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and, in the case of PWRs or advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR)s, frequency control and load modulation can, to some extent, be financially quantified. Yet, its contribution to the diversification of the electricity supply, technological spillovers, the preservation of skills, and the local economic development are of a more qualitative nature.
However, for these reasons, as well as due to the heterogeneous nature of individual nuclear new build projects, it is unlikely that nuclear projects will ever compete head-on with other renewables resources, such as wind and solar photovoltaics in unified “equivalent firm power” capacity auctions as proposed in the 2017 Cost of Energy Review requested by the government from Professor Dieter Helm (Helm, 2017). Even adjusting and derating different forms of electricity would create myriads of methodological challenges in a fast-evolving environment that are unlikely to be overcome to allow comparing like with like.
UK membership in Euratom and Brexit
The United Kingdom announced that it will be leaving the Euratom treaty as part of Brexit. As in other areas of energy policy affected by Brexit, there still exists considerable uncertainty as experts both in the United Kingdom and in the European Union explore options for future relations under different scenarios. The government’s Brexit White Paper of July 2018 (UK Government, 2018b), however, stated that in the area of civil nuclear trade, the United Kingdom will seek a close association with Euratom. The United Kingdom and the European Union have also now jointly published a political declaration on the future relationship (UK Government, 2018c), which, among other things, sets out the parties’ desire to agree a wide-ranging Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) that covers the continued co-operation on safeguards, safety, civil nuclear trade, research, and monitoring and improving security of supply for medical radioisotopes.
A Notice to Stakeholders by the European Commission of March 2018 spells out the implications of the United Kingdom leaving the Euratom acquis without a deal and becoming a third country (EC, 2018). After a hard Brexit the United Kingdom would no longer be able to participate in the common European supply arrangements for reactor fuels conducted by the European Supply Agency. EU countries would also require specific licences for exports to the United Kingdom.
In August 2018, the United Kingdom published guidance for operators on civil nuclear regulation that sets out the steps that businesses in the United Kingdom may need to take in a “no deal” scenario (UK Government, 2019), which includes import licence arrangements, authorisations for trans-frontier shipments of radioactive waste, and notifications for radioactive source shipments.
In the Withdrawal Agreement (UK Government, 2018d) there are six articles that deal in some detail with separation issues around civil nuclear trade. For example, one article deals with the equipment that Euratom inspectors currently use in the United Kingdom for their safeguards work. It specifies that Euratom equipment located at Sellafield and other UK sites will be inventoried and ownership will transfer to the United Kingdom, with the European Union being reimbursed at the book value of this equipment at the end of 2020.
The Withdrawal Agreement also provided for a general transition period (or “implementation period”) between the European Union and the United Kingdom for the
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period between 29 March 2019, the date the United Kingdom was due to leave the European Union, and 31 December 2020. This could be, in principle, a period during which a NCA or, alternatively, specific arrangements pertaining to the export and import of nuclear materials be negotiated, and the political declaration commits both parties to trying to achieve this.
In the meantime, a domestic Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 (‘2018 Act’) that provides for the continuation of nuclear safeguards after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from Euratom was passed by the UK Parliament on 6 June 2018 and enacted on 26 June 2018. The 2018 Act enables the United Kingdom to establish a domestic nuclear safeguards regime, to be operated by the national regulator (the Office for Nuclear Regulation), that will enable the United Kingdom to discharge its international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The regulatory regime was approved by the UK Parliament in February 2019. The 2018 Act also ensures that the United Kingdom is able to give effect to its obligations under new nuclear safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and under other international agreements that relate to nuclear safeguards. As part of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from Euratom, the United Kingdom has also signed new bilateral NCAs with Australia (August 2018), Canada (November 2018), and the United States (May 2018) and confirmed the operability of an existing NCA with Japan (February 2019) to continue civil nuclear trade when the Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also remains a member of the IAEA conventions on Nuclear Safety, the Safety of Spent Fuel Management, and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The United Kingdom’s new bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA, signed in June 2018, were ratified by the UK Parliament in December 2018 together with the three new bilateral NCAs.
Waste management and decommissioning
The United Kingdom has comprehensive policies in place for the decommissioning of nuclear installations and the disposal of nuclear waste. Decommissioning funding is based on three distinct pillars. The decommissioning of legacy nuclear sites is overseen by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), which has an annual expenditure of about GBP 3 billion. It is responsible for the decommissioning and clean-up of 17 sites, which include the Magnox fleet of nuclear power stations, research centres, fuel enrichment and fabrication facilities, and the vast Sellafield nuclear research and fuel reprocessing site. Funding for the decommissioning of current reactors, which EDF Energy acquired from British Energy in 2009, is ensured through the Nuclear Liabilities Fund. New reactor projects are required to have a separately funded decommissioning programme approved by the government to ensure that operators are able to meet the costs of decommissioning and waste management. In the case of the HPC project, decommissioning costs will be accounted for from a share of electricity sales in the order of GBP 2/MWh. In approving and then supervising the funded decommissioning programme, the government is advised by the independent Nuclear Liabilities Financing Assurance Board.
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The United Kingdom is also continuing preparations for a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) for what is referred to as “higher-activity waste (HAW)”, which is expected to be operational in the 2040s with estimated costs in the order of GBP 12 billion1.
The UK Government has policy responsibility for radioactive waste management in England. The Welsh Government has the responsibility in Wales; the Scottish Government in Scotland and the Northern Ireland Executive in Northern Ireland.
The policy framework for the long-term management of higher-activity radioactive waste and how to engage with communities to identify a suitable site for a GDF in England is set out in ‘Working with Communities: Implementing Geological Disposal’ which was published by the UK Government in December 2018 (UK Government, 2018e).
An equivalent document for Wales was published in January 2019: Geological disposal of radioactive waste: working with potential host communities2.
Northern Ireland is not participating further in this stage of the process to identify a site for a GDF and there are no plans to site a GDF in Northern Ireland. Any future policy decisions in relation to geological disposal in Northern Ireland would be a matter for the Northern Ireland Executive and would be subject to community agreement as well as planning and environment consents.
Scotland is not participating in the process to identify a suitable location for a GDF. The Scottish Government has a distinct policy for HAW, published in 2011. This policy is that long-term management of HAW should be in near-surface facilities. Facilities should be located as near to the site where the waste is produced as possible. In 2016, the Scottish Government published an Implementation Strategy3, expanding on the framework provided by its 2011 policy, to allow waste management decisions to be taken to ensure the policy is implemented in a safe, environmentally-acceptable and costeffective manner.
The National Policy Statement for Geological Disposal Infrastructure (UK Government, 2018f) is the document that will outline the criteria that will be considered by the Planning Inspectorate and the Secretary of State when a decision is made whether to give development consent to a proposed GDF development or not. The consultation on a draft of this document took place from January to April 2018. The draft National Policy Statement then underwent Parliamentary scrutiny in 2018, with a select committee report in July 2018 and a debate in the House of Lords in September 2018. The National Policy Statement for Geological Disposal Infrastructure is expected to be published by the UK Government in 2019. It will apply to England only, as planning consent for all radioactive waste projects are devolved to the respective national administrations
There is no absolute target date for starting operations, although the NDA currently bases its plans on the assumption that the first disposal of nuclear waste at the GDF could take place in the 2040s. The siting process in England began at the end of
1The UK government’s definition of HAW includes highand intermediate-level waste as well as the small proportion of low-level waste not suitable for the existing disposal facilities.
2https://gweddill.gov.wales/docs/desh/publications/190130-geological-disposal-of-higher-activity-radioactive-waste- working-with-communities-en.pdf
3https://www.gov.scot/publications/higher-activity-waste-implementation-strategy/
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December 2018 and in Wales in January 2019. Detailed site investigations may take up to 15 years and it will take about ten years to construct the first vaults within a facility. Interim storage facilities will be used until the GDF is fully operational.
Research and development
In the area of nuclear R&D, the United Kingdom maintains a Nuclear Innovation Programme but is reducing its funding from the original GBP 250 million to GBP 180 million over the next five years. The United Kingdom committed GBP 86 million for a National Fusion Technology Platform at Culham under the Nuclear Sector Deal (UK Government, 2018a), and plans to invest GBP 20m into plans for a next generation fusion reactor. The Nuclear Sector Deal includes a commitment to co-operate with the Welsh government on developing a thermal hydraulics facility in North Wales.
The information gathering stage of the small modular reactor (SMR) competition announced in 2016 was concluded at the end of 2017, when the United Kingdom announced three further initiatives: up to GBP 44 million of funding for research on advanced modular reactors, which include Generation 4 reactors and small fusion reactors; up to GBP 12 million of funding for the nuclear safety regulators, the Office of Nuclear Regulation, and the Environment Agency to build-up the appropriate regulatory capacity; and the establishment of an Expert Finance Working Group on Small Reactors to provide independent recommendations on the commercial feasibility of SMRs. The Group was set up in February 2018 and presented its final report, the Market Framework for Financing Small Nuclear (UK Government, 2018g), in August 2018. Its key recommendations are to establish a manufacturing supply chain initiative, similar to that for offshore wind, streamline regulatory approval, maintain suitable sites, and focus on the reduction of capital costs, especially for a first-of-a-kind model through a combination of public financing, loan guarantees, CFDs, power purchase agreement (PPA)s, or RAB financing.
The UK’s withdrawal from the Euratom Treaty has the potential to affect the UK’s relationship with EU nuclear research collaborations conducted under the umbrella of the Euratom Research & Training Programme (Euratom R&T). Under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement the UK will continue to participate fully in Euratom R&T until the end of 2020. This will coincide with the start of the new 2021-25 R&T programme, to which, subject to negotiations, the UK aims to seek association as part of its future Science and Innovation relationship with the EU (the Euratom R&T programme runs on a five-year cycle with a two-year extension to bring it in line with the EU’s overarching Multiannual Financial Framework). Under a no deal outcome the UK would still retain limited access to research activities as a third-country. BEIS set out the arrangements in a 2018 note (Nuclear Research if there’s no Brexit Deal) and in April 2019 (UK Government, 2019b).
The UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) hosts the Joint European Torus (JET) at the Culham Centre for Fusion Energy, which is at the heart of the European fusion research programme. UKAEA have a contract with the EU Commission to operate JET on behalf of Euratom. Under the terms of this contract the EU provides 87.5% of the JET operating costs, with the UK providing the remaining 12.5%. On 27 March 2019 the European Commission and the UK signed a new contract extension for the JET facility. This contract extension will ensure this can continue to operate until at least the
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