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the increment of fuel enthalpy at peak power 167 kJ/kg-UO2 (40 cal/g-UOg) is used as the reference threshold level for fuel failure caused by the fuel pellet-clad mechanical interaction (PCMI failure) with the pellet burnup of 65,000 MWd/t or more, no damage to the fuel occurs.

  1. Loss of Feed Water Heater

When the function of the feed water heater is lost, the reactor power will increase due to the positive reactivity added to the core from the feed water temperature decrease and the core inlet subcooling increase.

The feed water heater consists of several stages. Although one of the stages loses its heating function, the feed water system is designed so that the feed water temperature change is limited to less than 55°C.

The neutron flux increases to about 122% of the rated value due to the increased inlet subcooling when a feed water temperature drop of 55 °C is assumed in the analysis. The surface heat flux also increases to about 121% of the rated value, and the reactor is scrammed by the high neutron flux signal (equivalent for heat flux) in about 99 seconds (marked by the arrow in Figure 7.2.2). Hie maximum value of AMCPR is 0.16 and MCPR does not become less than 1.07. Change in the reactor pressure is comparatively mild and is about 7.11 MPas [gage] at the highest.

  1. Loss of Load

The generator load rejection and the turbine trip are events included in the category of "loss of load". Since both events are the same in terms of the external disturbance to the nuclear reactor from the viewpoint of main steam flow shutoff, the generator load rejection event is explained here.

When the generator load rejection occurs due to a power grid accident etc. during reactor operation with high output, the turbine control valve is immediately closed to prevent turbine generator overspeed caused by the loss of electric load. Consequently, the reactor pressure goes up because there is no area where the steam generated in the reactor can be released. If this situation continues, the MCPR decreases due to increased nuclear reaction and increased reactor power from the

collapse of voids in the core followed by increased reactor pressure.

The following measures are taken against such an event for a NPP.

  1. The reactor is shutdown automatically with load rejection (except the 100% bypass plant).

  2. The core pressure rise is mitigated by rapid opening turbine bypass valves and directly sending steam to the condenser with immediate turbine control valve closure.

  3. The reactor power is decreased by the recirculation pump trip with immediate turbine control valve closure.

  4. The safety and relief valves open when the reactor pressure reaches the pressure setpoint of the valves.

The analysis results for the most typical BWRs with 25% bypass capacity are shown in Figures 7.2.3(1) to (3). The reactor pressure reaches about 7.74 MPas [gage] after the generator load rejection (arrow of Figure 7.2.3 (1)). The neutron flux reaches about 128% of the rated value momentarily due to the collapse of voids (arrow of Figure 7.2.3

  1. ), but the pressure rise is mitigated by opening of the safety and relief valves. AMCPR of this transient is about 0.03 and the MCPR does not drop below the safety limit of 1.07.

Although in the example described above the turbine bypass valves open as they were designed to do, the example with no bypass valve opening is also performed as a conservative case in the safety evaluation. Figure 7.2.3 (3) shows the results of this analysis. The core behavior here is severer (for example, the safety and relief valve flow rate is about 30% higher, and the reactor pressure rise is also severe). Even in this case, AMCPR is about 0.05 and the MCPR does not drop below the safety limit of 1.07.

The load rejection is an unavoidable event including an external factor as far as the generation of power is concerned, and it is also an event experienced in all NPPs at comparatively high frequency. Since it is not necessarily expedient to shut down the NPP at every occurrence of the event with such high frequency, there are plants with 100% bypass capacity. The transients in this case are shown in Figure 7.2.3 (4). In this design, the shutdown of the nuclear reactor is avoided

NSRA, Japan

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