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A common mistake made by those who seek to dismiss the PGC is to assume that Gewirth attempts to prove a categorical imperative. This is not his task; rather, his argument is dialectical in that it seeks to show that an agent contradicts themselves if they choose not to act in accordance with the PGC.25 This results in an outcome that is admittedly similar to moral principles that do claim the status as a categorical imperative, such as those discerned by Kant,26 but which differs in two important ways. Firstly, rather than Kant’s open-ended indeterminism, the PGC seeks to protect two generic yet specific and identifiable rights.27 Secondly, where a categorical imperative can be critiqued from the point of view of the moral relativist the PGC cannot, insofar as it proceeds dialectically from the internal, cognitive standpoint of the agent.28 The PGC is universalisable based on the logic that if a Predicate (P) belongs to a Subject (S) because of a Quality (Q), all S who have Q possess P.29 Therefore, all S who are agents possess generic rights to freedom and wellbeing. Such a statement is dialectically necessary in that it is relative to what all agents must logically accept for themselves,30 and universal in that all human beings are capable of rational autonomy and are thus agents for this purpose.31 At this point, an objection might be raised that not all human beings are agents capable of being covered by the requirements of the PGC; it is not apparent, for example, whether newborn infants or those temporarily or permanently lacking consciousness, as but two examples, are capable of acting purposively or voluntarily. On a strict reading, this would exclude them from being able to benefit from the imperative Gewirth has identified. It is at this stage, however, that a precautionary principle necessarily comes into play. This can be seen to be necessary when we restate the imperative provided by the PGC: that we are required to avoid breaching its requirements in every situation when such a breach is a possible consequence of our actions. If an observer is required to decide whether the individual before them is also an agent, then the following is true: (a) If the being is an agent, then: (i) If the observer treats them in a way that is PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour is morally permissible. (ii) If the observer treats them in a way that is not PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour is morally impermissible.

(b) If the being is not an agent, then: (i) If the observer treats them in a way that is PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour is morally permissible. (ii) If the observer treats them in a way that is not PGC compliant, then the observer’s behaviour is morally permissible. The PGC requires us to avoid behaviour which is not compatible with its requirements in all circumstances, meaning that the course of action we are categorically required to avoid in the above scenario is option (a)(ii). If the agential status of the person in question is in anyway uncertain – even minimally so – an agent is required to treat them in a way that is PGC compliant as this is the only way to guarantee that the agent avoids course of action (a)(ii). The PGC thus requires us to see all beings who could conceivably be agents – hereafter prospective agents – as being of moral concern, and as being covered by its imperative. Being a prospective agent is thus sufficient for us to see the individual in question as being of moral concern, and we ought to guard against mistakenly treating them as though they were non-agents ‘to the extent that it is possible and meaningful for agents to do so’.32 This is referred to as the ‘Argument for the Sufficiency of Agency’.33 It could be countered, however, that this claim means that the PGC becomes a categorical imperative – something Gewirth wished to avoid – rather than a moral claim grounded dialectically in universally applicable instrumental reason. This will make many sceptical of the Gewirthian position given the difficulties involved in presenting objective moral claims to a world that seems – as a matter of social fact – morally pluralist. In order to address this critique, Gewirth argues that it is important to distinguish two different senses in which the term ‘moral’ is used in different areas of discourse. Positive, or collective, morality concerns itself with rules or directives held as categorically obligatory and is often found in customary ways of acting which are empirically identifiable. By contrast, normative, or critical, morality concerns mind-independent moral precepts, rules or principles that are demonstrably valid and ought to be upheld regardless of whether they are accepted as such. Unlike customary positive moralities, normative precepts exist independently of personal belief and are rationally identifiable through reason. Certain standards of moral rightness, such as the PGC, are simply universally valid; no alternative principles of what is genuinely morally right that conflict with the requirements of the PGC can coexist with its dialectical necessity.34 To further insist on

collective moral pluralism in light of a critical moral standard such as the PGC entails one of two arguments. Firstly, one may argue that normative morality cannot exist; the only standards are a series of positive, collective moralities as is demonstrable by empirical observation. This can be countered with two main arguments. One could respond to the objection, as Gewirth does, by pointing out that prioritising positive, collective morality, requires us to see cultures as homogenous wholes; this is clearly not the case, as can be observed by the fact of value pluralism within cultures.35 Or, one could point out that a rejection of critical, normative moral standards such as those provided by the PGC do not meaningfully engage with the argument in favour of seeing them as valid; they merely double down on a pre-existing scepticism without giving any reason as to why the PGC should be rejected: The argument depends on the recognition that action is the universal and necessary context of all moralities and indeed of all practice. For all positive moralities and other practical precepts, amid their vast differences of specific contents, are concerned, directly or indirectly, with telling persons how they ought to act, especially toward one another. In addition, all persons are actual, prospective or potential agents, and no person can reject for herself the whole context of agency, except, perhaps, by committing suicide; and even then the steps she takes to achieve this purpose would themselves be actions. The general context of action thus transcends the differences of the various positive cultures and moralities.36 The second reason for which the PGC might be rejected in favour of an argument for collective moral pluralism may be that the PGC, by appealing to an idealised ‘rational’ individual, shows that it is itself culturally grounded in western moralities that are more prone to valuing individual rights over those that might exist at the community level. Any moral principle that emerges from it is therefore itself culturally grounded in this western prioritisation, rather than being of a truly neutral and universal value. This point can again be rejected insofar as it does not fully engage with the argument in favour of accepting the PGC and – as with the first objection – merely doubles down on a pre-existing scepticism as to the existence of normative moral standards. It thus demonstrates either a refusal to engage with, or a misunderstanding of, the operation of the dialectically necessary argument for the PGC.37 Community values are necessarily a product of the choices and acts of individuals acting together, so a community right cannot exist unless we see its purpose as being the protection of the individuals that comprise the community in question. To criticise rights as individualistic therefore misses the point.38 A final point should be made at this stage as to the purpose of the test provided by the PGC; that it is not a test of moral obligatoriness. It does not seek to demonstrate that every moral question only has a single possible answer. Rather, it serves as a test for moral permissibility. It is therefore perfectly compatible with the concept of cultural pluralism; cultures and societies are free to engage in practices that diverge significantly from one another and can even raise them to the level of a positive and collective morality. The only thing that is impermissible is for these standards to fall below the line of impermissibility provided by the PGC. And what is true of cultural pluralism is also the case for attempts to apply the PGC to the question of legal validity; as will be shown in section 2.3 of Chapter 3, the PGC is compatible with the pluralism of legal reality.