0 Standard / 03. IAEA / IAEA_SGG 16-Safety Guide PUB1901
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Safety Fundamentals
Fundamental Safety Principles
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General Safety Requirements |
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Specific Safety Requirements |
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Part 1. Governmental, Legal and |
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1. Site Evaluation for |
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Regulatory Framework for Safety |
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Nuclear Installations |
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Part 2. Leadership and Management |
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2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants |
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for Safety |
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2/1 Design |
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Part 3. Radiation Protection and |
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2/2 |
Commissioning and Operation |
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Safety of Radiation Sources |
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Part 4. Safety Assessment for |
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3. Safety of Research Reactors |
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Facilities and Activities |
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Part 5. Predisposal Management |
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4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel |
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of Radioactive Waste |
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Cycle Facilities |
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Part 6. Decommissioning and |
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Safety of Radioactive Waste |
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Termination of Activities |
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Disposal Facilities |
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Part 7. Emergency Preparedness |
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6. Safe Transport of |
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and Response |
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Radioactive Material |
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Collection of Safety Guides
FIG. 1. The long term structure of the IAEA Safety Standards Series.
is necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative measures). The Safety Guides present international good practices, and increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high levels of safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed as ‘should’ statements.
APPLICATION OF THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
The principal users of safety standards in IAEA Member States are regulatory bodies and other relevant national authorities. The IAEA safety standards are also used by co-sponsoring organizations and by many organizations that design, construct and operate nuclear facilities, as well as organizations involved in the use of radiation and radioactive sources.
The IAEA safety standards are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities — existing and new — utilized for peaceful purposes and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. They can be
used by States as a reference for their national regulations in respect of facilities and activities.
The IAEA’s Statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in relation to its own operations and also on States in relation to IAEA assisted operations.
The IAEA safety standards also form the basis for the IAEA’s safety review services, and they are used by the IAEA in support of competence building, including the development of educational curricula and training courses.
International conventions contain requirements similar to those in the IAEA safety standards and make them binding on contracting parties. The IAEA safety standards, supplemented by international conventions, industry standards and detailed national requirements, establish a consistent basis for protecting people and the environment. There will also be some special aspects of safety that need to be assessed at the national level. For example, many of the IAEA safety standards, in particular those addressing aspects of safety in planning or design, are intended to apply primarily to new facilities and activities. The requirements established in the IAEA safety standards might not be fully met at some existing facilities that were built to earlier standards. The way in which IAEA safety standards are to be applied to such facilities is a decision for individual States.
The scientific considerations underlying the IAEA safety standards provide an objective basis for decisions concerning safety; however, decision makers must also make informed judgements and must determine how best to balance the benefits of an action or an activity against the associated radiation risks and any other detrimental impacts to which it gives rise.
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
The preparation and review of the safety standards involves the IAEA Secretariat and five safety standards committees, for emergency preparedness and response (EPReSC) (as of 2016), nuclear safety (NUSSC), radiation safety (RASSC), the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC) and the safe transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC), and a Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety standards programme (see Fig. 2).
All IAEA Member States may nominate experts for the safety standards committees and may provide comments on draft standards. The membership of the Commission on Safety Standards is appointed by the Director General and includes senior governmental officials having responsibility for establishing national standards.
A management system has been established for the processes of planning, developing, reviewing, revising and establishing the IAEA safety standards.
Outline and work plan prepared by the Secretariat; review by the safety standards committees and the CSS
Secretariat and consultants:
drafting of new or revision of existing safety standard
Draft
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Final draft |
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Endorsement
by the CSS
FIG. 2. The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an existing standard.
It articulates the mandate of the IAEA, the vision for the future application of the safety standards, policies and strategies, and corresponding functions and responsibilities.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the recommendations of international expert bodies, notably the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), are taken into account in developing the IAEA safety standards. Some safety standards are developed in cooperation with other bodies in the United Nations system or other specialized agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Labour Organization, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization.
INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT
Safety related terms are to be understood as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary (see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety-glossary.htm). Otherwise, words are used with the spellings and meanings assigned to them in the latest edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary. For Safety Guides, the English version of the text is the authoritative version.
The background and context of each standard in the IAEA Safety Standards Series and its objective, scope and structure are explained in Section 1, Introduction, of each publication.
Material for which there is no appropriate place in the body text (e.g. material that is subsidiary to or separate from the body text, is included in support of statements in the body text, or describes methods of calculation, procedures or limits and conditions) may be presented in appendices or annexes.
An appendix, if included, is considered to form an integral part of the safety standard. Material in an appendix has the same status as the body text, and the IAEA assumes authorship of it. Annexes and footnotes to the main text, if included, are used to provide practical examples or additional information or explanation. Annexes and footnotes are not integral parts of the main text. Annex material published by the IAEA is not necessarily issued under its authorship; material under other authorship may be presented in annexes to the safety standards. Extraneous material presented in annexes is excerpted and adapted as necessary to be generally useful.
CONTENTS
1. |
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Background (1.1–1.14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Objective (1.15–1.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Scope (1.21–1.26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Structure (1.27–1.29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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IMPLEMENTING IAEA GENERAL SAFETY |
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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE |
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SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Actions 1–10: National policy and strategy for safety (2.1–2.21) . . |
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Actions 11–19: Global nuclear safety regime (2.22–2.41) . . . . . |
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Actions 20–23: Legal framework (2.42–2.60) . . . . . . . . . |
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Actions 24–38: Regulatory framework (2.61–2.101) . . . . . . . |
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Actions 39–47: Transparency and openness (2.102–2.119) . . . . |
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Actions 48–60: Funding and financing (2.120–2.132) . . . . . . |
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Actions 61–71: External support organizations and contractors |
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(2.133–2.171) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Actions 72–84: Leadership and management for safety (2.172–2.195) |
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Actions 85–98: Human resources development (2.196–2.217) . . . |
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Actions 99–104: Research for safety and regulatory purposes |
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(2.218–2.232) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Actions 105–116: Radiation protection (2.233–2.247) . . . . . . |
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Actions 117–121: Safety assessment (2.248–2.270) . . . . . . . |
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Actions 122–132: Safety of radioactive waste management, spent |
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fuel management and decommissioning (2.271–2.290) . . . . . |
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Actions 133–145: Emergency preparedness and response |
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(2.291–2.310) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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3.IMPLEMENTING THE IAEA SPECIFIC SAFETY
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Actions 146–159: Operating organization (3.1–3.27) . . . . . . . 93 Actions 160–169: Site survey and site evaluation (3.28–3.59) . . . 103 Actions 170–184: Design safety (3.60–3.83) . . . . . . . . . . 111 Actions 185–188: Preparation for commissioning (3.84–3.95) . . . 117
Actions 189–192: Transport safety (3.96–3.113) . . . . . . . . |
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Actions 193–197: Interfaces with nuclear security (3.114–3.128) . . |
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APPENDIX: |
OVERVIEW OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN |
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EACH PHASE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF |
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THE SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . |
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REFERENCES . |
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CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . . . . . . . . |
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1. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
1.1.IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles [1], provides a coherent set of ten safety principles that constitute the basis for establishing safety requirements to achieve the fundamental safety objective of protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The safety principles form a set that is applicable in its entirety. Although in practice different principles might be more or less important in relation to particular circumstances, the appropriate application of all relevant principles is necessary. When a State is considering embarking on a nuclear power programme, Principle 1 (responsibility for safety), Principle 2 (role of government), Principle 3 (leadership and management for safety), Principle 4 (justification of facilities and activities) and Principle 9 (emergency preparedness and response) are crucial to preparing properly for the future safe operation of a nuclear power plant.
1.2.Aconsiderable period of time is needed to acquire the necessary competences and to foster a strong safety culture before constructing and operating a nuclear power plant. While the prime responsibility for safety rests with the operating organization, the State has the responsibility to create a robust framework for safety upon committing itself to a nuclear power programme, which demands significant investment [1]. Establishing a sustainable safety infrastructure is a long process, and it has been internationally acknowledged that a period of 10–15 years under optimum conditions is generally necessary between the consideration of nuclear power as part of the national energy strategy and the commencement of operation of the first nuclear power plant.
1.3.In 2007, the IAEA published a brochure, Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme [2], and a guide that was revised in 2015, Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power [3]. While those publications focus on the entire national infrastructure, the focus of this Safety Guide is on the development of the safety infrastructure for a nuclear power programme.
1.4.A 2008 report by the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) [4] defines nuclear safety infrastructure as “the set of institutional, organizational and technical elements and conditions established in a Member State to provide a sound foundation for ensuring a sustainable high level of nuclear safety.”
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1.5.IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1), Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety [5], establishes requirements relating to infrastructure for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the governmental and legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and for taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities
— existing and new — utilized for peaceful purposes. GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [5] applies to all facilities and activities, from the use of a single radiation source to a nuclear power programme. This framework for safety is essentially the part of the ‘nuclear safety infrastructure’ defined in Ref. [4] that is the responsibility of the government.
1.6.Paragraph 2.2 of GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) [5] states:
“The government establishes national policy for safety by means of different instruments, statutes and laws. Typically, the regulatory body, as designated by the government, is charged with the implementation of policies by means of a regulatory programme and a strategy set forth in its regulations or in national standards. The government determines the specific functions of the regulatory body and the allocation of responsibilities. For example, the government establishes laws and adopts policies pertaining to safety, whereas the regulatory body develops strategies and promulgates regulations in implementation of such laws and policies. In addition, the government establishes laws and adopts policies specifying the responsibilities and functions of different governmental entities in respect of safety and emergency preparedness and response, whereas the regulatory body establishes a system to provide effective coordination.”
1.7.Reference [4] (consistent with Refs [2, 3]) divides the lifetime of a nuclear power plant into five phases from a nuclear safety standpoint. These phases and their indicative average durations are as follows (see Fig. 1):
(a)Phase 1: Safety infrastructure considerations before a decision to launch a nuclear power programme is taken. Average duration: 1–3 years.
(b)Phase 2: Safety infrastructure preparatory work for the construction of a nuclear power plant after a policy decision has been taken. Average duration: 3–7 years.
(c)Phase 3: Safety infrastructure activities to implement the first nuclear power plant. Average duration: 7–10 years.
(d)Phase 4: Safety infrastructure during the operation phase of the nuclear power plant. Average duration: 40–60 years.
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of the rationale |
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for the decision |
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infrastructure |
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before a decision |
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infrastructure |
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infrastructure |
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FIG. 1. Main phases of safety infrastructure development over the lifetime of a nuclear power plant.
(e)Phase 5: Safety infrastructure during the decommissioning and waste management phases of the nuclear power plant. Average duration: 20 to more than 100 years.
This Safety Guide uses the same approach in considering Phases 1–3.
1.8.This Safety Guide provides recommendations, presented in the form of sequential actions, on progressively meeting all applicable safety requirements established in the IAEA safety standards during Phases 1–3 in the development of the safety infrastructure. The actions set out in this Safety Guide are not reformulations of safety requirements; they provide recommendations, expressed as ‘should’ statements, on when to implement the relevant requirements. This Safety Guide does not diminish the application of, or provide a synopsis of or a substitute for, the IAEA Safety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements publications and associated Safety Guides.
1.9.Figure 2 provides an indicative time frame and some important milestones expected in each of the phases. At the end of Phase 1, the State is ready to make a knowledgeable commitment to a nuclear power programme. At the end of Phase 2, the State is ready to invite bids or to negotiate a contract for the first nuclear power plant. At the end of Phase 3, the State is ready to commission and operate the first nuclear power plant.
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Policy and |
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Bid/contrac preparation |
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Application for authorization for commissioning
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Construction
FIG. 2. Indicative time frame and some important milestones for the development of a nuclear safety infrastructure.