- •System configuration
- •Iodine removal chemicals tank
- •Functions
- •Components
- •Safety Component Area Air Clean-up System
- •Functions
- •Components
- •Reactor Auxiliary Systems
- •Chemical and Volume Control System (cvcs)
- •System composition and functions
- •Inside coo tai oment
- •Injection pump —:—
- •Components
- •Residual Heat Removal System (rhrs)
- •System composition and functions
- •Component cooling water |m1
- •Components
- •Component Cooling Water System (ccws)
- •System composition and functions
- •Components
- •Instrument air compressor a
- •Instrument air cos pressor b
- •I .Aurillary components,
- •I [important for safetyj
- •Sea Water System (sws)
- •Spent Fuel Pit Cooling and Clean-up
- •Fuel Handling System
- •Radioactive Waste Disposal System
- •Gaseous Waste Disposal System
- •Liquid Waste Disposal System
- •Figure 3.9.4 Boron recycle system evaporator (immersion heater type)
- •Solid Waste Disposal System
- •Electrical Systems
- •Main Generators and Appurtenances
- •Appurtenances of the main generators
- •Generator excitation system
- •Voltage regulator
- •Major Transformers and Transmission System
- •Generator load break switch (glbs)
- •Switchyard
- •Plant Auxiliary Power Supply
- •Figure 3.10.4 Switchyard bus composition
- •311 Power transformer
- •Dc power supply systems
- •Instrument power systems
- •Figure 3.10.6 Direct current power supply system (one of safety system)
- •Board feu | 4 c Icard for j I c
- •(Note)Wllh mechanical Interlock
- •Compressed Air Systems
- •Drain line
- •Sieaj control valve for turbine
- •Inside containment
- •Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
- •Figure 3.11.5 Auxiliary building heating, ventilating and air-conditioning system diagram (general & safety component rooms)
- •Figure 3.11.6 Auxiliary building heating, ventilating and air-conditioning system diagram (main control room)
- •Fire Protection System
- •Figure 3.12.1 Schematic view of apwr steam generators
- •Enhancement of reliability
- •Improvement of operability
- •Reduction of radiation exposure
- •Plant Design
- •Core internals
- •Steam generator
- •Instrument and control system
- •Turbine generator
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter 4 Operation and Maintenance of bwr Plants
- •Plant Operation
- •Plant Startup
- •Figure 4.1.1 Schematic diagram of bwr plant system
- •Figure 4.1.2 Startup curve after periodic inspection
- •Figure 4.1.3 Operating range of core thermal power and core flow
- •Normal Plant Operation
- •Implementing surveillance tests
- •Core management during operation
- •Chemistry control during plant operation
- •Other operational activities
- •Plant Shutdown
- •Chemistry control during plant shutdown
- •Plant Maintenance
- •Figure 4.2.1 Administrative classification of maintenance
- •Periodic Inspections and Licensee’s Periodic Inspections
- •Periodic inspections
- •Licensee’s periodic inspections
- •Time to carry out licensee’s periodic inspections (including the periodic inspections) and periodic checks
- •Items for the periodic inspections and licensee’s periodic inspections
- •Procedure and Work Schedule of Periodic Inspections
- •VII) Preparations for startup
- •IV) Fuel exchange & shuffling
- •VI) pcv upper head Qf ’
- •Other major work activities
- •Figure 4.2.4 Reactor recirculation pump
- •Contents of isIs
- •Remote automatic ultrasonic testing device for isIs
- •Checks and Maintenance during Plant Operation
- •Switching components during operation
- •Maintenance during operation
- •Efficiency Improvement of Periodic Inspection Work
- •Improvement of plant layout
- •Reduction of the time needed for the periodic inspection
- •Maintenance Against Plant Aging
- •Technical Study on Aging
- •Upgrading of evaluation technology
- •Maintenance Technology against Aging
- •Figure 4.3.3 Concept of seal weld
- •Figure 4.3.5 Core shroud tie rod
- •Figure 4.3.8 Principle of crc
- •Figure 4.3.11 Conceptual diagram of wol pipe cross section
- •Upgrading by Facility Replacement
- •Chapter 5 Operation and Maintenance of pwr Plants
- •Plant Operation
- •Reactor Control Systems
- •Control rod control system
- •Turbine bypass control system
- •Pressurizer pressure control system
- •Pressurizer water level control system
- •Steam generator water level control system
- •Plant Startup
- •Plant Normal Operation
- •Operator Activities during Plant Normal Operation
- •Plant Shutdown
- •Chemistry Control
- •Outline of chemistry control of primary system
- •Outline of chemistry control of secondary system
- •Management of waler trealment chemicals
- •Sg blow down water recovery system
- •Plant Maintenance
- •Maintenance Management Policy
- •Periodical Inspections and Periodical Utility Inspections
- •Figure 5.2.2 Framework of plant in-service inspection system
- •Major activities in the periodical inspection period
- •0Utline of other major activities
- •Table 5.2.2 Overhaul inspection required by regulations
- •Maintenance during plant normal operation
- •Checks during plant normal operation
- •Maintenance dining plant normal operation
- •Rationalization of Plant Features Related to Periodical Inspections
- •Optimization of plant equipment arrangement
- •Reduction of durations for periodical inspections
- •Reduction of radiation dose
- •Maintenance to Cope with Plant Aging
- •Technical Evaluation of Aging Effects
- •Maintenance Techniques to Cope with Plant Aging
- •Maintenance of Alloy 600
- •Upgrading of Plants by the Renewal of Systems
- •Chapter 6 Radiation Control
- •Purposes of Radiation Protection
- •Regulation for Radiation Protection
- •Legislative System for Radiation Protection
- •Specific Applications of Legislation
- •Industrial Safety and Health Law
- •Radiation Sources at npPs
- •Actual Conditions concerning Radiation Sources
- •Figure 6.3.1 (1) Trends in dose equivalent rates of the bwr plr system piping
- •Area Control
- •Standards of Area Control in Accordance with Legislation
- •Confirmation of Radiation Environment
- •Access to and Exit from Controlled Areas
- •Work Management
- •Study of Work Methods
- •Approval of Radiation Work
- •Confirmation of Work Environment
- •Completion of Work
- •Fundamentals of Radiation Protection for Work Management
- •6.7 Controls of the Individual
- •Qualification of Radiation Workers
- •Evaluation of Individual Dose
- •Target of Individual Dose Control
- •Records of Individual Dose
- •Track Record of Individual Dose
- •Figure 6.7.1 History of the number of npPs, number of radiation workers, and total dose in Japan (excluding gcr)
- •Fiscal year Figure 6.7.5 Trends in annual average total doses per npp in major counties
- •Radioactive Waste Management
- •Radioactive Solid Wastes
- •Radioactive liquid Wastes
- •Figure 6.8.3 Trends in total amount of solid wastes stored as of the end of each fiscal year (for each type of light water reactor) and the number of drums sent to the Rokkasho Center
- •Tire level to classify the "materials not required to heat as radioactive materials" as the radioactivity is low enough
- •Figure 6.8.5 Outline of the clearance system
- •Fiscal year
- •Figure 6.8.6 Trends in discharged radioactivity of radioactive liquid wastes (excluding tritium) (total discharge for each reactor type)
- •Fiscal year
- •Environmental Radiation Monitoring
- •Chapter 7 Safety Evaluation of
- •Bwr Plants
- •Basic Policy for Safety Evaluation
- •Objectives of Safety Evaluation
- •Anticipated Operational Occurrences
- •Assumption of Event
- •Abnormal Withdrawal of Control Rods during Reactor Startup
- •Loss of Feed Water Heater
- •Loss of Load
- •Features of abwr Transient Analysis
- •Accidents
- •Assumption of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant (in case of a Large Break)
- •Time after the accident (s)
- •Characteristics of abwr Accident Analysis
- •Major Accidents and Hypothetical Accidents
- •Assumption of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Main Steam Line Break
- •(Note) These numbers are to be used for the whole body dose evaluation together with those of noble gases.
- •Figure 7.4.2(1) Process of iodine release during the main steam line break (major accident)
- •Dose Evaluation
- •(Note) These numbers are to be used for the whole body dose evaluation together with those of noble gases.
- •Probabilistic Safety Assessment (psa) for bwRs
- •Psa during Operation
- •Figure 7.5.1 Contribution of each sequence to the core damage frequency
- •Psa during Shutdown
- •Severe Accident
- •Chapter 8 Safety Evaluation of
- •Pwr Plants
- •Basic Principles for Safety Evaluation
- •Purposes of Safety Evaluation
- •Methodology for Safety Evaluation
- •Abnormal Transients during Operation
- •Postulation of Events
- •Partial Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow
- •Figure 8.2.1 Partial loss of reactor coolant flow (• indicates the initial value)
- •Uncontrolled Control Rod Withdrawal at Reactor Startup
- •Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow
- •Figure 8.2.2 Uncontrolled control rod withdrawal at reactor startup (•Indicates the initial value)
- •Accidents
- •Postulation of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- •Major Accidents and Hypothetical Accidents
- •Postulation of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- •Release from fuel rods to the reactor system
- •Release from the primary system to the secondary system
- •Release into the atmosphere
- •Probabilistic Safety Assessment (psa) for pwr Plants
- •Outline of Probabilistic Safety Assessment
- •Use of psa for safety management in the shutdown state
- •Chapter 9 Siting
- •Site Assessment
- •Site Conditions
- •Procedures for Site Assessment
- •Environmental impact assessment
- •Preliminary public hearing
- •Designation of important electric power development area
- •Basic Philosophy of Site Safety
- •Site Review Procedures and Contents
- •Hie Concept of Site Safety in the iaea Site Safety Standard
- •Reactor Site Criteria in the u.S.
- •Siting Philosophy
- •Site Assessment
- •Procedure for Radiation Effect Evaluation
- •Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
- •Seismic Safety
- •Basic Policy on Seismic Design
- •Figure 9.5.1 Formulation flow chart of design basis earthquake ground motion Ss ote£g)
- •Elastically design earthquake ground motion Sd (edegmSd)
- •Seismic Assessment
- •In the equipments
- •Seismic assessment of equipment and piping system
- •Maritime Environment Protection
- •The Effects of Thermal Effluent
- •Hie Effects of Coastal Structures
- •Advanced Siting Concept
- •General
- •Need for qa Activities in Nuclear Power Plants (npPs)
- •Addressing qa
- •International Trends in qa Activities for npPs
- •Development of Commercial qa Standards in Japan
- •1996 (Country taking part in un)
- •Establishment of jeac4111-2003
- •Quality Management System (qms)
- •Figure 10.2.2 Process diagram on npp (example)
- •Stipulation of qms
- •Provision of quality policy and quality objectives
- •Presentation of evidence of effective operation of qms
- •Document Control
- •Record Control
- •Management Responsibility (Top Management)
- •Quality Policy and Quality Objectives
- •Management Representative
- •Review by Management (Management Review)
- •Table 10.3.2 Three outputs on management review
- •Education and Training (Human Resources)
- •Product Realization Planning (Work Planning)
- •Product Realization Planning (Work Planning)
- •Noncon forming action/corrective action
- •Preventive action
- •Relationship with Customer
- •Determination and Review of Requirements related to the Product (Work)
- •Customer Communication and Customer Satisfaction
- •10.6 Design and Development
- •Planning of Design and Development
- •Verification
- •Validation
- •Figure*! 0.6.1 Process flow of design and development
- •Inputs to Design and Development
- •Outputs from Design and Development
- •Review of Design and Development
- •Table 10.6.2 Examples of verification items in the design review
- •Verification of Design and Development
- •Validation of Design and Development
- •Configuration Management of Design and Development
- •Purchasing
- •Purchasing Process
- •Communication with Suppliers
- •Purchasing Requirements
- •Verification of Purchased Products
- •Table10.7.1 Examples of purchase requirements
- •10.8 Production and Service Provision (Implementation of Work)
- •Control of Production and Service Provision (Control of Work)
- •Validation of Processes
- •Analysis of data and improvement (Sec.10.10)
- •Analysis of data
- •Nonconforming action / corrective action
- •Preventive action
- •Table 10.8.1 Controlled conditions and their examples
- •Identification and Traceability
- •Control of Monitoring and Measuring Devices
- •Monitoring & Measurement and Internal Audit
- •Product realization(Sec.L0.5) Production and service provision (implementation of work) (Sec. 10.8)
- •Monitoring and Measurement of Processes
- •Table 10.9.5 Examples of the monitored and measured items for npPs
- •Internal Audit
- •Analysis of Data and Improvement
- •Analysis of Data
- •Nonconforming Control & Corrective Action
- •Product realization(Sec.L0.5) Production and service provision (implementation of work) (Sec. 10.8)
- •Figure 10.10.1 pdca cycle for product realization in the quality management system
- •Preventive Action
- •Appendixes
- •Appendix 1 Chronology of Nuclear Power Plants
- •Improved transient performance
- •Improvement of plant availability
- •Improved main control board (1990s)
- •Appendix 8 The Outline of International Nuclear Event Scale (ines)
*Changes
due to transients
[Source]
Mitsubishi open documents
so that, a permanent contact between the grid springs and the fuel
rods over the life of the fuel assemblies is maintained. In
addition, to avoid fuel rod contact with top and bottom nozzles (due
to fuel rod elongation during irradiation), sufficient end
clearances between rods and nozzles are provided.
Hold down forces of sufficient magnitude to oppose the dynamic lift
of the primary coolant flow on the fuel assemblies are obtained by
the leaf springs of the top nozzle. Besides the leaf spring forces,
loading imposed by rapid insertion of the control rods (scram) as
well as the hydraulic forces developed in the event of a postulated
LOCA are considered in design of the control rod guide thimbles. The
maximum impact force on the support grids for the design-basis
earthquake occurrence is calculated by a group vibration analyses
method and the results are compared with the experimental results to
ensure that the grid deformation will never disturb the insertion of
the control rods into the guide thimbles.
As shown in Figure 3.3.4, the structural elements of a PWR and the
reactor core consist of the RV,
fuel assemblies, core
internals (CI), rod cluster control (RCC) and control rod
drive mechanism (CRDM).
The initially loaded core is divided into regions of three different
enrichments. Fuel assemblies are arranged in a roughly cylindrical
pattern in the core. Light water is used as the primary coolant to
cool the core and moderate the neutrons at the same time. Boric
acid, a soluble neutron absorber, is used in the coolant to control
long term reactivity changes.
The reactor internals are designed to support the fuel assemblies in
the core and they are divided into two main parts, i.e., the lower
core structure and the upper core structure. The primary coolant
enters into the RV through the inlet nozzles located in the upper
section of the vessel, passes down through an annular passage
between the core barrel and the vessel wall (downcomer) to the lower
plenum formed by the bottom head, then enters the bottom of the core
and flows up to the upper plenum. The coolant temperature rises by
absorbing the heat generated in fuel rods while passing through the
NSRA,
Japan
3-20
Reactor and Reactor Core
Structure of reactor and reactor core
Chapter
3 Systems of PWR Nuclear Power Plants
Core
barret
Upper
core
support plate
Control
rod drive
mechanism
Reactor
vessel head
Upper
core plate
Thermal
shield
Core
baffle
Reactor
vessel
Fuel
assembly
Radial
support
Lower
core
support plate
Reactor
vessel
inlet
nozzle
Lower
core
support
plate
Lower
core
plate
Reactor
vessel
outlet
nozzle
Upper
core support column
Control
rod cluster
(withdrawn)
Figure
3.3.4 Reactor and internal structures core.
After mixing in the upper plenum, the coolant leaves the RV through
the outlet nozzles located on the same plane as the inlet nozzles.
The
upper core support structure, shown in Figure
3.3.5, consists of the upper core support plate, upper core plate,
rod cluster control (RCC)
Control
rod cluster
guide
Lube
guide tubes and thermocouples (for measuring the coolant
temperature). Hie upper
core support structure is positioned on the core barrel of the lower
core support structure by flat-sided pins pressed into the core
barrel. The major support structure of the reactor core is the lower
core support structure shown in Figure 3.3.6. The core barrel of the
lower core support structure provides an annular passageway for the
coolant flow.
In order to minimize the corrosion products and accompanying
radioactivity accumulation in the primary coolant, all parts which
are in direct contact with the reactor coolant are made of either
stainless steel or stainless steel-clad materials. The fuel cladding
is made from Zircaloy-4 or zirconium- based alloy which has
excellent corrosion resistance in addition to good nuclear
characteristics. Water quality in the closed cycle of the primary
cooling system is maintained to minimize corrosion. This is
accomplished by adjusting the pH of the water to a proper value
using lithium hydroxide (LiOH) and also, by supplying hydrogen gas
to the water to promote recombination of the free oxygen molecules
produced by dissociation of water molecules due to irradiation.
Figure
3.3.5 Upper core support structure
Figure
3.3.6 Lower core support structure
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NSRA,
Japan
A summary of reactor and core specifications of Japanese
designed PWR NPPs is given in Table 3.3.3.
Core design
The reactor core is designed to produce a rated thermal power
throughout its specified lifetime without exceeding the safety
limits. In this regard, two main design objectives are
determination of the core size to obtain the rated thermal
output and safety assurance during normal operation and
accidents.
Determination of core size
The general design procedure of the reactor core size is shown
in Figure 3.3.7. The size of the reactor core basically depends
on the
thermal power objective and linear power density of the fuel
rods. Two conditions are set for determination of the number of
fuel assemblies: assuming a three-region-three-cycle
core; and keeping the symmetry of the core which implies that
the number of fuel assemblies in each region must be a multiple
of 4. In addition, one fuel assembly is necessary in the center
of the core. These conditions require that the total number of
the fuel assemblies must be equal to (4x3xN) +1 in which N is an
integer number. The core height should be determined by
considering the neutron economy which requires an equivalent
core diameter to core height ratio as close as possible to 1.
However, this criterion is not fully satisfied in the current
reactors, because the height of the
Table
3.3.3 Specifications of Japanese reactors and their cores |
2 |
3 |
4 |
||||
Electrical Power (MWe) |
340 |
500 |
559-579 |
826 |
870-890 |
1160-1180 |
|
Thermal Power (MWt) |
1031 |
1456 |
1650 |
2432 |
2652 |
3411 |
|
Core |
Equivalent diameter (m) |
2.47 |
2.47 |
2.47 |
3.04 |
3.04 |
3.37 |
Active height (m) |
3.05 |
. 3.66 |
3.66 |
3.66 |
3.66 |
3.66 |
|
Fuel Assembly |
Array |
14x14 |
14x14 |
14x14 |
15x15 |
17x17 |
17x17 |
No. of assemblies |
121 |
121 |
121 |
157 |
157 |
193 |
|
Fuel Rod |
Cladding outer diameter (mm) |
10.7 |
10.7 |
10.7 |
10.7 |
9.5 |
9.5 |
No. of rods/ assemblies |
179 |
179 |
179 |
204 |
264 |
264 |
|
Average Dnear Power (kW/m) |
15.4 |
17.9 |
20.3 |
20.2 |
17.1 |
17.9 |
|
Power Density (kW/m3) |
71 |
83 |
95 |
92 |
100 |
105 |
|
NPPs |
Mihama No.l |
Mihama No.2 |
Genkai No.l Genkai No.2 Ikata No.l Ikata No.2 Tomari No.l Tomari No.2 |
Takahama No.l Takahama No.2 Mihama No.3 |
Sendai No.l Sendai No.2 Takahama No.3 Takahama No,4 Ikata No.3 |
Ohi No.l Ohi No.2 Tsuruga No.l Ohi No.3 Ohi No,4 Genkai No.3 Genkai No.4 |
NSRA,
Japan
3~22
Chapter
3 Systems of PWR Nuclear Power Plants
Figure
3.3.7 Flow chart of core size determination
reactor core is standardized due to manufacturing reasons.
Nuclear design requirements for safety assurance
In order to ensure that the core has inherent safety provisions
through the provided negative reactivity coefficient, and the plant
has a sufficient shutdown margin, the following items are evaluated:
Sufficient shutdown margin is provided by two independent
reactivity control systems, i.e. by the RCC assemblies and by
injection of boric acid.
The design provides that the maximum reactivity
insertion rate corresponding to the maximum withdrawal rate of rod
cluster control (RCC) never exceeds its upper limit.
The design must guarantee
a negative reactivity
feedback (Doppler coefficient and moderator temperature coefficient)
characteristics of the core.
Further, the reactor core is designed so that the core power
distribution (power peaking coefficient) meets the criteria on fuel
temperature and critical heat
flux ratio (DNBR). After completion of the plant (i.e.
completion of
the test run and start of commercial operation),
refueling is conducted during the periodical inspection outages, for
which it is necessary to determine the next fuel loading pattern,
recalculate the core nuclear characteristics parameters and confirm
the safety of the core.
During reactor operation, it is necessary to trace the fuel burnup
through the recording and analyzing of various data (specially, core
output and core power distribution records). Fuel burnup information
is used as input data to determine the fuel loading pattern in the
next loading of the core.
The initially loaded core at the plant completion (first cycle core)
and the partially refueled core after each refueling operation
(second cycle, third cycle,...) are generally called the initial
core and reload
cores, respectively.
The initial core
The initial core is divided into three regions; each region is
loaded with fuel assemblies of different enrichment on the premise
of three- region-three-cycle refueling. The numbers of fuel
assemblies in each region are almost the same. The
fuel enrichment at each region is determined by considering the
following items. CD Planned unloading fuel burnup.
Larger operation cycles higher fuel enrichment
Sufficient flattening of power distribution.
Fuel assemblies with the highest enrichments (region 3) are placed
around the outside of the core (in a concentric circle) and the two
groups of assemblies of lower enrichments (regions 2 and 3) are
arranged in a selected pattern (checkerboard
pattern) in the central parts of the core. The initial
core is subject to three refueling operations which take place
generally in accordance with an inward loading schedule. Because the
initial core cycle contains more excess reactivity than subsequent
fuel cycles as a result of the loading of all-fresh fuel, burnable
poison rods are introduced to keep the negative moderator
temperature coefficient (this is done by reducing the soluble poison
concentration at the initial core cycle).
The reload cores
Reload core design calculations are carried out for each reload core
after the second cycle core, since the design conditions listed
below are different for different plants and different core
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operating cycles.
(D Burnup of reloaded fuel
which depends on the operating conditions in the preceding cycle and
on the new loading pattern.
If any mechanical defect is detected in the fuel assemblies to be
reloaded, the defective
fuel assembly is replaced by a new one.
The burnup plan of the concerned cycle is determined by considering
the plan of electrical power supply during the operation cycle
period.
@ The enrichment of the
fresh fuel might be changed based on the long-term operation plan of
the reactor.
Thermal-hydraulic safety limits
The reactor is designed so that the minimum critical heat flux
ratio (DNBR) is always greater than a specified value. The
temperature difference of the heat transfer surface (temperature
difference between the coolant and the cladding surface) is
determined, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.8, by the heat
flux and heat transfer rate inclination
of the curve).
Boiling phenomena develop as: the subcooled region (A-B), where
boiling does not occur even with increasing heat flux (heat
generation); the nucleate Boiling region (B-C), where small bubbles
are vigorously formed at the heat transfer surface and detach from
the surface; and the film boiling region (E-F), where bubble number
increases rapidly and the bubbles become so numerous that they begin
to clump near the heating surface before finally forming a
continuous film of vapor over the surface in the D-E-F region (the
film boiling region). When the heat flux exceeds point C in the
figure, the heating surface temperature rise will suddenly jump into
region E-F dramatically not passing through the transition boiling
region (C-D) where partial
film boiling generally occurs.
Long-time operation at such high temperatures will possibly lead to
fuel failure due to clad deterioration. Therefore, the design has
the provision so that such a high clad surface temperature will
never be reached during the normal operation or under any
anticipated abnormal transient conditions.
The point C in the figure is defined as the DNB (departure from
nucleate boiling) point and the
Temperature Difference: Tw-Ts
• “C
'l\v:
Heat Transfer Surface
Temperature Ts: Saturation
Temperature
Figure
3.3.8 Boiling characteristics
corresponding heat flux is called the critical
heat flux (or DNB
heat flux). The
critical heat flux not only depends on local conditions such as
coolant flow, pressure and vapor content, but it also depends on
many other factors such as inlet enthalpy of coolant, channel
length, upstream channel shape and condition. For assessing the
thermal margin of the fuel in the core, the ratio of the critical
heat flux at a particular core location to the existing heat flux at
the same location (the critical
heat flux ratio: DNBR) is defined as nxmn
critical heat
flux local heat flux
DNBR is chosen as an index of the thermal margin of the fuels in the
core.
The fuel rods are designed such that the fuel center temperature is
less than the melting point of UO2.
This criterion is necessary to prevent the occurrence of the
following problems.
(T) Sudden expansion of the
uranium oxide fuel followed by pellet-clad interaction.
(2) Increase of the internal pressure of the cladding due to release
of fission gases.
©Chemical interaction
between fuel and cladding material.
Since the thermal conductivity of the UO2
fuel is
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Japan
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