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355

Chapter  5

Basic Questions of Tort Law from the Perspective of

England and the Commonwealth

Ken Oliphant

Preliminary Remarks

I.  General introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide an English and ( within limits ) Common-

5 / 1

wealth perspective on the fundamental ideas elaborated in Helmut Koziol’s » Basic

 

Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective «. That book is so rich in its

 

argumentation that the selection of particular ideas within it as » fundamental «

 

runs the risk of omitting others that are no less or perhaps even more important.

 

But the task I was set requires me to grasp the nettle, though I would observe by

 

way of mitigation that the ideas I have chosen to highlight struck me as especially

 

likely to resonate with English and Commonwealth lawyers.

 

II.  The fundamental ideas in the » Basic Questions «

Formulated in my own words, the fundamental ideas to be found in the » Basic

5 / 2

Questions « are the following:

 

Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective

356

 

Ken Oliphant 

England

 

 

 

The law of tort1 should be seen as part of a comprehensive system that secures

 

1.

 

 

 

the protection of » legal goods «. This system includes not merely the various

 

 

 

divisions of private law ( tort, contract, unjust enrichment, etc ) but also vari-

 

 

 

ous mechanisms of a public law character, including criminal law and social

 

 

 

security law.

 

 

 

2. This overall system of protective mechanisms should be consistent in the fol-

 

 

 

lowing respects2: it should be based on a coherent and transparent set of val-

 

 

 

ues; each constituent mechanism should play a role appropriate to its place in

 

 

 

the system; it should be recognised that the various mechanisms have differ-

 

 

 

ent functions and are governed by different basic principles, and they should

 

 

 

not be twisted to perform foreign functions or to embrace alien principles;

 

 

 

and there should be proportionality between the factors generating legal con-

 

 

 

sequences and the consequences they generate ( » more serious legal conse-

 

 

 

quences call for stricter prerequisites « )3.

 

 

 

3. A fundamental difference exists between the protective mechanisms provided

 

 

 

by private law and those provided by public law. The former should not be

 

 

 

given public law tasks that are foreign to their nature. Private law is distinctive

 

 

 

in being based on a structural principle of bilateral justification that requires a

 

 

 

coincidence between the reasons for placing an obligation on one party and

 

 

 

those underpinning the corresponding entitlement in the other. The princi-

 

 

 

ples of private law cannot be justified by reference merely to » one-sided « con-

 

 

 

siderations4.

 

 

 

4.

The law best performs its functions when it is constructed as a flexible system

 

 

 

that recognises the divergent value of different goods and eschews clear-cut

 

 

 

boundaries in favour of fluid transitions5.

 

 

1It is convenient to use this terminology notwithstanding the inexact fit between the English

term » tort law « and the German » Schadenersatzrecht «. See Basic Questions I, v. Where necessary, the text below will speak of » the law of damages « if this more accurately conveys the sub- ject-matter addressed.

2 See generally Basic Questions I, no 2 / 90 ff.

3 Basic Questions I, no 2 / 95.

4Basic Questions I, no 2 / 92.

5Basic Questions I, nos 1 / 17 ff and 2 / 98.

Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective

 

  Preliminary Remarks

 

357

 

 

 

 

III.  Their application to English and

Commonwealth law

These propositions set out a basic approach to tort law that would strike most

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English and Commonwealth lawyers as somewhat familiar, and would be enthusi-

 

astically endorsed by some – though emphatically denounced by others. It would

 

be helpful at the beginning of this contribution to provide a preliminary indica-

 

tion of where – in England and the Commonwealth – the principal battlegrounds

 

would be seen to lie.

 

Tort as part of a comprehensive system for the protection of legal goods. Though

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I cannot now think of any account of tortious liability that subjects to such sus-

 

tained and rigorous analysis its place in the overall system for the protection of

 

legal goods, I suspect that most English and Commonwealth lawyers would ac-

 

cept that it is helpful to view it in those terms, and one sees debates in particular

 

contexts that set tort law against other protective mechanisms, including those of

 

public law ( eg tort versus regulation, tort versus » no fault « ).

 

The consistency of the overall system. Though there are a few » critical « legal

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scholars who celebrate inconsistency in the law6, a substantial majority of Eng-

 

lish and Commonwealth lawyers would accept the desirability of what is often

 

termed » coherence «. In recent decades, coherence in tort law has been a particu-

 

lar theme of the writings of the Canadian legal scholar Ernest Weinrib and those

 

who might loosely be called his disciples7. However, even those who accept in

 

principle that the law should be coherent in the senses described sometimes rec-

 

ognise restraints on what can be done to achieve it in a common law system: cer-

 

tain reforms may be considered to lie beyond the legitimate role of the judiciary

 

and to be appropriate only for the legislator. As the legislator rarely finds political

 

advantage in legislating in the field of tort law – and, when it does, cannot be re-

 

lied upon to enact a coherent reform – this becomes a source of considerable frus-

 

tration within the legal community.

 

The distinctiveness of private law. Weinrib has also argued extensively in his

5 / 6

writings that private law is distinctive because of its bilateral structure, and can-

 

not therefore coherently pursue » public « goals. These should be pursued, if at

 

all, through alternative legal mechanisms. This view is also endorsed by others

 

who nevertheless stop short of » buying into « the whole Weinrib package. However,

 

6See also the theory of » complementarity « developed by I. Englard: idem, The Philosophy of Tort Law ( 1992 ); idem, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in Tort Law, in: D.G. Owen ( ed ), The Philosophy of Tort Law ( 1997 ).

7As to E. Weinrib, see especially idem, The Idea of Private Law ( revised edn, 2012 ); idem, Corrective Justice ( 2012 ). As to his » disciples «, see eg A. Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence ( 2007 ); J.W. Neyers, A Theory of Vicarious Liability ( 2005 ) 43 Alberta Law Review 287; J.W. Neyers, The Economic Torts as Corrective Justice ( 2009 ) 17 Torts Law Journal ( TLJ ) 162.

Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective

358

 

Ken Oliphant 

England

 

 

 

 

there is also a substantial body of opinion that holds that instrumental goals are legitimately pursued through private law. It is routine, for example, for policy considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether, in a particular situation, a duty of care is owed by one person to another. Most of those who believe that this is legitimate would strenuously deny that they are conflating private law with public law.

5 / 7 Flexibility versus certainty. On this point, there is likely to be more resistance to the thesis elaborated in » Basic Questions «. Since probably time immemorial, there has been a tension in the law between flexibility and certainty, and the nature of common law systems – where the judge is the prime mover of legal development, not the legislator – has meant that judges attach particular importance to certainty as they create, apply and develop » case law «. The doctrine of precedent ( stare decisis ) is perhaps the most obvious product of this philosophy. But it has also been a particularly visible feature of the judicial development of the principles of tort law, in which it has often ( too often ? ) been accepted that a measure of arbitrariness is the necessary price of an overriding commitment to certainty.

Helmut Koziol ( ed ) • Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective