- •Part 1 Introduction
- •Part 3 The tasks of tort law
- •Part 4 The place of torts in the law of obligations
- •Part 1 Introduction
- •Part 3 The tasks of tort law
- •Part 5 The basic criteria for a compensation claim
- •Part 6 The elements of liability
- •Part 7 Limitation of liability
- •Part 8 The compensation of the damage
- •Part 9 Prescription of compensation claims
- •Preliminary Remarks
- •Part 1 Introduction
- •Part 3 The tasks of tort law
- •Part 5 The basic criteria for a compensation claim
- •Part 6 The elements of liability
- •Part 7 Limitations of liability
- •Part 8 Compensation of the damage
- •Part 9 Prescription of compensation claims
- •Part 2 The tasks of tort law
- •Part 3 Structure of the law of torts
- •Part 4 Contractual liability and delictual liability
- •Part 5 The basic prerequisites for delictual liability
- •Part 6 The elements of imputation
- •Part 7 Limitations of liability
- •Part 8 The compensation of the damage
- •Part 9 Prescription of compensation claims
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Chapter 5
Basic Questions of Tort Law from the Perspective of
England and the Commonwealth
Ken Oliphant
Preliminary Remarks
I. General introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an English and ( within limits ) Common- |
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wealth perspective on the fundamental ideas elaborated in Helmut Koziol’s » Basic |
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Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective «. That book is so rich in its |
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argumentation that the selection of particular ideas within it as » fundamental « |
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runs the risk of omitting others that are no less or perhaps even more important. |
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But the task I was set requires me to grasp the nettle, though I would observe by |
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way of mitigation that the ideas I have chosen to highlight struck me as especially |
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likely to resonate with English and Commonwealth lawyers. |
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II. The fundamental ideas in the » Basic Questions «
Formulated in my own words, the fundamental ideas to be found in the » Basic |
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Questions « are the following: |
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Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective
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Ken Oliphant |
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The law of tort1 should be seen as part of a comprehensive system that secures |
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the protection of » legal goods «. This system includes not merely the various |
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divisions of private law ( tort, contract, unjust enrichment, etc ) but also vari- |
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ous mechanisms of a public law character, including criminal law and social |
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security law. |
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2. This overall system of protective mechanisms should be consistent in the fol- |
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lowing respects2: it should be based on a coherent and transparent set of val- |
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ues; each constituent mechanism should play a role appropriate to its place in |
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the system; it should be recognised that the various mechanisms have differ- |
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ent functions and are governed by different basic principles, and they should |
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not be twisted to perform foreign functions or to embrace alien principles; |
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and there should be proportionality between the factors generating legal con- |
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sequences and the consequences they generate ( » more serious legal conse- |
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quences call for stricter prerequisites « )3. |
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3. A fundamental difference exists between the protective mechanisms provided |
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by private law and those provided by public law. The former should not be |
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given public law tasks that are foreign to their nature. Private law is distinctive |
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in being based on a structural principle of bilateral justification that requires a |
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coincidence between the reasons for placing an obligation on one party and |
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those underpinning the corresponding entitlement in the other. The princi- |
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ples of private law cannot be justified by reference merely to » one-sided « con- |
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siderations4. |
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The law best performs its functions when it is constructed as a flexible system |
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that recognises the divergent value of different goods and eschews clear-cut |
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boundaries in favour of fluid transitions5. |
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1It is convenient to use this terminology notwithstanding the inexact fit between the English
term » tort law « and the German » Schadenersatzrecht «. See Basic Questions I, v. Where necessary, the text below will speak of » the law of damages « if this more accurately conveys the sub- ject-matter addressed.
2 See generally Basic Questions I, no 2 / 90 ff.
3 Basic Questions I, no 2 / 95.
4Basic Questions I, no 2 / 92.
5Basic Questions I, nos 1 / 17 ff and 2 / 98.
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Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective |
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Preliminary Remarks |
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357 |
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III. Their application to English and
Commonwealth law
These propositions set out a basic approach to tort law that would strike most |
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English and Commonwealth lawyers as somewhat familiar, and would be enthusi- |
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astically endorsed by some – though emphatically denounced by others. It would |
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be helpful at the beginning of this contribution to provide a preliminary indica- |
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tion of where – in England and the Commonwealth – the principal battlegrounds |
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would be seen to lie. |
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Tort as part of a comprehensive system for the protection of legal goods. Though |
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I cannot now think of any account of tortious liability that subjects to such sus- |
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tained and rigorous analysis its place in the overall system for the protection of |
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legal goods, I suspect that most English and Commonwealth lawyers would ac- |
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cept that it is helpful to view it in those terms, and one sees debates in particular |
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contexts that set tort law against other protective mechanisms, including those of |
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public law ( eg tort versus regulation, tort versus » no fault « ). |
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The consistency of the overall system. Though there are a few » critical « legal |
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scholars who celebrate inconsistency in the law6, a substantial majority of Eng- |
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lish and Commonwealth lawyers would accept the desirability of what is often |
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termed » coherence «. In recent decades, coherence in tort law has been a particu- |
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lar theme of the writings of the Canadian legal scholar Ernest Weinrib and those |
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who might loosely be called his disciples7. However, even those who accept in |
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principle that the law should be coherent in the senses described sometimes rec- |
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ognise restraints on what can be done to achieve it in a common law system: cer- |
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tain reforms may be considered to lie beyond the legitimate role of the judiciary |
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and to be appropriate only for the legislator. As the legislator rarely finds political |
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advantage in legislating in the field of tort law – and, when it does, cannot be re- |
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lied upon to enact a coherent reform – this becomes a source of considerable frus- |
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tration within the legal community. |
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The distinctiveness of private law. Weinrib has also argued extensively in his |
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writings that private law is distinctive because of its bilateral structure, and can- |
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not therefore coherently pursue » public « goals. These should be pursued, if at |
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all, through alternative legal mechanisms. This view is also endorsed by others |
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who nevertheless stop short of » buying into « the whole Weinrib package. However, |
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6See also the theory of » complementarity « developed by I. Englard: idem, The Philosophy of Tort Law ( 1992 ); idem, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in Tort Law, in: D.G. Owen ( ed ), The Philosophy of Tort Law ( 1997 ).
7As to E. Weinrib, see especially idem, The Idea of Private Law ( revised edn, 2012 ); idem, Corrective Justice ( 2012 ). As to his » disciples «, see eg A. Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence ( 2007 ); J.W. Neyers, A Theory of Vicarious Liability ( 2005 ) 43 Alberta Law Review 287; J.W. Neyers, The Economic Torts as Corrective Justice ( 2009 ) 17 Torts Law Journal ( TLJ ) 162.
Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective
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Ken Oliphant |
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there is also a substantial body of opinion that holds that instrumental goals are legitimately pursued through private law. It is routine, for example, for policy considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether, in a particular situation, a duty of care is owed by one person to another. Most of those who believe that this is legitimate would strenuously deny that they are conflating private law with public law.
5 / 7 Flexibility versus certainty. On this point, there is likely to be more resistance to the thesis elaborated in » Basic Questions «. Since probably time immemorial, there has been a tension in the law between flexibility and certainty, and the nature of common law systems – where the judge is the prime mover of legal development, not the legislator – has meant that judges attach particular importance to certainty as they create, apply and develop » case law «. The doctrine of precedent ( stare decisis ) is perhaps the most obvious product of this philosophy. But it has also been a particularly visible feature of the judicial development of the principles of tort law, in which it has often ( too often ? ) been accepted that a measure of arbitrariness is the necessary price of an overriding commitment to certainty.
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Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective |
