Добавил:
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз: Предмет: Файл:
учебный год 2023 / Cartwright_Hesselink_Precontractual_Liability_in_European_Private_Law.pdf
Скачиваний:
8
Добавлен:
21.12.2022
Размер:
2.63 Mб
Скачать

Case 12: Confidential design information given during negotiations

Case 12

A is a major manufacturer of computers. B, who has recently established his business of design and manufacture of computer components, approaches him and tells him that he has designed a new form of computer chip which will allow hand-held computers to be produced to run at twice the current speed. A tells B that he is interested in the details, because he may wish to introduce the chip into his new model of computers, and they begin negotiations with a view to contracting for B to manufacture the computer chips for A. During the negotiations A asks for, and B gives, information about the detail of the design of the computer chip which A says he needs in order to evaluate whether the chip will be suitable for his computers. The design is not yet protected by any intellectual property rights (such as patent). After some time, A says that the price B is proposing is too high, and breaks off the negotiations; he then approaches C, asking C to produce the same kind of computer chip at a lower price than B had been asking. A passes on to C the design information he had received from B. C agrees to produce the chips, and a contract is formed between A and C for their production. What liability (in contract, tort, restitution, or any other form of liability), if any, does A have to B? Would it make any difference if B, when giving the detail of the design of the computer chip, told A that he expected A to treat it as confidential?

Discussions

Austria

This is a characteristic case for the application of culpa in contrahendo principles. B would not have forwarded the information about the

336

case 12: confidential design information

337

design of the computer chip had A not given the impression that he would conclude a contract with him. The negotiating parties are each protected in the precontractual stage against the other party’s arbitrary and unexpected breaking-off of the negotiations, and the mutual duty to take care of each other’s economic interests results in a claim for damages if a disloyal party exploits the other party’s ideas that were disclosed during the negotiations in the expectation that the contract would be perfected.

From a recent case, where similar problems had to be resolved by the OGH,1 it may be deduced that parties are bound in good faith to use information about crucial aspects of the contemplated contract, which could be economically exploited by others, only in the context of that contract. If a party decides to abstain from concluding a definite contract after having received such information from the original negotiating party, he is deemed to be contractually bound not to disseminate information on product design that would have remained undisclosed by the original negotiating party. According to the OGH, the original negotiating party may successfully resort to injunctive relief sounding in contract and to a claim for misappropriation of intellectual property (though not yet protected), according to §1041 ABGB:

Where property has been used for the benefit of another, not in the management of a business, the owner can demand the return thereof in kind, or if such return can no longer be made, the value thereof at the time of its use, even though no advantage was received therefrom.

Thus, A is responsible for restitution that is based on a ‘claim for misappropriation’ (Verwendungsanspruch) falling under ‘unjust enrichment’.2 The value of the frustrated benefit that could have been derived from the misappropriated design determines the amount of compensation.

Another possible ground for a claim, especially in the variation of the facts, could again be §1295(2) ABGB.3 If one, consciously and without a

1

OGH 22 Mar. 1994, WBl 1994, 279, ecolex 1994, 552: a slogan was developed as a

 

key component of a comprehensive advertising concept for a chain of restaurants by

 

an advertisement contractor, who was later released from the negotiations by the

 

operator of the chain in favour of another advertisement contractor.

2

Cf P. Apathy in Schwimann, Praxiskommentar ABGB, vol. V, §1041 nos. 1, 2; H. Koziol,

 

‘Der Verwendungsanspruch bei Ausnu¨tzung fremder Kenntnisse und scho¨pferischer

 

Leistungen’, JBl 1978, 239; OGH 17 Mar. 1982, SZ 55/37 (use of a negotiating party’s

 

customer list).

3

¨

 

Cf. Koziol, Osterreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol. II, p. 98. See also the Austrian report on

case 1.

338 precontractual liability in european private law

legal right, exploits the economic value that another has created by taking all necessary effort and incurring considerable cost, the exploiter is to blame for having wilfully caused damage in a way that amounts to a violation of good morals. This would certainly be the case under the variation to the facts: it is obvious that liability for all B’s prospective losses should be imposed on A, when B has told A that he expected A to treat the information about the design of the computer chip as confidential.

In principle, B can choose between these different remedies and measures of recovery. Under culpa in contrahendo reliance loss is recoverable: B must be put into the position he would be in had he not given the information about the chips in reliance on A’s seriousness in negotiating. It appears, however, that reliance loss and expectation loss may be identical on these facts. Under §1041 ABGB, B may claim restitution of the objective economic value of the profit that A draws from the contract with C by using B’s information in an unjustified and unauthorised way. Under §1295(2) ABGB, the quantum of recovery would be the greatest, and would extend to the actual profits made by A in using the information, provided that the court finds that A’s conduct amounts to a wilful causation of damage that amounts to a violation of good morals. Whether it would do so is difficult to predict with absolute certainty.

Denmark

Marketing Act §10 prohibits such behaviour as described in the case. In a case decided in 1978,4 the Copenhagen Commercial Court awarded damages to the plaintiff in a situation somewhat similar to the one described here. The plaintiff, a pharmacist, had negotiated with a physician about developing and marketing together a vegetable fibre pill which the plaintiff had developed and which was not patented. However, the parties abandoned the plan to do it together. The plaintiff had not expressly told the defendant that the recipe for the pill he gave him was confidential. The defendant, who acted as an advisor in the medical industry, had then passed the information he received from the plaintiff on to a medical factory which brought the pill into the market before the plaintiff could do so. The damages awarded were the plaintiff’s lost profit, of which the court (as usual) gave a rather modest estimate.

4 Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 1978, 305.

case 12: confidential desig n information

339

England

B may seek an injunction against A to restrain him from using the confidential information or (more likely) he may seek financial remedies against A, either damages for his loss in being unable to make profitable use himself of the information or an account of the profits A makes from the use of the information.

Such remedies are available where the defendant makes unauthorised use or disclosure of information which is confidential and where it was received by the defendant in circumstances which imported the obligation of confidence.5 The design information here has the necessary quality of confidence: there are cases in which such technical and commercially valuable information has been held to be subject to the duty of confidentiality.6 And even in the case where B does not expressly require confidentiality it is likely that a court would hold that A ought to have realised that he was expected to respect the confidentiality.7 There is no doubt about this where B tells A that he expects A to treat the information as confidential. The remedy of injunction may be inappropriate here because the information has already been passed to C, and it is not clear from the facts that the obligations of confidence will necessarily extend to C if he did not know the background to A’s obtaining the information. Moreover, where information was given in confidence with a view to monetary reward for it, as in many cases of the sharing of trade secrets in a commercial context, a court will be more likely to refuse an injunction and instead order monetary remedies.8 A will be liable either to pay damages or to account for his profits.9 Damages in such cases may be calculated either on the basis of the lost royalty payment which B could have charged for

5Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203.

6E.g. Seager v. Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923 (unpatented design for new form of carpet grip).

7Ibid. (parties negotiating towards contract for joint exploitation of invention); James Industries Ltd’s Patents [1987] RPC 235 (duty of confidence presumed between commercial partners); Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, 421 (information of commercial or industrial value given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture or the manufacture of articles by one party for the other, will generally give rise to an obligation of confidence).

8Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd, above n. 7, 423.

9Peter Pan Manufacturing Corporation v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 96. It is not entirely clear when an account of profits will be ordered; perhaps it is more likely where the defendant has acted deliberately: Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, para. 34.021.