Экзамен зачет учебный год 2023 / Koziol_BasicQuestions_Germanic

17

Chapter 2

The law of damages within the system for the protection of rights and legal interests

I.  In general

1Caroline-decisions of the BGH in BGHZ 128, 1 = NJW 1995, 861; NJW 1996, 984 f.

2See on this von Bar, Deliktsrecht I no 608 ff; Koziol / Schulze, Conclusio, in: Koziol / Schulze, EC Tort Law 596 f; Koziol / Wilcox, Punitive Damages. Cf also below no 2 / 55 ff.

context, it must be noted first, that there are different gradations of what is wrong and thus subject to censure 4: in a very abstract sense, every interference with the protected interests of another person and thus in the area allocated to another by the legal system, is wrong in that it leads to a result which is subject to censure by the legal system and is to be avoided as far as possible by those subject to the system’s norms. If an interference with third-party interests conflicts with the allocation of interests set out by the legal system, this constitutes the factual basis of an infringement ( Tatbestand ), which is, likely to trigger protection mechanisms. The weight of this wrong is certainly less than when an action is assessed

3On some questions in more detail Koziol, Gedanken zum privatrechtlichen System des Rechts-

güterschutzes, Canaris-FS I ( 2007 ) 631. See further the detailed comparative analysis in von Bar, Deliktsrecht I no 411 ff.

4On this in more detail Larenz / Canaris, Schuldrecht II / 213 § 75 II 2; similar Koziol, Rechtswidrigkeit, bewegliches System und Rechtsangleichung, JBl 1998, 621 ff; G. Wagner, Grundstrukturen des Europäischen Deliktsrechts, in: Zimmermann, Grundstrukturen: Deliktsrecht 217 ff; also G. Wagner in MünchKomm, BGB V5 § 823 no 10.

as unlawful and the interferer has violated objective rules of conduct that apply to everyone in the particular circumstances at issue, on a more concrete level. The weightiest ground for liability is fault, as in this case the blame is more concrete in that the individual circumstances, eg in particular the capacity for tortious liability, are taken into consideration. The degree of blame depends, however, on whether – beyond the issue of accountability – subjective abilities and knowledge are taken into consideration, as only then can we really speak of personal blame in relation to the wrongdoer. As in most legal systems, an objective assessment is the preferred approach in Germany, whereas in Austria a subjective standard is applied 5.

The assessment of wrongfulness that is based solely on the result, ie on the interference with protected interests, will be referred to in the following as the fulfilment of the factual elements of the offence ( Tatbestandsmäßigkeit 6 ); the more concrete but nonetheless purely objective assessment of the action or omission is referred to as the violation of a duty ( Pflichtwidrigkeit ); the third, more or less subjective evaluation of the behaviour in question is referred to as fault ( Verschulden ). The gravity of the grounds for liability also increases in this order. Accordingly, the legal system attaches the least severe legal consequences to simple fulfilment of the factual elements of the offence ( Tatbestandsmäßigkeit ) and the most severe to fault. Thus, the fulfilment of the factual elements of the offence alone is usually likely to trigger only preventive injunctions, owners’ claims to have property surrendered to them ( Eigentumsherausgabeansprüche ), claims in unjust enrichment ( Eingriffskondiktionen, Verwendungsansprüche ) and the right to act in self-defence ( Notwehrrecht ); violation of duty and fault 7 on the part of the interferer, on the other hand, justify comprehensive claims for damages on the part of the victim.

In the following, these legal protection systems, as well as the passing on 2 / 5 of damage as provided for contractually by insurance agreements, shall be compared. At first glance, it is not obvious whether overall there is a multitude of

legal possibilities that more or less coincidentally developed alongside each other, involving various requirements and legal consequences, or in the alternative a largely closed system – albeit with certain gaps and vagaries – with an appropriate division of tasks. The goal of this discussion is to delineate the different protection systems, as well as to demarcate the law of damages in relation to all other legal remedies. It will be shown that the individual protection systems are

5Cf on this Koziol, Objektivierung des Fahrlässigkeitsmaßstabes im Schadenersatzrecht ? AcP 196 ( 1996 ) 593; idem, Liability based on Fault: Subjective or Objective Yardstick ? MJ 1998, 111.

6Cf Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3 no 4 / 11; further Esser / Schmidt, Schuldrecht I / 28 § 25 IV.

7The other grounds for liability, which can trigger liability for damages, such as the especial dangerousness of things for example, will not be looked at in any more detail here.

not always clearly distinguishable from each other, in fact there are fluid transitions and hybrid forms also exist. However, the discussion will also look at what tasks are appropriately performed by the law of damages and which are very sufficiently and indeed better performed within the framework of other protection systems. In this fashion, questions arise as to whether the disgorgement of profits should actually – as advocated by the German BGH 8 – ensue with the help of the law of damages and whether the imposition of sanctions by » punitive damages « ( see on this no 1 / 23 and below no 2 / 55 ff ) can be an appropriate function of the law of damages.

II.  Claims for recovery

2 / 6 Claims for recovery of something, in particular rei vindicatio ( § 366 ABGB, § 985 BGB ), merely require that the claimant be entitled to a thing and that the defendant not be entitled to hold the thing. They are directed only at the surrender and recovery of the thing and not at covering any other further disadvantages sustained.

Claims for damages can also be directed at the recovery of a thing, given the possibility of compensation in kind ( § 1323 ABGB, § 249 ( 1 ) BGB ). However, such claims do require the fulfilment of other grounds for liability, above all fault on the part of the defendant, whereas on the other hand, in line with these stricter conditions, they can also trigger farther-reaching legal consequences, specifically the compensation of consequential damage that has been caused either by the removal of the thing or the unauthorised possession thereof.

III.  Preventive injunctions

2 / 7 As already implied, prevailing opinion is that fault is not a prerequisite for the entitlement to a preventive injunction; unlawful endangerment is sufficient. To be more specific, it is not even required that the party responsible for the endangerment violate any duties, it is sufficient that there is endangerment of an area protected by the legal system, in other words the fulfilment of the factual elements

8In the Caroline decisions of the BGH in BGHZ 128, 1 = NJW 1995, 861; NJW 1996, 984 f.

( Tatbestandsmäßigkeit ) of the threat 9 suffices. This seems entirely appropriate 10: if one has regard to preventive injunctions within the overall system of legal remedies available for the protection of interests, it is firstly significant that this defensive claim to the hindrance of future impairments thus relates to the future and not to the compensation of damage which has already occurred; it serves the purpose of prevention in the general interest 11. Furthermore, it relates to a legal consequence that encumbers the respondent in a comparably non-onerous fashion 12: it is merely required that such party not engage in the particular behaviour which poses the endangerment; unlike in claims for compensation, this party will not be required to make expenditures from his own pocket going beyond this in order to compensate another’s harm. All of this indicates that a mere accusation against the respondent at the most abstract level, to which only a slight weight can be ascribed, in other words the factual elements of the offence ( Tatbestandsmäßigkeit ), is sufficient.

As preventive injunctions do not require the presence of fault, in my opinion 2 / 8 incapacity to commit torts on the part of the party that endangers absolutely pro-

tected rights or interests is insignificant in substantive law terms when it comes to the granting of preventive injunctions 13, even if the implementation of such is

9See on this OGH 6 Ob 244 / 68 in JBl 1970, 35; 8 Ob 549 / 91 in ÖBA 1992, 386 = SZ 67 / 10; 1 Ob 61 / 08i in JBl 2009, 261; Jabornegg / Strasser, Nachbarrechtliche Ansprüche als Instrument des Umweltschutzes ( 1978 ) 68; Karollus, Zum Beseitigungsanspruch gegen pfandverschlechternde Einwirkungen, insbesondere durch Vermietung der Pfandliegenschaft, ÖBA 1991, 166; Koziol, Gedanken zum privatrechtlichen System des Rechtsgüterschutzes, Canaris-FS ( 2007 ) 635 f; Rei­ schauer in Rummel, ABGB II / 13 § 1294 no 29; Rummel in Rummel, ABGB I3 § 859 no 5; E. Wagner, Gesetzliche Unterlassungsansprüche im Zivilrecht ( 2006 ) 220 ff; clearly departing from this Wenzel, Zivilrechtliche Unterlassungsund Beseitigungsansprüche zur Abwehr von Umwelteinwirkungen im Rechtsvergleich zwischen Österreich und Deutschland ( 2005 ) 118, who bases his view on a violation of duty of care for Austria. On German law cf Henckel, Vorbeugender Rechts­ schutz im Zivilrecht, AcP 174 ( 1974 ) 113; Fritzsche in Bamberger / Roth, BGB II2 § 1004 no 6; G.

Wagner, Die Voraussetzungen negatorischen Rechtsschutzes, Medicus-FS ( 2009 ) 605 f. When Wilhelmi, Risikoschutz 118 ff, requires conduct contravening a duty for German law as a condition for a preventive injunction, he is only referring to the threatened, still future behaviour ( 129 f ), and not the behaviour triggering the disturbance ( 128 f ).

10Astonishingly, this is not taken into account by the DCFR, see PEL Liab Dam Art 1 : 102 and 6 : 301; no rationale is given for this in PEL / von Bar, Liab Dam, Chapter 1 Art 1 : 102, Comments either. See on this Koziol, Außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse im CFR, in: Schmidt-Kessel ( ed ), Der gemeinsame Referenzrahmen ( 2009 ) 98 f.

11This is emphasised by Wilhelmi, Risikoschutz 56 ff, 71 ff, 352.

12For the consideration of the costs and the burden for the party potentially responsible in the weighing up of interests see also Wilhelmi, Risikoschutz 165.

13Fritzsche, Unterlassungsanspruch und Unterlassungsklage ( 2000 ) 148; Baldus in MünchKomm, BGB VI5 § 1004 no 89; Spielbüchler in Rummel, ABGB I3 § 354 no 5, in agreement Koziol, CanarisFS 639. Another view in OGH 7 Ob 150 / 97b, head note published in ecolex 1998, 124 ( Rubin ); OLG Düsseldorf in MDR 1996, 477; Böhm, Unterlassungsanspruch und Unterlassungsklage ( 1979 ) 48 f; Hirsch, Ist der Unterlassungsanspruch wirklich verschuldensunabhängig ? Anmerkungen zu OGH 7 Ob 150 / 97b in JBl 1998, 541 ff.

not possible because the imposition of coercive penalties requires capacity to be at fault: it is necessary to distinguish between the existence of an entitlement and its current enforceability, in particular because it is certainly possible that the duty to cease will be complied with voluntarily in spite of the lack of capacity to be at fault.

2 / 9 Nonetheless, it is necessary to depart substantially from the rule that mere fulfilment of the factual elements of the offence ( Tatbestandsmäßigkeit ) is necessary for an entitlement to a preventive injunction to arise: it is recognised that not only persons who hold absolutely protected positions may be entitled to preventive injunctions, but that such relief is also available to those whose positions only enjoy legal protection against certain risks, for example against behaviour that violates protective laws ( Schutzgesetze ) or violates public morality ( gute Sitten ) 14. In the case of a violation of protective laws, it would certainly also be possible to distinguish between the fulfilment of the factual elements of the offence ( Tatbestandsmäßigkeit ), which is always present in the case of non-compliance with the positive or negative requirement and any objective negligence involved in such non-compliance, ie the violation of a duty owed 15. Such a distinction is completely impossible, however, when the protective purpose only targets behaviour violating a duty ( pflichtwidriges Verhalten ), ie for instance, when behaviour is contra bonos mores ( that is, against good morals: offensive to the conscience and to a sense of justice ), contravenes duties of care or the position at risk only enjoys limited protection against certain kinds of negligent interference. Thus, in this context we see limited protection in contrast to absolute rights that trigger defence rights as soon as the factual elements of the offence are fulfilled, since otherwise the significantly more concrete violation of duties requirement is decisive 16. This limitation is justified above all by the fact that the interests requiring protection are not obvious and their sphere of protection is not as clearly delineated as in the case of the classic absolute rights 17. Thus, it may be noted that in the case of these positions, entitled to lesser legal protection, the requirements for an entitlement to preventive injunctive relief are correspondingly more stringent 18.

14Prevailing view in Germany, cf Fritzsche, Unterlassungsanspruch 139 ff; Baldus in MünchKomm, BGB VI5 § 1004 no 9; G. Wagner in MünchKomm, BGB V5 § 823 no 15; for Austria likewise Rummel in Rummel, ABGB I3 § 859 no 5; E. Wagner, Gesetzliche Unterlassungsansprüche im Zivilrecht­ ( 2006 ) 47 ff, 325 ff.

15See above all Karollus, Schutzgesetzverletzung 142 ff.

16See also Reischauer in Rummel, ABGB II / 13 § 1294 no 27; Fritzsche, Unterlassungsanspruch 139 ff; G. Wagner in MünchKomm, BGB V5 § 823 no 15.

17On the significance of overtness and the clear delineation of the protected position see Fabricius, Zur Dogmatik des » sonstigen Rechts « gemäß § 823 Abs. I BGB, AcP 160 ( 1961 ), 271; Larenz / Canaris, Schuldrecht II / 213 § 76 I 1; Koziol, Conclusions, in: Koziol, Unification: Wrongfulness 132.

18Cf Hinteregger, Rechte des Pfandgläubigers bei Entwertung der Pfandliegenschaft durch Vermietung,­ ÖBA 2001, 451 FN 24.

of indirect threats to absolutely protected rights or interests due to the less obvious dangerousness 19. This is relevant above all with regard to the Austrian debate on preventive injunctive relief for mortgagees vis-à-vis any third party that endangers the usefulness of the property due to the establishment of tenancy rights: admittedly the general rule that fulfilment of the factual elements of the offence is sufficient is complied with to varying degrees 20, but sometimes objective negligence, ie violation of a duty, is required 21 and some decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court 22 and some teaching 23 additionally require even fault. The requirements for a preventive injunction are thus aligned to those of a claim for compensation. Hinteregger 24 even wants to deny the mortgagee any in rem rights of defence due to the lack of overtness of his position 25; instead he should merely have rights to compensation and these should – insofar atypically – be non-fault-based. As compensation claims require harm already to have been suffered, this would in fact lead to the denial of a preventive injunction 26. However, it is not clear why the legal system should refuse to provide any kind of preventive protection and would only allow a response once harm has been sustained 27. This conclusion, which takes as its base the tenant’s lack of knowledge of the mortgage, which typically cannot be held against him, thus goes too far; a more appropriate response to this circumstance would be to require an objective breach of a duty in the conduct of the tenant as a condition for a preventive injunction 28.

19On the breach of a duty to protect others against risks one has established by one’s activity or property ( Verkehrspflicht ) as a filter for liability in the case of actions indirectly leading to a result, see A. Walter, Störerhaftung bei Handeln Dritter ( 2011 ) 179 ff.

20OGH 3 Ob 505 / 90 in ÖBA 1991, 213 with discursive essay by Karollus, ÖBA 1991, 164, who takes the possibility that the tenant acquired the tenancy rights in good faith and thus aims to take the tenant’s need for protection into account in line with the system. Cf also Reidinger, Inbestand­ gabe zur Erschwerung von Liegenschaftsexekutionen – aktuelle Rechtsprechung, WoBl 1994, 110; E. Wagner, Unterlassungsansprüche 261 f; OGH 8 Ob 254 / 99g in ÖBA 2001, 483.

21OGH 3 Ob 134 / 88 in JBl 1989, 590; Petrasch in Rummel, ABGB I2 § 458 no 6.

22OGH 7 Ob 818 / 82 in EvBl 1984 / 119; 3 Ob 610 / 86 in SZ 59 / 206 = ÖBA 1987, 415 ( Rummel ); 6 Ob 107 / 98y in ÖBA 2001, 479; 6 Ob 136 / 98p in ÖBA 2001, 480.

23Hofmann in Rummel, ABGB I3 § 458 no 6.

24Hinteregger, ÖBA 2001, 450 f.

25In the end she only mentions the reparative injunction, but always connects preventive and reparative injunctions previous to this.

26Ultimately this view approaches that of Karollus, ÖBA 1991, 177 f, which only sees a reparative injunction as appropriate, as it will only be seen in the execution proceeding whether the pledge is impaired at all.

27There may be cases in which it is already at least highly probable at the time the lease is concluded by the pledgor that the pledgee will have to realise the collateral due to the insolvency of the debtor. Moreover, a preventive injunction could also avert the risk of an impairment by prohibiting conclusion of any contract that is likely to impair the execution rights of the creditor.

28There is no reason to require further fault in this respect as an objective scope of protection is concerned and moreover no claim for damages is at issue.

Corresponding examples are also supplied by preventive injunctions taken by patent holders: again the existence and limitations of patent rights are not obvious per se to third parties. This applies in particular in relation to such actions by third parties as do not consist in a use of the patent but in another course of conduct that could merely lead indirectly to damage to the patent-holder through the use of the patent by someone else; for example, when dealers sell goods that were produced in violation of a patent. It is also recognised that the provider is also only exposed to preventive injunctions based on personality rights or trademark rights being endangered or in the case of competition law violations if his conduct violates a duty: if a provider supplies his services to users and such users violate rights in this context, the disturber-liability of the provider due to his indirect interferences is tied to the requirement that his conduct constitutes a breach of a duty 29.

2 / 11 It must also be pointed out that the preventive legal protection granted to individuals facing concrete threats is supplemented by association claims ( Verbandsklagen ) 30: if public interest is involved and effective, preventive legal protection via individuals is hardly possible and if the idea of general prevention plays a decisive role, associations are granted a claim for preventive injunctions even independent of any specific endangerment 31. Such naturally serve the protection of individual interests indirectly.

IV.  Rights to self-defence

2 / 12 Self-defence constitutes defence against an unlawful attack which is threatening or already in course 32. Thus, like preventive injunctions it concerns the implementation of preventive protection of legal rights and interests 33 or in the case of attacks already in course the ending of an interference that has already begun in a manner similar to reparative injunctions, in this case however by means of self-help.

29Cf BGH in ZUM 2004, 831; ZUM 2007, 846, 852; OGH 4 Ob 166 / 00s in MR 2000, 328 ( Pilz ). Koziol, Providerhaftung nach ECG und MedienG, in: Berka / Grabenwarter / Holoubek ( eds ), Persönlichkeitsschutz in elektronischen Massenmedien ( 2012 ) 41 ff.

30Cf the German law on injunctions for infringements of consumer and other rights ( Gesetz über Unterlassungsklagen bei Verbraucherrechtsund anderen Verstößen ), as well as §§ 28 and 28a of the Consumer Protection Act ( KSchG ) in Austria.

31On this Feitzinger, Die » Verbandsklage «, ÖJZ 1977, 477; Schoibl, Die Verbandsklage als Instrument zur Wahrung » öffentlicher « oder » überindividueller « Interessen im österreichischen Zivilverfahrensrecht, ZfRV 1990, 3.

32Cf § 3 öStGB.

33On this Fuchs, Grundfragen der Notwehr ( 1986 ) 49 ff.

34Larenz / Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil9 § 19 no 9.

35Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3 no 4 / 67 f.

36Wilburg, Elemente 255; Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3 no 4 / 71; Posch in Schwimann, ABGB I3 § 19 no 9; Apathy / Riedler, Bürgerliches Recht III4 no 13 / 20; B.A. Koch in KBB, ABGB3 § 19 no 5. Departing from this somewhat, however, Reischauer in Rummel, ABGB I3 § 19 no 9 and 13.

37Thus, Demhardt in Bamberger / Roth, BGB I2 § 227 no 17. Ebenso Grothe in MünchKomm, BGB I / 15 § 227 no 1 and 17.

38Demhardt in Bamberger / Roth, BGB I2 § 227 no 22; cf also Grothe in MünchKomm, BGB I / 15 § 227 no 17.

39Larenz / Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil9 § 19 no 19.

V.  Reparative injunctions

2 / 15 While reparative injunctions, like preventive injunctions, are future-oriented and also similarly serve the purpose of prevention 40, they only come into question if there is not only a threat but already interference with a third party’s protected legal position 41 in the sense that the rights or interests of such third party are infringed upon without authority 42.

2 / 16 The substantive requirements for reparative injunctions are controversial even at the most basic level 43, above all in relation to the question of when the interference can be imputed to someone 44. The idea that the simple causation principle might apply 45, seems to be a largely outdated view nowadays 46. Some emphasise that the impairment must be traceable to human behaviour and must be unlawful 47. According to common opinion, however, the requirements are largely the same as those for preventive injunctions 48: it is non-fault-based 49 and does not require any violation of a duty 50, rather it is the result which is decisive, namely the unauthorised infringement upon a third-party right or interest or – put differently – the interference with a protected position, ie the fulfilment of the factual elements of the offence 51.

2 / 17 These parallels to preventive injunctions could be explained in the sense that both injunctions serve the aim of protecting certain positions either absolutely or

40This is emphasised by Wilhelmi, Risikoschutz 56 ff.

41This must not necessarily be an absolutely protected position, the protection can also derive from specific behavioural rules, see Henckel, Vorbeugender Rechtsschutz im Zivilrecht, AcP 174 ( 1974 ) 104, 110, 120.

42On this Jabornegg / Strasser, Nachbarrechtliche Ansprüche als Instrument des Umweltschutzes ( 1978 ) 132 ff.

43Cf the overview in Baldus in MünchKomm, BGB VI5 § 1004 no 16 and 61 ff.

44See on this also Koziol, Gedanken zum privatrechtlichen System des Rechtsgüterschutzes, Canaris-FS ( 2007 ) 645 ff.

45In favour, for instance, Herrmann, Der Störer nach § 1004 BGB ( 1987 ) 419 ff.

46Cf Larenz / Canaris, Schuldrecht II / 213 § 86 V 1; Ahrens, Störerhaftung als Beteiligungsform im Deliktsrecht, Canaris-FS ( 2007 ) 3, 16 ff; Wilhelmi, Risikoschutz 53.

47Baldus in MünchKomm, BGB VI5 § 1004 no 92.

48The preventive injunction requires a threatened disturbance, the reparative injunction an ongoing disturbance, cf § 1004 BGB and on this Fritzsche in Bamberger / Roth, BGB II2 § 1004 no 6.

49Larenz / Canaris, Schuldrecht II / 213 § 86 I 1 a; Baldus in MünchKomm, BGB VI5 § 1004 no 89; Mayr­

hofer, Schuldrecht I3 19; Karollus, ÖBA 1991, 166; Fritzsche in Bamberger / Roth, BGB II2 § 1004 no 6.

50See, however, G. Wagner, Die Voraussetzungen negatorischen Rechtsschutzes, Medicus-FS 601 ff.

51Larenz / Canaris, Schuldrecht II / 213 § 86 IV 1; Jabornegg / Strasser, Nachbarrechtliche Ansprüche 68 f, 131 ff; Karollus, ÖBA 1991, 166; Apathy / Riedler in Schwimann, ABGB IV3 § 859 no 25, in each case with further references. This is not sufficiently taken into account by Katzenstein, Der Beseitigungsanspruch nach § 1004 Abs. 1 Satz 1 BGB, AcP 211 ( 2011 ) 67 ff, in his criticism of the prevailing view when he assumes that this always requires the infringement of duties to protect interests of others against risks one has established by one’s activity or property and contends that a subjectively imputable conduct is held to be necessary.