Экзамен зачет учебный год 2023 / Dickerman, Land Registration in Africa

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been as high as some experts, including Comaroff, accept. Moreover, he insists that social and geographical factors rather than favorable physical conditions have been behind this success.

Perhaps the most critical factor is the unusual settlement pattern in the area, which dates from 1933. Before then, agriculture had been characterized by a pattern of seasonal migration. This pattern had ended in 1933, when an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease had caused farmers to live closer to their fields and grazing areas. The. new dispersed settlement pattern proved more efficient. And because farmers were more scattered than before, after 1948 it became the practice for farmers to control the timing of plowing and planting on an individual basis rather than to wait until the chief gave the signal for all to begin. In addition, the Barolong farmers had the example of the Boer farms in front of them, which provided experience of good agricultural practices.

Recent developments, however, call into question whether the Barolong Farms will continue to be as productive. The land shortage has created conflicts between agricultural and grazing activities, a problem which Staps considers can only be solved by giving priority to agriculture. Another change which may threaten the high levels of production is the fact that the chief has recently reorganized the area into 5 wards; this new structure may change the settlement pattern once again as people begin to live in villages at greater distances from their fields. If this were to happen, Staps believes that agricultural production may fall.

A further look at Barolong agriculture and the implications of the different interpretations of Comaroff and Staps is provided in the following collection:

B07 Ntseane, Peggy, Deepa Narayan-Parker, Paul Heisey, and John Comaroff. Barolong Agriculture Reconsidered: Agriculture and Planning in the Southern District Communal First Development Area. Gaborone: Applied Research Unit, Ministry of Government and Lands, 1983.

The first two papers in the collection, those of Ntseane and NarayanParker, present the results of surveys done in 1981 in the Southern District; Ntseane discusses the findings of an extensive study carried out in Kgoro village in Barolong Farms, while Narayan-Parker compares data from two Barolong villages with data from two nearby Ngwaketse villages. Ntseane's findings support Comaroff's contention that one cannot lump small traditional farmers into a single category, but must rather consider a range of sub-groups, each with different sets of needs and constraints that must be taken into account in planning programs. Narayan-Parker's comparison shows that the causes of Barolong agricultural success are difficult to pinpoint. Her data underscore the contention that agriculture is a more important activity in Barolong than elsewhere, but fail to discern its basis.

The papers by Heisey and Comaroff are more analytical in their focus and contribute to the debate about the causes and implications of Barolong agricultural success. Heisey does not focus on the extent to which the land tenure system has led to Barolong's prosperity, but rather questions whether there has actually been as much agricultural growth in Barolong Farms as claimed. For him, the important questions are: How different are the

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Barolong Farms? and Should they be held up as an example for the rest of Botswana, or does the success raise issues of social equity and employment opportunities that cannot be ignored? Heisey contends that there may be less of an agricultural miracle than Comaroff asserts and suggests that there is a need to investigate investment patterns of Barolong farmers. He argues that the single most important factor in raising agricultural production is timely access to draught power. The most successful farmers are those who are able to invest in implements, and access to the necessary capital and income, often acquired off-farm, has provided the opportunity for the fortunate few. Like Ntseane, Heisey insists that development programs must take into account the often varying needs and capacities of the different levels of farmers and make an effort to see that they benefit the smaller as well as the larger farmers.

Comaroff's paper is a rejoinder to both Staps and Heisey, and he argues that it is inappropriate to hold Barolong Farms up as an example that can be replicated elsewhere. Barolong Farms' agricultural success is the product of a complex interaction between external causes and internal structures, and one cannot focus on the surface indicators while ignoring the structural dynamics. Nor can one label the changes that have occurred as "modernization" or "development"; Comaroff insists that to do so distorts the reality of has happened. He also stands by the figures on agricultural production in the 1970s presented in his earlier paper (see BO5, above) on Barolong Farms. Subsequent events have led to a fall in production levels as successful farmers have diversified and invested in extra-agricultural enterprises. This leads Comaroff to argue that the changes in Barolong agriculture fall into two distinct phases. In the initial phase, which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, improved techniques and opportunities were apparently (his emphasis) open to all and resulted in substantial increases in agricultural productivity. These increases in production, however, were accompanied by several less desirable results, including uneven capital accumulation and fragmentation of the peasantry, scarcity of previously abundant resources (such as land), and privatization and commercialization of exchange rela-

tions (including land transactions). A second stage, which has occurred since Comaroff's initial research in the mid-1970s, is marked by increasing socioeconomic polarization among the population, with the wealthier individuals consolidating their positions and moving their accumulated wealth into other, non-agricultural enterprises. Lower levels of production currently found in Barolong Farms are the expression of this diversification (pp. 124-125). Comaroff thus argues that what has occurred in Barolong cannot and should not be held up as an example for agricultural development elsewhere in the country.

Since independence (in 1966), Government policy has been to extend leaseholds to other rural areas in order to encourage development rather than to create additional freehold. The following White Paper discusses the need for creation of individual tenure in the grazing areas and outlines the new Tribal Grazing Land Policy to be adopted.

BO8 Botswana. National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land. Government Paper No. 2 of 1975. Gaborone, July 1975.

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The Government's Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) represents an attempt to deal with problems of overstocked and overgrazed communal lands, widening disparities in rural incomes, and inequitable distribution of resources such as water while at the same encouraging commercial livestock production and keeping to Government policy of not creating additional freehold land. The TGLP rests on the argument that when land is held communally there is little or no incentive for individual livestock owners to conserve resources, an assumption known as the "tragedy of the commons" theory. The only way to break this cycle of ever declining yields and worsening range quality, the TGLP reasons, is through the establishment of a new system of land allocation and management.

At the center of this new policy are the Tribal Land Boards, which are to undertake systematic surveys of the land and water resources under their supervision and divide them into three zones: Commercial Farming Areas (CFAs), Communal Grazing Areas, and Reserved Areas. The last are to be set aside for future needs, while the communal areas are, for all intents and purposes, those already in use as such. Commercial Farming Areas are to be established in those remaining areas suitable for development as grazing areas but not already in use or significantly populated. The CFAs are then to be allocated by the Land Boards to groups or individuals with adequate resources of livestock and capital for commercial development. Leases on these lands are to be for fifty years, long enough to allow the leaseholders to recover their investment and obtain a reasonable profit. They are also to be inheritable, renewable, and, to a limited extent, transferrable; the land may also be subdivided or sublet, subject to Land Board approval.

The policy envisions that by guaranteeing certain groups or individuals exclusive rights to particular tracts of land, these individuals will not only conserve the land, but even improve it through construction of fencing and piped water systems. At the same time, the policy hopes to remove from the communal areas those individuals whose larger herds and better resources have put them in a more favorable position than the average stockholder and who have been most likely to benefit disproportionately from resources in-tended to for the entire community. In this way, it is hoped that communal grazing lands will be made more communal than at present and that, by the removal of the largest stockholders (and their herds), land now overgrazed will be rehabilitated.

Reaction to the TGLP, with its emphasis on commercial development through privatization of land holdings, has been mixed. A particularly interesting and thoughtful analysis of the implications of the TGLP is the following essay by Robert Hitchcock, employed as a rural sociologist by the Government of Botswana at the time.

B09 Hitchcock, Robert K. "Tradition, Social Justice and Land Reform in Central Botswana." In Land Reform in the Making; Tradition, Public Policy and Ideology in Botswana, edited by Richard P. Werbner, pp. 1-34. London: Rex Collings, 1982.

Hitchcock outlines some of the goals of the TGLP and then moves on to discuss the extent to which they are realistic and the range of unforeseen

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consequences he believes the policy will have. Especially useful is his summary of the TGLP is a table giving the location and extent of the areas designated as commercial development areas under the policy (p. 15). These are:

The stated goals of TGLP fall into three categories: economic, ecological, and social, but in each category, Hitchcock believes, planners have exaggerated or misinterpreted what the results will be. Although it has

been claimed that the new commercial ranches that will be created will be more profitable, Hitchcock is of the opinion that the potential profits have been overestimated. So too have been the ecological benefits that are ex-

pected from the TGLP. According to the author, the customary system of communal grazing was not as damaging to the environment as has been charged, and the old system, in fact, did have mechanisms for controlling the numbers of cattle and the location of cattle posts. Moreover, fencing in the commercial areas will

Hitchcock expects will go beyond simple commercialization of the cattle industry. Although the policy makes provision for compensation for cattle owners who will be moved out of the commercial areas, it both underestimates the size of this population and fails to provide for individuals who have no livestock. Hitchcock agrees with the comment of the Ngwato Board that "asking people to move out of commercial areas . . . has become notoriously

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known as the Government's way of removing the poor from the rich man's land" (p. 16), and his prediction is that the policy may lead to the creation of a substantial number of landless people in Botswana. Communal areas will become even more crowded as livestock owners are moved into them from the commercial areas. Even more severe are the consequences of the policy for huntergatherers, such as the Sarwa, whose nomadism, it has been decided, precludes their laying claim or possessing rights to specific areas of land. (Hitchcock argues that this is false, and. that there is the concept of territoriality among such groups.)

Nor is it likely that establishment of the ranches will increase employment opportunities. Citing evidence from the Ghanzi ranches (see Russell and Russell, BO1, above) and other areas of commercialized production, Hitchcock asserts that employment of local residents will actually fall as employers bring in skilled workers from outside the area. Other, less formal relations

contracts will become increasingly monetarized as owners themselves face the need to raise cash for various fees such as annual rents. (Annual rental fees are actually rather low, approximately 256 Pula, about $300 in 1982, for a 6,400-hectare ranch.) Again referring to evidence from the Ghanzi ranches, Hitchcock suggests that a class of squatters is likely to be created, an underclass with neither land, livestock, or skills. In addition, he predicts that the commercialization of stock-raising will bring about changes in diet (with milk becoming a less common element of people's diets), in transportation and land cultivation (as cattle are less often used to pull carts or for draught), and in social mobility (with labor more often paid in cash than in cattle, as in the past, and serving to limit an individual's chance to build up a herd). Hitchcock's conclusion is that the TGLP is based on a mirage that the Kalahari is a vast area of open spaces, of great ranges ready for commercial development and virtually empty of people, and this misconception is at the root of the many problems he believes the TGLP will create in the future.

Hitchcock's expectations (and warnings) regarding the TGLP are especially interesting in light of the following study done in 1980 of commercial ranches in the Ngwaketse First Development Area in Southern District.

BO10 Botswana. Commission of Inquiry into the Allocation of Ngwaketse First Development Area Ranches. Report of the Commission of Inquiry... and Government's Decision on the Recommendations of the Commission. Gaborone, December 1981.

The Commission's mandate was to inquire into the allocation and operations of commercial ranches in the Ngwaketse First Development Area, as provided for in the Tribal Grazing Land Policy. In its investigations it looked into the allocation, ownership, infrastructure (including boreholes and fencing), and stock levels of fifteen ranches first established in March 1979.

Of the fifteen ranches, three could not be allocated because there were already a number of people living on the land and having claim to it. For

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the allocation of the twelve remaining ranches, preference was given to applications according to the following priorities: (1) first claim went to an individual who already had an established borehole and was ranching the

not as yet done so successfully; (3) third priority was to go to people who had applied for a place to drill a borehole but who had not yet been granted such a place; and (4) fourth claim was to go to individuals who had grouped themselves into syndicates. The Commission, in looking over the original applications and the records of the allocation procedure, noted that many of the files were incomplete or incorrectly filled in and that the assets of the applicants had only been partially verified. Later investigation by the Commission revealed that only six of the applicants had probably held the requisite 350 livestock units at the time of application and that several had misrepresented ownership of other assets (such as vehicles and savings) as well. In addition, the Commission noted that none of the borehole owners had made claims to land at the Allocation Hearing, leading them to conclude that borehole owners had been notified privately in advance of the hearing that they would be allocated ranches. The allocation process was thus flawed and failed to follow the rules that had been laid down.

One individual's name recurred often in the Commission's investigations. This was a brother of the president, who himself was allocated a ranch; who also had several employees who had grouped themselves together to apply for and receive ranches; who entered into an agreement with the local chief to develop a ranch allocated to the chief (who had neither the time, funds, or livestock himself); who found a driller and organized borehole drilling, formed a fencing team and organized fencing, and devised a method for cutting boundaries; and who acted as a loan bank for poorer recipients. Although the Commission is quite lenient in its evaluation of this individual's role, concluding that the development of the various farms would not be as far ahead without his assistance, it is also clear that this one person stands in a position to benefit disproportionately from the allocations. To date, however, his relationship to some of the other, less well-off ranchers is very much one of patron and client.

Hitchcock asserts that this kind of interaction is likely to decline, but at least between the better-off and poorer leaseholders it has actually been strengthened. Some of Hitchcock's other, more dire predictions concerning relations between the leaseholders and the landless do not appear to have been fulfilled as yet, although it may well be too soon to judge. A more general discussion of the results of the TGLP is found in the following thesis.

BO11 Mathuba, Botshelo M. "Customary and Modern Land Tenure Systems in Botswana." M.A. thesis, University of Wis- consin-Madison, 1982.

Mathuba provides an overview of what has occurred around the country in the implementation of the TGLP and makes suggestions for needed changes in the policy (pp. 166-80). As with the study of Southern District (see B010, above), her findings are especially valuable in light of Hitchcock's reservations about TGLP.

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As originally proposed in the TGLP, some 900 commercial ranches were to be established around Botswana, covering roughly 10 percent of the country. By the end of 1980, however, progress had been much slower than expected: only 250 ranches had been demarcated, and of these only 110 had been allocated. The slow progress is due to several factors. As Hitchcock predicted, it has been found that areas to be zoned for commercial ranches are not as underpopulated as originally assumed; individuals had drilled boreholes in these areas in the past and were grazing their herds there. On the one hand, this has meant that more occupants of the areas will have to be moved

and compensated for their losses than originally anticipated; alternative

grazing land and service centers will also have to be provided for them. On the other, it has meant that fewer large herd owners have been moved out of

the communal areas onto commercial ranches. Because TGLP regulations state that first preference in allocating ranches is to be given to the borehole owners, there have been fewer ranches than anticipated to be to allocated to individuals not already resident. Another complication that may prove espe-

cially problematic in the future is that in some instances the zoning process has set aside too little land for the expansion of neighboring villages. Traditional rights to cutting grass, grazing, and hunting in what are now commercial areas--which would have acted to relieve pressure on land in the past--will be extinguished. (For a similar set of problems with freehold areas, see Fortmann, in BO2, above.)

Implementation of the TGLP has also raisea new questions about the distribution of the benefits of the policy. Cattle ownership is highly skewed, with (not surprisingly) the largest herds held by the wealthiest individuals. Because rents for the ranches are set at very low levels, it is these indi- viduals who will benefit disproportionately from the new policy rather than the country as a whole. Other problems have occurred because those remaining in the communal areas have been reluctant to accept the limits placed on herd size. The communal areas are thus less likely to recover quickly from the effects of overgrazing than had been planned. Another factor that has pre-vented the reduction of herds in the communal areas is that in many areas land boards have reluctant to allocate individuals more than one ranch, regardless of how large their herds may be. The result is that those individuals whose herds exceed the carrying capacity of the new ranches may leave their excess livestock in the communal areas, which remain as overstocked as ever.

Mathuba stresses that the process of consultation between policy planners and local inhabitants must continue and that there must be monitoring of income distribution and conservation. She also recommends several changes in the TGLP. Perhaps most crucial is the need to dezone some areas set aside for commercial development with the object of providing additional land for future village expansion. Rent levels for the commercial ranches should also be raised to economic levels with the goal of distributing the benefits of TGLP more equitably. And finally, Mathuba suggests that the Ministry of Agriculture be allocated the necessary funding and staff to supervise the ranching operations more closely to encourage conservation and prevent these areas from becoming overgrazed like the communal areas.

A very critical assessment of the TGLP is provided in the following evaluation of the 1981 World Bank-financed livestock project

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in Botswana, which has provided large amounts of credit to TGLP leaseholders through the National Development Bank. The authors' judgment on the TGLP is a very harsh one, in regards to both the general objectives of the policy and its implementation--indeed, their report was considered sufficiently sensitive that its findings were not made public until they were leaked to and published by the newspapers.

BO12 Bekure, Solomon, and Neville Dyson-Hudson. The Operation and Viability of the Second Livestock Development Project (1497-BT): Selected Issues. Gaborone: Ministry of Agriculture, 1982.

According to Bekure and Dyson-Hudson, the TGLP is a package of conflicting goals which contains few hints as to which objectives are to receive priority over the others. While it makes explicit the right of each citizen to adequate land to support himself and his family, it also insists that wealthier citizens must be given incentives in the form of exclusive rights to land to encourage their investment in commercial livestock production. In order to induce owners of large herds to remove their livestock from the overgrazed communal ranges, these individuals are to be allocated leases to newly demarcated commercial ranches. The amount of land that can be allocated to any one individual is not unlimited, however, and thus will not necessarily be sufficient for the largest herds. Moreover, commercial ranches apparently will not receive priority in land allocation and are to be demarcated in those areas not allocated for communal use or as reserved areas. Perhaps the most unrealistic aspect of the policy, according to the authors, is the assumption that there are significant areas of uninhabitated land that can be set aside for commercial ranching. (One estimate is that 10-20,000 people were dispossessed by the demarcation of the first 300 ranches.) As the authors remark, "The whole is at best a complicated balancing act which is dubious as a proposal for even one given point in time" (p. 3).

While the District Land Boards, charged with supervising the demarcation and allocation of the ranches, have responded in different ways to the challenge of implementing the TGLP in their particular jurisdictions, the authors found that several features were common to all their operations. First, because of a lack of experience, they have moved slowly. Second, their responsibilities have been poorly coordinated by the Ministry of Local Government and Lands (MLGL), which has failed to provide adequate direction for them. There is a critical need for the MLGL to formulate a clear national policy with regard to land issues, to set priorities for the Land Boards to follow, and to act upon the thorny issues of the need for higher rents and the enforcement of herd size limits. Finally, the often-voiced apprehension that Land Boards would act almost exclusively in the interests of the elite has not been borne out; their operations have not been dominated by either local or national elites, but have proven responsive to popular interests. The central problem, the authors charge, is that the TGLP is an impossible plan.

Bekure and Dyson-Hudson accept that commercial ranching can be a viable proposition but only if certain conditions are met. Herd sizes need to be kept large enough for there to be economies of scale. In addition, there will need to be better herd and range management practices instituted. At

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the present time, though, few possess the appropriate experience and the

correlated outside the freehold farm areas, and their prediction is that unless this is changed, commercial ranch areas may soon be as degraded

as the communal areas. (This statistic may be somewhat deceptive--freehold

A comparison of agricultural production between the communal areas and the registered areas (held as freehold or leasehold) in

Botswana is found in the following study carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture:

BO13 Litschauer, John G., and William F. Kelly. Traditional versus Commercial Agriculture in Botswana. Gaborone:

Ministry of Agriculture, Planning and Statistics, June

1981.

Litschauer and Kelly compared yields for both crop and livestock production between the commercial and traditional agriculture sectors and found that the commercial farms were significantly larger and more efficient in all areas of production. Not only were cropped areas and livestock herds larger on the commercial farms (as is to be expected given their larger sizes), but also they were more productive per hectare. The authors attribute these differences to several factors: better land, use of irrigation, use of fertilizers, yearround agricultural techniques (including fall plowing), and greater availability of capital, leading them to conclude that the commercial farms are more technically efficient--but they are also careful to point out that this does not necessarily mean that commercial farms are more economically efficient. The data to support or refute this conclusion are not available. Unfortunately, their study does not consider land tenure as an independent variable or draw any conclusions about its effects on production or even on access to capital.

A Presidential Commission was appointed in 1983 to look into land tenure issues throughout the country; the following report presents its findings and recommendations:

BO14 Botswana. Presidential Commission on Land Tenure. Re-port of the Commission.... Gaborone: Government Printer, December 1983.

Within a broad mandate to study land tenure systems throughout Botswana and to make recommendations for their modification, the Commission on Land Tenure focused on several aspects of the TGLP and recommended changes for its improvement. Although the Commission felt that it was too soon to evaluate

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the long-term impact of TGLP, it noted, as other critics had done, that the amount of unused land that could be zoned for commercial use had been overestimated and that the reduction in herd size in the communal areas that planners had predicted had not as yet occurred. This continuing overstocking was in part due to the fact that some TGLP ranchers continued to graze their herds on communal lands. To alleviate these problems, the Commission recommended that there be careful monitoring of the situation and that the Minis-try of Local Government and Lands and the Ministry of Agriculture develop means for the progressive restriction of TGLP ranch herds to the ranches. It also suggested that there be a rigorous enforcement of conservation measures in all

grazing areas regardless of tenure type.

As regards freehold land, the Commission recommended that the Government continue to purchase freehold land as it becomes available with the goal of converting it to tribal land--something it has already done in North East and South East Districts which has served to alleviate land shortage in those areas.

The following White Paper contains Government's response to the Commission's report and the adjustments it intends to make in light of the Commissions recommendations.

BO15 Botswana. National Policy on Land Tenure. Government Paper No. 1 of 1985. Gaborone: Government Printer, April 1985.

The Government agreed that overstocking was a continuing problem and accepted the Commission's proposal for careful land use planning and rigorous enforcement of conservation measures in all areas. It also agreed to the desirability of continuing to purchase freehold areas for conversion to tribal land as these areas became available.

In 1980 the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, in an attempt to create a record of land holdings while avoiding the expenses of formal legal registration and the requirement of specialized personnel, carried out a rough land inventory in several localities around the country, including the Tati Siding/Shashe Bridge area south of Francistown. The following report describes and evaluates the project in that area:

BO16 Botswana. Ministry of Local Government and Lands. Applied Research Unit. Evaluation of the Tati Siding/ Shashe Bridge Land Registration Project. Gaborone, December 1982.

Two factors were behind the project: the rising incidence of disputes over boundaries of arable land and the increasing numbers of immigrants (that is, individuals from outside the Tati Siding/Shashe Bridge area) who sought to have land allocated to them. It was hoped that the project would enable disputes to be settled easily, produce an inventory of land holdings from which a land use plan might be prepared, and establish a formal record of