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  1. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (psa) for bwRs

  1. Psa during Operation

Hie safety evaluations described so far are called deterministic safety evaluations, in which some representative events are assumed to envelop various potential events and then it is confirmed that their analytical results satisfy the criteria.

In contrast to this, the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is a method to comprehensively evaluate the development and effects of an event, by combining the occurrence frequency of an event that leads to an anomaly or accident of a nuclear reactor facility (initiating event) with the failure probability of each system and component that mitigate the effects of the event. Since the WASH-1400 (Rasmussen Report) was issued in 1975, the evaluation method has been established, and also in Japan, standards such as those for performing PSA have been prepared.

Also in Japan, PSAs have been applied by research and industrial organizations. Out of the PSAs performed on Japanese NPPs of the following types, the information obtained from the level 1 PSA to estimate core damage frequency is described.

  1. MARK-I type BWR-3

  2. MARK-I type BWR-4

  3. MARK-II type BWR-5

  4. RCCV-type ABWR

For the level 1 PSA, the occurrence frequencies of "significant core-damage events" of representative light water NPPs are sufficiently lower than 10-5 / reactor year, even if the uncertainties of the evaluations etc. are taken into consideration; this is approximately one order of magnitude lower compared with the US evaluation results. This is because the occurrence frequency of initiating events in Japan is approximately one order of magnitude lower than that in the US.

In addition, the "significant core-damage event" is defined as the "evaluated condition to show that the temperature of part of the fuel cladding in a core exceeds 1,200 °C", which does not necessarily mean that the core is damaged.

On the other hand, when comparing the contribution of each sequence to the total core damage frequency, the differences in the configurations of the safety system can be identified (Figure 7.5.1). For BWR-3 plants, sequences with LOCA events as initiating events are dominant, but, for BWR-4/5 or ABWR plants, sequences with

NSRA, Japan

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