Экзамен зачет учебный год 2023 / Sparkes, A New Land Law

registration.113 The form used to apply for first registration has a space to list transactions in order, and thus to show the conveyance before the mortgage. Only later will the buyer become registered proprietor, thus permitting entry of the mortgage on the charges register and registration of the lender as its proprietor. The security of the lender will be threatened if registration is not obtained within the two month “period for registration”.114 The legal estate is passed under the conveyance, and the buyer is able to deal with the land. Searches can be made against a potential registered title created by an application for first registration.115

3.Subsales

[9.37] A person who has a contract to buy land may sell it without first completing his purchase contract, a process known as a subsale. Two or more sales can be completed by one document, passing legal title direct from the estate owner to the ultimate buyer without any intermediate documentation, saving land registry fees116 and stamp duty.117 Thus:

Figure 9-4 A sub sale before first registration

The first contract for sale does not detonate the requirement of compulsory registration, and so it is the sub-buyer as legal estate owner under the transfer who is bound to apply for first registration.118

4.Chains of transactions

[9.38] Chains of transactions occur where land which is subject to first registration is resold while the seller’s title is still being registered at the land registry, thus:

113LRA 2002 s 7; DLRR 2003 r 35. The scheme was introduced in 1925 to make it possible to mortgage land at the time of the purchase that attracts compulsion: A Underhill (1911) 27 LQR 173, 176–177. It would now be better to adopt the same scheme as for a transfer – no legal title passing in advance of registration.

114LRA 2002 s 6(4). Time should run from the date of unconditional delivery of the conveyance: insertion of an incorrect date should not extend the period.

115DLRR 2003 r 148(2); P Sparkes [1990] NLJ 1077.

116See above at [9.30].

117JE Adams [1989] Conv 232, 317.

118LRA 2002 s 3(2).

10

ADVERSE POSSESSION

Paper title. Possession: factual and intention. Permissive occupation. Limitation. Extended limitation periods. Reform. Title derived from possession. Mechanics. Burdens. Trusts and equitable claimants. (For adverse possession against registered land see chapter 11.)

A. PAPER TITLE AGAINST SQUATTER

1.Adverse possession as theft or quasi-theft

[10.01] Proudhon said that “la propriété c’est le vol” (“Property is theft”).1 Few landowners today would view themselves as stealing from the rest of society, but a proprietor will most certainly think that a squatter who obtains title by adverse possession has “stolen” it. A person who takes adverse possession of the land and holds it for 12 years will be able to defeat the title of the dispossessed owner.2 Theft occurs only in a metaphorical sense, since the criminal law does not in fact allow land to be stolen.3 Lord Denning attempted a literal equation of adverse possession and theft in Hayward v. Challoner,4 but on this he formed a minority of one. The facts show clearly what alarmed him, and how a sound policy of avoiding the cruelty of stale claims5 can lead the courts to morally dubious decisions. Smallholdings had been let to the rector of a parish at 10s a year, but as an indulgence to the church rent was not claimed after May 1942, generosity for which the landowner was punished by loss of his title after 12 years.6 All members of the Court of Appeal criticised the conduct of the rector, but Lord Denning was alone in translating moral outrage into a ruling that the law could prevent the rector from taking the land which he knew belonged to a parishioner.

1 Qu’est-ce que la Propriété? (1840), ch 1; GB Shaw thought this the only truism; Maxims for Revolutionists, an appendix to Man and Superman.

2G Battersby, “Informally Created Rights in Land” ch 19 in Bright & Dewar, 490–494; PBH Birks “Before We Begin: Five Keys to Land Law” ch 18 in Bright & Dewar, 481; Chapelle’s LL (5th ed) ch 2; Dixon’s Principles (3rd ed), ch 11; Goo’s Sourcebook (3rd ed) ch 6; Gravells LL – Text (2nd ed), 79–104; Grays’ Elements (3rd ed), 239–282; K Green “Citizens and Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law” ch 9 in Dewar & Bright; Hopkins, Informal Acquisition, 217–250; Maudsley & Burn LL – Cases (7th ed) ch 3; Megarry & Wade (6th ed) ch 21; Panesar’s General Principles ch 8; Swadling in Birks’ Private Law, [4.554–4.558]; Smith’s Property Law (4th ed), 64–83; Thompson Modern LL ch 7.

3Theft Act 1968 s 4.

4[1968] 1 QB 107, CA; M Goodman (1968) 31 MLR 82.

5Cholmondeley v. Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1, 140, 37 ER 527, Willes CJ; A’Court v. Cross (1825) 3 Bing 329, 332, 130 ER 540, Best CJ.

6At 123, Russell LJ.

In the first edition of this work it was stated that “quasi-theft of land is relatively rare”,7 the reason given being that land is of such value that few landowners will allow a complete plot, as opposed perhaps to a boundary sliver,8 to be lost without taking action to recover it. This hostage to fortune was duly captured in Pye,9 a high-profile case widely reported in the press: the House of Lords handed 25 hectares of prime building land in Berkshire to a farmer who was making hay on it while the development company which owned the land struggled to obtain planning permission. Adverse possession of a sizeable site is only likely in a case such as this when it is standing vacant, earmarked for some future use. No doubt the Court of Appeal would have categorised this case as quasi-theft, since it decided for the developer,10 and some of the Lords felt unease at the decision they reached,11 but the farmer’s entitlement was clear, the developer’s claim impossible,12 and the family acted honourably throughout.13

Other developments that caused dissatisfaction in some quarters included the opening of a Squatters Estate Agency in Nottingham, and cases in which squatters claimed, with varying degrees of success, a number of properties left empty and unmanaged in London, particularly under the shambolic management of the public housing stock in Lambeth.14 Sneaking respect displayed in the popular press for squatters who had put one over the bureaucrats turned to outrage when those same squatters then proceeded to realise their gains by selling the properties in which they had squatted.

2.Revolution in the law of adverse possession

[10.02] Of the main legislative developments, the first is relatively low key. As part of a wide-ranging review by the Law Commission, the existing law for limitation of personal actions will be swept away and replaced by a new core regime. The Commission’s report and draft Bill15 propose only modest adjustments to the regime applied to land, but the second change could not be more radical. The Land Registration Act 2002,16 also emanating from the work of the Commission,17 provides that for the future18 a registered proprietor will not face the loss of his registered title until he has been given notice that an adverse possessor is claiming to have been in possession of the land for more than 10 years; a proprietor will only be stripped of his title against his will if he remains inactive for a further two years after receiving

7P Sparkes NLL (1st ed), 678.

8Plimmer v. Pearson (2000) 79 P & CR D21, D22, Robert Walker LJ (3” sliver).

9JA Pye (Oxford) v. Graham [2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865 (hereafter “Pye”).

10[2001] Ch 804, CA.

11Pye [2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865, [1–2], Lord Bingham.

12Pye at [61], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

13Pye at [2], Lord Bingham.

14Ellis v. Lambeth LBC (2000) 32 HLR 596, CA; Lambeth LBC v. Archangel [2002] 1 P & CR 18 at 230, CA (a performance poet who had acknowledged the council’s title); Lambeth LBC v. Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912, (2001) 33 HLR 74, CA; Battersea Freehold & Leasehold Co v. Wandsworth LBC [2001] 2 EGLR 75, Rimer J.

15Law Com 270 (2001).

16LRA 2002 part 9, ss 96–98 and sch 6.

17Law Com 271 (2001), part XIV.

18Vested rights acquired before the implementation of the legislation will be preserved.

that notice. In practice, therefore, registered titles will be immune from adverse possessors in all but the most extreme circumstances. Unregistered and registered land law are no longer aligned, so that three mechanisms for limitation require exposition, applying respectively to unregistered land, registered titles up until 2003, and the 2002 scheme. Reader must be left to judge, as this tale unfolds,19 just how this radical change will work out in practice.

B. FACTUAL POSSESSION

1.True owners and squatters

[10.03] Title to unregistered land is barred under the Limitation Act 1980 after someone has taken adverse possession of land against the true owner for the statutory limitation period and the same quality of possession is relevant to the operation of the new machinery for registered land.20 It is easiest to think, at least at first, of two known characters, a squatter moving in to oust a “true” or “paper” owner who can show a registered or paper title.21 To negate this title the squatter must prove over a limitation period that he held (1) factual possession, with (2) the intention to possess.

2.Possession that is adverse

[10.04] Only one person or group of co-owners22 has possession at any one time.23 Adverse possession must be held against the interest of the paper owner,24 since possession cannot be shared between the paper owner and a person intruding.25 It need not necessarily inconvenience the paper owner, since anyone actually incommoded would be goaded into taking legal action,26 so possession can be “adverse” without any suggestion of aggression, hostility or subterfuge on the part of the squatter.27

Possession involves the exercise of exclusive control over a thing for oneself, the full use of an owner.28 The squatter may possibly only use part29 but he must certainly occupy to the exclusion of everyone else, that is the rest of the world as well as the owner. A person who occupied a bombed out pub site but then allowed neighbouring

19Registration mechanics are considered below [11.13ff].

20Pye at [68], Lord Hope; see below [11.19].

21Powell v. McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, 470, Slade J; this statement of the law “cannot be improved”: Pye at [31], Lord Browne-Wilkinson. However if a person holds lawful possession (eg as tenant) but fails to return the land, it is not necessary to satisfy Slade J’s tests – the question is merely whether there has been a dispossession: Williams v. Jones [2002] EWCA Civ 1097, [2002] 40 EG 169.

22For the unity of possession between co-owners, see below [16.01].

23Pye at [70], Lord Hope.

24Latin corpus possessionis.

25Powell v. McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, 470, Slade J (“conclusive” should read “exclusive”); Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 640H–641E, Slade LJ; approved in Pye at [41], Lord BrowneWilkinson.

26Treloar v. Nute [1976] 1 WLR 1295, 1302E, Sir John Pennycuick.

27Pye at [69], Lord Hope.

28H Bond (1890) 6 LQR 259, 270; Pye at [70], Lord Hope, [75–76], Lord Hutton.

29West Bank Estates v. Arthur [1967] 1 AC 665, PC; Pavledes v. Ryesbridge Properties (1989) 58 P & CR 459, Knox J (not small scale parking on part).

tenants to have keys to the site showed by allowing others to have access that he had no intention to hold exclusive possession himself.30 Acts of exclusion are required: a declaration of intent however plain will not on its own amount to possession.31

3.Possession of buildings

[10.05] Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control, but what is appropriate must, as Slade J has said,32 depend on the circumstances, “in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed.” It is usually self-evident when possession is taken of a building, for someone will be working from a suite of offices,33 or living in a house,34 and a true owner can sense his exclusion when he sees that a squatter has padlocked the front door.35

4.Open land

[10.06] Reported cases usually concern open land. JA Pye (Oxford) v. Graham36 involved 25 hectares of potential building land near Newbury adjoining the Graham’s farm. At first the Grahams occupied this additional land under a grazing licence, but after September 1984 this licence was not renewed and they occupied it as if owners. They padlocked the only access, farmed the land as if it was a part of their farm, harrowing, rolling and liming the land37 before stocking it with up to 140 cattle, and they trimmed the hedges. An owner would not have done anything more.38

Possession may be more difficult to prove if the land is open, so one might turn to acts such as shooting,39 fishing,40 or reaping a harvest of wheat;41 land in the wilds of Canada can be possessed simply by paying tax on it.42 Erection of no parking signs, or even active steps to prevent parking, is not sufficient in the absence of fencing.43 Conversely, enclosure is strong evidence of adverse possession,44 certainly by padlocking the sole access,45 though possibly even by erecting corner posts46 though any fencing must have some degree of permanence. Fencing to keep in stock failed on the

30Battersea Freehold & Leasehold Co v. Wandsworth LBC [2001] 2 EGLR 75, Rimer J.

31Simpson v. Fergus (2000) 79 P & CR 398, 402, Robert Walker LJ.

32Powell v. McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452.

33Mount Carmel Investments v. Peter Thurlow [1988] 1 WLR 1078, 1082.

34BP Properties v. Buckler (1987) 55 P & CR 337.

35Lambeth LBC v. Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912, (2001) 33 HLR 74.

36[2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865, [6–24], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

37On cultivation: Jones v. Williams (1837) 2 M & W 326, 150 ER 78.

38Pye at [19]. Paper acts by the developer were not relevant since they were not in possession.

39Red House Farms case [1977] 2 EGLR 125, CA.

40Lord Advocate v. Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App Cas 273, Lord Blackburn; Beaufort v. John Aird & Co

(1904) 20 TLR 602 (Wye fishery).

41Cadija Umma v. S Don Manis Appu [1939] AC 136, PC; Powell v. McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, 471, Slade J.

42Kirby v. Cowderoy [1912] AC 599, PC.

43Simpson v. Fergus (2000) 79 P & CR 398, CA.

44Williams v. Usherwood (1981) 45 P & CR 235, CA; M Dockray [1983] Conv 398; HW Wilkinson (1984) 134 NLJ 144.

45Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 641B–C, Slade LJ.

46Wuta-Ofei v. Danquah [1961] 1 WLR 1238, PC; RE Megarry (1961) 77 LQR 481.

facts of Batt v. Adams47 to demonstrate the intention to exclude others. Treloar v. Nute48 involved acts said to lie on the borderline of what could constitute (adverse) possession; a buyer who wrongly thought that a derelict plot of 1/7th an acre was included with his garden grazed three animals and filled a gulley with spoil, the latter being the more important act. On the other hand,49 placing an oil tank on the land and planting shrubs and trees was more than enough. Prudential Assurance Co v. Waterloo Real Estate50 shows that it is possible to take adverse possession of a party wall by repairing it and by including the wall in a grant of a lease.

Fleeting acts do not count to create a title. Fencing for one day is not sufficient.51 In Marsden v. Miller52 a plot of land between two houses was originally the site of a derelict cottage with an unknown owner. Both neighbours made limited use of it. Successive owners of No 3 Preston Nook had used it for access to their garage, parking, hanging out washing and keeping hens, acts which were insufficient to establish title. The neighbours at No 2 also hung out their washing, played games and parked on it. In 1981 workmen employed by the owner of No 3 erected a fence with a notice claiming possession of the land, but this lasted for only one day before being removed by the owners of No 2. The application three years later for a declaration of ownership was hopeless. Also equivocal is minimal grazing by goats53 or irregular parking.54

5.Illegality as a defence

[10.07] Possession which is illegal should not create adverse possession by analogy with the rule for prescription55 – for example where there is a case of criminal trespass on defence land. However, failure by a squatter to pay rates or community charge is not a sufficient illegality.56

C. INTENTION TO POSSESS

1.How to prove intention

[10.08] Possession is assumed to reside with the holder of the paper title.57 Where someone else claims to be in possession that person, the squatter, must pass tests in Powell v. McFarlane.58 Acts of possession must be supported by an intention to

47[2001] 2 EGLR 92, Laddie J.

48[1976] 1 WLR 1295, CA.

49Green v. Wheatley [1999] May 19th, CA.

50[1999] 2 EGLR 85, CA (7 metre stretch of wall in Knightsbridge with a paper title back to 1710).

51Marsden v. Miller (1992) 64 P & CR 239, CA; Bills v. Fernandez-Gonzalez (1981) 132 NLJ 66, CA; Wilson v. Martin’s Executors [1993] 1 EGLR 178, CA (cutting timber, repairing fence).

52(1992) 64 P & CR 239, CA; Daniells v. Mendonca (1999) 78 P & CR 401, CA.

53Boosey v. Davis (1988) 55 P & CR 83, CA.

54Pavledes v. Ryebridge Properties (1989) 58 P & CR 459, Knox J; Pulleyn v. Hall Aggregates (1992) 65 P & CR 276, CA; Williams v. Usherwood (1981) 45 P & CR 235, CA.

55See below [36.16].

56Ellis v. Lambeth LBC (2000) 32 HLR 596, CA.

57Pye at [40], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

58(1979) 38 P & CR 452, 471–472, Slade J; approved in Pye at [31], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

possess.59 Acts of the mind can often only be demonstrated by acts of the body.60 In other words, the requisite intention has to be deduced from the evidence of unequivocal acts61 – controlling access,62 leaving the owner to squeeze through a hedge to get to his field,63 or enclosure.64

2.What intention?

[10.09] What is required is now much clearer as a result of the exhaustive review conducted by the House of Lords in Pye.65 The intention to be shown by a squatter is to exclude the paper owner and the rest of the world, to the extent that is reasonably practicable and so far as the law allows.66 He must also intend to exclude the rest of the world. It is the intention of the squatter that matters,67 and not that of the true owner, who indeed may be wholly unaware of the occupier.68

Although older authorities suggested that an intention to own the land was required,69 the squatter is likely to be aware that he is not the owner,70 but the relevant intention is to possess the land.71 A squatter may hold adverse possession while mistakenly believing that he is paying rent,72 or when he admits that he will be bound to leave the land when it is required for some future use.73

3.Proof of intention in Pye

[10.10] The facts in JA Pye (Oxford) v. Graham provoked considerable judicial disagreement. The squatters having succeeded before the trial judge,74 lost in the

59 Latin animus possidendi; Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 641E–644, Slade LJ; K Green, “Citizens & Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law” ch 9 in Bright & Dewar, 235–241.

60Pye at [70], Lord Hope.

61Tecbild v. Chamberlain (1969) 20 P & CR 633, 642, Sachs LJ.

62Wallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp v. Shell-Mex & BP [1975] QB 94, 106, Stamp LJ.

63Marshall v. Taylor [1895] 1 Ch 641, 645, Halsbury LC.

64Seddon v. Smith (1877) 36 LT 168, 169; George Wimpey & Co v. Sohn [1967] Ch 487, 511; Leigh v. Jack (1879) 5 Ex D 264, 271.

65JA Pye (Oxford) v. Graham [2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865.

66Powell v. McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, 471–472, Slade J; P Jackson (1980) 96 LQR 38; BP Properties v. Buckler (1987) 55 P & CR 337, 343, Dillon LJ; Pye at [42], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

67Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 644D–E, Nourse LJ; Pye at [32], Lord BrowneWilkinson.

68Red House Farms (Thorndon) v. Catchpole [1977] 2 EGLR 125, CA; Wilson v. Martin’s Executors

[1993] 1 EGLR 178, 180L, Ralph Gibson LJ; MJ Goodman (1970) 33 MLR 281; Law Com 271 (2001), [14.5].

69Littledale v. Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, 23; George Wimpey & Co v. Sohn [1967] Ch 487, 510;

Hughes v. Griffin [1969] 1 WLR 23, 28F, Harman LJ.

70Ocean Estates v. Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19, PC; M Dockray [1982] Conv 256, 345; Prudential Assurance Co v. Waterloo Real Estate [1999] 2 EGLR 85, 87E–K.

71Powell v. McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, 471; Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 643, CA; Pye at [42], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

72Lodge v. Wakefield MBC [1995] 2 EGLR 124 CA.

73Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, CA.

74[2000] Ch 676, Neuberger J.

Court of Appeal,75 but their victory was restored in the Lords.76 Those judges who ruled in favour of the squatters did express some reservations about that decision.77

Pye bought land adjoining the Grahams’ farm, intending to seek residential planning permission. In February 1983 a grazing licence was entered into but this expired that December. Although there was no physical change in the nature of the occupation, its legal character changed.78 On August 31st 1984 Graham bought a cut of grass from the land for £1100. Pye then wanted the land vacant as that was believed to assist the planning application. From that date the Grahams were in possession adverse to the developer’s title. It made no difference that Graham indicated in evidence that he would have paid for his use of the land had he been approached for payment:79 any candid squatter would admit has much if asked, but possession can be adverse until a request for payment is made.80

4.Earmarked land

[10.11] Pye makes quite clear the irrelevance, once a paper owner has lost possession, of the fact that he had plans for the land, that it had been earmarked it for some future use. In Pye the intention was to build on the land when planning permission was obtained, but many other cases have involved strips of land set aside for road widening. In some cases it was implied that the true owner granted a licence for the use of strips earmarked for future roads.81 These cases undermined the policy of securing titles by possession by proof of 15 years’ exclusive possession of land,82 and so were reversed by statute83 and Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran84 shows that 12 years possession of an earmarked strip will now effect a change of ownership. Adverse possession is determined from the quality of the intruder’s possession without consideration being given to the paper owner’s intended future uses.85

Earmarking may make it more difficult to prove both factual possession and the intention to exclude the world.86 Trivial acts of ownership by the paper owner may prevent the possession of a squatter being seen as adverse.87 In Leigh v. Jack,88 Jack

75[2001] Ch 804, CA.

76[2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865; W Batstone [2002] NLJ 1234; PH Kenny [2002] Conv 429; O Rhys [2002] Conv 470; MP Thompson [2002] Conv 480.

77Pye at [1], Lord Bingham.

78Pye at [55–58], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

79Pye at [46]; Lambeth LBC v. Blackburn [2001] EWCA Civ 912, (2001) 33 HLR 74.

80Pye at [46], Lord Browne-Wilkinson; he doubted R v. SS for Environment ex parte Davies (1990) 61 P & CR 487, CA.

81Leigh v. Jack (1879) 5 Ex D 264; Wallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp v. Shell-Mex and BP [1975] QB 94, CA. Wider dicta in the former and the decision in the latter were overruled by Pye at [32], Lord BrowneWilkinson.

82Ramnarace v. Lutchman [2001] UKPC 25, [2001] 1 WLR 651, [13] Lord Millett; Buckinghamshire CC

v.Moran [1990] Ch 623, 639C–640F, Slade LJ; G McCormack [1986] Conv 434; G McCormack [1989] Conv 211, 212; JA Omolota (1974) 38 Conv (NS) 172.

83Limitation Act 1980 sch 1 para 8(4); M Dockray [1982] Conv 345. This will be replicated under the new proposals: Law Com 270 (2001); Draft Limitation Bill 2001 sch 1 para 1(8)–(9).

84[1990] Ch 623, CA; G McCormack [1989] Conv 211; C Harpum [1990] CLJ 23; Hounslow LBC v. Minchinton (1997) 74 P & CR 221 CA.

85L Tee [2000] Conv 113; O Radley Gardner & C Harpum [2001] Conv 155; L Tee [2002] Conv 56.

86Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 639H–640A, Slade LJ.

87Wallis’s case [1975] QB 94, 109–110, Stamp LJ dissenting.

88(1879) 5 Ex D 264.

acquired factories on either side of a strip of land reserved for the site of a proposed street, but he blocked the way to pedestrians with piles of materials destined for use at his factories, and later on the road site was fenced and blocked off. Although this use continued for the 20 year limitation period (under the law at that time) Leigh preserved his paper title by carrying out work on the fence.89

D. PERMISSIVE OCCUPATION

1.Exercise of property rights

[10.12] Possession is never adverse if it is enjoyed under a lawful title,90 whether a lease, trust, agency, easement91 or profit, or where a purchaser is allowed possession of land under a contract before completion.92

2.Licence

[10.13] Acts done by permission of a paper owner do not exclude him.93 Occupation held under an express informal licence as from 1974 was not adverse.94 A licence could protect the owner indefinitely.95 Since 1980, a tenancy at will has had the same effect.96 It is a question of fact when the licence or tenancy at will is actually terminated,97 and as from that time limitation can begin to operate.

3.No licence from earmarking

[10.14] A licence may be implied. This should not be simply because the land is earmarked by its owner for some future purpose such as a building site or a road.98 The

89Pye at [45], Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

90Thomas v. Thomas (1855) 2 K & J 79, 83, 69 ER 701, Page Wood V-C; Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 636G; Cobb v. Lane [1952] 1 All ER 1199; British Railways Board v. GJ Holdings (1974) 230 EC 973, CA; Wallis’s [1975] QB 94, 103G, Lord Denning MR; Hughes v. Griffin [1969] 1 WLR 23, 30A, Harman LJ; (1969) 85 LQR 170.

91Williams v. Usherwood (1981) 45 P & CR 235, CA; M Dockray [1983] Conv 398; Bath & NE Somerset DC v. Nicholson [2002] 10 EG 156 (CS).

92Hyde v. Pearce [1982] 1 WLR 560; M Dockray (1983) 46 MLR 89; JE Martin [1982] Conv 383; contrast Bridges v. Mees [1957] Ch 475, Harman J (after purchase money paid).

93Doe d Thompson v. Clark (1828) 8 B & C 717, 108 ER 1209.

94BP Properties v. Buckler (1988) 55 P & CR 337; HW Wilkinson (1988) 138 NLJ 238; H Wallace [1994] Conv 196; Wallis’s case [1975] QB 94, CA.

95Cobb v. Lane [1952] 1 All ER 1199; Hughes v. Griffin [1969] 1 WLR 23, CA; Heslop v. Burns [1974] 1 WLR 1241 CA.

96A tenancy at will is no longer deemed to terminate after a year: Limitation Act 1980 s 9; contrast Ramnarace v. Lutchman [2001] UKPC 25, [2001] 1 WLR 1651.

97Hyde v. Pearce [1982] 1 WLR 560 (purchaser’s licence revoked by request for return of keys; occupation still permissive under contract). Contrast Foster v. Robinson [1951] 1 KB 149, CA (life interest) and Palfrey v. Palfrey (1974) 229 EG 1593 (oral gift so adverse possession); ER Ives Investment v. High [1967] 2 QB 379, 398G, Danckwerts LJ (indefinite).

98Limitation Act 1980 sch 1 para 8(4); M Dockray [1982] Conv 345; Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran [1990] Ch 623, 639C–640F, Slade LJ; G McCormack [1986] Conv 434; G McCormack [1989] Conv 211, 212; JA Omolota (1974) 38 Conv (NS) 172; Hounslow LBC v. Minchinton (1997) 74 P & CR 221, CA; Pye at [44–45], Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See above [10.11].