
- •Introduction for English Version
- •Toshiaki Enomoto
- •Foreword
- •Table of Contents
- •Xj nsra, Japan
- •X;;; nsra, Japan
- •Chapter 5
- •Chapter 6
- •Chapter 1 General
- •History of Nuclear Power Plant Development
- •Experiences in Nuclear Power Generation and Safety Research
- •Comparison of Schemes of Nuclear and Thermal Power Generation
- •Effective Reactor Fuel Loading
- •Reactor Self-Regulation Characteristics
- •Reactor Decay Heat
- •Confinement of fPs
- •Reactor Steam Conditions
- •Safety Design Principles for npPs
- •Prevention of Occurrence of Abnormal Conditions (Level 1)
- •Figure 1.4.1 Defense-in-Depth philosophy
- •Prevention of Expansion of an Abnormal Event (Level 2)
- •Prevention of Abnormal Release of Radioactive Materials and Mitigation of Consequence (Level 3)
- •Emergency core cooling system
- •Confinement of radioactive materials by five barriers
- •Outline of Laws, Regulations and the Regulatory Framework
- •Domestic Framework
- •Permit to establish a power generating reactor
- •Sanction of the construction plan
- •Approval of technical specifications
- •Regulations after start of commercial operation
- •Iaea Safety Standards
- •Figure 1.5.4 Structure of iaea safety standards
- •Chapter 2 Systems of bwr Nuclear Power Plants
- •General Design Philosophy
- •Fuel Rods
- •Reactor Core
- •Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
- •Engineered Safety Features
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Other Systems
- •Plant Layout
- •Plot Plan
- •Grade level planning
- •Configuration of the buildings
- •Road planning
- •Pipe conduits and electric cable conduits planning
- •Construction area planning
- •Harbor and water intake/discharge planning
- •Other considerations
- •Main Buildings and Auxiliary Buildings
- •Figure 2.2.2 Overall plant layout of a bwr npp
- •Reactor building
- •Turbine building
- •Figure.2.2.7 Main building arrangements (two-unit site)
- •Main control room (Control building)
- •Radioactive waste treatment facility building
- •Service building
- •Exhaust stack
- •Advanced boiling water reactor (abwr) plant arrangement
- •Nuclear Reactor and Core
- •Fuel Rod and Fuel Assembly
- •Structure of fuel rod and fuel assembly
- •Figure 2.3.1 9x9 Fuel assembly (a type) and fuel rod structure (example)
- •Fuel rod and assembly designs
- •Reactor and Reactor Core
- •Structure of reactor and reactor core
- •Figure 2.3.4 Internal structure of a reactor pressure vessel (cut out view)
- •Vessel (rpv)
- •Incore monitor housing
- •Hpcf sparger top Fuel guide—
- •Reactivity control system
- •Core Design
- •Figure 2.3.20 Control rod with the maximum reactivity worth
- •Core stability
- •Operation and management of the core
- •Primary Coolant System
- •System Summary
- •Primary loop recirculation (plr) system
- •Main steam (ms) system
- •Feed water (fdw) system
- •Key Components
- •Reactor pressure vessel (rpv)
- •Figure 2.4.3 Control rod drive mechanism and in- core monitor housing
- •Recirculation pumps
- •Safety relief valve (srv)
- •Turbine System
- •System Summary
- •Main Turbine System and Auxiliary Equipment
- •Iypes of nuclear plant steam turbines
- •Steam turbine
- •Moisture separator and heater
- •Electro-hydraulic turbine control (ehc) unit
- •Main Steam System and Condensate Feed Water System
- •Main steam line and turbine bypass system
- •Steam extraction system and feed water heater drain system
- •Condenser and circulating water system
- •Condensate and feed water system and condensate cleanup system
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Reactor Instrumentation and Control System
- •Plant control system
- •Reactor neutron monitoring system (nms)
- •0 Source range monitor (srm) 4 detectors q Power range monitor (prm) 43x4detectors
- •Main Control Room
- •Structure and functions of control panels
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- •Remote shutdown system (rss)
- •Emergency operational facilities
- •Process Instrumentation System
- •Reactor process instrumentation system
- •Figure 2.6.14 Reactor water level and pressure instrumentation
- •Radiation monitoring system
- •2.7 Engineered Safety Features
- •Design Policy of Engineered Safety Features
- •Basic safely philosophy
- •Philosophy to prevent occurrence of serious incidents
- •Philosophy to mitigate serious incidents
- •Emergency Core Cooling System (eccs)
- •Roles of the eccs
- •Criteria for design and evaluation of eccs
- •Design policies for the eccs
- •Eccs configuration
- •Eccs configuration of an abwr
- •Reactor Containment Facility
- •Roles of reactor containment facility
- •Primary containment vessel (pcv)
- •Containment spray system (css)
- •Flammable gas control system (fcs)
- •Standby gas treatment system (sgts)
- •Reactor containment facility of an abwr
- •Reactor Auxiliary Systems
- •Residual Heat Removal (rhr) System
- •Operating modes
- •System functions and configuration
- •Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (rcic) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Reactor Water Cleanup (cuw) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Key components and features
- •Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (fpc) System
- •System functions and configuration
- •Figure 2.8.8 cuw pump (canned motor type)
- •Reactor Building Cooling Water (rcw) System and Reactor Building Cooling Seawater (rcws) System
- •System functions and configurations
- •Key components and features
- •Figure 2.8.10 Basic concept of rcw and rcws systems (example)
- •Fuel Handling and Storage System
- •Spent fuel storage pool
- •Cask pit
- •Refueling machine
- •Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems
- •Gaseous Waste Treatment System
- •Figure 2.9.1 a typical flow sheet of gaseous wastes treatment system (Example of a 1,100 mWe bwr plant)
- •Liquid Waste Treatment System
- •Solid Waste Treatment System
- •Generator excitation system
- •Major Transformers and Switchyard System
- •Major transformers
- •Switchyard system
- •Plant Auxiliary Power System
- •Plant auxiliary power supply system
- •Emergency diesel generator system
- •Direct current (dc) power supply system
- •Instrumentation and control power supply system
- •Plant Auxiliary Systems
- •Plant Water System
- •Plant water treatment system
- •Make-up water system
- •Auxiliary Steam System (House Boiler System)
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Compressed Air Supply System
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (hvac) System
- •Design philosophy
- •Key equipment
- •Figure 2.11.6 Outline of hvac system of the turbine building
- •Figure 2.11.7 Outline of hvac system of the main control room
- •Fire Protection System
- •Key equipment
- •Advanced bwr (abwr)
- •Design Principles
- •Enhanced safety and reliability
- •Figure 2.12.2 Reactor buildings (a 1,100 mWe bwr and an abwr)
- •System design
- •Advanced core
- •Reactor system
- •Reinforced concrete containment vessel (rccv)
- •Turbine system
- •Enhanced Safety
- •Improved reactor shutdown capabilities
- •I turbine driven reactor feedwater pump||
- •Figure 2.12.8 abwr safety features
- •Enhanced reactor cooling capability
- •Enhanced capability for containing radioactive materials
- •Overall safety
- •Figure 2.12.10 abwr eccs (three divisions)
- •Enhanced Operability and Maneuverability
- •Improved monitoring and maneuverability
- •Enhanced operability
- •Chapter 3 Systems of pwr Nuclear Power Plants
- •General Design Philosophy
- •Fuel Rods
- •Reactor Core
- •Engineered Safeguard Systems
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Other Systems
- •Plant Layout
- •Plot Plan
- •Intake and discharge structures
- •Switchyard
- •Reactor building and reactor auxiliary building
- •Turbine building
- •Water supply and treatment system
- •Radioactive waste storage building
- •Cask storage building
- •Harbor facilities
- •Access control system
- •Equipment Arrangement
- •Reactor building
- •Reactor auxiliary building
- •Turbine building
- •Fuel handling and storage building and facilities
- •Plant Layout Considerations
- •Building composition
- •General requirements of plant layout design
- •Decontamination Pi t
- •Isolation Valve
- •2 Loop Plant
- •3 Loop Plant
- •Figure 3.2.7 Buildings configurationn of nuclear power plants in japan
- •Figure 3.3.1 Schematic of fuel assembly and fuel rod
- •Structure of the fuel rods and fuel assemblies
- •Design of fuel rods and fuel assemblies
- •Figure 3.3.2(2) Support grid structure (2)
- •Reactor and Reactor Core
- •Structure of reactor and reactor core
- •Dynamic characteristics of the nuclear reactor
- •Core stability
- •Reactivity control
- •Figure 3.3.13 Critical boron concentration vs. Burnup (hot full power (hfp), all rods out)
- •Power distribution control
- •Figure 3.3.15 Reactivity worth of control group bank d (beginning of cycle, hot zero power, no xenon; example 4-loop core)
- •Figure 3.3.16 Structure of primary neutron source assembly
- •Figure 3.3.17 Structure of secondary neutron source assembly
- •Core management
- •Reactor Coolant System
- •Outline
- •System summary
- •System functions
- •Main Components
- •Reactor vessel
- •Steam generators
- •Pressurizer
- •Vertical u-lube type heat exchanger 7.D8 mPa [gage]
- •17.16 MPa (gage]
- •Reactor coolant piping
- •Reactor coolant pumps
- •IVol. Seal
- •Turbine System
- •Outline
- •Main Turbine and Its Appurtenances
- •Characteristics of Nuclear Power Plant Turbines
- •Turbine types, blade designs and steam cycles
- •Structures of turbines
- •Table 3.5.2 Turbine type and applicable output
- •Turbine governor system
- •Turbine steam inlet valves
- •Turbine protection system
- •Main Steam System
- •Main steam safety and relief valves
- •Main steam isolation and check valves
- •Turbine bypass valves
- •Condensate, Feedwater System and Other Related Systems
- •Condensate, feedwater system
- •Auxiliary feedwater system
- •Circulating water system
- •Instrumentation and Control System
- •Reactor Instrumentation and Control System
- •10 5 Neutron Source Range Trip Point
- •Figure 3.6.1 Out-of-core nuclear instrumentation range of measurement
- •High Neutron Flux {Power Range High Selling)
- •Sleam Generator Feedaler Flow Level tl *
- •Interlock
- •Reactor
- •Turbine Load Neutron Flux Level
- •Injection Pump Actuation
- •2/4 Logic
- •Figure 3.6.6 Pressurizer pressure protection and control system
- •Reactor control system
- •Figure 3.6.11 Feedwater control system
- •Main Control Room
- •Composition of main control board
- •Methods for monitoring and operation
- •Alarm system
- •(1) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (system screen)
- •(2) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (control screen)
- •(3) Vdu monitor operation example of the screen (screen monitors only)
- •Operator assisting system
- •Plant operation management
- •Reactor shutdown panel outside the main control room
- •Emergency support plan
- •Process Instrumentation System
- •Primary system
- •Secondary system
- •Radiation Monitoring System
- •Process radiation monitors
- •Area monitors
- •Radiation measurement during accidents
- •Engineered Safety Feature
- •Systems and Their Functions
- •Emergency core cooling system (eccs)
- •Reactor containment facility
- •Containment spray system
- •Annulus air clean-up system
- •Safety component room air clean-up system
- •General points
- •Emergency Core Cooling System (eccs)
- •Functions
- •System configuration
- •Reactor Containment Facility
- •Functions and configuration
- •Functions and structure of the different containment vessels
- •External shield building
- •Annulus
- •Containment Spray System
- •Function
- •System configuration
- •Iodine removal chemicals tank
- •Functions
- •Components
- •Safety Component Area Air Clean-up System
- •Functions
- •Components
- •Reactor Auxiliary Systems
- •Chemical and Volume Control System (cvcs)
- •System composition and functions
- •Inside coo tai oment
- •Injection pump —:—
- •Components
- •Residual Heat Removal System (rhrs)
- •System composition and functions
- •Component cooling water |m1
- •Components
- •Component Cooling Water System (ccws)
- •System composition and functions
- •Components
- •Instrument air compressor a
- •Instrument air cos pressor b
- •I .Aurillary components,
- •I [important for safetyj
- •Sea Water System (sws)
- •Spent Fuel Pit Cooling and Clean-up
- •Fuel Handling System
- •Radioactive Waste Disposal System
- •Gaseous Waste Disposal System
- •Liquid Waste Disposal System
- •Figure 3.9.4 Boron recycle system evaporator (immersion heater type)
- •Solid Waste Disposal System
- •Electrical Systems
- •Main Generators and Appurtenances
- •Appurtenances of the main generators
- •Generator excitation system
- •Voltage regulator
- •Major Transformers and Transmission System
- •Generator load break switch (glbs)
- •Switchyard
- •Plant Auxiliary Power Supply
- •Figure 3.10.4 Switchyard bus composition
- •311 Power transformer
- •Dc power supply systems
- •Instrument power systems
- •Figure 3.10.6 Direct current power supply system (one of safety system)
- •Board feu | 4 c Icard for j I c
- •(Note)Wllh mechanical Interlock
- •Compressed Air Systems
- •Drain line
- •Sieaj control valve for turbine
- •Inside containment
- •Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
- •Figure 3.11.5 Auxiliary building heating, ventilating and air-conditioning system diagram (general & safety component rooms)
- •Figure 3.11.6 Auxiliary building heating, ventilating and air-conditioning system diagram (main control room)
- •Fire Protection System
- •Figure 3.12.1 Schematic view of apwr steam generators
- •Enhancement of reliability
- •Improvement of operability
- •Reduction of radiation exposure
- •Plant Design
- •Core internals
- •Steam generator
- •Instrument and control system
- •Turbine generator
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter 4 Operation and Maintenance of bwr Plants
- •Plant Operation
- •Plant Startup
- •Figure 4.1.1 Schematic diagram of bwr plant system
- •Figure 4.1.2 Startup curve after periodic inspection
- •Figure 4.1.3 Operating range of core thermal power and core flow
- •Normal Plant Operation
- •Implementing surveillance tests
- •Core management during operation
- •Chemistry control during plant operation
- •Other operational activities
- •Plant Shutdown
- •Chemistry control during plant shutdown
- •Plant Maintenance
- •Figure 4.2.1 Administrative classification of maintenance
- •Periodic Inspections and Licensee’s Periodic Inspections
- •Periodic inspections
- •Licensee’s periodic inspections
- •Time to carry out licensee’s periodic inspections (including the periodic inspections) and periodic checks
- •Items for the periodic inspections and licensee’s periodic inspections
- •Procedure and Work Schedule of Periodic Inspections
- •VII) Preparations for startup
- •IV) Fuel exchange & shuffling
- •VI) pcv upper head Qf ’
- •Other major work activities
- •Figure 4.2.4 Reactor recirculation pump
- •Contents of isIs
- •Remote automatic ultrasonic testing device for isIs
- •Checks and Maintenance during Plant Operation
- •Switching components during operation
- •Maintenance during operation
- •Efficiency Improvement of Periodic Inspection Work
- •Improvement of plant layout
- •Reduction of the time needed for the periodic inspection
- •Maintenance Against Plant Aging
- •Technical Study on Aging
- •Upgrading of evaluation technology
- •Maintenance Technology against Aging
- •Figure 4.3.3 Concept of seal weld
- •Figure 4.3.5 Core shroud tie rod
- •Figure 4.3.8 Principle of crc
- •Figure 4.3.11 Conceptual diagram of wol pipe cross section
- •Upgrading by Facility Replacement
- •Chapter 5 Operation and Maintenance of pwr Plants
- •Plant Operation
- •Reactor Control Systems
- •Control rod control system
- •Turbine bypass control system
- •Pressurizer pressure control system
- •Pressurizer water level control system
- •Steam generator water level control system
- •Plant Startup
- •Plant Normal Operation
- •Operator Activities during Plant Normal Operation
- •Plant Shutdown
- •Chemistry Control
- •Outline of chemistry control of primary system
- •Outline of chemistry control of secondary system
- •Management of waler trealment chemicals
- •Sg blow down water recovery system
- •Plant Maintenance
- •Maintenance Management Policy
- •Periodical Inspections and Periodical Utility Inspections
- •Figure 5.2.2 Framework of plant in-service inspection system
- •Major activities in the periodical inspection period
- •0Utline of other major activities
- •Table 5.2.2 Overhaul inspection required by regulations
- •Maintenance during plant normal operation
- •Checks during plant normal operation
- •Maintenance dining plant normal operation
- •Rationalization of Plant Features Related to Periodical Inspections
- •Optimization of plant equipment arrangement
- •Reduction of durations for periodical inspections
- •Reduction of radiation dose
- •Maintenance to Cope with Plant Aging
- •Technical Evaluation of Aging Effects
- •Maintenance Techniques to Cope with Plant Aging
- •Maintenance of Alloy 600
- •Upgrading of Plants by the Renewal of Systems
- •Chapter 6 Radiation Control
- •Purposes of Radiation Protection
- •Regulation for Radiation Protection
- •Legislative System for Radiation Protection
- •Specific Applications of Legislation
- •Industrial Safety and Health Law
- •Radiation Sources at npPs
- •Actual Conditions concerning Radiation Sources
- •Figure 6.3.1 (1) Trends in dose equivalent rates of the bwr plr system piping
- •Area Control
- •Standards of Area Control in Accordance with Legislation
- •Confirmation of Radiation Environment
- •Access to and Exit from Controlled Areas
- •Work Management
- •Study of Work Methods
- •Approval of Radiation Work
- •Confirmation of Work Environment
- •Completion of Work
- •Fundamentals of Radiation Protection for Work Management
- •6.7 Controls of the Individual
- •Qualification of Radiation Workers
- •Evaluation of Individual Dose
- •Target of Individual Dose Control
- •Records of Individual Dose
- •Track Record of Individual Dose
- •Figure 6.7.1 History of the number of npPs, number of radiation workers, and total dose in Japan (excluding gcr)
- •Fiscal year Figure 6.7.5 Trends in annual average total doses per npp in major counties
- •Radioactive Waste Management
- •Radioactive Solid Wastes
- •Radioactive liquid Wastes
- •Figure 6.8.3 Trends in total amount of solid wastes stored as of the end of each fiscal year (for each type of light water reactor) and the number of drums sent to the Rokkasho Center
- •Tire level to classify the "materials not required to heat as radioactive materials" as the radioactivity is low enough
- •Figure 6.8.5 Outline of the clearance system
- •Fiscal year
- •Figure 6.8.6 Trends in discharged radioactivity of radioactive liquid wastes (excluding tritium) (total discharge for each reactor type)
- •Fiscal year
- •Environmental Radiation Monitoring
- •Chapter 7 Safety Evaluation of
- •Bwr Plants
- •Basic Policy for Safety Evaluation
- •Objectives of Safety Evaluation
- •Anticipated Operational Occurrences
- •Assumption of Event
- •Abnormal Withdrawal of Control Rods during Reactor Startup
- •Loss of Feed Water Heater
- •Loss of Load
- •Features of abwr Transient Analysis
- •Accidents
- •Assumption of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant (in case of a Large Break)
- •Time after the accident (s)
- •Characteristics of abwr Accident Analysis
- •Major Accidents and Hypothetical Accidents
- •Assumption of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Main Steam Line Break
- •(Note) These numbers are to be used for the whole body dose evaluation together with those of noble gases.
- •Figure 7.4.2(1) Process of iodine release during the main steam line break (major accident)
- •Dose Evaluation
- •(Note) These numbers are to be used for the whole body dose evaluation together with those of noble gases.
- •Probabilistic Safety Assessment (psa) for bwRs
- •Psa during Operation
- •Figure 7.5.1 Contribution of each sequence to the core damage frequency
- •Psa during Shutdown
- •Severe Accident
- •Chapter 8 Safety Evaluation of
- •Pwr Plants
- •Basic Principles for Safety Evaluation
- •Purposes of Safety Evaluation
- •Methodology for Safety Evaluation
- •Abnormal Transients during Operation
- •Postulation of Events
- •Partial Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow
- •Figure 8.2.1 Partial loss of reactor coolant flow (• indicates the initial value)
- •Uncontrolled Control Rod Withdrawal at Reactor Startup
- •Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow
- •Figure 8.2.2 Uncontrolled control rod withdrawal at reactor startup (•Indicates the initial value)
- •Accidents
- •Postulation of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- •Major Accidents and Hypothetical Accidents
- •Postulation of Events
- •Loss of Reactor Coolant
- •Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- •Release from fuel rods to the reactor system
- •Release from the primary system to the secondary system
- •Release into the atmosphere
- •Probabilistic Safety Assessment (psa) for pwr Plants
- •Outline of Probabilistic Safety Assessment
- •Use of psa for safety management in the shutdown state
- •Chapter 9 Siting
- •Site Assessment
- •Site Conditions
- •Procedures for Site Assessment
- •Environmental impact assessment
- •Preliminary public hearing
- •Designation of important electric power development area
- •Basic Philosophy of Site Safety
- •Site Review Procedures and Contents
- •Hie Concept of Site Safety in the iaea Site Safety Standard
- •Reactor Site Criteria in the u.S.
- •Siting Philosophy
- •Site Assessment
- •Procedure for Radiation Effect Evaluation
- •Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
- •Seismic Safety
- •Basic Policy on Seismic Design
- •Figure 9.5.1 Formulation flow chart of design basis earthquake ground motion Ss ote£g)
- •Elastically design earthquake ground motion Sd (edegmSd)
- •Seismic Assessment
- •In the equipments
- •Seismic assessment of equipment and piping system
- •Maritime Environment Protection
- •The Effects of Thermal Effluent
- •Hie Effects of Coastal Structures
- •Advanced Siting Concept
- •General
- •Need for qa Activities in Nuclear Power Plants (npPs)
- •Addressing qa
- •International Trends in qa Activities for npPs
- •Development of Commercial qa Standards in Japan
- •1996 (Country taking part in un)
- •Establishment of jeac4111-2003
- •Quality Management System (qms)
- •Figure 10.2.2 Process diagram on npp (example)
- •Stipulation of qms
- •Provision of quality policy and quality objectives
- •Presentation of evidence of effective operation of qms
- •Document Control
- •Record Control
- •Management Responsibility (Top Management)
- •Quality Policy and Quality Objectives
- •Management Representative
- •Review by Management (Management Review)
- •Table 10.3.2 Three outputs on management review
- •Education and Training (Human Resources)
- •Product Realization Planning (Work Planning)
- •Product Realization Planning (Work Planning)
- •Noncon forming action/corrective action
- •Preventive action
- •Relationship with Customer
- •Determination and Review of Requirements related to the Product (Work)
- •Customer Communication and Customer Satisfaction
- •10.6 Design and Development
- •Planning of Design and Development
- •Verification
- •Validation
- •Figure*! 0.6.1 Process flow of design and development
- •Inputs to Design and Development
- •Outputs from Design and Development
- •Review of Design and Development
- •Table 10.6.2 Examples of verification items in the design review
- •Verification of Design and Development
- •Validation of Design and Development
- •Configuration Management of Design and Development
- •Purchasing
- •Purchasing Process
- •Communication with Suppliers
- •Purchasing Requirements
- •Verification of Purchased Products
- •Table10.7.1 Examples of purchase requirements
- •10.8 Production and Service Provision (Implementation of Work)
- •Control of Production and Service Provision (Control of Work)
- •Validation of Processes
- •Analysis of data and improvement (Sec.10.10)
- •Analysis of data
- •Nonconforming action / corrective action
- •Preventive action
- •Table 10.8.1 Controlled conditions and their examples
- •Identification and Traceability
- •Control of Monitoring and Measuring Devices
- •Monitoring & Measurement and Internal Audit
- •Product realization(Sec.L0.5) Production and service provision (implementation of work) (Sec. 10.8)
- •Monitoring and Measurement of Processes
- •Table 10.9.5 Examples of the monitored and measured items for npPs
- •Internal Audit
- •Analysis of Data and Improvement
- •Analysis of Data
- •Nonconforming Control & Corrective Action
- •Product realization(Sec.L0.5) Production and service provision (implementation of work) (Sec. 10.8)
- •Figure 10.10.1 pdca cycle for product realization in the quality management system
- •Preventive Action
- •Appendixes
- •Appendix 1 Chronology of Nuclear Power Plants
- •Improved transient performance
- •Improvement of plant availability
- •Improved main control board (1990s)
- •Appendix 8 The Outline of International Nuclear Event Scale (ines)
Chapter
4 Operation and Maintenance of BWR Plants
For systems with a standby component, periodical switches of
components are made in order to keep the component operating times
even.
The switching frequency is determined taking into account long-term
plans of maintenance jobs to be performed during periodic
inspections, items to be maintained such as through oiling etc. at
comparatively short intervals, and matters to be considered from
operating experiences at each plant
Since the switching operation will cause some disturbance to the
system, it should be performed carefully.
Plant component maintenance such as oiling (to be performed as a
check item), armature brush replacement, periodic calibration of
instruments and controls, replacement of burned out indicating lamps
on control panels and ink container replacement for recorders are
basically performed as maintenance jobs during periodic inspection.
And, maintenance and inspection of waste processing facilities are
often performed during plant steady operation while generating
relatively small amount of effluent, thus avoiding the period of the
plant periodic inspection.
As instruments and controls belonging to major systems for the
reactor, engineered safety features, turbine generator, and
auxiliary components are intensively calibrated during plant
shutdown, then calibration jobs during plant operation cover
instruments and controllers of other auxiliary systems and waste
processing facilities. Since the instruments and controllers are
often components of control systems, careful work procedures
including isolation are required to avoid disturbance of the
operating systems when performing calibrations.
Since overhaul inspections and nondestructive inspections of many
components are performed to confirm integrity of a plant during
periodic inspections, a long time is taken to conduct periodic
inspection jobs. Therefore, various rationalizing measures have been
studied from the standpoints
of reduction of dose rate which workers receive and improvement of
availability factor.
The following matters for rationalizing periodic inspection works
were studied in conjunction with activities for improvement and
standardization of light water nuclear plants promoted by the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
Improvement of plant layout
Facility improvements to reduce the time needed for a periodic
inspection
■ Improvements such as remote automation of facilities and devices
for reduction of dose equivalent
Regarding plant layout, focus was placed from the basic design stage
on securing spaces required for component overhaul inspections,
securing lay- down spaces for disassembled parts, and securing
utilities (power supplies, air, water, etc.) required for
maintenance work, and plants that were easy to maintain were studied
to develop second generation modified standard plants. The Fukushima
Daini NPP Unit 2 and subsequent plants were built, reflecting those
results on their design layouts.
A periodic inspection previously required almost three months, and
with amendment of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law calling for
rationalization of the electricity fee structure in 1995, the time
needed for the periodic inspection was reduced from the standpoint
of availability factor improvement which cut the time required for
major work activities constituting the critical path of the periodic
inspection jobs. In 2001, the 29-day periodic inspection was
achieved through the following various component and work
improvements and device developments.
Improvements of
facilities, components, and tools (faster traveling speeds for the
refueling machine and overhead traveling crane etc.)
Improvements of work practices (parallel work, replacement system
etc.)
Review of work system (24-hour work)
Upgrading of work management
Review of tests and inspections (divided
4-25
NSRA,
JapanSwitching components during operation
Maintenance during operation
Efficiency Improvement of Periodic Inspection Work
Improvement of plant layout
Reduction of the time needed for the periodic inspection
inspections etc.)
However, as the Electricity Utilities Industry Law had been
partially modified on the basis of falsified self-controlled
inspection records of NPPs which were uncovered in August 2002, the
licensee’ s periodic
inspection system was legislated, and the environment surrounding
NPPs was changed significantly, making the duration of subsequent
periodic inspections comparatively longer.
(3) Dose reduction
In early plants, many periodic
inspection jobs were done by human power, requiring many workers,
and radiation dose rate was also high, so reduction of the exposure
dose was a big issue.
Therefore, dose reduction has been attempted by providing facility
improvements and device developments as follows.
Adopting low cobalt-containing materials
Controlling radioactive corrosion products generation, and
improving their removal performance
Adopting automatic ISI devices
Adopting high temperature and high pressure small valves with
bellows seal and installing gland leak-off lines for large-sized
valves
Locating a reactor coolant
cleanup system (CUW) pump in the low temperature section downstream
from the heat exchanger
Providing permanent
shielding to pipes with high dose rate
The effective dose limit on radiation workers which the ICRP
(International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommended in
1990 and which was incorporated into Japanese legislation and
regulations in 2001, is 100 mSv per 5 years (50 mSv per year at the
maximum), so it is especially necessary to make efforts to reduce
individual dose rate as well as total dose rate.
As some of the commercial NPPs in Japan have been operated for 30
years or more, it has become necessary to take measures against
their aging. As operating plants were previously regulated to meet
the structural standards equivalent to those under
which they were constructed in accordance with the old Notice No.
501, it was necessary to establish a reasonable operation standard
following the provisions of the US ASME Section XI, which allows
continued plant operation when design assessment concludes that a
safe continuous operation is possible even if there is degradation
due to aging etc., From this background, the "Code for Nuclear
Power Generation Facilities: Rules on Fitness-for- Service" was
issued in 2000 by the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Currently, the Code provides a standard for fitness-for-service
of operating NPPs in conjunction with the performance-based
regulation of the National Government. For upgrading and
rationalization of fitness-for-service management of facilities, and
also measures addressing aging, the Rules on Fitness-for-Service
were amended in 2002 and 2004 so as to include the provisions for
inspection and evaluation on Class 1, 2, 3 components, Class MC
components, support structures,
and core internal components.
This section outlines the inspections according to the 2004 Edition
of the Rules on Fitness-for-Service.
(1) Plant inspections
according to the Rules on Fitness-for-Service (2004 Edition)
The inspections according to the
Rules on Fitness- for-Service
include individual inspections of core internal components to
address aging degradation events typified by stress corrosion
cracking (SCC) and standard inspections corresponding to the ISI of
components, such as vessels, pipes, pumps and valves, which were
previously conducted according to JEAC-4205 "In-Service-Inspection
of Components of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants."
Standard inspections
The standard inspections adopt a concept of fixed point sampling for
component inspection. Moreover, the objects to be inspected cover
almost all core internal components.
Inspection requirements for Class 1 components
Class 1 components are pressure parts of equipment etc. which
constitute the reactor coolant pressure boundary and their support
structures.. They are required to undergo nondestructive tests
(visual tests (VTs), ultrasonic
NSRA,
Japan
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Maintenance Against Plant Aging
Technical Study on Aging
Chapter
4 Operation and Maintenance of BWR Plants
tests (UTs) etc.) and leak tests.
Inspection requirements for Class 2 components.
Class 2 components are those which belong to the direct systems,
reactor emergency shutdown system and the cooling systems required
for reactor shutdown among engineered safety features. They are
required to undergo nondestructive tests and leak tests. Moreover,
the components belonging to the turbine system and the containment
boundary are required to undergo leak tests.
Inspection requirements for Class 3 components
Class 3 components are those belonging to the indirect systems of
engineered safety features and spent fuel storage facility and its
cooling system. They are required to undergo nondestructive tests.
Inspection requirements for Class MC components
Class MC components include the reactor containment vessel (made of
steel). They are required to undergo nondestructive tests and leak
tests.
Inspection requirements for support structures
VTs are required for the support structures of Class 1,2
and 3 components.
Inspection requirements for core internals
VTs are required for core internal
components,
Individual inspections
Individual inspections have individual inspection requirements for
the following components including some of the core internal
components and Class 1 components.
Individual inspections of Class 1 components
Neutron measurement housing
Control rod drive housing
Individual inspections of core internal components
Shroud support
Shroud
Upper grid
Jet pumps
In-core spray piping and sparger
The individual inspections
in the Rules on Fitness- for-Service were established according to
the inspection requirements in consideration of specific
aging events for each component in the "Guideline for BWR Core
Internal Inspection and Assessment" established by the Thermal
and Nuclear Power Engineering Society, and they are generally
equivalent to the Guideline. The aging events specified here are
mainly due to SCC of austenitic stainless steel and high-nickel
(Ni) alloy weld metal, and areas to be inspected are limited to
welded joints for many components. In addition, as the concept of
fixed point sampling is not adopted for the individual inspections,
unlike for the standard inspections, all plural components of the
same type are fundamentally subject to inspection.
Table 4.3.1 summarizes requirements for the individual inspection
provided in the 2004 Edition of the Rules on Fitness-for-Service.
(2) Upgrading of inspection
technology
Since 2001, many cracks due to SCC have been discovered in the core
shrouds made of low-carbon stainless steel (SUS316L or SUS304L).
Similarly, SCC has also been discovered at the welds of
recirculation system piping made of low-carbon stainless steel. The
inspection technology using a phased array type ultrasonic flaw
detector which has not been used previously for ISIs because it was
not standardized has played an active role in discovering and sizing
these cracks and this detector has been used to perform a wide range
of high- accuracy inspections. Recently, inspection accuracy of this
inspection technology was confirmed through research sponsored by
the National Government, and it is being standardized as a
high-accuracy measurement technique of crack depths and lengths.
In order to inspect core internal components during periodic
inspections, various kinds of remote inspection devices have been
developed and applied. A small underwater vehicle was developed for
visual inspection of core internal components; this device moves
underwater to access and inspect almost any location in core.. The
shroud UT vehicle attaches itself onto the internal and external
surfaces of the shroud by suction, and it is used for UT on
circumferential weld lines with the phased array method. The vehicle
releases and applies suction to move along. A shroud support UT
vehicle has been developed for UTs on weld lines below the baffle
plate, and it has been put to actual use.
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NSRA,
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Table
4.3.1 Components subject to Individual inspections and
inspection methods |
Area to be inspected |
Damage mode |
Inspection method |
Area to be inspected and extent |
|
ICM housing |
(1) |
Welded joints for mounting housing (nickel- based alloy (Inconel®)) |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |
(2) |
Welded joints for mounting housing (stainless steel) |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |
|
(3) |
Flange welded joints (for LPRM installation, SUS 304) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
|
(4) |
Flange welded joints (for LPRM installation , SUS 316) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
|
(5) |
Flange welded joints (for other than LPRM installation) |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |
|
CRD housing |
(1) |
Welded joints for mounting housing |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |
(2) |
Stub tube welded joints (with block welding) |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |
|
(3) |
Stub tube welded joints (without block welding) |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |
|
(4) |
Flange welded joints |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |
|
Shroud support |
(1) |
Circumferential weld joints (182 nickel-based alloy (Inconel ®182 alloy)) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
(2) |
Circumferential weld joints (82 nickel-based alloy (Inconel® 82 alloy)) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
|
Shroud |
(1) |
Circumferential weld joints (without shroud support ring) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
(2) |
Circumferential weld joints (with shroud support ring) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
|
Upper grid |
(1) |
Restraint structure |
SCC |
VT-3 |
Restraints |
(2) |
Hold down structure, hold down bracket |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welds |
|
Jet pump |
(1) |
Circumferential welded joints (SUS304) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
(2) |
Circumferential weld joints (except SUS304) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
|
(3) |
Welded joints of riser brace |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
|
(4) |
Welded joints of bracket and riser pipe |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
|
(5) |
Jet pump beam |
SCC |
VT-3 |
Beams |
|
(6) |
Wedges, locating bolts |
Wear . |
VT-3 |
Wedges, bolts |
|
Core spray piping / sparger |
- |
T box and straight pipe welded joints Gow-carbon stainless steel) |
SCC |
MVT-1 |
Welded joints |
Differential pressure detection / standby liquid control system piping |
|
Nozzle mounting welds (only for BWR 5) |
SCC |
VT-2 |
Welded joints |