учебный год 2023 / Ciacci, The Case of Unfair Suretyships

European Review of Private Law 3-2005 [285–308] © Kluwer Law International | Printed in the Netherlands

Non-Legislative Harmonisation of Private Law under the European Constitution: The Case of Unfair Suretyships*

AURELIA COLOMBI CIACCHI**

Keywords: Suretyships, European Constitution, Case-Law Harmonisation

Abstract: This paper explores the horizontal effect of European constitutional rights, freedoms and principles as an alternative method of harmonisation based on case-law convergence. The feasibility and the appeal of this method are illustrated with specific reference to the case of unfair suretyships. A comparison of the existing national instruments protecting vulnerable sureties from disproportionate obligations enables us to detect spontaneous convergences and ‘cryptotypes’, but also dramatically different levels of protection. This paper argues that to give equally effective protection to sureties’ (and lenders’) fundamental rights in all Member States, a new system of judicial harmonisation would be necessary.

Résumé: Cet article considère l’effet horizontal des droits, des libertés et des principes constitutionnels européens comme méthode alternative d’harmonisation basée sur la convergence jurisprudentielle. La faisabilité et l’intérêt de cette méthode sont illustrés à travers l’exemple du contrat de cautionnement déloyal. Une comparaison des instruments nationaux en vigueur protégeant les garants vulnérables contre des engagements disproportionnés permet de détecter des convergences spontanés et des ‘cryptotypes’, mais également des niveaux de protection nettement différents. Cet article soutient que pour proteger les droits fundamentaux des garants (et des créditeurs) avec la même efficacité in tous les États membres, un nouveau système d’harmonisation juridique serait nécessaire.

Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Drittwirkung der europäischen Grundrechte, Grundfreiheiten und Verfassungsprinzipien als eine alternative Harmonisierungsmethode, die auf richterrechtlicher Konvergenz beruht. Die Praktikabilität und die Vorteile dieser Methode werden anhand des spezifischen Beispiels der unbilligen Bürgschaftsverträge erläutert. Ein Vergleich der vorhandenen nationalen Rechtsinstrumente zum Schutz der Bürgen vor unverhältnismäßig hohen Verpflichtungen ermöglicht es, spontane Konvergenzen und ‘Kryptotypen’, aber auch kraß unterschiedliche Schutzstandards zu entdecken. Um die Grundrechte der Bürgen (und Kreditgeber) gleichermaßen effektiv in allen Mitgliedstaaten zu schützen, hält dieser Beitrag ein neues System judikativer Harmonisierung für notwendig.

*I wish to thank Ulf Bernitz, Gert Brüggemeier, Hugh Collins, Nicola Countouris, Christine Godt, Matthias Haentjens, Catherine Jacqueson, Gerard McCormack, Ruth Sefton-Green, Steve Weatherill, Simon Whittaker and Katja Ziegler for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

**Dr., Marie Curie Fellow, University of Oxford, Institute of European and Comparative Law; Researcher in European Private Law, Centre of European Law and Politics at the University of Bremen.

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1The European Constitution: Form and Substance

Continental lawyers, particularly private lawyers, may tend to associate the word ‘Constitution’ exclusively (or at least primarily) with a formally enacted, written constitutional document. They might therefore think that a European constitutional legal order will emerge only if and when all Member States have ratified the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, in any case not before 1 November 2006.1

But as soon as we recall that legal systems which have not seen the need for written constitutional documents, such as those of England and Scotland, also consider themselves as governed by a Constitution,2 another meaning of the word comes into play: the Constitution as a set of fundamental principles, rules and rights, be they written or unwritten. In this regard, continental constitutional lawyers distinguish between a formal and a substantive Constitution.3 In the substantive sense of basic rules shaping government institutions, their powers and mutual relationships, and fundamental policy objectives, a European Constitution as applicable law already exists and is more than 50 years old.4

For much of the European Community’s first few decades of existence, the nature of its Constitution was unclear. On the one hand, the long-term objective pursued by the Member States through the institution of the Community was a poli-

1Cf. Art. IV-447 (2) of the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty was signed by the representatives of the governments of the Member States on 29 October 2004 in Rome. The full text is available at <http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index_en.htm>.

2See W. BAGEHOT, The English Constitution, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1928; D.H. MCNEILL, The Scottish Constitution, The Scottish National Party, 1943.

3In Germany, the distinction between formal and substantive constitutional law (‘formelles und materielles Verfassungsrecht’) goes back to G. JELLINEK (e.g. Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edn,

Springer, 1929). Cf. P. UNRUH, Der Verfassungsbegriff des Grundgesetzes, Mohr Siebeck, 2002, p 422 et seq. For the French concepts of ‘Constitution formelle’ and ‘Constitution matérielle’ see

D.TURPIN, Droit constitutionnel, 4th edn, Presses universitaires de France, 1999, pp 87-88. In Italian literature, the two distinctions ‘Costituzione formale/Costituzione sostanziale’ and ‘Constituzione formale/Costituzione materiale’ are not always treated as equivalent: cf. G. DE VERGOTTINI, Diritto costituzionale, 3rd edn, Cedam, 2001, p 10 et seq.

4On European constitutionalism see J.H.H. WEILER, The Constitution of Europe: ‘do the new clothes have an emperor?’ and other essays on European integration, Cambridge University Press, 1999; J. SHAW, ‘The emergence of postnational constitutionalism in the European Union’, 6 Journal of European Public Policy 1999, p 579; I. PERNICE, ‘Multi-level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: Constitution-Making Revisited?’, 36 CMLR (Common Market Law Review) 1999, p 703; P. CRAIG, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’, 7 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2001, p 125; C. JOERGES, ‘The law in the process of constitutionalizing Europe’, EUI Working Paper Law 4/2002; S. WEATHERILL, ‘Is constitutional finality feasible or desirable? On the cases for European constitutionalism and a European Constitution’, Constitutionalism Web-Papers (ConWEB), Paper No 7/2002, <http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb>;

A.VON BOGDANDY (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht: theoretische und dogmatische Grundzüge Springer, 2003.

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tical one: to ensure peaceful and even closer political relationships between the people of Europe. On the other hand, however, some Member States were quite reluctant to accept the idea of a European Community as a political entity having supremacy over the governments of Member States’. As a compromise, the European Economic Community was born. In this context, it was perfectly understandable to speak of a ‘European Economic Constitution’.5

During the following decades, Europe increasingly freed itself from being a mere economic alliance. In 1989 the word ‘political Union’ officially entered into the Community agenda.6 With the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union was born and the adjective ‘economic’ disappeared from the European Community name.

In the meantime, fundamental rights had made their entrance into the European Constitution. In 1974 – 26 years before the Nice Charter! – the ECJ stated that ‘fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures. In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional tradition common to the Member States’, and from ‘international Treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories’.7 In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty codified and generalised these principles. They are now laid down in Article 6 of the EU Treaty in the consolidated version of Nice.8

Hence, the European Constitution is no longer merely economic. The citizens of the European Union are granted not only economic freedoms, but also personal free-

5For discussion of this topic see P. BEHRENS, ‘Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in: G. BRÜGGEMEIER (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, Nomos, 1994, pp 73-90; M.E. STREIT & W. MUSSLER, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Community. From “Rome” to “Maastricht”’, 1 ELJ (European Law Journal) 1995, p 5; C. JOERGES, ‘The Market without the State? The “Economic Constitution” of the European Community and the Rebirth of Regulatory Politics’, European Integration online Papers (EioP) Vol 1, No. 19, 1997, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-019a.htm>; A. SOMEK, ‘Equality and Constitutional Indeterminacy. An Interpretative Perspective on the European Economic Constitution’, 7 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2001, p 171; A. HATJE, ‘Wirtschaftsverfassung’, in: A. VON BOGDANDY (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, op. cit. (footnote 4 above) 683 et seq.; and, last but not least, C. JOERGES, ‚What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy’, EUI Working Paper Law 13/2004.

6On 9 December 1989 in Strasbourg, the European Council decided to convene an inter-govern- mental conference on moving ahead with economic and monetary union and political union (DOC/89/3, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/searchAction.do>).

7ECJ, Case C-4/73 (Nold v. European Commission).

8(1) ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’.

(2)‘The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law’.

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doms and fundamental rights not necessarily related to economic interests. Besides being based on common economic interests such as the Internal Market, the contemporary European Union is founded first, and foremost, on common human values.

The fundamental rights and constitutional principles enshrined in Article 6 EU continue to be legally binding independently of the existence and the binding force of both the Fundamental Rights Charter of 2000 and the Constitutional Treaty of 2004.

2A Paradigm Shift

What consequences are we to draw from the above scenario for the Europeanisation of private law? First of all, a paradigm shift is required:

The European debate on harmonisation of private law beyond the field of consumer protection could be described as having been hitherto dominated by three paradigms. The first one is the supposed necessity of private law harmonisation for the completion of the Internal Market.9 The second one is the supposed existence of a common core of principles of private law, deductible from the national legal systems and which could constitute the basis for further harmonisation.10 The third one is the highly controversial project of a European Civil Code, which is promoted increasingly as an optional instrument rather than as directly binding law.11

9On which this paper shares the criticism expressed by H. COLLINS, ‘The Freedom to Circulate Documents: Regulating Contracts in Europe’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 787, and S. WEATHERILL, ‘Why Object to the Harmonization of Private Law by the EC?’ 12 ERPL (European Review of Private Law) 2004, p 633.

10Cf. e.g. O. LANDO, The harmonization of European contract law through a restatement of principles, University of Oxford, Centre for the Advanced Study of European and Comparative Law, 1997; C. VON BAR, O. LANDO & S. SWANN, ‘Communication on European Contract Law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil Code’, 10 ERPL (European Review of Private Law) 2002, p 183. The discovery of similar solutions in the case-law of the Member States behind the veil of the different provisions or doctrines applied is the aim of the comparative law project ‘The Common Core of European Private Law’, launched by U. Mattei and M. Bussani in the early 1990s. See M. BUSSANI & U. MATTEI, ‘The Common Core Approach to European Private Law’, 3 Colum. J. Eur. L. (Columbia Journal of European Law) 1997, p 339. The Common Core project itself, however, does not aim to harmonise the private laws of European countries. For more information about this project see <http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-core/>.

11For discussion see S. GRUNDMANN, ‘The Optional European Code on the Basis of the Acquis Communautaire – Starting Point and Trends’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal)2004, p 698; M. HESSELINK, ‘The Politics of a European Civil Code’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 675.

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All three paradigms permeate both scholarly writings and the Community’s official documents on private law harmonisation.12 Yet, none of these paradigms is commonly considered as having much to do with the European Constitution. Notwithstanding the Community institutions being the main actors in European constitutional development, there isn’t a single hint to the constitutional dimension of private law harmonisation either in the relevant Parliament’s Resolutions or in the Commission’s Communications. The constitutionalisation of Europe and the harmonisation of private law appear as strictly separate processes.

This is partially true also with regard to the academic debate. Only recently scholars have begun to bridge the gap and to recognise the European constitutional relevance of private law harmonisation.13 In general, public lawyers tend to prefer not to enter the minefield of EC private law. And the constitutional melody played by EC law since the 1970’s seems not to have yet reached the ears of private lawyers,

12See in particular the first Communication of the European Commission on European contract law: COM(2001) 398 final, 11 July 2001. Thereafter, the Commission seems to have changed its understanding of the second paradigm. In the Communication of 2001, the common principles of contract law were presented as immanent in the law of ‘all Member States’ (p. 14), whilst in the Action Plan (COM(2003) 68 final, 12 February 2003) the Commission seems to have abandoned the ‘common core’ mythos. The Action Plan recognises (p. 16 et seq.) that every drafting of common solutions requires to choose, between different national models, the ‘best’ ones. On this new approach is based also the most recent Commission Communication on European contract law: COM(2004) 651 final, 11 October 2004, p 3 et seq.

13See S. WEATHERILL, ‘The Commission’s Options for Developing EC Consumer Protection and Contract Law: Assessing the Constitutional Basis’, 13 EBLR (European Business Law Review) 2002, p 497; idem, ’European Contract Law: Taking the Heat Out of Questions of Competence’, 15 EBLR (European Business Law Review) 2004, p 23; STUDY GROUP ON SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (SOCIAL JUSTICE GROUP), ’Social Justice in European Contract Law. A Manifesto’ 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 653; O. GERSTENBERG, ’Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 766; D. CARUSO, ’Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: the Case of Property’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 751; G. ALPA, ’The Meaning of ’Natural Person’ and the Impact of the Constitution for Europe on the Development of European Private Law’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 734. See also A. COLOMBI CIACCHI, ’Der Aktionsplan der Europäischen Kommission für ein kohärenteres Vertragsrecht: Wo bleibt die Rückbindung an die Europäische Verfassung?’, in: A. TIETZE , M.-R. MCGUIRE et al. (eds), Europäisches Privatrecht. Über die Verknüpfung von nationalem und Gemeinschaftsrechts, Jahrbuch junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 2004, Boorberg, 2005 (forthcoming).

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although they are not insensitive to the music emanating from the national Constitutions and the Human Rights Convention.14

Time has therefore come for a paradigm shift: the acknowledgement that both EC and national private laws as being embedded in and having to be permeated by a European constitutional legal order.15

3Constitutionalisation of Private Law in Europe: One Word for a Thousand Realms

‘European private law’ is a very popular expression, despite or perhaps even thanks to its vagueness. First, it often serves as a synonym for the body of EC private law legislation,16 which is not limited to consumer protection measures (as e.g. the Late Payment Directive17 shows).18 Second, the term designates the bundle of different national private law regimes in Europe, both gradually converging from the bottom

14In most Member States the effect of constitutional and/or Convention norms in private law is a well-known subject of study. The Italian and German literature on this topic goes back to the 1950s-1960s: see P. BARILE, Il soggetto privato nella Costituzione Italiana, Cedam, 1953; W. LEISNER, Grundrechte und Privatrecht, Beck, 1960; H.-C. NIPPERDEY, Grundrechte und Privatrecht, Scherpe, 1961. For some of the first contributions in other Member States see, in the Netherlands, A.G. MARIS, Dient de wet bijzondere regelen te bevatten ten aanzien van de civielrechtelijke werking van de grondrechten, en, zo ja, welke?, Preadviezen NJV 1969, Arnhem, 1969; H. DRION, ‘Civielrechtelijke werking van grondrechten’, NJB (Nederlandse Juristenblad) 1969, p 585; in Spain, T. QUADRA-SALCEDO, El recurso de amparo y los derechos fundamentales en las relaciones entre particulares, Civitas, 1981; in Portugal, J.C. VIEIRA DE ANDRADE, ‘Os Direitos Fundamentais nas Relações entre Particulares’, 5 Documentação e Direito Comparado 1981, p 181 et seq.; in France, L. FAVOREU, ‘L’influence de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnnel sur les diverses branches du droit’, in: Mélange Hamon, Paris Economica, 1982, p 235 et seq. In Sweden the discussion is more recent: see J.NERGELIUS, Konstitutionellt rättighetsskydd: svensk rätt i ett komparativ perspektiv, Fritze 1996, p 261. Also in England the debate is at an early stage, as it was sparked by the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998. Amongst the first contributions see M. HUNT, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Act’, PL (Public Law) 1998, p 423; B. MARKESINIS, ‘Privacy, freedom of expression and the horizontal effect of the Human Rights Bill. Lessons from Germany’ 115 L.Q.R (Law Quarterly Review) 1999, p 47; N. BAMFORTH, ‘The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to public authorities and private bodies’ C.L.J (Cambridge Law Journal) 1999, p 159.

15Cf. SOCIAL JUSTICE GROUP, ’Social Justice in European Contract Law. A Manifesto’ 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 653 at 667-668.

16See e.g. R. SCHULZE & R. ZIMMERMANN (eds), Basistexte zum Europäischen Privatrecht,

Nomos, 2002.

17Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions.

18On the importance of the Late Payment Directive for the whole system of EC private law see A. COLOMBI CIACCHI, ‘Die EG-Richtlinie über den Zahlungsverzug und ihre Umsetzung durch das Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz’,) EWS (Europäisches Wirtschaftsund Steuerrecht)

2002, p 306.

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up and being increasingly harmonised from the top down.19 A third use of the expression refers more specifically to the tricky interplay between EC legislation and national private laws, especially after the transposition of EC Directives.20 Further stratifications of meanings of ‘European private law’ arise from the multi-level and pluralistic nature of both national and EC private law, produced by legislators, courts, academic works, self-regulation of market actors etc.21

All of the above private law contexts are embraced by the European constitutionalisation process. The extension and complexity of the latter is due to both its multi-level dimension and the plurality of constitutional norms relevant in the field of private law.22

To entirely explore this phenomenon several books would need to be written. The more modest aim of this paper is to outline some initial ideas for further discussion on one single aspect: the horizontal effect of European constitutional rights and principles as a possible instrument of non-legislative contract law harmonisation, briefly illustrated by the example of unfair surety agreements.

4The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Principles in Private Law

It is a settled principle in the constitutional theory of most Member States that fundamental rights and freedoms have effect not only in the ‘vertical’ relationship between private individuals and public powers, but also in the ‘horizontal’ relationships of

19See e.g. M. BUSSANI & U. MATTEI, ‘The Common Core Approach to European Private Law’, 3 Colum. J. Eur. L. (Columbia Journal of European Law) 1997, p 339.

20See e.g. A. TIETZE, M.-R. MCGUIRE et al. (eds), Europäisches Privatrecht. Über die Verknüpfung von nationalem und Gemeinschaftsrechts, Jahrbuch junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 2004,

Boorberg, 2005 (forthcoming).

21See C. JOERGES, ‘On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Private Law: Considerations on a Justicemaking Law for the EU Multi-level System’, 7.3 EJCL (Electronic Journal of Comparative Law) 2003, <http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/73/art73-3.html>.

22For further discussion on this topic see O. GERSTENBERG, ’Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 766.

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private parties between each other. The same is true for constitutional principles such as non-discrimination, which confer rights upon individuals.23

In EU law, the four fundamental economic freedoms and some principles of the Treaties (such as equal pay for men and women) have been applied horizontally by the ECJ since the early 1970s.24 The same happened to the fundamental right to freedom of expression in a case of 1991.25 This seems to be the only example of horizontal effect of fundamental rights in ECJ jurisprudence. Perhaps for this reason, in academic literature much attention has been paid to the horizontal effect of funda-

23On the horizontal effect of fundamental and constitutional rights see, for France J.-P. MARGUÉNAUD, CEDH et droit privé, La documentation française, 2001; for Germany C.-W. CANARIS, Grundrechte and Privatrecht – Eine Zwischenbilanz, de Gruyter, 1999; for Italy A. DI MAJO, La tutela civile dei diritti, 4th edn, Giuffré, 2003; for the Netherlands; J.H. NIEUWENHUIS, ‘De constitutie van het burgerlijk recht, RM (Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn) Themis 2001, p 203; S.D. LINDENBERGH, ‘Constitutionalisering van contractenrecht. Voer de werking van fundamentele rechten in contractuele verhoudingen, WPNR (Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie) 2004, p 977; for Portugal J.C. VIEIRA DE ANDRADE, ‘Os Direitos Fundamentais nas Relações entre Particulares’, 5 Documentação e Direito Comparado 1981, p 181 et seq.; for Spain M.P. GARCÍA RUBIO, ‘La eficacia inter privatos (Drittwirkung) de los derechos fundamentales’, in: Libro Homenaje a Ildefonso Sánchez Mera, Fundación General del Notariado, 2002, pp 297-314; for Sweden J. NERGELIUS, Konstitutionellt rättighetsskydd: svensk rätt i ett komparativ perspektiv, Fritze, 1996, p 261. In England it is still controversial whether or not human rights can have horizontal effect. For an overview of the debate cf. P. CRAIG, Administrative Law, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003 p 599 and see further M. HUNT, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Act’ PL (Public Law) 1998, p 429; N. BAMFORTH, ‘The true “horizontal effect” of the Human Rights Act 1998’ 117 L.Q.R (Law Quarterly Review) 2001, p 34; R. BUXTON, ‘The Human Rights Act and Private Law’ 116 L.Q.R. (Law Quarterly Review) 2000, p 48; H.R.W. WADE, ’Horizon of Horizontality’ 116 L.Q.R. (Law Quarterly Review) 2000, p 217. For discussion of the impact of the Human Rights Act on contracts see S. WHITTAKER, ’The Human Rights Act 1998 and Contracts’, in: H.G.BEALE (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 29th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2004, 1-029 et seq.

24See e.g. C-36/74 Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale (1974) ECR 01405; C-43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena (1976) ECR 00455; C-13/76 Donà v. Mantero (1976) ECR 01333. For a recent overview on the ECJ jurisprudence giving horizontal effect to fundamental rights and European constitutional principles see N. FERREIRA, J. KRZEMINSKA & T. RUSSO, Horizontal Effects of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in European Union Law, May 2004 (on file with authors).

25C-219/91 Ter Voort (1992) ECR I-05485.

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mental freedoms,26 while the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in EC law remained almost unexplored.27

In the academic debate at both national and EU level, the most controversial question about the horizontal effect of fundamental rights, freedoms and principles is whether it is direct or indirect. This distinction is usually referred to either the applicability of a constitutional norm (or a norm of the ECHR) in a private law case, or the binding force of this norm on private parties, or both.

As to applicability, scholars speak of direct horizontal effect when a fundamental right, freedom or principle is applied as the very, direct legal base of a private law claim.28 Consequently, horizontal effect is considered as indirect when the individuals’ claims need to be based on (ordinary) private law norms, which are to be interpreted and applied in the light of fundamental rights, freedoms and constitutional principles.29

As to binding force, direct horizontal effect is associated with the idea of fundamental rights, freedoms and constitutional principles being directly binding not only for public powers but also for private parties. In other words, the question is whether the relevant constitutional (or Convention) norms confer upon private individuals the legal obligation to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of

26The discussion of the horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms has been particularly intense in Germany: see E. STEINDORFF, ‘Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht’, in: Festschrift P. Lerche, Beck, 1993, p 575; W. KLUTH, ‘Die Bindung privater Wirtschaftsteilnehmer an die Grundfreiheiten des Eg-Vertrages’, 122 AöR (Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts) 1997, p 581; M. JAENSCH, Die unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten, Nomos, 1997; T.O. GANTEN, Die Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten, Duncker & Humblot, 2000; R. STREINZ & S. LEIBLE, ‘Die Unmittelbare Drittwirkung von Grundfreiheiten’,

EuZW (Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrech) 2000, p 459; T. KÖRBER, ‘Innerstaatliche Anwendung und Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten?’, 6 EuR (Europarecht) 2000, p 947; C.W. CANARIS, ‘Drittwirkung der gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Grundfreiheiten’, in: H. BAUER D. CZYBULKA, W. KAHL, A. VOSSHLE (Hrsg.), Umwelt, Wirtschaft und Recht, Wissenschaftliches Symposium aus Anlass des 65. Geburtstages von Rainer Schmidt, Mohr Siebeck, 2002, p 40.

27On this topic see the doctoral thesis of D. SCHINDLER, Die Kollision von Grundfreiheiten und Gemeinschaftsgrundrechten. Entwurf eines Kollisionsmodells unter Zusammenführung der Schutzpflichtenund der Drittwirkungslehre, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2001.

28Cf. M. HUNT, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the HRA’, PL (Public Law) 1998, p 429; D. SPIELMANN, L’effet potentiel de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme entre personnes privées, Bruylant, 1995, p 19; G. CAMPANELLI, ‘Le forme di tutela immediata dei diritti fondamentali tra giudice comune e corte costituzionale’, Giust. Civ. 2002, p 411 et seq.

29Cf. G. DÜRIG, ’Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung’, in T. MAUNZ (ed.), Vom Bonner Grundgesetz zur gesamtdeutschen Verfassung. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag von Hans Nawiasky, Isar-Verlag, 1956, p 157 et seq.; C.A.J.M. KORTMANN, P.T. BOVEND’EERT, Dutch Constitutional Law, Kluwer Academic, 2000, no. 358, p 147; M.P. GARCÍA RUBIO, ‘La eficacia inter privatos (Drittwirkung) de los derechos fundamentales’, in: Libro Homenaje a Ildefonso Sánchez Mera, Fundación General del Notariado, 2002, p 300.

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others.30 If not, the horizontal effect is only indirect: those norms only bind public powers and require them to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals from detrimental behaviour of other private parties. This protection can be provided not only by legislative measures, but also by case-law.31

Whether direct or indirect, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights and constitutional principles is a matter of fact in the courts practice. In western continental Europe, it has been a powerful and effective means to develop and innovate private law. The supreme rank of fundamental rights, freedoms and constitutional principles has provided the courts with the legitimacy necessary to move away from established principles of private law no longer respondent to the spirit of the time. Through horizontal effect, courts have ensured contemporary private law offers higher levels of protection for weaker parties and stronger consideration of non-economic human values.32

5Harmonisation of Standards of Protection through Horizontal Effect

The academic debate about horizontal effect of fundamental rights, freedoms and constitutional principles in Europe has so far predominantly reflected the traditional boundaries between States on the one hand, and between legal disciplines on the other. The main point of reference has not been the European Constitution, but the individual national Constitutions. Comparative law studies on this topic are at their very beginning.33 And at EC level, except for the apparently separate, specific matter of the horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms,34 little debate has been sparked. Since the adoption of the Nice Charter, countless contributions have been written on the new European fundamental rights, but only few sensed a link between their horizontal effect and the approximation of private law in Europe.35

30Cf. J.-P. MARGUÉNAUD, CEDH et droit privé, La documentation française, 2001, p 77; A. BALDASSARRE, ‘I diritti fondamentali nello stato costituzionale’, in: Scritti in onore di Alberto Predieri, Milano 1996, p 76.

31Cf. C.-W. CANARIS, Grundrechte and Privatrecht – Eine Zwischenbilanz, de Gruyter, 1999; H. DANELIUS, Mänskliga rättigheter i europeisk praxis, Norstedts Juridik, 1997, p 62.

32See e.g. G. COMANDÉ, ‘Diritto privato europeo e diritti fondamentali’, in: G. COMANDÉ (ed.),

Diritto Privato Europeo e Diritti Fondamentali, Giappicchelli, 2004, p 21 et seq.

33A thorough comparative analysis of the horizontal effect of fundamental and Constitutional rights in the law of eight Member States and in EC law is in preparation by the EC funded Research Training Network ‘Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union’ (<http://www.fundamentalrights.uni-bremen.de>), co-ordinated by G. Brüggemeier, A. Colombi Ciacchi and G. Comandé.

34See footnote 26 above.

35See O. GERSTENBERG, ’Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 766; W. VAN GERVEN, ‘Remedies for Infringements of Fundamental Rights’, 10 EPL (European Public Law) 2002, p 261; M. HESSELINK, ’The Politics of a European Civil Code’, 10 ELJ (European Law Journal) 2004, p 675 at 682; A. COLOMBI CIACCHI, ’Der Aktionsplan der Europäischen Kommission für ein kohärenteres Vertragsrecht: Wo bleibt die Rückbindung an die Europäische Verfassung?’, op. cit. footnote 13 above.

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