
- •Introduction for English Version
- •Toshiaki Enomoto
- •Foreword
- •Table of Contents
- •Xj nsra, Japan
- •X;;; nsra, Japan
- •Chapter 5
- •Chapter 6
- •Chapter 1 General
- •History of Nuclear Power Plant Development
- •Experiences in Nuclear Power Generation and Safety Research
- •Comparison of Schemes of Nuclear and Thermal Power Generation
- •Effective Reactor Fuel Loading
- •Reactor Self-Regulation Characteristics
- •Reactor Decay Heat
- •Confinement of fPs
- •Reactor Steam Conditions
- •Safety Design Principles for npPs
- •Prevention of Occurrence of Abnormal Conditions (Level 1)
- •Figure 1.4.1 Defense-in-Depth philosophy
- •Prevention of Expansion of an Abnormal Event (Level 2)
- •Prevention of Abnormal Release of Radioactive Materials and Mitigation of Consequence (Level 3)
- •Emergency core cooling system
- •Confinement of radioactive materials by five barriers
- •Outline of Laws, Regulations and the Regulatory Framework
- •Domestic Framework
- •Permit to establish a power generating reactor
- •Sanction of the construction plan
- •Approval of technical specifications
- •Regulations after start of commercial operation
- •Iaea Safety Standards
- •Figure 1.5.4 Structure of iaea safety standards
- •Chapter 2 Systems of bwr Nuclear Power Plants
- •General Design Philosophy
- •Fuel Rods
- •Reactor Core
- •Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
- •Engineered Safety Features
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Other Systems
- •Plant Layout
- •Plot Plan
- •Grade level planning
- •Configuration of the buildings
- •Road planning
- •Pipe conduits and electric cable conduits planning
- •Construction area planning
- •Harbor and water intake/discharge planning
- •Other considerations
- •Main Buildings and Auxiliary Buildings
- •Figure 2.2.2 Overall plant layout of a bwr npp
- •Reactor building
- •Turbine building
- •Figure.2.2.7 Main building arrangements (two-unit site)
- •Main control room (Control building)
- •Radioactive waste treatment facility building
- •Service building
- •Exhaust stack
- •Advanced boiling water reactor (abwr) plant arrangement
- •Nuclear Reactor and Core
- •Fuel Rod and Fuel Assembly
- •Structure of fuel rod and fuel assembly
- •Figure 2.3.1 9x9 Fuel assembly (a type) and fuel rod structure (example)
- •Fuel rod and assembly designs
- •Reactor and Reactor Core
- •Structure of reactor and reactor core
- •Figure 2.3.4 Internal structure of a reactor pressure vessel (cut out view)
- •Vessel (rpv)
- •Incore monitor housing
- •Hpcf sparger top Fuel guide—
- •Reactivity control system
- •Core Design
- •Figure 2.3.20 Control rod with the maximum reactivity worth
- •Core stability
- •Operation and management of the core
- •Primary Coolant System
- •System Summary
- •Primary loop recirculation (plr) system
- •Main steam (ms) system
- •Feed water (fdw) system
- •Key Components
- •Reactor pressure vessel (rpv)
- •Figure 2.4.3 Control rod drive mechanism and in- core monitor housing
- •Recirculation pumps
- •Safety relief valve (srv)
- •Turbine System
- •System Summary
- •Main Turbine System and Auxiliary Equipment
- •Iypes of nuclear plant steam turbines
- •Steam turbine
- •Moisture separator and heater
- •Electro-hydraulic turbine control (ehc) unit
- •Main Steam System and Condensate Feed Water System
- •Main steam line and turbine bypass system
- •Steam extraction system and feed water heater drain system
- •Condenser and circulating water system
- •Condensate and feed water system and condensate cleanup system
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Reactor Instrumentation and Control System
- •Plant control system
- •Reactor neutron monitoring system (nms)
- •0 Source range monitor (srm) 4 detectors q Power range monitor (prm) 43x4detectors
- •Main Control Room
- •Structure and functions of control panels
- •3BbBia3b3jjsbj5ca;nS1ss!aacBa3caoanoDaj3j;|
- •Remote shutdown system (rss)
- •Emergency operational facilities
- •Process Instrumentation System
- •Reactor process instrumentation system
- •Figure 2.6.14 Reactor water level and pressure instrumentation
- •Radiation monitoring system
- •2.7 Engineered Safety Features
- •Design Policy of Engineered Safety Features
- •Basic safely philosophy
- •Philosophy to prevent occurrence of serious incidents
- •Philosophy to mitigate serious incidents
- •Emergency Core Cooling System (eccs)
- •Roles of the eccs
- •Criteria for design and evaluation of eccs
- •Design policies for the eccs
- •Eccs configuration
- •Eccs configuration of an abwr
- •Reactor Containment Facility
- •Roles of reactor containment facility
- •Primary containment vessel (pcv)
- •Containment spray system (css)
- •Flammable gas control system (fcs)
- •Standby gas treatment system (sgts)
- •Reactor containment facility of an abwr
- •Reactor Auxiliary Systems
- •Residual Heat Removal (rhr) System
- •Operating modes
- •System functions and configuration
- •Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (rcic) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Reactor Water Cleanup (cuw) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Key components and features
- •Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (fpc) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Figure 2.8.8 cuw pump (canned motor type)
- •Reactor Building Cooling Water (rcw) System and Reactor Building Cooling Seawater (rcws) System
- •System functions and configurations
- •Key components and features
- •Figure 2.8.10 Basic concept of rcw and rcws systems (example)
- •Fuel Handling and Storage System
- •Spent fuel storage pool
- •Cask pit
- •Refueling machine
- •Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems
- •Gaseous Waste Treatment System
- •Figure 2.9.1 a typical flow sheet of gaseous wastes treatment system (Example of a 1,100 mWe bwr plant)
- •Liquid Waste Treatment System
- •Solid Waste Treatment System
- •Generator excitation system
- •Major Transformers and Switchyard System
- •Major transformers
- •Switchyard system
- •Plant Auxiliary Power System
- •Plant auxiliary power supply system
- •Emergency diesel generator system
- •Direct current (dc) power supply system
- •Instrumentation and control power supply system
- •Plant Auxiliary Systems
- •Plant Water System
- •Plant water treatment system
- •Make-up water system
- •Auxiliary Steam System (House Boiler System)
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Compressed Air Supply System
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (hvac) System
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Figure 2.11.6 Outline of hvac system of the turbine building
- •Figure 2.11.7 Outline of hvac system of the main control room
- •Fire Protection System
- •Key equipment
- •Advanced bwr (abwr)
- •Design Principles
- •Enhanced safety and reliability
- •Figure 2.12.2 Reactor buildings (a 1,100 mWe bwr and an abwr)
- •System design
- •Advanced core
- •Reactor system
- •Reinforced concrete containment vessel (rccv)
- •Turbine system
- •Enhanced Safety
- •Improved reactor shutdown capabilities
- •I turbine driven reactor feedwater pump||
- •Figure 2.12.8 abwr safety features
- •Enhanced reactor cooling capability
- •Enhanced capability for containing radioactive materials
- •Overall safety
- •Figure 2.12.10 abwr eccs (three divisions)
- •Enhanced Operability and Maneuverability
- •Improved monitoring and maneuverability
- •Enhanced operability
- •Chapter 3 Systems of pwr Nuclear Power Plants
- •General Design Philosophy
- •Fuel Rods
- •Reactor Core
- •Engineered Safeguard Systems
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Other Systems
- •Plant Layout
- •Plot Plan
- •Intake and discharge structures
- •Switchyard
- •Reactor building and reactor auxiliary building
- •Turbine building
- •Water supply and treatment system
- •Radioactive waste storage building
- •Cask storage building
- •Harbor facilities
- •Access control system
- •Equipment Arrangement
- •Reactor building
- •Reactor auxiliary building
- •Turbine building
- •Fuel handling and storage building and facilities
- •Plant Layout Considerations
- •Building composition
- •General requirements of plant layout design
- •Decontamination Pi t
- •Isolation Valve
- •2 Loop Plant
- •3 Loop Plant
- •Figure 3.2.7 Buildings configurationn of nuclear power plants in japan
- •Figure 3.3.1 Schematic of fuel assembly and fuel rod
- •Structure of the fuel rods and fuel assemblies
- •Design of fuel rods and fuel assemblies
- •Figure 3.3.2(2) Support grid structure (2)
- •Reactor and Reactor Core
- •Structure of reactor and reactor core
- •Dynamic characteristics of the nuclear reactor
- •Core stability
- •Reactivity control
- •Figure 3.3.13 Critical boron concentration vs. Burnup (hot full power (hfp), all rods out)
- •Power distribution control
- •Figure 3.3.15 Reactivity worth of control group bank d (beginning of cycle, hot zero power, no xenon; example 4-loop core)
- •Figure 3.3.16 Structure of primary neutron source assembly
- •Figure 3.3.17 Structure of secondary neutron source assembly
- •Core management
- •Reactor Coolant System
- •Outline
- •System summary
- •System functions
- •Main Components
- •Reactor vessel
- •Steam generators
- •Pressurizer
- •Vertical u-lube type heat exchanger 7.D8 mPa [gage]
- •17.16 MPa (gage]
- •Reactor coolant piping
- •Reactor coolant pumps
- •IVol. Seal
- •Turbine System
- •Outline
- •Main Turbine and Its Appurtenances
- •Characteristics of Nuclear Power Plant Turbines
- •Turbine types, blade designs and steam cycles
- •Structures of turbines
- •Table 3.5.2 Turbine type and applicable output
- •Turbine governor system
- •Turbine steam inlet valves
- •Turbine protection system
- •Main Steam System
- •Main steam safety and relief valves
- •Main steam isolation and check valves
- •Turbine bypass valves
- •Condensate, Feedwater System and Other Related Systems
- •Condensate, feedwater system
- •Auxiliary feedwater system
- •Circulating water system
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Reactor Instrumentation and Control System
- •10 5 Neutron Source Range Trip Point
- •Figure 3.6.1 Out-of-core nuclear instrumentation range of measurement
- •High Neutron Flux {Power Range High Selling)
- •Sleam Generator Feedaler Flow Level tl *
- •Interlock
- •Reactor
- •Turbine Load Neutron Flux Level
- •Injection Pump Actuation
- •2/4 Logic
- •Figure 3.6.6 Pressurizer pressure protection and control system
- •Reactor control system
- •Figure 3.6.11 Feedwater control system
- •Main Control Room
- •Composition of main control board
- •Methods for monitoring and operation
- •Alarm system
- •(1) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (system screen)
- •(2) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (control screen)
- •(3) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (screen monitors only)
- •Operator assisting system
- •Plant operation management
- •Reactor shutdown panel outside the main control room
- •Emergency support plan
- •Process Instrumentation System
- •Primary system
- •Secondary system
- •Radiation Monitoring System
- •Process radiation monitors
- •Area monitors
- •Radiation measurement during accidents
- •Engineered Safety Feature
- •Systems and Their Functions
- •Emergency core cooling system (eccs)
- •Reactor containment facility
- •Containment spray system
- •Annulus air clean-up system
- •Safety component room air clean-up system
- •General points
- •Emergency Core Cooling System (eccs)
- •Functions
- •System configuration
- •Reactor Containment Facility
- •Functions and configuration
- •Functions and structure of the different containment vessels
- •External shield building
- •Annulus
- •Containment Spray System
- •Function
- •System configuration
- •Iodine removal chemicals tank
- •Functions
- •Components
- •Safety Component Area Air Clean-up System
- •Functions
- •Components
- •Reactor Auxiliary Systems
- •Chemical and Volume Control System (cvcs)
- •System composition and functions
- •Inside coo tai oment
- •Injection pump —:—
- •Components
- •Residual Heat Removal System (rhrs)
- •System composition and functions
- •Component cooling water |m1
- •Components
- •Component Cooling Water System (ccws)
- •System composition and functions
- •Components
- •Instrument air compressor a
- •Instrument air cos pressor b
- •I .Aurillary components,
- •I [important for safetyj
- •Sea Water System (sws)
- •Spent Fuel Pit Cooling and Clean-up
- •Fuel Handling System
- •Radioactive Waste Disposal System
- •Gaseous Waste Disposal System
- •Liquid Waste Disposal System
- •Figure 3.9.4 Boron recycle system evaporator (immersion heater type)
- •Solid Waste Disposal System
- •Electrical Systems
- •Main Generators and Appurtenances
- •Appurtenances of the main generators
- •Generator excitation system
- •Voltage regulator
- •Major Transformers and Transmission System
- •Generator load break switch (glbs)
- •Switchyard
- •Plant Auxiliary Power Supply
- •Figure 3.10.4 Switchyard bus composition
- •311 Power transformer
- •Dc power supply systems
- •Instrument power systems
- •Figure 3.10.6 Direct current power supply system (one of safety system)
- •Board feu | 4 c Icard for j I c
- •(Note)Wllh mechanical Interlock
- •Compressed Air Systems
- •Drain line
- •Sieaj control valve for turbine
- •Inside containment
- •Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
- •Figure 3.11.5 Auxiliary building heating, ventilating and air-conditioning system diagram (general & safety component rooms)
- •Figure 3.11.6 Auxiliary building heating, ventilating and air-conditioning system diagram (main control room)
- •Fire Protection System
- •Figure 3.12.1 Schematic view of apwr steam generators
- •Enhancement of reliability
- •Improvement of operability
- •Reduction of radiation exposure
- •Plant Design
- •Core internals
- •Steam generator
- •Instrument and control system
- •Turbine generator
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter 4 Operation and Maintenance of bwr Plants
- •Plant Operation
- •Plant Startup
- •Figure 4.1.1 Schematic diagram of bwr plant system
- •Figure 4.1.2 Startup curve after periodic inspection
- •Figure 4.1.3 Operating range of core thermal power and core flow
- •Normal Plant Operation
- •Implementing surveillance tests
- •Core management during operation
- •Chemistry control during plant operation
- •Other operational activities
- •Plant Shutdown
- •Chemistry control during plant shutdown
- •Plant Maintenance
- •Figure 4.2.1 Administrative classification of maintenance
- •Periodic Inspections and Licensee’s Periodic Inspections
- •Periodic inspections
- •Licensee’s periodic inspections
- •Time to carry out licensee’s periodic inspections (including the periodic inspections) and periodic checks
- •Items for the periodic inspections and licensee’s periodic inspections
- •Procedure and Work Schedule of Periodic Inspections
- •VII) Preparations for startup
- •IV) Fuel exchange & shuffling
- •VI) pcv upper head Qf ’
- •Other major work activities
- •Figure 4.2.4 Reactor recirculation pump
- •Contents of isIs
- •Remote automatic ultrasonic testing device for isIs
- •Checks and Maintenance during Plant Operation
- •Switching components during operation
- •Maintenance during operation
- •Efficiency Improvement of Periodic Inspection Work
- •Improvement of plant layout
- •Reduction of the time needed for the periodic inspection
- •Maintenance Against Plant Aging
- •Technical Study on Aging
- •Upgrading of evaluation technology
- •Maintenance Technology against Aging
- •Figure 4.3.3 Concept of seal weld
- •Figure 4.3.5 Core shroud tie rod
- •Figure 4.3.8 Principle of crc
- •Figure 4.3.11 Conceptual diagram of wol pipe cross section
- •Upgrading by Facility Replacement
- •Chapter 5 Operation and Maintenance of pwr Plants
- •Plant Operation
- •Reactor Control Systems
- •Control rod control system
- •Turbine bypass control system
- •Pressurizer pressure control system
- •Pressurizer water level control system
- •Steam generator water level control system
- •Plant Startup
- •Plant Normal Operation
- •Operator Activities during Plant Normal Operation
- •Plant Shutdown
- •Chemistry Control
- •Outline of chemistry control of primary system
- •Outline of chemistry control of secondary system
- •Management of waler trealment chemicals
- •Sg blow down water recovery system
- •Plant Maintenance
- •Maintenance Management Policy
- •Periodical Inspections and Periodical Utility Inspections
- •Figure 5.2.2 Framework of plant in-service inspection system
- •Major activities in the periodical inspection period
- •0Utline of other major activities
- •Table 5.2.2 Overhaul inspection required by regulations
- •Maintenance during plant normal operation
- •Checks during plant normal operation
- •Maintenance dining plant normal operation
- •Rationalization of Plant Features Related to Periodical Inspections
- •Optimization of plant equipment arrangement
- •Reduction of durations for periodical inspections
- •Reduction of radiation dose
- •Maintenance to Cope with Plant Aging
- •Technical Evaluation of Aging Effects
- •Maintenance Techniques to Cope with Plant Aging
- •Maintenance of Alloy 600
- •Upgrading of Plants by the Renewal of Systems
- •Chapter 6 Radiation Control
- •Purposes of Radiation Protection
- •Regulation for Radiation Protection
- •Legislative System for Radiation Protection
- •Specific Applications of Legislation
- •Industrial Safety and Health Law
- •Radiation Sources at npPs
- •Actual Conditions concerning Radiation Sources
- •Figure 6.3.1 (1) Trends in dose equivalent rates of the bwr plr system piping
- •Area Control
- •Standards of Area Control in Accordance with Legislation
- •Confirmation of Radiation Environment
- •Access to and Exit from Controlled Areas
- •Work Management
- •Study of Work Methods
- •Approval of Radiation Work
- •Confirmation of Work Environment
- •Completion of Work
- •Fundamentals of Radiation Protection for Work Management
- •6.7 Controls of the Individual
- •Qualification of Radiation Workers
- •Evaluation of Individual Dose
- •Target of Individual Dose Control
- •Records of Individual Dose
- •Track Record of Individual Dose
- •Figure 6.7.1 History of the number of npPs, number of radiation workers, and total dose in Japan (excluding gcr)
- •Fiscal year Figure 6.7.5 Trends in annual average total doses per npp in major counties
- •Radioactive Waste Management
- •Radioactive Solid Wastes
- •Radioactive liquid Wastes
- •Figure 6.8.3 Trends in total amount of solid wastes stored as of the end of each fiscal year (for each type of light water reactor) and the number of drums sent to the Rokkasho Center
- •Tire level to classify the "materials not required to heat as radioactive materials" as the radioactivity is low enough
- •Figure 6.8.5 Outline of the clearance system
- •Fiscal year
- •Figure 6.8.6 Trends in discharged radioactivity of radioactive liquid wastes (excluding tritium) (total discharge for each reactor type)
- •Fiscal year
- •Environmental Radiation Monitoring
- •Chapter 7 Safety Evaluation of
- •Bwr Plants
- •Basic Policy for Safety Evaluation
- •Objectives of Safety Evaluation
- •Anticipated Operational Occurrences
- •Assumption of Event
- •Abnormal Withdrawal of Control Rods during Reactor Startup
- •Loss of Feed Water Heater
- •Loss of Load
- •Features of abwr Transient Analysis
- •Accidents
- •Assumption of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant (in case of a Large Break)
- •Time after the accident (s)
- •Characteristics of abwr Accident Analysis
- •Major Accidents and Hypothetical Accidents
- •Assumption of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Main Steam Line Break
- •(Note) These numbers are to be used for the whole body dose evaluation together with those of noble gases.
- •Figure 7.4.2(1) Process of iodine release during the main steam line break (major accident)
- •Dose Evaluation
- •(Note) These numbers are to be used for the whole body dose evaluation together with those of noble gases.
- •Probabilistic Safety Assessment (psa) for bwRs
- •Psa during Operation
- •Figure 7.5.1 Contribution of each sequence to the core damage frequency
- •Psa during Shutdown
- •Severe Accident
- •Chapter 8 Safety Evaluation of
- •Pwr Plants
- •Basic Principles for Safety Evaluation
- •Purposes of Safety Evaluation
- •Methodology for Safety Evaluation
- •Abnormal Transients during Operation
- •Postulation of Events
- •Partial Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow
- •Figure 8.2.1 Partial loss of reactor coolant flow (• indicates the initial value)
- •Uncontrolled Control Rod Withdrawal at Reactor Startup
- •Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow
- •Figure 8.2.2 Uncontrolled control rod withdrawal at reactor startup (•Indicates the initial value)
- •Accidents
- •Postulation of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- •Major Accidents and Hypothetical Accidents
- •Postulation of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- •Release from fuel rods to the reactor system
- •Release from the primary system to the secondary system
- •Release into the atmosphere
- •Probabilistic Safety Assessment (psa) for pwr Plants
- •Outline of Probabilistic Safety Assessment
- •Use of psa for safety management in the shutdown state
- •Chapter 9 Siting
- •Site Assessment
- •Site Conditions
- •Procedures for Site Assessment
- •Environmental impact assessment
- •Preliminary public hearing
- •Designation of important electric power development area
- •Basic Philosophy of Site Safety
- •Site Review Procedures and Contents
- •Hie Concept of Site Safety in the iaea Site Safety Standard
- •Reactor Site Criteria in the u.S.
- •Siting Philosophy
- •Site Assessment
- •Procedure for Radiation Effect Evaluation
- •Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
- •Seismic Safety
- •Basic Policy on Seismic Design
- •Figure 9.5.1 Formulation flow chart of design basis earthquake ground motion Ss ote£g)
- •Elastically design earthquake ground motion Sd (edegmSd)
- •Seismic Assessment
- •In the equipments
- •Seismic assessment of equipment and piping system
- •Maritime Environment Protection
- •The Effects of Thermal Effluent
- •Hie Effects of Coastal Structures
- •Advanced Siting Concept
- •General
- •Need for qa Activities in Nuclear Power Plants (npPs)
- •Addressing qa
- •International Trends in qa Activities for npPs
- •Development of Commercial qa Standards in Japan
- •1996 (Country taking part in un)
- •Establishment of jeac4111-2003
- •Quality Management System (qms)
- •Figure 10.2.2 Process diagram on npp (example)
- •Stipulation of qms
- •Provision of quality policy and quality objectives
- •Presentation of evidence of effective operation of qms
- •Document Control
- •Record Control
- •Management Responsibility (Top Management)
- •Quality Policy and Quality Objectives
- •Management Representative
- •Review by Management (Management Review)
- •Table 10.3.2 Three outputs on management review
- •Education and Training (Human Resources)
- •Product Realization Planning (Work Planning)
- •Product Realization Planning (Work Planning)
- •Noncon forming action/corrective action
- •Preventive action
- •Relationship with Customer
- •Determination and Review of Requirements related to the Product (Work)
- •Customer Communication and Customer Satisfaction
- •10.6 Design and Development
- •Planning of Design and Development
- •Verification
- •Validation
- •Figure*! 0.6.1 Process flow of design and development
- •Inputs to Design and Development
- •Outputs from Design and Development
- •Review of Design and Development
- •Table 10.6.2 Examples of verification items in the design review
- •Verification of Design and Development
- •Validation of Design and Development
- •Configuration Management of Design and Development
- •Purchasing
- •Purchasing Process
- •Communication with Suppliers
- •Purchasing Requirements
- •Verification of Purchased Products
- •Table10.7.1 Examples of purchase requirements
- •10.8 Production and Service Provision (Implementation of Work)
- •Control of Production and Service Provision (Control of Work)
- •Validation of Processes
- •Analysis of data and improvement (Sec.10.10)
- •Analysis of data
- •Nonconforming action / corrective action
- •Preventive action
- •Table 10.8.1 Controlled conditions and their examples
- •Identification and Traceability
- •Control of Monitoring and Measuring Devices
- •Monitoring & Measurement and Internal Audit
- •Product realization(Sec.L0.5) Production and service provision (implementation of work) (Sec. 10.8)
- •Monitoring and Measurement of Processes
- •Table 10.9.5 Examples of the monitored and measured items for npPs
- •Internal Audit
- •Analysis of Data and Improvement
- •Analysis of Data
- •Nonconforming Control & Corrective Action
- •Product realization(Sec.L0.5) Production and service provision (implementation of work) (Sec. 10.8)
- •Figure 10.10.1 pdca cycle for product realization in the quality management system
- •Preventive Action
- •Appendixes
- •Appendix 1 Chronology of Nuclear Power Plants
- •Improved transient performance
- •Improvement of plant availability
- •Improved main control board (1990s)
- •Appendix 8 The Outline of International Nuclear Event Scale (ines)
Chapter
5 Operation and Maintenance of PWR Plants
to the synchronous speed and the generator is synchronized with the
power transmission grid ("generator tie-in” operation).
During the turbinegenerator startup operations, excess steam is
bypassed to the condenser via the turbine bypass line. When the
generator output exceeded the level of station auxiliary loads,
power supply to the auxiliary loads is switched over from the
offsite power supply (startup transformer) line to the
generator (the station auxiliary transformer) line. Typical startup
curves of a PWR plant are
shown in Figure5.1.2.
These are examples where the power increase rate is not restricted
to ensure the fuel mechanical integrity. In cases of reactor
startups after refueling,
or power increases after long periods of low power operation, the
power increase rate is restricted so as not to exceed 3%/h during
the period of reactor power increase from 20%
to 100%. However, if a plant has been operated at a specified power
level for more than 72 hours, the restriction is ignored below that
power level.
In actual plant operations, the above-mentioned restriction is
applied more conservatively, although practices vary plant by plant
Figure 5.1.3 shows an example set of startup curves of plants under
the restriction.
The main duty of the operating crew during the plant normal
operation is to compensate the reactivity loss of core which
increases as fuel burnup proceeds. The reactivity of a PWR plant
reactor is controlled by two methods: operation of control rod
clusters and adjustment of boron concentration in the reactor
coolant. These two methods are used for different purposes. The
control rod clusters are used for control of the core reactivity
during relatively rapid reactivity changes as required in startup,
shutdown or emergency shutdown phases of reactor operation. They are
also used for the control of core reactivity during rapid load
changes together with the reactor control system. The adjustment of
boron concentration is used for the control of core reactivity
during slow reactivity changes caused by the fuel burnup, the
buildup or decay of fission products which have relatively large
neutron absorption cross sections, such as xenon and samarium, the
reactivity changes
during the reactor coolant temperature change from room temperature
to the zero-power operation temperature due to the moderator
temperature coefficient, and so on.
The control rod clusters are classified into two groups, a shutdown
group and a control group, according to their purposes. Control rods
of the shutdown group are used only for the emergency shutdown of
the reactor, and hence, they are fully withdrawn during the plant
power operation. The control rods of the control group are
automatically controlled by control rod control system signals
during the plant normal operation. Both groups of control rod
clusters are divided into several subgroups, called banks, for the
purpose of restricting reactivity added to the core at one time.
Withdrawal operation procedures of each bank of the control group
rod clusters are fixed and are not changed throughout the core
lifetime. Since all control rod clusters are almost fully withdrawn
during the plant normal operation and subsequently the reactor core
neutron flux distribution pattern is flat, flux distribution does
not need to be adjusted in anyway
including computer control.
Adjustment of the reactor coolant boron concentration is conducted
by batch operations in the chemical and volume control system, i.e.
adding a volume of boric acid solution to increase the concentration
and adding a volume of pure water to decrease it
Plant normal operation usually means that the plant is steadily
operated with its rated power, except during periodical intermittent
power reductions for the turbine stem-free testing operations. In
plant normal operation, the main operational procedures which the
crew must implement are the dilution and concentration of reactor
coolant boron to compensate for core reactivity changes due to fuel
burnup and xenon buildup or depletion following reactor power
changes. For instance, when reactor core reactivity gradually
declines as the core fuel burns up, the average temperature of the
reactor coolant gradually decreases, and the control group rod
clusters are automatically withdrawn to compensate for this. When
control rod clusters are withdrawn and reach certain specified
positions, plant operators are required to dilute the boron
concentration in the reactor coolant and restore the
5
—
5
NSRA,
Japan
Plant Normal Operation
(Shujui)
uiutobjV
Jasuapuoj
o
5
Pressurizer Water Level
100%
(uidj)
pija auiqinj
(%)
jaMoj
otipqg
(jUio/aif)
amssajj
uieajs 8 |
I I 8 |
T H |
i o |
i |
|
|
3 |
|
&
\
a
%
\
sl
Achievement
of Rated Power
— Automatic
Feed Water Control, Automatic Control Rod Control
Turbine Bypass Control
Change over toTAVC
Control
Tie-in, Low Genereator Load
Turbine Speed up Initiation
—* Rated R.P.M
Criticality, Specified
Power Level Maintain by Control Rods
and Boron Concentration
Steam Supply Initiation
(Condenser Vacuum Establish)
Main Steam Pipe Heat up
Zero Power Coolant Average
Temperature and Pressure Reached
— Turbine
Bypass Control Change over to Pressure Control
Isolation of Residual Heat
Removal System
Charging Flow Automatic
Control Normal Letdown Line
Alignment Establish
Pressurizer Water Level Set
at Zero Power Level
Pressurizer Vapor Formation
Initiation
Figure
5.1.2 PWR standard startup curve
Residual Heat Removal Pump
Shutdown
Hydrogen Blanket Formation
in tire Volume Control
Tank
Primary Coolant Water
Quality Adjustment Complete
Primary Coolant Water
Quality Adjustment
Initiation (Oxygen Concentration
etc.)
Primary Coolant Pump Startup
All Pressurizer Heaters
Puton Control
Rod
Shutdown Bank
Withdrawal
Charging Pump Startup
Let Down Line Pressure
Setpoint Adjustment
I
L i |
8 |
(%) pAOq JozrJnsso |
8 i |
B CM . 1 |
(a) ajnpHodmaxSQH |
8 |
O o |
G.UI3/3T arnssay gOH |
System Checkup prior to Plant
Startup Complete
NSRA,
Japan
5~6
§
3
100
(Startup
Time) 1.
At cold shutdown: (Suberitical
with coolant temperature of 60°F
or under)
2.
At hot shut down: (Subcritical
with coolant temperature of 286“C)
NSRA,
Japan
286t
50f
300
200k
RCS
Cool down
0
100
Actual
Time
Required
Time |
Required Time |
Duration Time |
|||
® Heat up Initiation of heat up and pressure raise ~ Rated temperature and pressure |
30 h |
30 h |
|||
® llcat up complete ~ Criticality |
0 |
39 |
|||
CO Criticality — Tic in |
3 |
42 |
|||
® Tie-in — Full Power |
(1) Power raise lime |
150 |
200-202 |
||
(2) Water quality adjusting time (al 30% power) |
8 ~ 10 |
||||
Procedure |
Required Time |
Duration Time |
|||
(D Critical procedure initiation — Critical!ty |
0.5 h |
0.5 h |
|||
(g) Critiacal i ty ~ Tie-in |
1.0 |
1.5 |
|||
® Tie-in ~ Full Power |
34 |
36 |
100$
Initiation
of
Coo!
down Complete
35
-1U--5-
7h
8h
(Power
Change Rate etc.)
7 5$
50-60
r
50-60
TC
i ?i r
50
1.
Startup from Long Time (Over 2 weeks) Shutdown.
Power
Increase Rule
shall
be
Hold
75%
Electric Power over
Power
Increase Rale
shall be
RCS
Water qua!ity
check
[leal
up Initiation
80
r
Turbine
RPH
increase
Turbine
1,800
rpm
Under
10%
: Control
rod bank D shall be withdrawn over
80% during this period.
=
§
as
286
r I
. *20
3
%/h
from Tie-in to 75% Electric
Power.
75h
Period of Time.
0.5
%/h
from 75%
Electric Power or Over.
2.
Startup from Short Time (Under 2 weeks) Shutdown.
®
Power Increase Rale shall
be 3%
from Tie-in to Tull
Power.
1
Power Decrease Rate shall
be 10 %/h.
30h
9h
3$/h
0.5$/h
3h -
*
These figures shall be changed depend on the reactor operation time
and shutdown
conditions.
Figure
5.1.3 Startup and shutdown curve under restricted power raise
conditions
Chapter
5
O
S
I
§
positions of control rod clusters. Through repeating such
operations, the boron concentration in the reactor coolant linearly
decreases as the reactor core approaches the end of its service
life.
The responses of a reactor plant in the case of sudden off-site
power rejection due to a system disturbance or some other occurrence
are briefly discussed below. When an off-site power rejection occurs
two things take place: a power deviation signal based on the
discrepancy between the turbine output and the reactor output
generates a signal to insert rod clusters at the maximum speed to
reduce the reactor output, and a temperature difference signal
between the reactor coolant average temperature and a reference
temperature initiates rapid opening of the turbine bypass valves to
their fully-open positions. When the reactor output and the heat
removal rate from the core by the main steam system are
equilibrated, the reactor coolant temperature stops rising.
Subsequently, the temperature is decreased by automatic movements of
control rods based on the temperature difference signal, until
eventually the reactor coolant temperature is stabilized. The
pressurizer pressure increases due to an in-surge of water caused by
the reactor coolant temperature rise. Hie
pressure rise is suppressed by the actuation of the pressurizer
spray and relief valves. The coolant temperature is lowered by the
operation of turbine bypass valves, resulting in out-surging of the
pressurizer water and a decrease in the pressurizer pressure.
Finally, the system pressure is gradually restored by the
pressurizer heaters. In a standard design plant, the turbine bypass
control system can dump 40% of the rated steam flow to the condenser
and can cope with up to a 50% rapid load reduction without a reactor
trip. A house load
independent operation plant, has a design which makes if
capable of dumping 70% of the rated steam flow. This
type plant is not tripped, even if its entire off-site loads are
rejected as a result of trouble in the transmission system, and it
is switched over to the independent operation mode with only the
station house load of approximately 5%.
The main parameters to be monitored during the plant normal
operation are the reactor output (not exceeding 100%), positions of
the control rod clusters (below the upper limits of withdrawal to
maintain the controllability of the reactor and above the minimum
insertion positions determined as a function of output to keep the
shutdown margin), and the axial offset i.e. neutron flux deviation
in the axial direction (kept within the target range of +
5%).
The reactor operation with the axial offset kept within fixed limits
is called constant axial
offset control (CAOC) operation. It is adopted to keep
the reactor output distribution within limits imposed by loss of
coolant accident (LOCA) requirements. Under the CAOC operation, the
axial power distribution in the core is kept as uniform as possible
during slow load changes as seen in the case of daily
load follow operation, by minimizing the fluctuation of
axial power distribution due to xenon.
The axial offset (A*O)
is a distortion of reactor core axial power distribution,
and defined by the following equation.
Pt
—
Pb
A •
O
x 100
Pt
+
Pr
Here PT is the power of the top half of the core and PB is the power
of the bottom half. In practice AO is obtained from the upper and
lower detector signals of the four out-of-core power range channels
installed in the vicinity of the outer periphery of the reactor
vessel. Figure 5.1.4
illustrates diagrams and the locations of channels related to the
CAOC.
Though NPPs are now operated with base-loads, increased nuclear
power generation capacity in the future will require that plants are
designed to accommodate themselves to varying loads (daily load
follow operation, automatic frequency control operation, etc.) and
to continue operation in cases of transmission system accidents
(operation with only
house loads, etc.) for satisfying transmission grid needs.
Furthermore, a long-term (long-cycle) continuous operation design
for about one year or longer is now being studied to improve plant
availability factors.
NSRA,
Japan
5-8