institution of some kind, even if multiple markets develop. Here again, the further development of the AERN probably makes more sense than developing an entirely new institution. At the same time, this would not prevent the development of subregional collaborative bodies among subsets of AMS. For example, in Europe there is the Council of European Energy Regulators, which is a regulatory network similar in many ways to the AERN, and NordREG, which includes only regulators from the Nordic region.

There are a number of functions that are only indirectly relevant to the establishment of multilateral power trade in ASEAN. High among these is regional collaboration on transmission planning. Power trade is not possible without transmission infrastructure in place. At the same time, the activity of transmission planning is not directly related to the practice of multilateral power trade.

Given that transmission planning is needed across ASEAN, here again it probably makes the most sense for a single central institution to take on this responsibility. It may be that an existing institution such as HAPUA should take on this role. It is notable, however, that the AIMS III study is being managed by ACE. This arrangement may make sense over the long term as well, or it may make more sense to further develop HAPUA’s capabilities. Alternatively, a formal regional transmission operator institution could be developed, as per the recommendations of the ATSO study discussed previously. Regardless, here an ASEAN-wide institution most likely makes the most sense. At the same time, the existence of such an institution should not prevent groups of AMS from developing their own collaborative grid studies. This is the case in Europe, where ENTSO-E develops a Europe-wide grid study, but where groups of countries also collaborate to develop deeper and more fully integrated assessments on, for example, resource adequacy.

Finally, it is worth emphasising why there is value in at least some division of responsibilities. One of the lessons of efforts such as the GMS or regional integration in other parts of the world is that it can be difficult to decide which country should host a new institution. If all aspects related to regional integration are placed in a single organisation, it will be difficult or even impossible to decide who will host. Dividing functions across multiple institutions, and creating multiple institutions with some parallel or even overlapping functions, may lead to some inefficiencies, but it will also allow multiple AMS to more actively participate, and therefore feel some ownership over, the process of establishing multilateral power trade in the region.

References

ACE (2019), Introduction (website), aseanenergy.org, www.aseanenergy.org/about-ace/introduction/.

ASEAN Secretariat (2019), ASEC Mission, Vision and Core Principles (website), asean.org, www.asean.org/uploads/archive/job144-c.pdf.

ASEAN Secretariat (2016), ASEAN Sectretariat Organisational Structure (website), asean.org, www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ASEAN-Secretariat-Organizational-Structure- effective-1-January-2016.png.

Greater Mekong Subregion (2019a), Conference Proceedings (website), greatermekong.org, https://greatermekong.org/conference-proceedings?page=1.

Greater Mekong Subregion (2019b), 24th Meeting of the Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee

(website), greatermekong.org, https://greatermekong.org/24th-meeting-regional-power-trade- coordination-committee-rptcc-24-0.

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HAPUA (2019a), About HAPUA (website), hapua.org, http://hapua.org/main/hapua/about/.

HAPUA (2019b), HAPUA Coordination Line (website), hapua.org, http://hapua.org/main/hapua/hapuastructures/.

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