Экзамен зачет учебный год 2023 / Koziol_BasicQuestions_Germanic

utilisation for designated purposes, eg consumption, usage, processing or transfer of the good 116. Rummel 117 emphasises this very clearly: » The simple destruction of a thing contrary to its designated purpose may not generally be deemed a use, even if it serves one’s interests ( for example, in the course of a burglary ). This is the only

111Fundamentally see Wilburg, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung 27 ff;continuing along this line von Caemmerer, Bereicherung und unerlaubte Handlung, Rabel-FS ( 1959 ) 352 ff; see further in more recent times, for example F. Bydlinski, System und Prinzipien 242 f; Larenz / Canaris, Schuldrecht II / 213 § 69 I 1c; Reuter / Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung ( 1983 ) § 7 I 1.

112Larenz / Canaris, Schuldrecht II / 213 § 69 I 1c.

113In favour, for example, also Jansen, Die Struktur des Haftungsrechts ( 2003 ) 479, 496, 521 f.

114Cf also Jansen, Struktur des Haftungsrechts 495 ff.

115On use as a prerequisite for the claim see Apathy, Der Verwendungsanspruch ( 1988 ) 46 ff; Rummel in Rummel, ABGB I3 § 1041 no 3.

116Only the various possibilities for use are mentioned in each case, but never destruction, cf Wendehorst in Bamberger / Roth, BGB II2 § 812 no 127; von Caemmerer, Rabel-FS 353; see further from more recent times, for example F. Bydlinski, System und Prinzipien 242 f; Ellger, Bereicherung durch Eingriff ( 2002 ) 228 f; Reuter / Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung § 7 IV 1; further from a comparative law perspective Schlechtriem, Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich in Europa II ( 2001 ) 111 ff.

117Rummel in Rummel, ABGB I3 § 1041 no 3; following this line Koziol in KBB, ABGB3 § 1041 no 9.

118 Cf also Ellger, Bereicherung durch Eingriff 125 f; Reuter / Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereiche­ rung § 7 II 2.

119 Fundamental on all of this Wilburg, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung 27 ff; see further F. Bydlinski, System und Prinzipien 242 f; Ellger, Bereicherung durch Eingriff 148 ff; Larenz / Canaris, Schuld­ recht II / 213 § 69 I 1c; Reuter / Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung § 7 I 1; cf also OGH 3 Ob 544 / 95 in JBl 1996, 48.

120 Parallel problems also arise in some cases where profits are obtained by breach of fiduciary duties, cf on this for example Rusch, Gewinnhaftung bei Verletzung von Treuepflichten ( 2003 ) 251 f; Böger, Vorteilsorientierte Haftung 103 ff.

121 Das stellvertretende Commodum ( 1999 ) 218.

122 See also already Koziol, Die Bereicherung des Schädigers als schadenersatzrechtliches Zurech­­ nungselement ? F. Bydlinski-FS ( 2002 ) 175 ff.

stances if those who caused the destruction of a good had to surrender the benefit they gained thereby, which was allocated to the good. At first glance it might seem that there is no necessity for this since the victim generally has a claim for damages when the perpetrator has acted culpably. However, this is not ultimately the case: while claims for damages and for use both require to the same extent that there has been interference with the protected interests of another, the law of tort aims at the compensation of the harm suffered by the party whose interests were impaired, whereas the law on unjust enrichment serves the disgorgement of the advantage gained by the interferer.123

In principle, there is certainly no doubt as to the victim’s claim to compen- 2 / 37 sation for the damage culpably inflicted upon him in the cases under discussion

here. The need for a solution under the law on unjust enrichment arises, however, because the law of tort does not seem sufficient in this respect 124 since by its very nature it is only directed at the compensation of the harm. This may – as the Caroline cases above all have shown 125 – lead to the interferer being left with a considerable profit even after full compensation of damage, so that the law of tort cannot procure any deterrent effect. The approach taken by the BGH, of increasing the compensation for non-pecuniary damage on this basis is clearly impermissible because it disregards a fundamental principle of liability law, namely that claims for damages are only directed at the compensation of the damage 126. Moreover, this approach does not come into question for many other abundantly obvious reasons: the destruction of a thing does not concern the infringement of personality rights that could trigger a claim for non-pecuniary damage. Even in the case of bodily injury, increasing the damages for pain and suffering on the basis of the advantage gained by the perpetrator comes even less into question than in the Caroline cases.

The claim for disgorgement of profit 127 would also have the advantage for the victim that the claim is based on an actual enrichment gained by the interferer and

123Cf Wilburg, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung 97 ff; Böger, Vorteilsorientierte Haftung 50 ff.

124Helms, Gewinnherausgabe als haftungsrechtliches Problem ( 2007 ) 1, limits the question of surrender of profits completely to those cases in which a plus on the side of the infringing party is not matched by a corresponding minus on the side of the victim.

125BGH in BGHZ 128, 1 = NJW 1995, 861; NJW 1996, 984; NJW 1996, 985.

126Cf Canaris, Gewinnabschöpfung bei Verletzung des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts, Deutsch-FS ( 1999 ) 102 ff; Löwe, Der Gedanke der Prävention im deutschen Schadensersatz­ recht ( 2000 ) 188 ff; Böger, Vorteilsorientierte Haftung 882 ff. Departing from this, however, Helms, Gewinnherausgabe 300 ff; von Bar, Deliktsrecht I no 609.

127On the reference to the right to management without authorisation, see in particular Canaris, Deutsch-FS 87 ff; further Hoppe, Gewinnorientierte Persönlichkeitsverletzung in der europäischen Regenbogenpresse, ZEuP 2000, 29; Löwe, Prävention 185 ff; G. Wagner, Geldersatz für Persönlichkeitsverletzungen, ZEuP 2000, 200; Wernecke, Schadensersatz und Gewinnherausgabe als Strafelemente des bürgerlichen Rechts ? ( 2005 ). On Swiss law see Inderkum, Schaden­ ersatz, Genugtuung und Gewinnherausgabe aus Persönlichkeitsverletzung ( 2008 ) 171 ff.

ing in this provision shows that it applies not merely in the case of use of a thirdparty patent but in general when profit is gained by culpable » patent infringement «.

The German Patent Act does not contain any corresponding provision, but intellectual property case law 132 has long recognised the option of assessing the –

128 Cf Stoll Haftungsfolgen im bürgerlichen Recht ( 1993 ) 43; Helms, Gewinnherausgabe 4 f.

129 See Kraßer, Schadensersatz für Verletzungen von gewerblichen Schutzrechten und Urheber­ rechten nach deutschem Recht, GRUR Int 1980, 264.

130 OGH in 4 Ob 246 / 97y in ÖBl 1998, 307; 4 Ob 36 / 05 f in ecolex 2005, 928 ( G. Schönherr ). 131 BGH in BGHZ 68, 90 = JZ 1977, 515 ( Bälz ).

132 BGH in GRUR 1962, 401; BGHZ 145, 366. Cf on this – also from a comparative law perspective – König, Gewinnhaftung,­ von Caemmerer-FS ( 1978 ) 188 ff.

133In BGHZ 68, 90 the BGH refers to this non-fault-based claim as a » residual claim for damages «.

134System und Prinzipien 92 ff; idem, Die Maxime beidseitiger Rechtfertigung im Privatrecht, KoziolFS ( 2010 ) 1355 ff. Following this line in particular in respect of the law on unjust enrichment

to our problem area this means: if there are not only arguments for a disgorgement of the advantage unlawfully gained by the enrichee, but also arguments in favour of compensation on the basis of the allocation of the good used in an unauthorised manner to the claimant, then such claimant should be awarded the claim for unjust enrichment by interference. Only when there are solely arguments to the effect that the advantage should not be left with the enrichee but no grounds in favour of a claim on the other side, would the claim no longer fall under the law on unjust enrichment and in such case disgorgement to the benefit of the state should be ordered ( see below no 2 / 82 f ).

In the area under discussion here, however, it could after all be argued that while there was certainly no allocation of the use in the strict sense, there was nevertheless an attenuated allocation: the infringer frustrates the possibility of use allocated by the legal system to the victim 135 and avails of this potential for use himself. In my opinion it must also suffice for the bilateral justification of a claim for disgorgement of the profit obtained if the party whose good was the subject of interference is comparatively more entitled than the interferer 136. It would after all seem more fitting if the party who owned the good and who suffered a disadvantage due to the interference receives the benefit obtained by the destruction of his thing than if it is received by the party that destroyed a third-party good 137.

That claims be granted merely on the basis of comparatively more entitlement is indeed by no means uncommon under the ABGB and the BGB: in the case of action of ejection the outcome does not depend on whether the claimant is conclusively entitled to the thing of which he was deprived. This aspect plays an even greater role in the case of the actio Publiciana, which explicitly simply invokes the comparatively stronger right ( cf § 372 ABGB, § 1007 BGB ) 138.

2 / 43 However, this attenuation of the justification on the side of the victim has to be balanced by toughening the prerequisites for the claim on the side of the interferer in order to proceed overall from appropriate grounds for the existence of the claim as in the case of the claims more closely regulated by law; unless it is balanced such claim would not fit harmoniously into the overall legal concept. This is why the claim for disgorgement of profits that goes beyond the actual area of

  Bollenberger, Gewinnabschöpfung bei Vertragsbruch, ZEuP 2000, 905. In the same sense – however, without invoking F. Bydlinski’s arguments – Ellger, Bereicherung durch Eingriff 409. Rejecting this, on the other hand, G. Wagner, Präventivschadensersatz im Kontinental-Europäischen Privatrecht, Koziol-FS ( 2010 ) 932 f. See additionally under no 2 / 92.

135A similar concept is developed by Helms, Gewinnherausgabe 157.

136von Caemmerer, Bereicherung und unerlaubte Handlung, Rabel-FS 360, sees the justification in that the damage suffered by the victim should roughly correspond to the profit gained by the interferer. However, this is merely speculation, which will by no means always reflect reality.

137In this sense already Koziol, Bereicherungsansprüche bei Eingriffen in nicht entgeltsfähige Güter ? Wiegand-FS ( 2007 ) 454 ff.

138Similar results are achieved in Swiss law under Art 934 ff ZGB.

allocation should be bound to the requirement of negligent interference in thirdparty goods. The intellectual property law rules do speak to some extent of culpable behaviour but in my opinion it would be an excessive requirement if one were to take subjective culpability as a basis: this would not adequately take into account that it is not damages that are at issue but the surrender of an enrichment, ie a lesser legal consequence. Milder legal consequences call for correspondingly milder prerequisites, which thus must be less stringent than those for claims for damages.

This slight correction, to the effect that fault means objective negligence in this context, means the intellectual property law rules fit seamlessly into a consistent overall system: by means of this toughening of the prerequisites in comparison to those under the law on unjust enrichment, the assessment once again falls overall in favour of the party at whose expense the enrichment was obtained. Moreover, it can be argued that additionally deterrent grounds 139 also speak in favour of granting a claim to disgorge profit.

Therefore, it is to be presumed that in the case of negligent destruction of a 2 / 44 good, the party to whom this good was allocated also has a claim for disgorgement

of the profit gained by the interferer thereby even if the specific advantages gained cannot be deemed to have been allocated to the owner. The comprehensive protection and thus the general allocation of the good at least allows the owner of the good to be reckoned as more entitled than the unauthorised interferer to gain the advantage actually drawn from the infringement of the third-party good.

5.The doctrinal classification of the claim to disgorgement of profit

profit is considered unclear 140. This is unsurprising in that some requirements are based on the law of tort whereas the legal consequences are oriented on the law of unjust enrichment 141. Frequently, the claim is referred to as a claim for damages due to the requirements derived from the law of tort 142. But the Austrian Copyright

139The concept of deterrence is emphasised above all by those who advocate the economic theory, see Köndgen, Gewinnabschöpfung als Sanktion unerlaubten Tuns. Eine juristisch-ökono- mische Skizze, RabelsZ 64 ( 2000 ) 679 ff.

140Seiler in MünchKomm, BGB IV5 § 687 no 27; Helms, Gewinnherausgabe 263 ff; Alexander, Schadensersatz und Abschöpfung im Lauterkeitsund Kartellrecht ( 2010 ) 255 ff.

141Thus, for example Däubler, Anspruch auf Lizenzgebühr und Herausgabe des Verletzergewinns – atypische Formen des Schadensersatzes, JuS 1969, 53.

142There is always reference to a threefold method of damage assessment; cf also Canaris, Gewinn­ abschöpfung bei Verletzung des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts, Deutsch-FS ( 1999 ) 92; Helms, Gewinnherausgabe als haftungsrechtliches Problem ( 2007 ) 275 ff. In my contribution, Die Bereicherung des Schädigers als schadenersatzrechtliches Zurechnungselement ? F. Bydlinski-FS ( 2002 ) 188 f, I too referred to the claim as a claim for damages because of the requirements

6. Conclusion

2 / 46 The basic principles, which can be obtained by comparison of the requirement for claims and the legal consequences under the law of tort and the law on unjust enrichment, point to the following solution: if the party that infringes a protected good has obtained an advantage through interference that does not consist in use in the usual sense, and this advantage is not covered by the allocation of the infringed good, the injured owner of the good can demand disgorgement of such advantage if the enriched infringer is guilty of objective negligence as regards the infringement.

However, this rule is not explicitly contained either in the general private law norms of the law of tort nor those of the law on unjust enrichment. It would certainly be a bold step to recognise a new type of claim merely on the basis of the discernible general principles, such claim being a mixture of the requirements of damages claims ( negligence ) and the legal consequence under the law of unjust enrichment ( surrender of the enrichment ) and thus located somewhere in the no man’s land between these two legal fields. Nonetheless, it is decisive that the legislator and established case law have already recognised this hybrid claim in intellectual property law and have already conceived of a whole system of claims from

  derived from the law of damages, following the German terminology for patent infringements, see BGH in BGHZ 68, 90. Critical, however, of such classification see, for example Jakobs, Ein­ griffserwerb und Vermögensverschiebung in der Lehre von der ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung ( 1964 ) 81 ff; von der Osten, Zum Anspruch auf Herausgabe des Verletzergewinnes im Patentrecht, GRUR 1998, 284 with reference to Isay, Kommentar zum Patentgesetz4 ( 1926 ) § 35 Comment 16.

143This is also taken into account too little by G. Wagner, Neue Perspektiven im Schadensersatzrecht – Kom­merzialisierung,­ Strafschadensersatz, Kollektivschaden, Gutachten A zum 66. Deutschen Juristen­tag ( 2006 ) 96 f, who advocates classification under the law of damages, but in proposing such a provision once again speaks of how » in lieu of damages, the disgorgement of the profit « can be sought and thus ultimately recognises the different nature of the claim. L. Alexy, Gewinnabschöpfung bei Verletzung des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts durch die Medien ( 2009 ) 205 ff, also sees the claim for disgorgement of profit as a claim for damages and hence neglects significant differences.

preventive injunctions to damages claims and all the gradations between in this area. The positive law starting point and established case law mean the intellectual property law norm can acquire general validity by analogy under consideration of the basic principles governing our legal systems in general.

VII.  Creditors’ avoidance

ance merely for indirect disadvantages implicated by a transaction is so widely extended, at least under Austrian but also now under German law 148, that the

144On this Henckel, Anfechtung im Insolvenzrecht ( 2008 ) § 143 no 23 ff; Koziol, Grundlagen und Streit­ fragen der Gläubigeranfechtung ( 1991 ) 45 ff with additional references; Bork, Grundgedanken, Geschichte, Bedeutung, in: Bork ( ed ), Handbuch des Insolvenzanfechtungsrechts ( 2006 ) no 1 / 4.

145Gerhardt, Die systematische Einordnung der Gläubigeranfechtung ( 1969 ) 236 ff; Koziol, Gläubigeranfechtung 61 ff.

146Jaeger, Die Gläubigeranfechtung außerhalb des Konkursverfahrens2 ( 1938 ) 45, cites the example of when the debtor throws a bill of exchange into the fire in full view of the obligator, declaring his intention to disadvantage the creditor. Although the obligator cannot be accused of anything in this regard, he is exposed to the possibility of action for avoidance by the creditor.

147See in detail Jaeger, Gläubigeranfechtung2 45 ff; Baur / Stürner, Zwangsvollstreckungs-, Konkursund Vergleichsrecht II12: Insolvenzrecht ( 1990 ) no 16, 18. Fridgen, Die Rechtsfolgen der Insolvenzanfechtung. Vorsatzanfechtung unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Schadensersatzes ( 2009 ) in particular 140 ff, seeks, however, to understand the legal consequence of avoidance for intent as a claim for damages; in this respect he does not have sufficient regard to the differences between the requirements for the claim and also the legal consequences.

148Hirte in: Uhlenbruck ( ed ), Insolvenzordnung12 ( 2003 ) § 129 no 127 f, § 133 no 14; Schoppmeyer, Directly disadvantageous transactions, in: Bork, Insolvenzanfechtungsrecht no 9; Kreft in Eickmann et al ( eds ), Heidelberger Kommentar zur Insolvenzordnung4 ( 2006 ) § 129 no 45, § 132 no 9.

respondent actually covers the proportional damage suffered by the creditors due to the fact that insolvency was not filed in good time ( Quotenschaden ) 149, although the liability criteria under the law of damages must not be fulfilled 150: the avoidance for indirect disadvantage through the transaction conceived as a penalty for failing to file for insolvency on time is permissible subject to far less stringent prerequisites than asserting liability for damages on grounds of delay in filing insolvency and furthermore, the burden of proof is balanced in favour of the party seeking avoidance 151. Insofar as the matter concerns compensation of damage caused, therefore, either no creditors’ avoidance should be allowed and the matter should be dealt with under the law on damages or, alternatively, the prerequisites for avoidance must be correspondingly stricter; however, the provisions on avoidance do not provide any means to this end.

VIII.  Claims for damages

2 / 49 In the following, only the most important principles, prerequisites for liability and consequences of liability will be addressed, such as are or could be significant in the relationship between the law of tort and adjoining legal protection mechanisms.

The law of tort regulates when a victim can pass the damage he has suffered onto someone else. Since, as already mentioned in the introduction, in principle everyone must bear the risks of the goods he is entitled to himself, there must be special reasons to justify shifting the damage to someone else. Damage can basically only be imputed to someone other than the victim if such other party himself caused the harm or such was caused by his sphere of responsibility. Furthermore, however, further criteria for liability must also be fulfilled: in the field of extracontractual liability, our legal systems recognise above all the following criteria: misconduct on the side of the party causing the harm ( delictual liability ), misconduct by such party’s auxiliaries ( liability for auxiliaries ), the particular dangerousness of something within his sphere of control ( strict liability ) and permitted

149See, for instance, in more recent times OGH 6 Ob 72 / 06s in ÖBA 2007, 654 ( Fruhstorfer ).

150Accordingly critical Koziol, Gläubigeranfechtung 94; Bollenberger, Anfechtung von Finanzie­ rungsgeschäften gemäß § 31 Abs 1 Z2 Fall 2 KO, ÖBA 1999, 422 f; Rebernig, Konkursanfechtung des Kontokorrentkredites ( 1998 ) no 162; Fruhstorfer, Anmerkungen zu OGH 6 Ob 72 / 06s in ÖBA 2007, 662 ff.

151As regards such claims see OGH 1 Ob 571 / 86 in SZ 59 / 132 = ÖBA 1986, 570; 6 Ob 508 / 86 in ÖBA 1988, 828 ( Apathy ); Koziol, Die Haftung wegen Konkursverzögerung durch Kreditgewährung, RdW 1983, 34 and 66; Karollus, Banken-, Gesellschafterund Konzernleitungshaftung nach den » Eumig « -Erkenntnissen, ÖBA 1990, 337 and 438.