Экзамен зачет учебный год 2023 / Koziol Prevention in Law

Prevention under Tort Law from a Traditional Point of View

Helmut Koziol 1

I. Introduction: Compensation and Prevention

For centuries2 it has been practically undisputed in the Continental European legal systems3 and to some extent also accepted under common law4 that the primary task of “Schadenersatzrecht” (the law of damages), as its German name suggests, is to provide the victim with compensation for damage that has already been sustained. Accordingly, under the heading “Of the Obligation to Compensate” the venerable § 1295 of the Austrian Civil Code, the ABGB, says: “Every person is entitled to claim compensation from the wrongdoer for the damage the latter has culpably inflicted upon him”.5 As well § 823 of the much younger German Civil Code, the BGB, reads: “Duty to compensate loss. (1) Whosoever unlawfully injures, intentionally or negligently, the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another person, has an obligation to the other person to compensate the resulting loss”.6 Also Arts 41 and 43 of the Swiss Law of Obligations (OR) refer explicitely to “compensation”. Likewise the first sentence

1I have to thank Mag. Marlene Steininger for laboriously adapting the manuscript to the rules provided by the editor.

2On this Jansen N., in Schmoeckel M., Rückert J., Zimmermann R. (eds.), Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. II, Tübingen 2007, §§ 249-253, 255 no. 17 ff.

3Bydlinski F., System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts, Vienna 1996, 187 ff.; Magnus U., Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, in Magnus U. (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Damages, The Hague/ London/Boston 2001, 185; Meder S., Kann Schadensersatz Strafe sein?, in Festschrift für Hinrich Rüping, Munich 2009, 125 ff.; Schäfer C., Strafe und Prävention im Bürgerlichen Recht, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis (AcP), 202, 2002, 399 f., 414 ff.; Schiemann G., in Staudinger BGB, Berlin 2005, Neubearbeitung, Vor §§ 249 ff. no. 3; Schlobach K., Das Präventionsprinzip im Recht des Schadensersatzes, Baden-Baden 2004, 6 ff.; Wilhelmi R., Risikoschutz durch Privatrecht, Tübingen 2009, 62 f. European law also holds the compensatory purpose to be primary; see Kelliher D., Aims and Scope, in Koziol H., Schulze R. (eds.), Tort Law of the European Community, Vienna/New York 2008, 10 ff.; Oliphant K., The Nature and Assessment of Damages, ibid, 241; Oskierski J.-T., Schadensersatz im Europäischen Recht, Baden-Baden 2010, 85 f.

4Cf. Baez B., Tort Law in the USA, Leiden 2010, 31; Cane P., Atiyah‘s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Cambridge 2006, 7. ed., 408 ff.; Deakin S., Johnston A., Markesinis B., Markesinis and Deakin‘s

Tort Law, Oxford 2007, 6. ed., 52; Quill E., Torts in Ireland, Dublin 2009, 3. ed., 3 f.

5Translation by Steininger B. C., in Oliphant K., Steininger B. C. (eds.), European Tort Law: Basic Texts, Vienna 2011, 2.

6§ 249 BGB specifies “Measure and quantification of compensation. Whosoever is liable to compensate loss has to restore the situation that would exist but for the circumstance that gave rise to the claim for compensation.” Translation by Fedtke J., Wagner-von Papp F., in Oliphant K., Steininger B. C. (n. 5 above) 91 and 93.

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published in: Lubos Tichý, Jiri Hrádek (eds.) Prevention in Law Prag 2013 ISBN 978-80-87146-90- 3

of Art 10:101 of the PETL (Principles of European Tort Law),7 which were developed by the European Group on Tort Law (EGTL), emphasises the compensatory function of tort law: “Damages are a money payment to compensate the victim, that is to say, to restore him, so far as money can, to the position he would have been in if the wrong complained of had not been committed.” The same is true for the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR); in chapter VI the basic rule in Art I:101 reads: “A person who suffers legally relevant damage has a right to reparation from a person who caused the damage intentionally or negligently or is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage.” At stake is thus explicitly the compensation or reparation of damage. It should be noted that this is also true if non-pecuniary loss is at issue.8

The justification of this view is also demonstrated in that each legal system’s need for rules on compensation of damage is covered solely by the rules of the law of damages, at least in the Continental European systems.

Nevertheless, time and again scepticism is expressed as regards such primary compensatory notion of tort law. One such sceptic is Kötz,9 but his criticism seems to be primarily based on the fact that he expects this concept to clarify issues which it is not intended to clarify and indeed understandably cannot clarify. This is true specifically for his argument that compensation of damage is by no means always required and that this principle does not offer much insight into the question of what goals the legislator pursued in selecting the special grounds that lead to compensation of damage. Firstly, a similar argument would also be available against the opinion that deterrence is the

7On these see Magnus U., Nature and Purpose of Damages, in European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law, Vienna/New York 2005, 149 ff.

8Bydlinski F., Der Ersatz ideellen Schadens als sachliches und methodisches Problem, Juristische Blätter (JBl), 1965, 253 f.; Karner E., Der Ersatz ideeller Schäden, Vienna 1999, 88 f., 132 ff.; Köndgen J., Haftpflichtfunktionen und Immaterialschaden, Berlin 1976, 84 ff.; Lorenz E., Immaterieller Schaden und „billige Entschädigung in Geld“, Berlin 1981, 95 ff.; see also Art 10:301 Principles of European Tort Law (PETL). However, see Deutsch E., Allgemeines Haftungsrecht, Köln/Berlin/Bonn/Munich 1996, 2. ed., no. 904 ff.; Oetker H., in MünchKomm BGB, Vol. II, Munich 2007, 5. ed., § 253 no. 13. From a comparative perspective on this complex of problems Brüggemeier G., Prinzipien des Haftungsrechts, Baden-Baden 1999, 189 ff.; Koch B. A., Koziol H., Comparative Analysis, in Koch B. A., Koziol H. (eds.), Compensation for Personal Injury in a Comparative Perspective, Vienna/New York 2003, 420, 424 f.; Rogers W. V. H., Comparative Report of a Project Carried Out by the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law, in Rogers W. V. H. (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective, Vienna/New York 2001, 251 ff.

9Kötz H., Ziele des Haftungsrechts, in Festschrift für Ernst Steindorff, Berlin 1990, 644 f. Cf. also Möller R., Das Präventionsprinzip des Schadensrechts, Berlin 2006, 247 ff.; Ott C., Schäfer H.-B., Die Anreiz und Abschreckungsfunktion im Zivilrecht, in Ott C., Schäfer H.-B. (eds.), Die Präventivwirkung zivilund strafrechtlicher Sanktionen, Tübingen 1999, 135 f.; Schiemann G., Argumente und Prinzipien bei der Fortbildung des Schadensrechts, Munich 1981, 185 ff.; Visscher L. T., Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna/New York 2009, 6 and 57; Wagner G., in MünchKomm BGB, Vol. V, Munich 2009, 5. ed., Vor § 823 no. 38 f.; Wagner G., Prävention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch Privatrecht – Anmaßung oder legitime Aufgabe?, AcP, 206, 2006, 453 ff.

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primary function of tort law: Deterrence is by no means always required and the principle of deterrence does not offer any insight into the question of which grounds lead to deterrent measures. Secondly, one has to underline that the elaboration of the compensatory notion is not, however, aimed at delivering insights into the grounds for imputation but merely intended to clarify what function tort law should have, if the criteria for liability are met.10 The compensatory notion clearly expresses the purpose of Continental European tort law,11 provides a guideline for the scope of the claim for damages and thus excludes the integration, for example, of punitive damages12 or the disgorgement of an enrichment within the framework of the law of damages

– a finding that if observed could have provided exactly the means to avoid many a wrong turn and that underlines the importance of emphasising this notion.

However, it has to be pointed out that nowadays, it is largely recognised that tort law also has a preventive or deterrent function. Beyond this, there is even a fashionable tendency today to reject the notion of compensation and place the focus on the sanctioning13 or on the postulated primary deterrent function;14 thus damages can be much higher or lower than the loss suffered by the victim. Even at first glance such theories seem questionable, as they contradict positive law. Moreover, any redesign of tort law as an instrument primarily aimed at deterrence would open up a regulatory gap: as legal history and comparative law shows, there is a need for rules that are primarily aimed at the compensation of damage. Hence, it would not seem wise to alienate the present-day tort law, aimed as it is at compensation of damage, from the task it has served hitherto, thus creating the necessity for a new branch of law dealing with the compensation of damage, which would correspond essentially to the currently existing laws.

Nevertheless, as a preventive measure we must discuss such alarming opinions on a primary preventive function of tort law.

10T us,h also Bydlinski F., System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts, Vienna 1996, 187 f.; Bydlinski F., Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, in Tichý L. (ed.), Causation in Law, Prague 2007, 12 f.; cf. also Wilhelmi R., Risikoschutz durch Privatrecht, Tübingen 2009, 63, 65 f.

11Bydlinski F., System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts, Vienna 1996, 187 f.

12See below and further Koziol H., Grundfragen des Schadenersatzrechts, Vienna 2010, no. 1/22 and 2/55 ff.

13By means of “punitive damages”; see on this von Bar C., Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht, Vol. I, Munich 1996, no. 608 ff.; Koziol H., Schulze R., Conclusio, in Koziol H., Schulze R. (eds.), Tort Law of the European Community, Vienna/New York 2008, 596 f.; Koziol H., Punitive Damages: Admission into the Seventh Legal Heaven or Eternal Damnation?, in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna/New York 2009, 275 ff.

14See Ott C., Schäfer H.-B., Die Anreiz und Abschreckungsfunktion im Zivilrecht, in Ott C., Schäfer H.-B. (eds.), Die Präventivwirkung zivilund strafrechtlicher Sanktionen, Tübingen 1999, 132 ff.; Wagner G., Prävention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch Privatrecht – Anmaßung oder legitime Aufgabe?, AcP, 206, 2006, 451 ff.; Visscher L. T., Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna/New York 2009, 222 ff.

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In the following, I will firstly present the traditional view on the preventive function of tort law and discuss whether the preventive function can even be seen as primary; secondly, – I believe I reveal no secret by saying this much in advance – after denying such extreme position I will work out some relevant questions connected with the preventive function and some consequences of the ancillary deterrent function from a traditional point of view.

II. The deterrent function in general

1. The traditional view

As already mentioned, it is broadly15 but not unanimously16 accepted that tort law also – as a side effect17 – has a deterrent function:18 The threat of a duty to compensate in the event of damage being caused undoubtedly provides a general incentive to avoid infl icting damage. With respect to the specific tortfeasor who has already caused harm

15See Boom van W. H., Compensating and Preventing Damage: Is there any Future Left for Tort Law?, in Essays on Tort, Insurance, Law and Society in Honour of Bill W. Dufwa, Stockholm 2006, 287; Bydlinski F., System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts, Vienna 1996, 190 ff.; Hachem P., Prävention und Punitive Damages, in Wolf S., Mona M., Hürzeler M. (eds.), Prävention im Recht, Basel 2008,

198ff.; Hager J., in Staudinger BGB, Berlin Bearbeitung 1999, Vor §§ 823 ff. no. 10; Koziol H., Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, Vol. I, Vienna 1997, 3. ed., no. 1/15; Löwe H., Der Gedanke der Prävention im deutschen Schadensersatzrecht, Frankfurt am Main 2000, 57 ff.; Lunney M., Oliphant K., Tort Law: Text & Materials, Oxford 2010, 4. ed., 18 ff.; Deakin S., Johnston A., Markesinis B., Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law, Oxford 2007, 6. ed., 50 ff.; Magnus U., Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, in Magnus U. (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Damages, Vienna/New York 2001,

185f.; Möller R., Das Präventionsprinzip des Schadensrechts, Berlin 2006; Ohly A., „Volenti non fit iniuria“ Die Einwilligung im Privatrecht, Tübingen 2002, 404; Quill E., Torts in Ireland, Dublin 2009,

3.ed.,; Rohe M., Gründe und Grenzen deliktischer Haftung – die Ordnungsaufgaben des Deliktsrechts, AcP, 201, 2001, 125; Schäfer C., Strafe und Prävention im Bürgerlichen Recht, AcP, 202, 2002, 399 f.; Schlobach K., Das Präventionsprinzip im Recht des Schadensersatzes, Baden-Baden 2004, 267 ff.,

467ff.; Spickhoff A., in Soergel BGB, Vol. XII, Stuttgart 2005, 13. ed., Vor § 823 no. 31; Tichý L., Prävention im Haftungsrecht: Ansatz zu einer Revision, in Festschrift für Helmut Koziol, Vienna 2010,

908f.; Wagner G., Präventivschadensersatz im Kontinental-Europäischen Privatrecht, in Festschrift für Helmut Koziol, Vienna 2010, 931 f. A stocktaking of German and European law developments is offered by Sailer K., Prävention im Haftungsrecht, Frankfurt am Main 2005, 21 ff.; Meder S., Kann Schadensersatz Strafe sein?, in Festschrift für Hinrich Rüping, Munich 2009, 125 ff.; Oskierski J.-T., Schadensersatz im Europäischen Recht, Baden-Baden 2010, 86 ff.

16Sceptical, eg, Widmer P., Der österreichische Entwurf aus der Sicht des Auslandes, in Griss I., Kathrein G., Koziol H. (eds.), Entwurf eines neuen österreichischen Schadenersatzrechts, Vienna/New York 2006, 129; in the same sense for individual torts Boom van W. H., (n. 15 above) 288 f. Cf. also Bühler T., Ist die Schadensprävention kein Thema für das Schweizerische Haftpflichtrecht?, in Festschrift für Heinz Rey zum 60. Geburtstag, Aktuelle Aspekte des Schuldund Sachenrechts, Zurich 2003, 199.

17According to Schlobach K., Das Präventionsprinzip im Recht des Schadensersatzes, Baden-Baden 2004,

273ff., the deterrent function is of equal rank to the compensatory function.

18Regarding prevention in the area of private law, see in more detail Schlobach (n. 17 above) 304 ff.

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and thus been held liable for compensation, it provides motivation to avoid causing damage as far as possible in future. Yet it cannot be denied that there are quite some doubts as to whether and how far people’s behaviour can really be influenced by threatening them by sanctions.19

It also should be emphasised that – similar to the tortfeasor’s liability – the victim’s responsibility for contributory negligence similarly provides a preventive effect by giving every potential victim an incentive to protect his goods from being damaged as, otherwise, he may lose full compensation.20 Further, the deterrence function is not only exercised by the laws on fault liability but also by those of strict liability:21 the threat of the duty to compensate increases efforts to prevent damage being caused by a source of danger as far as possible; this applies at least – as specified by the economic analysis of law – insofar as the costs of preventing damage do not exceed the otherwise threatening duty of compensation.

The deterrent purpose of tort law is underlined very often in the context of the discussion as to if and when compensation of non-pecuniary damage in cases of violation of personality rights should be awarded.22 Such compensation is felt to be particularly important because if compensation for non-pecuniary harm were to be refused or restricted to a far-reaching extent, serious infringements of personality rights – thus one of the highest ranking goods – would often remain completely unsanctioned under private law unless they also give rise to consequential damage in the pecuniary context.23 T he significance of the deterrent function is further

19See eg Dreier T., Kompensation und Prävention, Tübingen 2002, 130.

20Hinteregger M., Contributory Negligence under Austrian Law, in Magnus U., Martin-Casals M. (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence, Vienna/New York 2004, 10; Gilead I., Contributory Negligence under Israeli Law, ibid, 106; Boom van W. H., Contributory Negligence under Dutch Law, ibid, 133; Schwartz G. T., Contributory Negligence under United States Law, ibid, 223; Faure M., Economic Analysis of Contributory Negligence, ibid, 233; Hürzeler M., Schadensprävention und Schadensminderung im Sozialversicherungsund Haftpflichtrecht, in Wolf S., Mona M., Hürzeler M. (eds.), Prävention im Recht, Basel 2008, 163; Koziol H., Grundfragen des Schadenersatzrechts, Vienna 2010, no. 6/204.

21Adams M., Ökonomische Analyse der Gefährdungsund Verschuldenshaftung, Heidelberg 1985, 47 ff.; Faure M., Economic Analysis, in Koch B. A., Koziol H. (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability, Vienna/New York 2002, 364 ff.; Oertel C., Objektive Haftung in Europa, Tübingen 2010, 34 ff.; Rey H., Ausservertragliches Haftpflichtrecht, Zurich 2007, 4. ed., no. 16; Schäfer H.-B., Ott C., The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, London 2004, 163 ff.; Stoll H., Das Handeln auf eigene Gefahr, Berlin 1961, 347 ff.; Wagner G., in MünchKomm BGB, Vol. V, Munich 2009, 5. ed., Vor § 823 no. 17, 49, 52; divergent Rohe M., Gründe und Grenzen deliktischer Haftung – die Ordnungsaufgaben des Deliktsrechts, AcP, 201, 2001, 151.

22Bydlinski F., System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts, Vienna 1996, 223. See also Körner M., Zur Aufgabe des Haftungsrechts – Bedeutungsgewinn präventiver und punitiver elemente, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), 2000, 24 ff.

23Canaris C.-W., Grundprobleme des privatrechtlichen Persönlichkeitsschutzes, Juristische Blätter, 1991, 220; Bydlinski F., Der immaterieller Schaden in der österreichischen Rechtsentwicklung, in Festschrift für Ernst von Caemmerer, Tübingen 1978, 785.

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emphasised by many voices today above all with respect to intellectual property law,24 as in that context a high degree of vulnerability is combined with unusual difficulties when it comes to establishing damage.

On the other hand, it is also underlined that the granting of claims for damages is not the legal system’s only response to the infringement or to the threatened endangerment of protected rights or interests: in fact it has a whole arsenal of very different weapons available under private, administrative and criminal law to serve the protection of rights and interests in very different ways, by defending such against risks, by compensating losses, by returning unjust enrichment, by disgorgement of profits in favour of the public purse or by the imposition of penalties for infringements attempted or committed.25 With regard to prevention I must mention in particular the preventive injunctions, the right to self-defence and the reparative injunctions which also help to hinder the occurrence of further harm.26 Last but not least, reference is had to the fact that the aim of deterrence – independently of the notion of compensation – is also pursued above all by criminal law; hence, the private law measures should never be viewed in isolation. This must be borne in mind, for example, when supporters of the economic analysis of law27 cry out that killing a person does not involve any consequences under tort law28 unless there are surviving dependants to whom the deceased had a duty to make maintenance payments: in reality – when the overall legal system is taken into account – there is no gap in protection here as criminal law comprehensively protects human life.29

2. The economic analysis of law

As already mentioned,30 in more recent times the deterrent function of the law of damages is thought to be the primary function, in particular by advocates of the

24See in detail Dreier T., Kompensation und Prävention, Tübingen 2002, 57 ff., 128 ff., 413 ff.

25On some questionsinmore detailKoziol H.,Gedanken zumprivatrechtlichenSystemdesRechtsgüterschutzes, in Festschrift für Claus-Wilhelm Canaris zum 70. Geburtstag, Vol. I, Munich 2007, 631. See further the detailed comparative analysis in von Bar C., Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht, Vol. I, Munich 1996, no. 411 ff.

26See in detail Dreier T., Kompensation und Prävention, Tübingen 2002, 20 ff.

27See, eg, Schäfer H.-B., Ott C., The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, London 2004, 235 ff.

28T ish applies in any case to German, Austrian and Swiss law, see Koziol H., DieTötung im Schadenersatzrecht, in Koziol H., Spier J. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pierre Widmer, Vienna/New York 2003, 203 ff. The situation is different, however, under Japanese law, which recognises a compensation claim on the part of the deceased that is passed on to his heirs; see on this Marutschke H.-P., Einführung in das japanische Recht, Munich 2010, 2. ed., 171 f.; Nitta, Die Berechnung des Schadens beim Unfalltod eines minderjährigen Kindes, in Caemmerer von E., Müller-Freienfels W., Stoll H. (eds.), Recht in Japan: Berichte über Entwicklungen und Tendenzen im japanischen Recht, Frankfurt am Main 1998, 77 ff.

29Koziol (n. 28 above), 206; thus also Koch B. A., Der Preis des Tötens, in Die soziale Funktion des Privatrechts. Festschrift für Heinz Barta zum 65. Geburtstag, Vienna 2009, 189; Kötz H., Wagner G., Deliktsrecht, Munich 2010, 11. ed., no. 738.

30See n. 14.

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economic analysis of law,31 who strive towards a comprehensive explanation by application of economic approaches.32 Landes, Posner and Calabresi33 come in this respect to the conclusion that rules on liability may be interpreted as a legal attempt to create incentives for socially efficient behaviour. Nonetheless, the view taken by certain adherents of the economic approach that the notion of deterrence is therefore the only, or at least the decisive, aspect for the law of damages is misguided.34 As already mentioned, according to its positive law construction in the Continental European legal systems, the law of damages is in fact explicetely directed at the objective of compensation,35 this function is clarified unambiguously in the legal consequences it defines. Deterrence is merely a secondary function and is not enough on its own under the law of damages to justify the imposition of payment obligations that go beyond the damage occurred or that do not cover the whole damage and hence do not serve the purpose of compensation; this means that under tort law the victim’s claim can not go beyond the victim’s loss. This is true not only due to the necessity for mutual justification of the claims, as is a feature of private law36 which I will come back to later, but also because the law of damages is in fact not at all suitable to serve as an instrument for the consistent implementation of the notion of deterrence. For it to be suitable, it would be necessary that the penalty be linked – as under modern criminal law and also the law of injunctions – to the censured behaviour, ie also to the preparatory actions or the attempt as such and for it not to be contingent on damage being sustained. As the duty to compensate only arises when damage has been sustained, however, penalties imposed solely on the basis of proscribed behaviour are alien to the nature of this field of law.37 Finally, those critics of the principle

31T ish theory will be looked at in more detail below; cf. further Koziol H., Grundfragen des Schadenersatzrechts, Vienna 2010, no. 3/17 ff.

32Kötz H., Schäfer H.-B., Schadensverhütung durch ökonomische Anreize, AcP 189, 1989, 502 ff. with additional references; Gimpel-Hinteregger M., Grundfragen der Umwelthaftung, Vienna 1994, 43 ff.; Faure M., Comparative Analysis, in Faure M., Koziol H. (eds.), Cases on Medical Malpractice in a Comparative Perspective, Vienna/New York 2001, 294 ff., 320.

33On this Schäfer H.-B., Müller-Langer F., Strict liability versus negligence, in Faure M. (ed.), Tort Law and Economics, Cheltenham 2009, 4 f.

34See, for example, Adams M., Ökonomische Analyse der Gefährdungsund Verschuldenshaftung, Heidelberg 1985; Schäfer H.-B., Ott C., The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, London 2004, both with additional references; see further in particular Wagner G., Prävention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch Privatrecht – Anmaßung oder legitime Aufgabe?, AcP, 206, 2006, 451 ff.; idem, Präventivschadenersatz im Kontinental-Europäischen Privatrecht, in Festschrift für Helmut Koziol, Vienna 2010, 931 ff., in each case with additional references.

35See Taupitz J., Ökonomische Analyse und Haftungsrecht – Eine Zwischenbilanz, AcP, 196, 1996, 126; Koziol H., Punitive Damages: Admission into the Seventh Legal Heaven or Eternal Damnation?, in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna/New York 2009, no. 65; Wilhelmi R., Risikoschutz durch Privatrecht, Tübingen 2009, 64 f. Qualifying this Möller R., Das Präventionsprinzip des Schadensrechts, Berlin 2006, 270 ff.

36Cf. Koziol H., Grundfragen des Schadenersatzrechts, Vienna 2010, no. 2/87 with further details.

37Spickhoff A., in Soergel BGB, Vol. XII, Stuttgart 2005, 13. ed., Vor § 823 no. 31 and Koziol (n. 36 above), no. 2/60.

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of compensation who – wrongly – contend that it is merely an empty principle and that it is impossible to deduce from it when compensation should in fact be paid, should recognise that the deterrence notion they prefer would accordingly suffer from matching emptiness.38

All these arguments also speak out against Wagner’s 39 interesting attempt to justify punitive damages in substance by shifting the line of argumentation to “preventive damages”, which do not serve the aim of punishment but of deterrence. This proposition is to some extent similar to the law and economics view of punitive damages but also bears some resemblance to Dobbs’ preference for the deterrent as opposed to punitive measure of such damages. Dobbs proposes that extra compensatory damages be triggered when it is shown that deterrence is needed.40 The measure of such damages should be taken by assessing the amount necessary to deter, not the amount necessary to inflict justly deserved punishment. In Dobbs’ opinion, for torts committed in the course of a profit-motivated activity, the deterrence measure should usually be either the profit or gain which the defendant derives from the activity or the plaintiff’s reasonable litigation costs, including a reasonable attorney fee. As a result, “punitive damages” would still be extra compensatory, but no longer punitive.

Wagner wants by reference to “preventive damages” to avoid most of the arguments directed against punitive damages. In his opinion, such damages must be awarded on the one hand if the defendant committed the infringement with the intent to gain a profit that exceeds the damages he may have to pay, and on the other hand if claims for damages would otherwise be insufficiently enforced.41

38T ish is rightly pointed out by Wilhelmi (n. 35 above), 65 f.

39Wagner G., Neue Perspektiven im Schadensersatzrecht – Kommerzialisierung, Strafschadensersatz, Kollektivschaden, Gutachten A zum 66. Deutschen Juristentag, Munich 2006, 451 ff.; idem, Prävention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch Privatrecht – Anmaßung oder legitime Aufgabe?, AcP, 206, 2006, 451 ff.; idem, Präventivschadenersatz im Kontinental-Europäischen Privatrecht, in Festschrift für Helmut Koziol, Vienna 2010, 931 ff. Cf. Boom van W. H., Efficacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort, The Hague 2006, 35 ff.; Hachem P., Prävention und Punitive Damages, in: Wolf S., Mona M., Hürzeler M. (eds.), Prävention im Recht, Basel 2008, 201 ff.; Visscher L. T., Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna/New York 2009, 222 ff.

40Dobbs D. B., Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 Alabama Law Review, 1988/1989, 831 ff.; see also Dobbs D. B. Hayden P. T. Bublick E. M., The Law of Torts, Vol. III, St. Paul 2011, 2. ed., 56. In a similar sense see: Wagner G., Schadensersatz – Zwecke, Inhalte, Grenzen, in Lorenz E. (ed.), Karlsruher Forum 2006, Munich 2006, 18 ff. for the position under German law.

41On this problem see also Ott C., Schäfer H. B., Die Anreiz und Abschreckungsfunktion im Zivilrecht, in Ott C., Schäfer H. B. (eds.), Die Präventivwirkung zivilund strafrechtlicher Sanktionen, Tübingen 1999, 131 ff., 148 ff.; Schaub R., Streuschäden im deutschen und europäischen Recht, Juristenzeitung (JZ), 2011, 13 ff.

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However, this does not seem very convincing as the same problems arise as with punitive damages:42 it must be borne in mind that penalties do not serve the aim of retribution alone but also – or according to economic analysis of law even primarily43 – serve the aim of prevention;44 as these two aims can not be clearly separated, ultimately there will in most cases exist almost no difference if the judge were to take regard of only the preventive aim. In connection to this it should be pointed out that in the U.S. today, punitive damages have expanded to ensure what Sebok terms “efficient deterrence”45 and therefore also aim at prevention.

This leads to the decisive, fundamental objection to Wagner’s theory: It must be repeated once again that prevention is neither the sole aim nor even the main aim of Continental European tort law and, therefore, is unable to justify on its own a claim for damages. As the primary aim is the idea of compensation, the claim for damages always requires that the claimant suffered a loss and damages have to be calculated in correspondence to the loss suffered by the victim.

The decisive reason for my rejection of the deterrent function’s primacy and therefore also of preventive damages lies even deeper, namely in my firm belief that the theory on economic analysis as it stands is amiss in principle as it violates fundamental principles of private law. It would be out of place to go into detail here and insofar I have to refer to my earlier statement,46 but I nonetheless think I ought to state at least some reasons for my contention here: to begin with, the historical continental European legislators47 by no means only pursued the aim of efficiency and our present legal system is thus not one-sidedly directed only at this goal; the recognised methods of historical, systematic and teleological interpretation cannot lead to the exclusive decisiveness of the concept of efficiency. Thus, the economic analysis

42Cf. in more detail Koziol H., Punitive Damages: Admission into the Seventh Legal Heaven or Eternal Damnation?, in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna/New York 2009, no. 43 ff.; cf. also idem, Grundfragen des Schadenersatzrechts, Vienna 2010, no. 3/4 ff.

43See, eg, Entorf H., Ökonomische Theorie der Kriminalität, in Ott C., Schäfer H.B. (eds.), Die Präventivwirkung zivilund strafrechtlicher Sanktionen, Tübingen 1999, 1 ff.; Schmidtchen D., Wozu Strafrecht? Einige Anmerkungen aus ökonomischer Sicht, ibid, 49 ff.

44See Bydlinski F., System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts, Vienna 1996, 190 ff.; Koziol H., Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, Vol. I, Vienna 1997, 3. ed., no. 1/15 and 17; Schäfer C., Strafe und Prävention im Bürgerlichen Recht, AcP, 202, 2002, 402 f.

45Sebok A. J., Punitive Damages in the United States, in Koziol H., Wilcox V. (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives, Vienna/New York 2009, 165 ff.

46Koziol H., Grundfragen des Schadenersatzrechts, Vienna 2010, no. 3/14 ff.

47See Jansen N., in Schmoeckel M., Rückert J., Zimmermann R. (eds.), Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. II, Tübingen 2007, § 249-253, 255 no. 156 ff.

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