- •Acknowledgements
- •Table of Contents
- •List of Cases
- •List of Legal Instruments
- •Introduction
- •1 Research Background
- •(A) Multinational Corporation Groups
- •(B) The Importance of Legal Certainty to MCG Insolvency Cases
- •(C) Abusive Forum Shopping
- •(D) Background on European Insolvency Regulations
- •2 Research Questions
- •3 Research Methodology
- •4 Structure of the Thesis
- •(A) The Concepts of Limited Liability, Separate Legal Personality, and Lifting the Veil
- •(B) Corporate Groups in UK Case Law
- •(C) Post Adams Era and the Problems of the Company Law Approach
- •1.2 The Conflict of Laws Perspective: Theories and Implications
- •(A) Universalism Theory in Insolvency Proceedings
- •(B) Modified Universalism Theory in Insolvency Proceedings
- •(C) The Principle of Territoriality
- •(D) The Principle of Cooperative Territoriality
- •(E) The Principle of Contractualism
- •1.3 Conclusion
- •2.1 The Notion of the COMI under the EIR 2000
- •(A) Importance of the COMI
- •(B) The Notion of the COMI
- •(C) Registered Office Approach vs Real Seat Approach
- •(A) Analysis of the Case of Daisytek ISA Limited: The ‘Head Office Function’ Approach
- •(B) Analysis of the Eurofood Case: The Registered Office Approach
- •2.3 Forum Shopping and European Insolvency Regulation
- •(A) The Implications of Forum Shopping in the Insolvency Regulation
- •(B) Preventing Abusive Forum Shopping
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •3.1 Substantive Consolidation
- •3.2 Coordination and Cooperation
- •(A) Procedural Coordination
- •(B) Enhanced Cooperation and Coordination
- •3.3 Harmonisation of Insolvency Laws within the EU
- •(A) Full Harmonisation
- •(B) Harmonisation of Selected Insolvency Topics
- •3.4 Party Autonomy
- •(A) International Protocols: An Effective Tool for Dealing with the Insolvency of MCGs
- •(B) Choice Model
- •3.5 Conclusion
- •4.1 Overview of the EIR Recast
- •4.2 Legal Certainty-Enhancing Provisions of the EIR Recast
- •(A) Secondary Proceedings
- •(B) Clarification of the Notion of the COMI
- •(C) Chapter V on Insolvency Proceedings of a Member of a Group of Companies
- •(i) Cooperation and Communication
- •(ii) Coordination
- •4.3 Opportunities for Reform
- •4.4 Conclusion
- •Conclusion
- •1 Cross-Border Insolvency of MCGs
- •2 Original Contribution
- •3 Future Research
- •4 Final Remarks
- •Bibliography
Introduction
‘Forum shopping is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdiction, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case most favourably be presented; this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation.’1 Lord Simon
This Thesis examines the European Union insolvency rules, specifically, the European
Insolvency Regulation (EIR 2000) and the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (New
Recast EIR 2015), in order to determine whether such rules help enhance legal certainty in
cross-border insolvency cases involving multinational corporate groups (MCGs). The
objective therein is protecting creditor interests through the reduction of abusive forum
shopping.
Many major companies now use complex structures that involve multiple levels of
subsidiaries.2 Such structures are used to achieve economic and administrative advantages.3
As noted by Hannigan, it may also ‘make geographic sense depending on the nature of the
company’s business’ for a multinational company to divide its activities through
subsidiaries.4 The problem of cross-border insolvency with MCGs is a very timely one,
especially in light of the global growth of international trade, the movement towards the
economic integration of various regions around the world, such as the European Union, the
1The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 346, 471.
2Subsidiary company: a subsidiary company is a company that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a parent company. A subsidiary company may be wholly owned by a single parent company, or may partially owned by several parent companies. Subsidiary companies have a separate legal personality from their parent companies and consequently a parent company cannot be held liable for the debts of the subsidiary except in cases where the veil may be lifted. For more on subsidiaries, see Henry Ballantine, ‘Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations’ (1925)14 California Law Review 12.
3Irit Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (Oxford University Press 2009) 12-13.
4Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 18.
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