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Экзамен зачет учебный год 2023 / Yun-chien Chang, A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Access to Landlocked Land. A Case for a Hybrid of Property and Liability Rules

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Yun-chien Chang

Access to Landlocked Land

III. WHY SHOULD EASEMENTS BE PRESCRIBED?

The legal servitude of passage law should facilitate transactions between landlocked owners and owners of neighboring parcels. The normative Coase theorem prescribes that the law should be structured so as to remove the impediments to private agreements (Cooter and Ulen 2012: 91–93). Without statutory easements, bargaining powers of the two parties are asymmetrical, hampering transactions.23 This article argues that, to reduce transaction costs, the law only has to grant a “limited” legal right-of-way. Applying the hybrid rule facilitates Coasean transactions, ensuring that property rights are allocated to the party who values them more—this is what often called “the normative Hobbes theorem” (Cooter and Ulen 2012: 91–93) (for different term but similar normative goal, see Epstein 1994: 31; Krier and Schwab 1995: 446; Merrill 2009: 488; Posner 2010: 66). Below I explain why using the hybrid rule to replace the property rule is necessary, and Part V will demonstrate why the hybrid rule is more efficient than the liability rule.

A. Overcoming Asymmetrical Bargaining Power

Landlocked owners may not be able to reach an agreement on passage with their neighbors, because of asymmetrical bargaining power. Without a right-of-way, a landlocked parcel may worth nothing (Dana and Merrill 2002: 181), whereas a passage is just one of the many possible ways to use the neighboring land. Thus, landlocked owners have much more to lose should the transaction fail to go through. Both parties know this. Neighbors are very likely to ask for a price that is way beyond the opportunity costs of using their land as passage, and, more importantly, they may

23 One would contend that it would not be inefficient if transaction fails and the neighbor buys the landlocked land from the landlocked owners (at a very low price) and becomes a single owner, who will have incentives to maximize the joint product of the two land parcels. There could be several responses to this argument. First, because the neighbor acquires the landlocked parcel at a low price, she may not value it more than the original landlocked owner does. Even if the neighbor as a single owner will aim to maximize the total value of the two parcels, the two parcels could have been more valuable in the hands of their original owners (given a certain extent of passage for the landlocked parcel). Second, in the context of statutory easements, landowners become landlocked involuntarily and usually unexpectedly. If landowners would have no prescribed passage when their land suddenly becomes landlocked, some of them (particularly risk-averse ones) would care enough to bargain for a passage option or right (which is useless at the time of the transaction and often never needed), to prevent the sudden drop of property value. The total transaction costs and welfare losses from such bargaining are presumably higher than those arising from bargaining between the few landlocked owners and their neighbors. Finally, insurances might not always be available, as most insurance policies do not cover losses resulting from earthquakes, landslides, tsunami, etc., which are causes of sudden landlocking. The adverse selection problem might also dissuade insurance companies from providing such insurances.

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Access to Landlocked Land

stick to a price beyond the difference in economic value of the landlocked parcel with and without a right-of-way (this difference in value is the most that the landlocked owner is willing to pay, but is unobservable to the neighbors). Hence, an efficient transaction may fail to happen due to imperfect information.

Bargaining does not always fail. The two parties may be able to reach a deal, but only after a prolonged bargaining process, as transaction costs tend to increase when the bargaining range is wide (Epstein 1997: 2094; Posner 2010: 89), which is exactly the case here because near total value of the landlocked parcel is at stake. The social welfare gain of this trade, consequently, to a large extent may be chopped away by the high transaction costs.

A prescribed right of passage facilitates transactions and enhances efficiency. The landlocked owners generally value the land used for passage more than the owners of passage do (Sterk 1987: 76).24 Therefore, this doctrine meets the requirement set by the normative Hobbes theorem, because the land used for passage, the resource in question, is assigned to the user who values it more. At the same time, this doctrine saves the high transaction costs that the two parties otherwise would have incurred to try to reach a deal, due to the wide bargaining range. Moreover, statutory easements facilitate “Solomonic” bargaining under the shadow of the hybrid rule. That is, the court (or the administrative agency) does not have to actually prescribe an easement. The very rule that landlocked owners can request certain passage rights can facilitate transactions more than a pure property rule protection of entitlements will do (Ayres and Talley 1995). Rights of way arranged through voluntary transactions, as compared to prescribed ones, can further ensure efficient results.

B. Bilateral Monopoly Theory Reconsidered

One should not conflate my bargaining power theory with the oft-raised bilateral monopoly theory (Sterk 1987: 57–58; Kelly 2009: 231; 2011: 349), though they involve similar issues. The bilateral monopoly theory characterizes the access to landlocked land issue as having only one buyer (the landlocked owner, the monopsonist25) and only one seller (the owner of neighboring parcel, the monopolist26). Nevertheless, this theory should be reconsidered on both fronts. The

24In other words, if the landlocked land and the adjacent land are owned by a single owner (Coase 1960; Baxter and Altree 1972: 2–4; Epstein 1993: 556–557; Schaefer and Ott 2004: 440–441), she will create a passage over the adjacent land for the landlocked land.

25“A monopsonist is a buyer who faces an upward-sloping supply curve” (Landsburg 2008: 488).

26“A monopolist is the only seller of a product for which no close substitutes exist” (Cooter and Ulen

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Access to Landlocked Land

landlocked owner is not a monoposonist if her neighbor can use her land in other ways, like growing flowers on it at her leisure or leasing the land to others. My guess is that usually neighboring parcels have many possible uses. Depicting the landlocked owner as a monoposonist may overestimate his bargaining power.

Moreover, the neighbor may not be a monopolist. While a landlocked parcel could have only one adjacent plot, like the left graph in Figure 1 shows, a landlocked parcel could also have many adjacent plots, as the right graph in Figure 1 demonstrates. In the latter scenario, there is no monopoly of passages; rather, there could be a competitive market of passage rights. In this scenario, although a parcel is (technically speaking) landlocked, its owner does not necessarily stand in a weaker bargaining position when dealing with her neighbors, as the neighbors may compete for selling a passage right.27 Hence, characterizing the neighbors as monopolists may sometimes over-estimate their bargaining power and in any case blur the nature of the problem.

Also, neighbors do not have to be (strictly defined) monopolists to have strong bargaining power. They can be oligopolists or form a cartel.28 Thus, the bilateral monopoly theory may mislead unsophisticated third-party adjudicators to underestimate the bargaining power of the neighbors when a few adjacent parcels could serve as the servient land.

public road

neighboring parcel

landlocked parcel

public road

 

neighboring

neighboring

neighboring

 

neighboring

parcel 2

parcel 3

parcel 4

neighboring

parcel 1

 

 

 

parcel 5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

landlocked

 

 

 

 

parcel

 

neighboring

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

neighboring

 

 

neighboring

neighboring

parcel 6

parcel 9

 

 

parcel 8

parcel 7

 

 

 

 

 

 

public road

Figure 1 Two types of landlocked parcels.

2008: 300).

27In this scenario, the court (or the state administrative agency that handles private condemnation in the U.S.) should refuse to grant a statutory easement to the landlocked owner and leave it to voluntary transactions to solve the passage issues, for the following reasons: First, property rule protection of the neighbors’ entitlements preserves autonomy and subjective value. Second, as elaborated below, the court (or the administrative agency) tends to undercompensate the owner of servient land, while voluntary transactions do not.

28This cartel could be more powerful than cartels in other contexts. First, most anti-trust laws in the world probably will not define the coalition of neighbors as a cartel. Second, an act of passage (the right of which is the product controlled and sold by the cartel) is easily observable, making it easier for the cartel to discipline defecting neighbors.

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IV. COMPENSATION

Requiring landlocked owners to compensate neighbors can be easily justified from an economic perspective. Compensation forces landlocked owners to internalize the costs their passage imposes on neighbors. Internalization, as compared to externalization, ensures that prescribing the passage enhances social welfare. This is Law and Economics 101.

In reality, full compensation is not always feasible. The court measures the amount of compensation by computing the difference between the fair market value of the property before and after an easement is prescribed (Wagstaff v. Sublette County Board of County Commissioners, 53 P.3d 79 [2002]; Mayland v. Flitner, 28 P.3d 838 [2001]).29 Neighbors/landowners, however, measure their losses from forced passage by the changes in their economic value, which is subjective and not taken into account by a third party (such as the court or the administrative agency that administers the private taking). Therefore, if neighbors lose subjective value due to prescribed easement, it will not be compensated. In other words, the fair market value standard might undercompensate the neighbors because their subjective value is not taken into account (Posner 2010: 87).30 As a result, the costs of statutory easements are not always fully internalized by the landlocked owners. The following analyses will be based on this claim.

V. NECESSITY

This part explains why the hybrid rule is more efficient than the liability rule in the access to landlocked land problem. I argue that although a legal right-of-way should be prescribed, a “limited” one, when the perceived marginal social benefit of passage is larger than the perceived marginal social cost, is more efficient than a more expanded one, when the perceived marginal social cost is equal to or larger than the perceived marginal social benefits. To be more exact, the “extent”31 of the statutory

29Wagstaff v. Sublette County Board of County Commissioners and Mayland v. Flitner are the leading cases cited in the authoritative Bruce and Ely (2011) when discussing compensation for statutory easements. Bruce and Ely (2011) note the complex nature of the compensation issue but do not describe whether and how different states adopt different formula for computing compensation.

30Granted, systemic undercompensation is less frequent in partial takings such as statutory easement than in complete physical takings. The prescribed passage is usually set at the least used part of a plot—certainly not through buildings, and landowners may not attach much, if any, subjective value to the vacant part of their properties.

31Theoretically, “extent” of the statutory easement can capture various aspects of accessing. In practice, the court is more likely to focus on, say, the width and road condition of the passage, rather

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easement should be set at where the perceived marginal social benefit of passage is about to sharply decline. Following these criteria, much of the value of landlocked land will be preserved and the bargaining powers of the two parties will be much more balanced, reducing the transaction costs for future bargaining. At the same time, the uncompensated loss by the neighbors is minimized. Finally, the necessity requirement that is adopted in the civil-law jurisdictions and states in the U.S. should be interpreted to prescribe such a limited statutory easement. In what follows, I elaborate the above arguments.

A. MR=MC Leads to Too Much Passage

The intuition for some law-and-economists may be to set the solution to whatever problems at the point where MR=MC (marginal revenue equals marginal cost). A pure liability rule implies this formula, because it does not impose any internal constraint on the extent of losses that the infringers can impose on others (Fennell 2007: 1427). I argue that in the context of statutory easements, this formula of MR=MC, however, will produce inefficiency. Assuming that a third-party adjudicator in general accurately assesses the fair market value of the neighboring land and the social benefit of passage,32 following the mandate of MR=MC, the adjudicator will set the extent of passage at Q4 in Figure 2, because the MC(FMV) curve that represents observable marginal social costs (marginal losses in fair market value) crosses the MR curve that denotes the marginal social benefits at Q4. By contrast, an omniscient social planner would have set the extent of passage at Q3 in Figure 2, because that is where the actual marginal social costs (marginal losses in economic value, represented by MC(EV)) equal the marginal social benefits. In other words, Q3 represents the optimal extent of passage, but a third-party adjudicator will award Q4 (more than Q3) to the landlocked owners.

Q4 is inefficient, because first, it grants landlocked owners too much passage rights and fails to maximize social welfare. In addition, the total amount of uncompensated losses to neighbors generally increases with the extent of passage. Q4, as compared to any point left to it, imposes more losses on neighbors and reduces the value of their land. Granted, presumably transaction costs will not be insurmountable after a statutory easement is granted to landlocked owners, and the two parties can negotiate to reduce the extent of passage to Q3, the optimal point. But it will be the

than, for instance, the frequency of landlocked owners’ using the easement. That is, landlocked owners should be able to use the prescribed passage as often as they desire.

32 Empirical studies, however, show that courts in the U.S. and administrative agencies in Taiwan often overor underestimate property value (Chang 2009; 2011).

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Access to Landlocked Land

neighbors who have to pay the landlocked owners to reduce the extent of passage. If such compensation is not paid in lump sum, but paid regularly as long as the easement lasts, this compensation, stipulated in a covenant that runs with the land, would further reduce the value of servient land.33

Even in cases where neighbors lose no subjective value from the prescribed easement, and thus MC(EV)=MC(FMV), the MR=MC formula does not always lead to the socially optimal result. My prior empirical study shows that the court often assesses fair market value inaccurately (Chang 2011). That is, the court’s perceived social costs of passage may be higher than or lower than the actual social costs. Thus, the adjudicated extent of passage will deviate from Q3. Inaccurate assessment of property value is another reason why property law should leave as much decision-making to bargaining between disputing parties as possible.

P

MC EV MC FMV

$

 

 

MR

Q (extent of passage)

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Figure 2 Marginal costs and marginal benefits of passage. MC (EV) curve represents the marginal cost of a passage if the economic value of the neighboring land is taken into account. MC (FMV) curve represents the marginal cost of a passage if only the fair market value of the neighboring land is considered. MR curve shows the marginal revenue (benefit) of a passage.

B. “Too Few” Is More Efficient Than “Too Much”

Given that fair market value is the most practicable compensation standard and can hardly be amended, it is the MR=MC formula that has to be discarded to avoid the inefficiency described above. I argue that the extent of statutory easements should

33 By the way, this result will also be undesirable from a distribution perspective, as the neighbors, who do no harm to the landlocked owners, have to incur so many losses.

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Access to Landlocked Land

be set at a point where MR>MC; to be more exact, where the slope of the marginal benefit curve (MR) drastically changes, like Q1 in Figure 2. The limited liability rule part of the hybrid rule should be interpreted as such.

While Q1 (determined by MR>MC and the change of slope of MR) is not necessarily more efficient than Q4 (determined by MR[FMV]=MC) in terms of the extent of passage, there are several reasons why a limited extent of statutory easement like Q1 (the hybrid rule) is more efficient than a “too much” statutory easement like Q4 (the liability rule). First, the uncompensated loss in Q1 is smaller than that in Q4, making neighboring land more valuable in the former situation.

Second, the accurate marginal analysis as required by MR=MC is difficult for a third-party adjudicator to implement, whereas under my proposal, the adjudicator only has to know that the marginal benefit is about to change sharply. This is an important point. Even when subjective value is zero and fair market value is accurately assessed, the adjudication cost under the hybrid rule is still lower than the liability rule.

Third, my requirement that the extent of passage has to be set at the point where the slope of MR curve drastically changes can generally ensure that the marginal social benefit of the statutory easement is high and most likely higher than the marginal social cost.34 Indeed, most economic models assume that marginal social benefits decrease smoothly. In the context of statutory easements, I believe that it is more realistic to assume that there is a turning point, over which the marginal social benefit abruptly decreases.35 Consider this example: the extent of passage increases when the landlocked owners change the manner in which they pass through the neighboring land from walking on foot, to riding a bicycle, riding a motorcycle, driving a car on a single-lane road, driving on a two-lane road, driving on a six-lane road, etc. In many (but almost certainly not all) cases, the marginal social benefit sharply decreases after the landlocked owners can drive a car on a single-lane road.36

Fourth, bargaining powers are already much balanced after a statutory easement at Q1 is granted (for a large part of the value of the landlocked land has been preserved), and transaction costs will be much lower. The two parties can negotiate

34Of course, in cases where the observable MC(FMV) curve crosses the MR curve before the latter reaches the turning point, it is more efficient for the court to set the extent of passage at MC(FMV)=MR. Nevertheless, this should only happen when the landlocked parcel is not very valuable in the first place, or when the passage across the servient land has other very high-yielding usages.

35When the MR curve is indeed smooth, the court should determine an extent of passage where a large portion of the value of the landlocked parcel has been preserved, so that future transactions are possible.

36The single lane road is just an illustration of what Q1 may be like. It is certainly not a general case. When the building on the landlocked land is a high-rise rather than a single-family house, Q1 may be better represented by a two-lane or four-lane road.

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Access to Landlocked Land

for a more expanded, optimal extent of passage at Q3. The landlocked owners have to fully compensate their neighbors to get their consent. Hence, there will be no uncompensated loss for the extent of passage between Q1 and Q3. Unlike when the law prescribes a right-of-way at Q4, the landlocked owners enjoy the benefit of passage by bearing the full cost of moving from a sub-optimal extent of passage to an optimal extent of passage.

Finally, even if no transaction between the two parties is possible at all, my proposal is still the best choice. Given that economic value is not observable to third parties, no legal rule can guarantee efficient allocation in all access cases, and no feasible rules can claim their supremacy in making the efficient allocation. My proposal at least ensures that much of the value of the landlocked land is preserved and uncompensated losses by the neighboring land are limited.

C. Necessity as MR>MC

In terms of statutory interpretations, it should not be difficult to interpret the ubiquitous “necessity” requirement in the jurisdictions discussed in this article as stipulating the extent of statutory easements at the point where the slope of the marginal benefit curve (MR) drastically changes.37 Statutory easements are used to balance the bargaining powers of the two parties; thus statutory easements are necessary only to the extent that the playing field has been leveled, but not to the extent that MR=MC. In addition, following my example above, it should be acceptable to most people that a two-lane street is no longer “necessary” once a single-lane road is in place.

Only a few jurisdictions, including Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S., explicitly allow landlocked owners to “build a road” over their neighbors’ land, if necessary, instead of just “passing through.” I argue that the necessity requirement in these statutes should be interpreted in the same way as the necessity requirement discussed above. Namely, if building a road produces high marginal social benefit and this marginal social benefit is only slightly smaller than that before the road is built,38 road construction should be considered necessary. In other words, if the marginal social benefit has sharply declined before a road is built, of course the road should not be considered necessary.

37Doctrinally, sometimes “reasonable necessity” is required and sometimes “strict necessity” is prescribed (Bruce and Ely 2011: 4:10, 4:14). This article apparently prefers a unified, economic interpretation.

38In other words, the marginal benefit of road construction has to fall on the MR curve between the original point and Q1, as shown in Figure 2.

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VI. PASSAGE LOCATION: THE LEAST DAMAGE AND OTHER RULES

In my analytical framework of statutory easements, the necessity requirement deals with social benefits of passage, and the compensation requirement enforces internalization of costs. This part discusses the third prong of the statutory easement doctrine; that is, the location of the passage, which determines the private and social costs of the passage. The doctrines regarding the passage location are diverse. As introduced above, some civil-law jurisdictions prescribe that the statutory passage has to be set so as to cause the least damage to the neighboring land, while some stipulate an even more specific rule—the shortest passage. The American states are different, emphasizing the width of the passage. Although the least damage rule has its intuitive appeal—certainly to traditional lawyers who think it is only fair to minimize the inconvenience by the neighbors, below I will argue it is not necessarily the most efficient rule. Part A will discuss this counter-intuitive point in more details. Then Part B discusses the length and width stipulations.

A. Four Prototypes: “Least Damage” Probably Most Efficient

There are four prototypical methods to determine the passage location. As shown in Table 1, first, some approaches are pro-neighbor while others give preferential treatment to the other party. In addition, there are objective and subjective approaches. Under the objective approach, a dispute over the passage location often ends up in court for the judges to determine which location causes the least damage to neighbors or produces the most benefits for landlocked owners. Under the subjective approach, the location is determined at the will of the neighbor or that of the landlocked owner. Thus, the two parties usually settle, as the court will have to defer to the choice of the entitlement holder anyway. This two-by-two matrix constitutes four methods to determine passage locations.

Table 1 Four Prototypical Methods of Determining Passage Location

 

 

Objective

Subjective

 

 

 

 

Distributional Pro-neighbor

(1) Least damage

(2)

Neighbor chooses

effects

Pro-landlocked

(3) Most benefits

(4)

Landlocked owner

 

 

owner

 

chooses

 

 

 

 

 

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Figure 3 visualizes a hypothetical example, in which a rectangle landlocked parcel is surrounded by a trapezoid of neighboring land. The landlocked owner can gain access to a public road through four locations on the neighboring land: a, b, c, and d. Table 2 is the numeric version of the example. Plans A, B, C, and D represent the costs and benefits of passing through a, b, c, and d on the neighboring parcel, respectively. Below I will use this example to demonstrate my points.

Method (1), the objective and pro-neighbor method shown in cell (1) in Table 1, and method (2), the subjective and pro-neighbor method shown in cell (2) in Table 2, will result in the same passage location, if, first, passage costs are easily verifiable; second, neighbors maximize their pecuniary interests; and, third, voluntary transactions are not possible after a statutory easement is granted. When all three of the above conditions hold, the court will always correctly identify Plan C as causing the least damage, and the neighbor will certainly choose Plan C as well. Hence, method (1) and method (2) converge.

Nevertheless, method (1) and method (2) could produce different results when any of the three conditions is violated. When the first condition does not hold, landlocked owners may be able to persuade the court that Plan B causes the least damage. If the second condition is violated, an emotional neighbor may be willing to sacrifice her personal interest just to anger the landlocked owner by choosing, say, Plan D if method (2) is the law. Finally, if future transactions are possible, under method (2), neighbors may strategically choose Plan D, to reduce the value of the statutory easement and the value of the landlocked land. In other words, if either of the latter two conditions does not hold, granting a statutory easement may still not be able to preserve much the value of the landlocked land and balance the bargaining power of the two parties. Therefore, as a whole, method (1) is probably more efficient than method (2).

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