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7 The concept of self-defence

A.The rig ht of self-defen ce

(a)

The

mea ning

of

self

-defenc e

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In its

1996

Ad

visory

Opinion Legon alitythe

of the Threat or Use of Nucl

Weapon ,s the Internat ional Court of Justice stat ed:

 

 

 

 

Furthermore,

the

Court

cannot

lose

sight

of

the fundamental right of every

to survival, and thus its

right

to

resort to

self-defence, in accordance with

51 of the Charter, when

its survival

is1 at

stake.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The impl ication is that the right of

self-de

fence

is

eng

endered

embedd ed

in,

the

fund ament

al

right

of St ates to survival . Ho

Court

itself

ackn owled

ged

tha

t

‘th

e

very

survival

of

a

St ate

stake’ only ‘in an ext reme circu mstan

ce of

2

 

 

 

 

 

selfExtrem-de fence’ cir. -

cumstances of self-defence – when

the

very

survival

of

a

State is

imp

do ari se from time to time, but

the exerc ise of self-defe nce is

confine d to such catastrophi

c

scenario

s.

The

reality

of

self-defe

inter-Sta te

r elations

is

muc

h

more

p

rosaic:

it

trans cends

life

exist ential

crises

an d

impi

nges

on

 

a

 

host

of

commonpl ace

involvin g the use of coun ter-for

ce.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The essence of se lf-defenc e is

self-he lp: under certain conditio

intern ational law, a State acting

uni laterally – perh aps in associat

othe r countri es – may respond

with lawful force to unlawfu l

minim

ally,

to

the

imminen

t

threa t

of

 

unl

awful

force).

The

r

self-help, as a remedy available to States when their rights are violated, is and always has been one of the hallmarks of international law.3 Self-help

1 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, 263.

2 Ibid., 266. For the full quotation and its context,supra Chaptersee 6, Ca),. (

3 See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 339 (1945).

175

176 Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

is

a

charac teristic

featu

re

of

all

primi tive

legal

syst

ems,

but

 

in

i

law it has been honed

to

 

4

 

form .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

art

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Self-he lp under

intern

ational

law

may

be display ed in a vari

et

In the firs t place,

an agg rieved Stat e

may resor t to non-fo rcib

such

as

se

vering

diplo

matic

 

rel

ations

with

anothe

r

State

 

or

d

forei

gn

dipl

omatpersona

non

 

 

5

 

 

 

 

lly, legitim ate self-help

in

grata. Additiona

the

relations

between

St

ates

may

take

the

shape

of

forci

ble

 

mea

wh

ich case

these

measu

 

res m ust nowad ays meet the

requ

iremen

def

ence.

 

Occa sionally,

int

ernational

legal

sc

 

holars

regard

the

 

conc

self-he lp and self-defe

nce

 

as

 

related

yet 6 separateHowever,.

the

proper

 

app roach is to view

se

 

lf-defenc

e

as

a species

subord

inate

 

to

th

self-he lp. In other

word

s,

 

self-de

fence

is

a

 

permi

ssible form

of

hel

p’7.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The legal

notion

of self-defe nce has

its

roots

in inter-pers onal

r

and

is

sanc tified

in

domes

 

tic

legal

syst

 

ems

since

time

 

imm

From

the

dawn

of

intern

ational

law,

writers

 

sought

to

apply

 

this

to

inter-Stat

e

relations

,

 

par

ticular ly

in

 

conn ection

with

 

the

doct

8

 

 

 

 

Chapt

er

3 cA)),. (But

when

the

freedom

to

 

wag

rine (see supra,

 

war

was

 

coun tena

nced

 

without

reserva

tion

 

(in

the

nineteent

h

a

twen

tieth

centurie

s),

conc

ern

with

the

issue of self-defe nce

 

was

met a-jurid ical

exe

rcise.

 

As

long

as

recours

e

to

war

was

 

cons

for

all, agai

nst

all,

for

an

y

reason

on

earth – inclu ding territ ori

or

even

mot ives

of

pres

tige and grande ur –

States

did

not

n

justifi

cation

to

comme nce

 

hosti lities.

The

plea

of

self-defe

nce

 

vant

to

the

discu

ssion

of

 

the

legalit

y

of

 

forcible

measures

 

‘short

such as extra-te rritorial

law

enforce

mentinfra(see, Chapt

er

8, bB)),.9 (

 

 

Still , logically as well as

legally, it had no role to

play

in

 

the

i

arena

as

 

regard

s

the

 

cardi

nal

issue10 ofUp warto.

the

point

of

 

the

4 See Y. Dinstein, ‘International Law as a Primitive Legal System’,NYUJILP191, 12

 

 

(1986–7).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5 See B. Sen,A Diplomat’s Handbook of International

Law

 

and

218,Practice232

(3rd

ed.,

 

1988).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6 See T. R. Krift, ‘Self-Defense

and

 

Self-Help:

The

Israeli

Raid on BJILEntebbe’,43,

4

 

55–6 (1977–8).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7 Report of

the International Law

 

Commission,

32nd

Session,

[1980]ILC YbkII 1,(2) 54.

 

 

8See M. A. Weightman, ‘Self-Defense in International Law’,Vir. R.371095, 1099–1102 (1951).

9 Owing to these historical roots, the customary law relating

to self-defence

is often

as ‘best expressed’ in D. Webster’s formula in the Caroline incident (examined infra,

Chapter 8, B,c)).( M. A. Rogoff

and E. Collins,Caroline‘The

Incident and

the

Development of International Law’, 16

BJIL 493, 506 (1990).

 

 

10See E. Giraud, ‘La The´orie de la Le´gitime De´fense’, 49 RCADI 687, 715 (1934); J. L. Kunz, ‘Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations’, 41 AJIL 872, 876 (1947).

The concept of self-defence

177

prohibi

tion

of

war, to

most

int ents

and

 

purpose s,

‘self-de

fence

legal conce pt but merely a

p olitical excuse for the

11

 

 

 

useOnlyof force

when the

uni

versal

libert y

to go

to

war

 

was

elimina

ted,

coul

d

emerge

as

a

right

of

signa

l

importan

ce

 

in

 

12

 

 

,lawon.

 

intern ationalIndeed

the eve of the ren unciatio n

of war (and, subseq uentl y, upon th

tion of all form s

of

int er-State

force),

 

the

need

for

regu

lating

self-defe nce became manifest supra(see , Chapt

er A4).,

The

evolut

ion

of

the ide a of self-defe nce in

internatio

nal

law

goes

‘han d

in

han

prohibi tion of aggressi13on.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The right of self-defe nce is

ens hrined in Article 51 of the Cha

United Natio ns, which pro claims:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nothing in the present Charter

shall

impair

the

inherent

right

of

individ

collective

self-defense

if

an

armed

attack occurs

against a

Member

of

the

Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to ma

international

peace and security.

Measures

taken

by Members

in

the

exerci

this right of self-defense shall be

immediately

reported

to the

Security

Coun

shall not in any way affect the

authority

and responsibility

of

the

Security

under the present Charter to take at any

time

such

action as it deems ne

order to maintain or restore international

peace

and14security.

 

 

 

 

 

The

provisi

on

of

Article

51

has

to be

read

in

conjuncti

on

wi

th

of the

Charter

(supraee , Chapt

er 4, a))B,.15(Art

 

icle

2(4)

pro

mulgates

the

general

obligat

ion

to

refrai n

from

the

use

of

inter-Stat

e

forc

51

introduc

es

an

exce

ption

to

this

norm

by

al lowing

Mem

ber

emplo y

force

in

self-defe

nce

in

the

eve nt

of

an

arme

d

attac k.

Article 51 describes the right of self-defence

as both

‘individual’

‘collective’ in nature.

The meaning of these two

adjectives

in the co

self-defence will be

examinedinfra (Chapter

9,A). Interestingly enough,

the legislative history

shows that, at its

inception, the whole clause g

ing self-defence was inserted in the Charter with a view to confirm legitimacy of regional security arrangements (notably, the inter-America

system).16 In actuality,

Article 51 has become the main pillar of the

self-defence in all its

forms,

individual as well as collective.

This chapt er will

deal

with commo n questio ns pert aining

defence of whatever category. The next two chapters will be devoted to specific problems relating to the two distinct types of self-defence.

11E. Jime´nez de Are´chaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 159 RCADI 1, 96 (1978).

12See J. Verhoeven, ‘Les ‘‘Etirements’’ de la Le´gitime De´fense’, 48 AFDI 49, 52 (2002).

13

Report of the International Law Commisuprasion,note

7, at 52.

14

Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 9 Int.Leg. 327, 346.

15 Ibid., 332.

16L. M. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations 342–4 (3rd ed., 1969).

178 Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

(b)Self-defen ce as a right

Art

icle

51

expl

icitly

refe

rs

to a

‘right’

of

se

lf-defe nce. A

 

St

at

an

armed attac

k

is

thus

legally

entitled

to resor

t

 

to

 

force

.

The

has

 

been

mad e that

self-defe

nce

connotesde

onlyfactoconda

ition,

rath

er

than

a

verit

able

17

 

since

it

is

conce

ded

that

the

State

 

exer

rightBut.

 

self-de fence

is

‘exoner ated’ from

the

duty

to

refrai

n

 

from

the

us

agai

 

nst

 

the

othe

r side

(the

18

 

 

 

 

nce

betw

een

that

and

 

 

aggressor),thediffere

de jureright is purely nominal .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The thesis of self-defence as a legitimate

recourse

to force b y Utopi

is inextricably linked to the antithesis

of

the

employment

o

f

un

force b y Arcadia (its opponent). Under

n

o

circumstances

ca

actual use of force b y b oth

parties

to

a

conflict

 

be lawful

eously.

 

If

Utop

ia

is

p

roperl

y

e

xercising

th

 

e

 

r

ight

o

f

Arcadia

 

mus t

b

e

in

v

iolation

of

the

correspond

ing

duty

t

from

an

illegal

r

esort

to

force.

Should

Arcadia

 

be

using

force

Utopia legitimately – as an exercise o f collective security decre

authorized by the Security Council infra(see, Chapter

 

10A,–B) –

 

Utopia would not be abl e to invoke

agains t

A

rcadia

the

r ig

defence.19 By the same token, as an

 

American

 

Milit

ary

Trib

(following

Wharton)

held

in

the

 

Minist1949

riescase,

there

can

be

no self-defense against

 

 

20

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

self-defense’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In

pra

ctice,

when

int

er-State

force

is

 

emplo

yed, both parties

invo ke

the

right

of

 

 

21

 

 

such

cont radictory

claims

are

self-defe Butnce.

mutu

ally

 

exclu

sive:

on

ly one

of

 

the

antagoni sts can possibly be

an authent

ic

exerc

ise

of

the

right

of

self-defe nce,

 

wh

ereas

the

be dissembli ng. When each persis ts in

its

postu

re,

an

authori tat

minat

ion

is

required

to

establish

wh o

is

legally

in

infrathe ,rightD,

(see

(a)). Even where no binding decision is made by a competent forum, it must be borne in mind that one of the parties is using force under false pretences of legality.

Self-defence, in conformity with general international law, is a right and not a duty. Vattel, like many others before and after his time, propounded that ‘[s]elf-defence against an unjust attack is not only a

17See R. Ago, ‘Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility’, [1980] II (1) ILC Ybk 13, 53.

18Ibid.

19K. Nagy, Le Proble`me de la Le´gitime De´fense en Droit International 55 (1992).

20USA v. Von Weizsaecker et al. (‘the Ministries case’) (Nuremberg, 1949), 14 NMT 314, 329.

21See O. Schachter, ‘In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force’, 53 UCLR 113, 131 (1986).

The concept of self-defence

179

right

which

every

Natio

n

has,

but

it

is

a

duty,

an

d

one

 

of

its

 

22

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moral ity

or

theology

,

dutie s’. Although the stateme nt may reflect

not compo

rt

with

intern ational

law .

As

a

rule,

intern

ational

law

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

23

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to

an

lay down any obligation to exercise self-de AfenceState. subj ected

 

armed attac k is vested with a right ,

hen ce

an

optio

n, to

resor

force. A prude nt State may decli ne

to

exerc

ise

 

this

right,

on

t

that a politica l compromi

se is

prefera

ble to a clash of arms

.

T

able military supr emacy of the advers ary

may

 

have

a

 

sobering

effe

targe

t

State,

inhi

biting

it

from

 

steps

that would trans mute a t

right

into

a

pract

ical

dis aster. The

idea

that

 

a State

must

 

sacrific

at the altar of conc

eptuali sm,

 

and

risk

defeat

 

while

pro

dded

‘sacred dut y’, is incongru ous.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The status of self-de fence as a right,

an d not a duty,

is

em

general int ernational law. There is no

impedim ent to the assump

State

of

a

specia l obl

igation

(throu gh

a

bilateral

or

m ultilateral

exerc ise self-defe nce, should an arme

d

 

24

 

 

 

 

 

 

of

 

ind

i-

attackTheoccurdut. y

 

vidual

 

self-defe nce

is

usu

ally

incurred

by a

State

 

when

bind

ing

perman

ent

neutrali ty

 

25

 

 

 

 

Chapter

1, Ca)), . (The

obliga

-

 

regime(se supra,

 

tion of coll ective se lf-defenc e is form

ulated in several tre aty for

military alliances, to be discussed

 

in infradeta(Chapil

 

ter

9B,).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Self-d efence as

a dut y may also be

inco

rporate

d

in

na

tional

to armed

force s.

Thus

, the

Uni

ted

St

ates

 

Ru

les

of

E

ngagem

a comma nder’s obligatio n

to

use

force in

26

 

 

 

 

 

obliga -

self-Stdefeill,ncethis.

tion m ust be unde rstood in the cont ext

of

‘unit

selfin -fradefe,

nce

Chapt

er

8,

A, i(),a ),and

bearing

in

mind

the

distinct

pos sibilit

escalat

ion

it is

a

privil

ege

that

on

ly

the

 

strong

can

afford.

 

(c)Self-defen ce as an ‘in herent’ rig ht

Article

51

of

the UN Chart er pronounc es self-defe nce to be an

right.

In

the

Frenc h

te

xt

of

the

Art

icle,

the

phrase ‘inheren

render

eddroit

naturel’.27 The

choice

of

word

s

has

overtonesjus natof-

urale,

wh

ich

appears to

be

the fount

of the

right

of self-de fence.

22Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, Book III, x III, 35 (3 Classics of International Law ed., C. G. Fenwick trans., 246 (1916)).

23See J. Zourek, ‘La Notion de Le´gitime De´fense en Droit International’, 56 AIDI 1, 51 (Wiesbaden, 1975).

24See ibid., 51.

25See A. Verdross, ‘Austria’s Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization’, 50 AJIL 61, 63 (1956).

26United States Army, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Operational

Law Handbook 75 (2004).

27 Charter of the United Nations,supra note 14, at 346.

180 Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

a

refere

nce

to

self-de

fence

as

a

‘n

atural

right

’ or

a

 

r

ight

 

‘nat

ural

 

law’

althoug h

comm

on

in

 

pop

ular

and

even

 

som

pro

nounce

 

28

 

is

 

 

 

29

 

m

ay

be

conceived

as

an

an

ments–

unwarra ntedIt.

chron

istic

residu

e

from an era in whic h int ernationa

l

law

 

was

by

 

ecclesiast

ical

do

ctrines. At the pres ent time, there

is

no

t

m

trans cendent al truths pro

fessed to be derived from nature.

A

le

g

an

 

int erest

pro

tected

by

law, an d it must be validated

withi

n

work

of

 

a

legal

system.

Self-defe

nce,

as

an

int ernational

legal

rig

be

 

proved

to exist

withi n

the compass of positive internationa

l

la

It m ay be conten ded

that the right of self-defe nce

is jusinherent

natur ale,

but

in

the

sovere ignty of States. This cons truct

finds

sup

ser

ies

of

 

ident

ical

notes,

sent in 1928 by the Govern

ment

 

of

 

Stat es to a numbe

r

of

othe

r

Gov

ernmen

ts

(inviti

ng

them

Cont racting Parties to the Kellogg–Bri and Pact), where

it

was

sta

There

is

 

nothing

 

in

the

American

draft

of

an

antiwar

treaty

which

rest

impairs

in

 

any

way

the right of self-defense. That right is

inherent

i

sovereign

state

and

is

implicit

in every30 treaty.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Yet,

the

 

princi

ple

of

Stat

e

sov

ereignty

sheds

no

ligh t

on

the

th

def

 

 

31

St

ate

 

so

vereign

ty

has

a

variab

le

cont

ent,

wh

ich

de

 

ence.

 

 

the stage of development of the international legal order at any given

 

 

 

moment.32 The best index of the altered perception of sovereignty is that,

 

 

 

in the nineteenth (and early twentieth) century, the liberty of every State

 

 

 

to go to war as and when it pleased was also considered ‘a right inherent in

 

 

 

sov

 

ereignty

 

33

 

 

 

ra,

Chapter

D3,).

Notwi ths tanding

the

abo-

 

 

itself (see’ sup

lition of this liberty in the last century, the sovereignty of States did not crumble. The contemporary right to employ inter-State force in selfdefence is no more ‘inherent’ in sovereignty than the discredited right to resort to force at all times.

It is advisable to take with a grain of salt the frequently made assertion that, in the language of the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (delivered at Tokyo in 1948):

28See S. Sims and K. Van der Borght, ‘The Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, 27 GJICL 345, 367 (1998–9).

29See H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 791–2 (1950).

30United States, Identic Notes, 1928, 22 AJIL, Supp., 109, id. (1928).

31See G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The Fundamental Principles of International Law’, 87 RCADI 191, 339–40 (1955).

32See M. Virally, ‘Panorama du Droit International Contemporain’, 183 RCADI 9, 79 (1983).

33See A. S. Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law 349 (1912).

 

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

181

 

 

 

Any

law,

international

or

municipal, which

 

prohibits recourse

to

force,

is

 

sarily

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

34

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

limited by the right of self-defence.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This

postulate

may

have

always

been

true

in

regard

to

domesti

and

it

is currently

a

ccurate

also

in

respect

of

international

law.

 

safer

 

to avoid axiomatic propositions p urporting to

 

cover

fu

even

tualities

f

or

 

all

time.

Even

 

if

 

the

right

of self-d

efence

w

be abolished in the relations between

f

lesh

-and-blood

hum a n

 

there

 

is n o guarantee o f a similarobili

tyimmin in ternation

al

law.

Sel

defence

exercised

by

States

(legal

entiti

es)

is

not

to

be

equate

self-defence

carried

out by

physical

personsinfra(see, Chapter

8,

A,

 

(b ),iii). It is n ot beyond the realm

 

o f the plausible that

a

day

when

States

will

ag ree

to

dispense

completely

with

the

use

o

f

self-defence, ex clusivel y relyingenceforth on some central authority wielding an effective internationalicep force. The a llegation that the

prerogative

o

f

self-defence

 

iserenti h

in

the

sovereignty

 

o

f

 

State

to su ch an exten t that no treaty

can

 

35

 

 

 

beit,

 

derogatecannotfrom

 

accepted.

 

It

is

by

no

m

eans

clea

r

w

hether

the

r

ight

 

of

s

may

be

classified jusas

 

36

(thus

curtailin

g

the

freed

om

of

Stat

cogens

to contract o ut of it), and, in any

evenjus cogenst, evenissusceptible

o f

 

modification (seesupra, Chapter 4, bE)), .( Far be it

f rom

us

to

sugg

that,

at

this

juncture,

the

right

of

self-defence is receding

 

or

t

sign ificance is abating. On theary,contrif anything, self-defence

is

gaining g round in the

p

ractice

o f

States. Nevertheless,

what

was

– i

s

n

ot

always

w hat

will

be.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In

its

Ju dgment inNicaraguathe

case

,

in

1986,

the

Internat

ional

Cou

of Justice gave a diffe rent

m

eaning

to

self-defe

nce

as

an

‘inhe

The Court cons trued the expr ession

as a referenc e to

customary

tional law37.Accord ing to the Court ,

the framers of the Charter t

ackn owledged that self-de fence was a pre-existi

ng

right

of

 

a

cu

nature, wh ich they des ired to pres

erve (at least38inThisessencis

ae).

sensible interpretation of Article 51, rationalizing the employment of the

 

 

 

adjective ‘inherent’ without ascribing to it far-fetched (and insupport-

 

 

 

able) consequences.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Article 51 addresses only the right of self-defence of UN Member States. After all, these are also the subjects of the duty, set out in Article 2(4),

34In re Hirota and Others (International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo trial, 1948), [1948] AD 356, 364.

35See Ago,supra note 17, at 67 n. 263.

36But see A. P. Rubin, ‘Book Review’, 81 AJIL 254, 255–8 (1987).

37Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, 94.

38Ibid.

182

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

to

refrain from

the use of forcesu pra(see,Chapter

4, aB)), . (The

existence

of

the right

of self-defence under general

customary

international

denotes that it is conferred on every State. Contemporary custo

international

law

forbids the use of inter-State

force by all

States,

w

or not they

are

UN

Membersupra(see, Chapter 4,

Ca)), . ( In the

same

 

vein, any State

(even

if not a UN Member)

is entitled to

the

rig

defence under existing customary international law. Both the gen

prohibition

of

the

use

of

inter-State

force

and

the

exception

to

right

of

self-defence)

 

are

part

and

parcel

of

customary

international

as well

as

the

law

of

the

39

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Charter.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B.

 

Self-defe

nce

 

as

 

a

respo

nse

to

an

armed

a

ttack

 

Sinc

e

the

right

of

se

lf-defenc

e

arises

 

unde

r

Article

51 only

‘if

attac

k

occurs’,

it

is

 

cl ear that the use of

force

in

self-defe nce i

on

dem

onstratin

g

 

that

 

an

 

armed

 

attack

has

taken

place.

Interna

tional

Court

 

of

 

Justice prono

unced

in

2003,Casein

the

Concer ning

Oil

Platform(bes tween

Iran

an

d

the

Unite

d

States ),

‘th

den

of

pro

of

of

the

facts

showing

the

exi stence

’ of

an

armed

at

the

St

ate

justifyi

ng

its

own

use

of

force

as 40self-defe

nce.

 

(a)Armed attack and preven tive war

The

United

St

ates

has

tradi tionally

taken

the posit

ion

that

a

exerc

ise

‘antic

ipatory’

 

 

41

nce,in response

not

only

to

 

a

‘hostil

self-defe

 

act’

but

even

to

a

‘hostile

 

inten

t’

 

(a

 

dichotom

y

eleva

ted

 

to t

doct

rine

by

the

US

Ru les

of

 

 

42

 

 

 

 

 

the

 

US

was

Engag Inement)the . past,

 

care

ful

to

unders

 

core

that

 

an

ticipato

ry

self-de

fence

or

res

hosti

le

int

ent

must

neverth

eless

 

relate

to

theimminent‘threatuseofof

 

force

43

 

 

empha

tic

use

of

the

quali

fying

adjective

‘immin ent

’. The

great

import.

As

we

shall infrase ,e

((b),

 

(aai), the immin ence of an

armed attac k (provided that

it

is

no

longer

a

mere

threa

t)

do

justify an early response by

 

way

of

interce ptive

self-def

ence.

Ho

after

the

hei

nous

 

te

rrorist

 

attac

ks

 

of 11 Septembe r 2001 (9/11

know

n

stat ement of policy on preem

ptive

action

 

in

 

se

lf-defe

39

See ibid.,

102–3.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

40

Case Concerning

Oil

Platforms, 2003,

42ILM 1334,

 

1356

(2003).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

41

Annotated Supplement

to

the

Commander’s

Handbook

on the Law of Naval, 73Operation

 

ILS 263

(A. R. Thomas and J. C. Duncan

 

eds.,

1999).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

42

Operational

Law

Handbook, supra note

 

26,

at

75

(2004).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

43

Ibid. See

alsoAnnotated

 

Supplement, supra note

41,

at

263.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

183

 

 

issued as par t of the US

National

 

 

 

44

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Se curity TheStratenewgy. policy,

 

often referre d to as the

‘Bush Doc

trine’

(a

fter

Pre sident

G.

appears to push the enve lope by claimin g

 

a

right

to

preemp

defence coun tering pure threats, es pecially by

 

te rrorists and in p

when

 

the

p

otential

 

use

of

weapons

of

mass

 

destruct

ion

(WMD)

into

 

the equ

45

 

 

 

 

 

 

what

 

practical

effects the

new

 

ationIt. is not yet clear

 

will

 

have

in

the

future:

contra

ry

to

wh

at

m

any

comme ntators

was

 

not

applied

in

Iraq

in

2003in fra(see,Chapt

er

10,

C,iii)(.b),But to

 

the

exten

t

that it will actu ally

bring

abou

t

a

 

preve ntive

use

respo

nse

to

sheer

threa

ts,

it

will

not

be

in

 

compl iance

with

A

the

 

 

 

46

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chart er.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sinc

e

Artic le

51

permi

ts

self-de

fence

solely

wh

en

an

‘arme

occurs,

the

question

arise s

wh

ether

there

exi

sts

independ

entl

Chart er – a b roader customa ry int ernational law right of anticip

defence . The Interna tional Court

of Justice,Nicaraguain thecase,

base

d

 

 

its

decisio

n

on

the

no

rms of

custom

ary

internationa

l

law

 

conce

defence

as

a

seque

l

to

an

 

47

 

Court

stres

sed

that

thi

armed Yeatt,ackthe.

was

due

to

the

circum

stances

of

the

case, and

it

passed

 

no

jud

 

 

 

 

 

48

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the issue at han d.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On the other hand, Judge Schw ebel

in

his

Di

ssenting

Opin

take

 

a

clear-c ut

p osition

on

the subject. In confor mity

 

with

a

scho ol of thought maint aining

tha t Art icle

51

only

highl

ights

o

self-defe

nce

(viz.

respo

nse

to

an

armed

attac

k),

without

neg

ati

patterns

of

legitima

te

action

in

self-de fence

 

vouchs afed

 

by

cus

intern

ational

49

 

 

 

Schweb

el rejecte d a readi

ng

of

the

te

xt

law Judge,

would

imply

that

the

right

of

self-de fence

under

 

Artic

 

le

51

exist

only

if,

an

armed

attac

k

50

urs’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

occ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In

the opini on of

the present writer, precisel

y

 

such

 

a

res

trictiv

of Article 51 is called for. Any othe r

interpret

ation

of

the

Artic

l

coun

ter-textu al,

coun ter-fact ual

and

counter

-logical:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

44Preemptive Action in Self-Defense: National Security Strategy, [2002] Digest of United States Practice in International Law 947.

45See, e.g., A. E. Wall, ‘International Law and the Bush Doctrine’, 34 IYHR 193, 196–7, 212 (2004).

46See D. Rezac, ‘President Bush’s Security Strategy and Its ‘‘Pre-Emptive Strikes

Doctrine’’ – A Legal Basis for the War against Iraq?’, 7 ARIEL 223, 227 (2002). 47 See Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 102–6.48 See ibid., 103.

49See D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 187–92 (1958); M. S. McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 232–41 (1961); J. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression 44 (1958).

50Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 347.

184

 

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(i)

A

differe

 

nt

interpret

ation

 

of

Article

51

would

be

coun

te

beca

use

the

 

use

of the phrase ‘armed attack’

in

Article

 

51

 

is

vertent .

The

expr

ession

 

should

 

be

juxt

aposed

with

compa

 

rable

l

in

other

provisi

ons

of

 

the

Charter.

It

is

particula

rly

striking

 

fram

ers

of

 

the

 

te xt

prefe

rred

 

in

Article

51 the coinag e ‘arme

the

te

rm

‘aggress

ion’,

 

wh

ich

 

appears

in

the

Charter

 

in

 

se

veral

(the

Purposes

 

of

the

United

Nati

ons

(Article

 

1(1

)),

collecti

ve

(Ar

ticle

39)

 

an

d

regio

 

nal

 

arran

gement

s

 

51

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Ar ticleThe 53(choice1))). of

 

 

word

s

in

Article

51

is

 

delibera

tely

confi

ned

to

a

respo

 

nse

 

to

attac

k.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An

 

arme

d

attac k

is,

 

of

 

cours e,

a

typ

e of aggres sion. Aggr

gen

eric

meaning

may

be

stret

 

ched

to

include

merecf.

 

thresupra,ats

 

(

Chapt

er

5,

 

C,

i(),a), althoug h

 

it

is

int eresting

that

 

the

conse

Defin

ition

of

 

Aggr ession

,

 

adop

ted

b

y

the

Genera

l

As

sembly

wh

ile

not

 

pretendin

g

to

be

exhau

stiv

e

– does not cov er t

force52 (see su

pra,

Chapter

 

5B,). Yet,

only

a

special form

of

aggressi

amoun

ting

to

 

an

armed

atta

ck

 

justifi

es

self-de

fence

under

 

Article

Frenc h

versi

on

of

the

 

Article

 

sharpens

its

thrust

by

unspea

king

agres

sion

 

 

 

53

Und er

the

Art

icle, a

St

ate

is

permi

tted

 

to

 

use

ar´eme.

 

 

 

self-de

fence

only

in response to agg ression

wh

ich

is

armed.

 

 

 

(ii

)

The

 

idea

that on e can go beyond

the

tex

t

of Article

supp

ort

for

 

a

 

broad

conc

ept

 

of

prevent

ive

self-defe

nce

in

c

int

ernational

 

law

is

coun

ter-fact

ual.

When

did

such

customa

ry

tional

 

law

evo

lve

an

d

 

wh

at

eviden

ce

 

in

the pract ice of States

from

sc

holarly

 

 

writings

)

 

do

we

 

have

for

it?

As supramen, Ationed,a()),

(

 

 

the

right

of

 

self-defe

nce

conso

 

lidated

only

upon

the

pro

 

hibition

use of force between States. That prohibition was first evinced i

Kellogg–Briand

Pact

of

1928

 

an d

reitera

ted,

in

cl

earer

an d

ter ms,

in

Artic le

2(4)

of

 

the Chart er in 1945. W

hat

p reve

self-de

fence

was

unl

eash

ed

 

betwee

n 1928

and

1945?

 

 

It

is

frequen

tly

stat

ed

that

the concep t

of anticip atory

self-def

back

to the

1837Caroline inciden

54

(exami

nedinfra, Chapt

er

8, c))B., (

 

t

However, reliance on that incident in the context of anticipatory selfdefence is misplaced. There was nothing anticipatory about the British action against the Caroline steamboat on US soil, inasmuch as use of the Caroline for transporting men and materials across the Niagara River – in

51

Charter

of

the

United

Nations,supra note

14,

at

331,

343, 347.

52

General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 29(1) RGA 142, 143 (1974) (Articles 2–4).

53

Charter

of

the

United

Nations,supra note

14,

at

346.

 

54See, e.g., T. M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks

97 (2002).

The concept of self-defence

185

supp

ort

of

an

anti-B

ritish

rebellion

in

Cana

da

had

alread

progres

55

 

less

signifi

cantly,

the

issue

address ed at the time

s.

No

exclu

sively

to

 

the

use

of

force

by

Brit ain ‘sho rt of war’ . The

not

whet

her

Brit

ain had

a

right to go

to

war

against

the

US

in

of

self-defe

nce

(si

nce

 

any

St

ate

then

had

a

right

to

go

to

anothe

r

State

for

any

 

reason

).

The

questio

n,

rathe r,

was

Britain

coul

d

 

use

forci

ble

measu

res

of

 

se lf-defe

nce within

US

without plungin g into war.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

The

reliance

on an extra-Charter customary right of self-defen

also

 

counter-logical.

After

all,

the

authors of

Article

51

introduced

s

cant

limitations

on

the exercise of self-defence (which is subject t

overriding powers of the Security Councilnfra(see,D)). Does

it

make

 

sense

that

the

 

most

obvious

case

of

self-defence – conducted

in

resp

an

armed

attack

is

subordinated

to

confining

 

conditions,

whereas

defence putatively invoked in other circumstances (on a preventive bas

absolved of those conditions? What

is

the point in stating thei.e. obvio

that an armed attack gives rise to

the

right of self-defence), while

any reference whatever to the ambiguous circumstances of an alleg

permissible

preventive war? Preventive war in self-defence (if legitim

under the

Charter) would require regulationlex byscriptamore acutely

than a response to an armed attack, since the opportunities for ab

incomparably

greater. Surely, if preventive war

in

self-defence is just

(on

the

basis of ‘probable cause’ rather than an

actual

use

of

force),

to

be

exposed to no less – if possible, even

closer

supervisio

Security

Council.

In

all,

is this not an appropriate

case

for

the

appli

the maxim of interpretationexpressio unius est exclusio

alterius?

 

 

 

When pressed, the advocates of the legitimacy

of

a

broad

anticip

concept

of

self-defence

are forced to

frown

upon

the

strict

langua

Article

51 as ‘an inept

 

56

 

 

the

draftsman-

piece of draftsmanship’However,.

ship

appears

to

be

quite satisfactory

once it

is

recognized

that the

self-defence is deliberately circumscribed to counter-force stimulated by armed attack. The leading opinion among scholars is in harmony with the

view expressed here.57

55See J. P. Paust, ‘Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and

56

Due Process in Military Commissions’, 79 NDLR 1335, 1345 (2003–4).

 

 

 

McDougal and

Feliciano,supra note

49,

at 234.

 

 

 

57

See Ago,supra note

17,

at

64–7;

W.

E. Beckett,The North Atlantic Treaty,

the

Brussels

 

Treaty and the

Charter

of

the

United

13Nations(1950); Kelsen,supra note

29,

at

797–8;

 

Kunz, supra note

10,

at

877–8;

L. Oppenheim,International Law, II, 156

(H.

Lauterpacht

ed., 7th ed., 1952); K. Skubiszewski, ‘Use of Force by States. Collective Security. Law of

186

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The proposition that UN Member States are barred by the Charter

exercising

self-defence, in response to a mere threat of force, is app

in

every

situation.

 

It

is

 

sometimes

 

put

forward

 

that

‘[t]he

destr

potential

of nuclear

weapons

is

so

 

enormous

as

to

call

into

questi

and

all received

rules of

international

law

regarding

the

trans-boundar

 

 

 

58

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

only

operative under

of force’. But the inference that Article 51 is

ditions

of

conventional

warfare

 

cannot

be

substantiated.

 

 

 

 

 

He

nc

e,

when

t

h

e

Un

i

ted

St

ate

s

i

mpo

sed

a

qu

aran

1962,

subsequent

to the

i

nstallationfSoviet

missiles

on

the

island, thi

c

oul

d

n ot be recon ci

led wi th the p

 

59

 

 

wof itAhstaricndle -

rovi si noton

i

ng vali

ant

a tte

 

mpts

by

s

ome

writ60ersTheto installdosoation.

heof

t

mi

ss

ile

s

s

o

cl

 

ose

to

Ame r

ican shores

d

id

p

ose

a

certa

Unite

d

S

tates.

Yet,

in

t

he

absence

of

an

armed

attack,

n

o rec

be

made

to

the

exc eptional

right

o

f

s

elf-defence,

 

and

the

gene

dictio

n

of the use of i nt er-State force prevaile

d.

 

 

 

 

 

When Israeli aircraft raided an Iraqi nuclear reactor (under construc-

 

tion) in 1981, the legal justification of the act should have rested on the

 

state of war which characterized the relations between the two countries

 

(see su

pra,

Chapt

er

2,

B,i).(c),Had

Israel

bee n at peace with

Iraq

bombing of the site would have been prohibited, since (when examined in

 

itself and out of the context of an on-going war) it did not qualify as a

 

legitimate act of self-defence consonant with Article 51. This is the

 

position de lege lata, despite the understandable apprehension existing at

 

the time that nuclear devices, if produced by Iraq, might ultimately be

 

delivered against Israeli targets.61

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The requirement of an armed attack as a condition of legitimate self-

 

defence, in accordance with Article 51, precludes not only threats.

 

Recourse to self-defence under the Article is not vindicated by any viol-

 

ation of international law other than an armed attack. Even declarations

 

of war, if it is evident to all that they are unaccompanied by deeds, are

 

not

enough.62

The

contention that mere

mobilization

or

‘bellicose

 

War and Neutrality’, Manual of Public International Law 739, 767 (M. Sørensen ed., 1968); H. Wehberg, ‘L’Interdiction du Recours a` la Force. Le Principe et les Proble`mes qui se Posent’, 78 RCADI 1, 81 (1951).

58A. D’Amato, ‘Israel’s Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor’, 77 AJIL 584, 588 (1983).

59See Q. Wright, ‘The Cuban Quarantine’, 57 AJIL 546, 560–2 (1963).

60See M. S. McDougal, ‘The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense’, 57 AJIL 597–604 (1963).

61Per contra, see T. L. H. McCormack, Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 295–302 (1996).

62A declaration of war patently unaccompanied by deeds may be deemed ‘an overt threat of the use of force’. E. Myjer, ‘Book Review’ [of the first edition of this volume], 2 LJIL 278, 283 (1989). But such a threat per se does not constitute an armed attack.

The concept of self-defence

187

utteran ces’

as

such

m ay

justify

self-defe nce

within

the

fram e

Article

63

 

no foundat

ion.

 

 

 

 

 

 

51, has

 

 

 

 

 

 

At

bottom,

self-defence consistent with Article

51 implies

resort

counter-force:

it

comes in reaction to the use of

force

by the

oth

When

a country feels

menaced by

the threat of

an

armed attack,

all

free to do – in keeping with the Charter – is make the necessar

preparations for repulsing the hostile action

should

it

materialize,

as w

bring the

matter forthwith to the attention

of the Security Council (

that

the

latter will take collective security

measures in the face of a

the

peace

(seeinfra, Chapter 10, A, (c)).64 Either

course

of

action may

fail

to inspire confidence in the successful resolution of the crisis. The military

 

preparations can easily prove inadequate, whether as a deterrence or as a

 

shock absorber. The Council, for its part, may proceed in a nonchalant

 

manner.65 Regardless of the shortcomings of the system, the option of a

 

preventive use of force is excluded by Article 51.

 

 

 

 

Having said that, it is the considered opinion of the present writer that

 

the right to self-defence can be invoked in response to an armed attack as

 

soon as it becomes evident to the victim State (on the basis of hard

 

intelligence available at the time) that the attack is in the process of

 

being mounted. There is no need to wait for the bombs to fall – or, for

 

that matter, for fire to open – if it is morally certain that the armed attack is

 

under way (however incipient the stage of the attack is). The victim State

 

can lawfully (under Article 51) intercept the armed attack with a view to

 

blunti ng

its edge infra(see, (b), (aai),.

 

 

 

 

(b) The na ture and scope of an armed attack

An armed attack can be conducted by a foreign State. It can also be conducted by non-State actors from within a foreign State. This section will be divided into two parts dealing with the two disparate sets of circumstances.

(aa)An armed attack by a State

i. The beginning of an armed attack and interceptive self-defence Since self-defence (under Article 51) is linked to an armed attack, it is important to pinpoint the exact moment at which an armed attack begins to take

63See E. Miller, ‘Self-Defence, International Law, and the Six Day War’, 20 Is.LR 49, 58–60 (1985).

64See J. Zourek, L’Interdiction de L’Emploi de la Force en Droit International 106 (1974).

65For a case in point, see R. Lapidoth, ‘The Security Council in the May 1967 Crisis: A Study in Frustration’, 4 Is.LR 534–50 (1969).

188

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

place:

this

is

also

 

the

m oment when forcible counter-

measures

b

leg

itimate

as

self-defe nce.

In practic e, the issue

acqui

res

 

anothe

sion

 

as

a

result

of

the

procl

ivity

 

of

both

 

par

ties,

once

hostili

ties

to charge each other with

the initiation of an armed

attack.

Verifi

the

precis

e

instant

at

 

which an armed attac k

 

comm

ences

 

is

 

equ

ivalent

 

to

an

 

identifica

tion

of

the

 

agg

ressor

and

the

victi

res

pectivel

y.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

When

confronted

with

contradictory claims of self-defence

(and

atte

ant charges of armed attac k), the int ernational

 

comm

unity

is

g

confoun

ded

by

effusion

s

of

disinforma

tion

pourin

g

forth

from

 

sourc es. Given that there

may be meagre oppor tunity

f

or

 

imparti

vers to invest igate wh

at

reall

y

 

hap

pened

,

 

the

publ

ic

 

 

te

nds

dece

ptively

unc

omplicate

d

criteria

designed

 

to

 

establi

sh

the start

i

of the

arme d

 

attac k.

The

 

most

simplis

tic

touc

hstone

is

that

 

shot’,

nam

ely,

finding

ou

t

which

 

State

(throu

gh

its

armed

force

firs t to open fire.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Art

icle

2

of

the

 

Gene

ral

 

Asse

 

mbly’s

consensus

Defin

ition

of

A

refers to the first use

of

f orceprimaas onlyfacieeviden ce

 

of

aggres

66

 

 

 

 

 

sion

 

 

(see supra,

Chapt

er B5).,

This is a judici ous appro

ach

that

 

relegate

openi ng of fire to the

level of a presumpt ion of

an

armed attac

burde n

of

proof

shif ts

to

 

the

 

State

firin

 

g

the

first

shot,

that

esto

pped

from

demon

strating that the action came

in

r

esponse

take n by the opponen

t,

 

whic

h

 

were

far

and

away

more

 

dec

turn ing point in the

pro cess leading from peac

e to war (o r

 

cenc

e

to

an

intern

ational

 

armed

 

conflict

‘short

of

war’).

 

 

 

 

 

 

In many ins tances, the

openi ng of fire is an

 

unreliab

le test

o

bility for an armed attack. The

most

element

ary

example

 

perta

in

inva sion of one coun try

by anot her. An invasion

consti

tutes

the

case

 

of

agg

ression

 

enu

merated

in

Article

 

3(

a)

of

the

Genera

l

 

Defin

 

67

 

m ay

start

wh

en

massive

 

Arca

dian

armou

 

red

or

ition. It

 

 

divis ions storm, with blazing guns

 

, a Utopia n line

of

fortificat

io

inva sion may also be

effec

ted

 

wh en

a

 

sma

ller

military

Num

cross

es

the

Ruritan

ian

 

fronti

er

and

then

 

halts,

positioni

ng itsel

f

gic

outpost

s

well

 

within

 

the

Ru

ritanian

 

territory

 

(the

 

 

move

m

Pakis

tani

troo

ps

int o

 

Indian K

 

ashmir

in

1999

is

a

 

 

68

case

 

 

good

If the invasion takes place

in a tract of land not

 

easily

acc

 

essible

gua rded, it is entire ly conce ivable that some

time

would

pass

b

compe tent

 

authori

ties

of

Ru

ritania

gra

sp

 

wh

at

has

actually

tran

the

se

ci rcumstan

ces,

it

m

ay

 

very

well

 

ensue

 

that

the

 

armed

66

General Assembly Resolution 3314,supra note 52, at 143.67 Ibid.

68

For the Kashmir incident, see 45 Keesing’s Record of World Events 42997 (1999).

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

189

 

 

 

Ruritan

ia

would be instru cted to

dislodge

from

their positions

 

the

ing conting ents belongin g to Num

idia,

 

and

that

fire

be

opened

soldie

rs

flyin g

the

Ruriut

 

anian

colour

s

 

agai

nst

Numidi an

m

il

Nevert heless, Nu midia cann ot relieve itsel f of

res ponsibil

ity

 

for

attac k. Whe n a coun try sends arme d formations

across

an

 

inte

fronti

er, without

the cons

ent of

the

local

Gov

ernmen

t,

 

it

must

 

to have triggered an armed attack. The openi ng of

f

ire

b y

 

the

would amoun t to a le gitimate m easure of self-defe

nce.

 

 

 

 

 

Anoth

er

rudim entary illust ration for the need

to

gaze

beyond

shot relates to circum stances in

wh

ich

Atlant

ican

military

 

for

statione

d

by permiss ion, for a limite d spac e

of

time

,

on

Pata

Whe n

the

agreed-up on period come s to

an

end

,

and

 

Patago ni

ing to pro long the stay

 

within

its

 

te

rritory

of

the

 

At

lantica

Atlant

ica

m ust

pull

them

ou t.

If

 

At

lantica

fails

to

do

so,

i

withd

raw

from

Patagoni a

amoun

ts

to

an

act

of

aggres

 

sion

und

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

69

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

may

 

be

3(e) of the Genera l Asse mbly’s De finitionThefactu. al situati on

 

legally

analyzed

as

a

constru ctive

armed70 attacWhe kn. the

armed

forces

 

of Patagoni a open fire firs t, with

a

view

to

compell

ing

the

 

eva

Atlant

ican

troops

from

Patagoni an territory,

they

are

exer cising

 

th

 

 

 

71

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of self-de fence.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

These are open-and -shut case s, inasm uch as the

first

 

shot

 

fire

Ruritan

ian

or

Patagoni an

 

armed

force

s

 

is

plain

ly

pro

 

voked,

 

ei

Num

idian

invasion or b y an unautho rized At

lantican

 

m

ilitary

within

Patagoni

an

territory.

But

a

State

may

res

ort

 

to

force

defence

,

even

before

its

 

territory

 

is

 

penet

rated

by

 

anothe

r

Suppo

se

that

Carpa

thia

 

launche s

 

inter-co ntinental

balli

stic

 

 

against Apollonia on the other side of the planet. The Apollonian radar

 

 

 

immediately detects the launching. In the few minutes left prior to impact

 

 

 

(and before the missiles draw near the Apollonian frontier), Apollonia

 

 

 

activates its armed forces and an Apollonian submarine torpedoes a

 

 

 

Carpathian warship cruising in the ocean. Although a Carpathian target

 

 

 

69 General Assembly Resolution 3314,supra note 52, at 143.

70See W. Wengler, ‘L’Interdiction de Recourir a` la Force. Proble`mes et Tendances’, [1971] RBDI 401, 408.

71It must be emphasized that the scenario of a constructive armed attack relates to a nonconsensual extension by Atlantica of the stay of its troops on Patagonian soil. Article 3(e) of the Definition of Aggression also pertains to the use of Atlantican forces, during their agreed-upon stay in Patagonia, in contravention of the conditions provided for in agreement. There is no doubt that Atlantican troops may commence an armed attack against Patagonia in the course of their consensual stay there (see infra, iii). But minor breaches of the conditions of an unexpired agreement, allowing the stationing of foreign forces on local soil, cannot be considered an armed attack. See A. Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, I, 788, 799 (B. Simma ed., 2nd ed., 2002).

190 Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

is the first to be hit, one can scarcely deny that Carpathia (having launched its missiles previously) should be regarded as the initiator of an armed attack, whereas Apollonia ought to be able to invoke selfdefence.

It may be contended that what ultimately counts in the last script is the launching of the missiles, which resembles the firing of a gun: once a button is pressed, or a trigger is pulled, the act is complete (while impact is a mere technicality). However, suppose that the radar of a Carpathian aircraft locks on to an objective in Apollonia or that the aircraft illuminates (i.e. aims laser beams at) the target. While no missile has been fired yet – and no laser-homing bomb has been dropped – an armed attack is clearly in the process of being unleashed. A timely response would merely constitute interceptive self-defence.

The best way to illustrate what interceptive self-defence signifies is to hypothesize that the Japanese Carrier Striking Force, en route to the point from which it mounted the notorious attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, had been destroyed by American forces before a single Japanese naval aircraft got anywhere near Hawaii.72 If that were to have happened, and the Americans would have succeeded in aborting an onslaught which in one fell swoop managed to change the balance of military power in the Pacific, it would have been preposterous to look upon the United States as answerable for inflicting an armed attack upon Japan.

The proper analysis of the case should be based on three disparate scenarios (all linked to a counter-factual premise that the Americans knew exactly what the Japanese were up to):

(1)The easiest scenario relates to the hypothetical shooting down by the Americans of the Japanese aircraft – following detection by radar or other means – in the relatively short time-frame between launch from the air carriers and the actual execution of the attack mission. Once the launch was completed, there can be no doubt that (although theoretically the mission could still be called off) the US as the target State had every right to regard the Japanese armed attack as having commenced and to intercept it.

(2)The more difficult scenario pertains to a hypothetical sinking of the

Japanese fleet once poised for the attack on Pearl Harbor but prior to the launch of the aircraft. In the opinion of the present writer, the turning point in the unfolding events was the sailing of the tasked Japanese fleet towards its fateful destination (again, notwithstanding the possibility of its being instructed to turn back). Had the

72The Pearl Harbor example was adduced in debates in the United Nations. See M. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, V, 867–8 (1965).

The concept of self-defence

191

Americans – perhaps through the breaking of Japanese naval codes – been in possession of conclusive evidence as to the nature of the mission in which the Japanese Striking Force was already engaged, and had the Americans located the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet, they need not have relinquished the opportunity to intercept.

(3)On the other hand, had the Americans sought to destroy the Japanese fleet before it sailed – while it was still training for its mission, wargaming it or otherwise making advance preparations – this would not have been an interceptive (hence, lawful) response to an armed attack but an (unlawful) preventive use of force in advance of the attack, which had not yet commenced. As and of themselves, training, wargaming and advance preparations do not cross the red line of an

armed attack.

The crux of the issue, therefore, is not who fired the first shot but who embarked upon an apparently irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the legal Rubicon. The casting of the die, rather than the actual opening of fire, is what starts the armed attack. It would be absurd to require that the defending State should sustain and absorb a devastating (perhaps a fatal) blow, only to prove an immaculate conception of selfdefence. As Sir Humphrey Waldock phrased it:

Where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the frontier.73

Interceptive self-defence is lawful, even under Article 51 of the Charter,74 for it takes place after the other side has committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike anticipates a latent armed attack that is merely ‘foreseeable’ (or even just ‘conceivable’), an interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is in progress, even if it still is incipient: the blow is ‘imminent’ and practically ‘unavoidable’.75 To put it in another way, there is nothing preventive about nipping an armed attack in the bud. But the real (in contradistinction to the suspected) existence of that bud is an absolute requirement. Self-defence cannot be exercised merely on the ground of assumptions, expectations or fear. It has to be demonstrably apparent

73C. H. M. Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law’, 81 RCADI 451, 498 (1952).

74For support of this view, see M. N. Shaw, International Law 1030 (5th ed., 2003).

75Cf. C. C. Joyner and M. A. Grimaldi, ‘The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention’, 25 VJIL 621, 659–60 (1984–5). See also I. Pogany, ‘Book Review’ [of the first edition of this volume], 38 ICLQ 435, id. (1989).

192 Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

that the other side is already engaged in carrying out an armed attack (even if the attack has not yet fully developed).

An in-depth study of the background may be required before a decision is made regarding the classification of the first shot as either preventive (namely, unlawful) or interceptive (i.e. a legitimate exercise of self-defence). Thus, in the ‘Six Days War’ of June 1967, Israel was the first to open fire. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the events surrounding the actual outbreak of the hostilities (assuming that the factual examination was conducted, in good faith, at the time of action) would lead to the conclusion that the Israeli campaign amounted to an interceptive self-defence, in response to an incipient armed attack by Egypt (joined by Jordan and Syria). True, no single Egyptian step, evaluated alone, may have qualified as an armed attack. But when all of the measures taken by Egypt (especially the peremptory ejection of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula; the closure of the Straits of Tiran; the unprecedented buildup of Egyptian forces along Israel’s borders; and constant sabre-rattling statements about the impending fighting) were assessed in the aggregate, it seemed to be crystal-clear that Egypt was bent on an armed attack, and the sole question was not whether war would materialize but when.76

That, at least, was the widely shared perception (not only in Israel) in June 1967, based on sound judgement of events. Hindsight knowledge, suggesting that – notwithstanding the well-founded contemporaneous appraisal of events – the situation may have been less desperate than it appeared, is immaterial.77 The invocation of the right of self-defence must be weighed on the ground of the information available (and reasonably interpreted) at the moment of action, without the benefit of post factum wisdom.78 In the circumstances, as perceived in June 1967, Israel did not have to wait idly by for the expected shattering blow (in the military manner of the October 1973 ‘Yom Kippur’ offensive), but was entitled to resort to self-defence as soon as possible.

76See Y. Dinstein, ‘The Legal Issues of ‘‘Para-War’’ and Peace in the Middle East’, 44 SJLR 466, 469–70 (1970).

77‘Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the time may be clouded with the fog of war.’ G. K. Walker, ‘Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said’, 72 ILS 365, 393 (M. N. Schmitt ed., 1998). Although the statement is made about anticipatory action (which is inadmissible in the opinion of the present writer), it is equally applicable to interceptive self-defence.

78This rule works both for and against the State invoking self-defence. Thus, it cannot base its recourse to forcible measures on information unavailable at the time of action and acquired only subsequently. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg trial), Judgment (1946), 1 IMT 171, 207–8.

 

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

193

 

 

ii.

 

 

 

A small-sca le armed

 

attackThe

re

 

is

no

doubt

that,

for

an

ille

use of force to acquire the

 

dime nsions of an armed attac

k,

a

threshol d has to be reached.

 

Since Article

2(4)

of

the

Chart

er

fo

threa

t

or

use

of

 

force ’

 

an

d

Article

51

allow

s taking self-defe n

only

agai

nst

an

 

‘armed

attac

k’,

a

 

gap

is

dis

cernible

b

etween

stipul

 

 

 

79

 

 

 

leaving

 

aside

mere

threats

of

force

(discusssupra,

ed

 

ations. Even

 

 

 

(a)),

it is cl ear that one

 

St

ate

may

emplo

y

some

illegal

for

anothe r

 

without

unleash

ing

a

full -fledge d armed attack. Thus, a

Arcadia – without inflicti ng

any casualti es or much damag e

m

into

a

Utopi an

 

dipl omatic

 

bag or deta in a Ruritan ian ship

stance s disallow ed by intern ational law . In both

instances

,

a

m

force

m

ust

be

posit

ed,

yet

no

armed

attac

k

 

can

be

alleged

occurre d. In the absence of

 

an

 

armed

attac

k,

self-defe nce is not

availab le to the victim Stat

 

e,

 

so

that neither

Utopi

a

nor

Ru

respo

nd with self-defe nce.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Logical

ly

and

 

pra gmatica

 

lly,

the

 

gap

betw

een

 

Artic

le

 

2(

4)

force’) and Article 51 (‘armed

attack’

)

ou

ght

to

be

quite

 

narro

muc h as ‘ther e is very littl

 

e effec tive protect ion agai nst States

prohibi tion

of

the

use

of

f

orce,

as

 

long

as

the

y

 

do

not

resor

attac

80

If

Utopia

an d

Ru ritania

are

barred

from

 

invo king

the

k’.

 

 

self-defe

nce

against

Arca

dia,

notwithst

andin

g

the

use

of

som

against them, this

 

is

so

merely

because

of

the

applicabil

ity of

the

de minim is non curat. Thatlex is

 

to

sa y, a use of force not tantamo u

armed attac

k

is

simp

ly

not

 

of

 

‘suffici

ent

gravity’

 

(in

the words

of the cons ensus Defin

ition

of

 

 

81

 

 

 

Chapt

er B5),.

An

 

 

 

Aggr supession,ra

 

 

armed attac k pres upposes a

 

use of force pro ducing (or liable to

serious consequ ences, epitomiz ed by territoria

l intrus

ions,

human

ties or cons iderable destruct

 

ion of pro perty. Whe n no such r

engen

dered

by

(o

r

reason ably

 

expec

ted

from)

a

 

recours e

to

fo

51 does

 

not

come

into

play .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In theNica raguacase, the I

 

nternat

ional

Court

of

 

Justi

ce

allud

‘measures which do not constitute an armed attack but may nevertheless

 

 

involve a use of force’,82 and found it ‘necessary to distinguish the most

 

 

grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from

 

 

other less grave forms’83 (a differentiation reiterated in the Oil Platforms

 

 

case of 2003).84 The Judgment in the Nicaragua case envisaged legitimate

 

 

counter-measures, ‘analogous’ to but less grave than self-defence, in

 

 

79

See

Randelzhofer,supra note

71,

at

790.80 Ibid., 791.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

81

General

 

Assembly Resolution

3314,supra note

52,

at

143.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

82

Nicaragua case, supra note 37,

at

110.83

Ibid., 101.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

84

Case

Concerning

Oil

 

Platformsupra,

note

40,

at 1355.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

194

 

 

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

res ponse to use of force wh ich

is

 

le

ss

grave

than

85

 

 

 

 

 

att

 

anWhatarmed

eme

rges

is

a

quadru

ple

 

structure

 

of

 

(i)

se

lf-defe

nce

versus

(

attac

 

k, an d (iii) coun

ter-

measures

analogo

us

to

but

 

sho

rt

 

of

versu

s

 

(iv)

forci

ble

m

easures

short

of

 

an

arme d

attac

k.

This

entire

ly

satisfac tory,

provide

d

that

it

 

is

unders

tood

 

 

that

the

measu

res

comin

g

within

the

fram

ework

of

 

rubri

c

(iii)

cann

ot

use

of

 

 

force,

beca

 

use

 

however

 

‘anal

ogous’

to

self-de fence

 

abse

nce

of

an

arme

d

 

attac

k,

they

 

cannot

cons

titute

 

se

lf

Unfort unately, the Court carefull y

refrai

 

ned

from

ruling

out

the

lity

that such coun ter-m easures

m

ay

involve

 

the

use of

force

 

by

Stat

 

86

Indeed ,

it

was

‘strongl

y

sugg

ested’

in

the

Judgm

ent

th

e.

 

coun ter-m easures may include acts

87

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of Theforce.notion that ‘an unlaw-

ful

use

 

of

 

force

‘‘short

of

’’

an

armed attac k’ can prompt in

‘defe

 

nsive acti on – by

f

orce

also

 

‘‘sho

rt

 

of ’’

Article

51’

 

deve

 

loped by Judge Si mma in his Separa te

OpinionOil Platin formsthe

 

 

case

 

decided

by

the

Court

 

in882003Yet,. this

 

position cann ot be recon

cile d with the te xt of

the

Chart

er. Purs uant to Article 51, on

attac

 

k – and no thing

short

of

an

armed

attac

k

can

precip

ita

reac tion by way of self-defe nce.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Whil e the Court inNicaraguthe

acase

did not paint a clear pic ture

the

similari

ties

and

 

dissi milariti

es

betw

een

the

coun termeasures

fou nd

 

analogo

us,

on

e

striking

differenc

 

e is emphas ized in the

The

 

Court

held

 

tha

t

when

non-self-d efenc

e

coun

 

ter-

measur

empl

oyed,

there

is

 

no

 

coun terpa

rt

to

coll ective

self-de

fence,

 

na

right

 

of

a

thir

d

St

 

ate

to

resort

to

 

force

in

response

to

89

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

theAs wrong

a result,

the

options

of

response

to

forcib

le

 

measu

res

 

short

 

of

attack are substantially reduced.90 Moreover, since the Court did not brand as an armed attack the supply of weapons and logistical support to rebels against a foreign State (see infra, v), a ‘no-man’s-land’ unfolds between the type of military assistance that a third State can legitimately provide and the direct exercise of collective self-defence in response to an armed attack.91

85 Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 110.86 Ibid.

87See J. L. Hargrove, ‘The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense’, 81 AJIL 135, 138 (1987).

88

Case Concerning Oil Platformsupra,

note 40, at 1428, 1433.

89

Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at

110, 127.

90See T. M. Franck, ‘Some Observations on the ICJ’s Procedural and Substantive Innovations’, 81 AJIL 116, 120 (1987).

91See L. B. Sohn, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Scope of the Right of SelfDefense and the Duty of Non-Intervention’, International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne 869, 878 (Y. Dinstein ed., 1989).

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

195

 

 

All

this is

quite

baf

92

gen

erated

by

the

Court

flingThe. confusi on

dicta

is compoun ded by the fact that

it also

dis

tingui shed

be

armed

attack

and ‘a

m

ere fron tier incid

ent’

,

inasmuch

as

an

ar

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

93

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

must have some ‘scale and effecThets’. questio n of a fron tier inciden

particul

arly

bothe rsome

. It stand s to

reason

that,

if

a rifle

shot

an

Arcadian

soldie

r

across

the

bor der

of

Utopi

a

and

the

bullet

or

a

cow, no arme d attack

 

has

 

been

perp

etrated.

But

it

woul

d

to

dism

iss

automa tically

from

 

cons

iderati

on

as

an

armed

atta

fronti

er

incid

ent.

As

aptly

 

put

by

Sir Gerald

Fitzmauri

ce,

‘[t]

fronti

er

incid

ents

and

 

frontier

incid

ents.

Some

are

trivi

al,

som

extreme

ly

gra

94

 

 

 

element

s

of

the

armed

force s

of

 

Ar

 

ve’.W hen

 

amb

ush a borde r patro

l

 

(or

 

some

othe

r

isol

ated

unit)

of

assaul t

 

has

to

rank

as

an

armed

attack

 

an

d

some

sort

of

s

must

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

95

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

be warrante d in respoManynse. fronti er incid ents compri se fair

large

military

engag

ements,

and

an

at

tempt

to

disso

ciate

them

 

fro

form

s of arme d attac

 

k would be spur ious.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The

criteria

 

 

of

‘scale

and

effects’,

as will infrabe ,seenC),

(are

of

 

 

imme

nse

practical

impo

rt.

 

They

are

par

ticular

ly

rel

evant

in

a

whet

her

a

coun ter-

action

take

 

n

in

self-defe nce, in response

 

to

attac

k,

is le

gitimate

.

But

unless

the

scale

 

and

 

effec

ts

are

trif

lin

de minimisthre shold, the

 

y do not contribu te to a deter minat ion

an

arme

d

attack

h

as

 

unfold ed.

There

is

ce

rtainly

no

cause

small

-scale

armed

attac

ks f rom the spectrum of armed

attacks.

word

s

of

W.

 

H.

Taft,

‘[t]he

gra

vity

of

an

attac

k

m

ay

affect

scop

e

of the

defensive

 

use

 

of. . . ,forcebut

it

is

not

releva nt to

deter

ing

wh

ether

there

is

a

right of self-defe nse in

the

96

 

 

 

tanc

firsArticleins

51

‘in

no

way

 

limi

ts

 

itself

to

 

espec ially

large

,

direc

t

or

impo

attac

 

97

 

 

positio n

was

summed up

by

J. L.

K

unz: ‘If

‘‘armed

ks’. The

means illegal armed attack it means, on the other hand, any illegal armed attack, even a small border incident.’98

The fact that an armed attack – justifying self-defence as a response under Article 51 – need not take the shape of a massive military operation, was conceded by the Court in the Nicaragua case when it held that the sending of armed bands into the territory of another State may count as

92 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel,Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 349–50.

93Ibid., 103.

94G. G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Definition of Aggression’, 1 ICLQ 137, 139 (1952).

95See G. M. Badr, ‘The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility’, 10 GJICL 1, 17 (1980).

96W. H. Taft IV, ‘Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision’, 29 YJIL 295, 300 (2004).

97

Hargrove, supra note

87,

at 139.

98

Kunz, supra note 10,

at

878.

196

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

an

 

armed

 

 

99

k(see infra, v)

If

‘low inten

sity’

fight ing

quali

fies,

 

attac

 

‘scal

e

an

d

 

effe cts’

required

as a conditio n for

an

armed

attac

mal

. Intere stingly enough, Oilin

thePlatformcase,

the

Court

speci fically

stat

ed that it ‘d oes

not

exclu

de

the

possibilit

y that the m inin

mili

tary vessel

m

ight

be

sufficient

to

 

bring

into

play

the

‘‘inheren

 

 

 

 

 

100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

self-de fence’’’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

T

he c hoice o f a

rm s

 

b

y

t

he

attack

ing

State

is

imm

ater

ia

b y

the

In

ternational

Court

o

f

Ju

stice,

i

n

its

 

1

996

A

dvi

sor

y

Legality

of the Threat or Use

of

Nuclear , WeaponsAr ticle

51 does n ot ref e

sp

ecific

weap

ons;

it

applies

to

a

ny

arm

ed

a

ttack,

regar

dless

o

em

 

 

101

I

n

 

other

wor

ds,

an

 

arm

ed

 

attack

can

be

carr ied

ployed.

 

 

 

 

conventional

or

 

unconventional,

pr

imit

ive

or

soph

 

isticated,

ordn an

th e o ns et of th e third millenn ium , what especially loom s on t

electronic

‘ com

puter

n

etwork

attack’.

Wh

at

cou

nts h ere

is th

e

of

such

an

 

102

ltIf.

it

were to

cause

f

ataliti

es

 

(r

esulting

,

e.g.,

assau

 

sh

utdown

of

comp uters

controllin

g

w

ater

wo

r

ks

and

dams ,

w

quent

flooding

of

inhabited

areas),

it would

 

qualify

as

103

 

attack.

 

armed

 

iii.

 

 

 

The

locale

of

an

ar

med Ordinaattack rily,

 

an armed attac k (justi

fying

self-defe

nce)

is

mounted

across

 

the

frontier of the aggres so

int

o

the

territ

ory

of

 

the

vict

im

coun

try. How ever, the cross

fron

tier can p recede the armed attac k, wh ich may comme nce f

the

territory of the target State. As mensuprationed, i), At( lantican troops

 

stat

ioned by permiss ion on Pata gonian

soil may commit a con

armed attac k, if they

refu

 

se

to

withd

raw

upon

expiry

of

 

the

ti

for

 

the ir presen ce. In fact, the armed attac

k

need

not

be

constr

Atla

ntican militar y uni t base d in Pa tagonia,

under

the

terms

o

alli

 

ance,

may

in

vio

lation

 

of

the

se

term s – open fire on

pers

onnel

or

 

ins tallations

.

An

Arcadian

warship

adm

itted

 

Utopi

an

port,

ostens

ibly for refuellin g, may

shell

Utopi

an

shore

The

 

use of force withi n a

host

coun

try

by forei gn military uni t

vent

ion

of

the

cond itions

 

of

the

cons

ent

to

the

ir

entry

int

o

Stat

e’s

territ ory,

is

recog

nized

as an act

 

of

agg

ression

under Art

the

Ge

neral

Assem bly’s

 

 

104

 

 

 

 

 

Chapt

er B5).,

 

 

 

 

 

Definitio(seen supra,

 

 

 

 

 

99

Nicaragua case, supra note

37,

at

 

103.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

100 Case Concerning Oil Platformsupra,

note

40,

at

1360.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

101

Advisory

Opinion

onNuclear

Weapons, supra note

1,

at

244.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

102See H. B. Robertson, ‘Self-Defense against Computer Network Attack under International Law’, 76 ILS 121, 140 (M. N. Schmitt and B. T. O’Donnell eds., 2001).

103See Y. Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense’, 76 ILS , ibid., 99, 105.

104 General Assembly Resolution 3314,supra note 52, at 143.

The concept of self-defence

197

An armed attack by Arcadia against Utopia can also involve (either in an active or in a passive way) the territory of a third State. For instance, Utopian targets may be bombed by Arcadian planes operating from airfields located in Ruritania (a country allied with or occupied by Arcadia). Another possibility is that Arcadian troops assault Utopian personnel stationed by consent within the territory of Numidia. As well, the destruction of a Utopian Embassy in Carpathia – brought about by Arcadian agents – will be deemed an armed attack against Utopia (whose embassy was destroyed), no less than Carpathia (in whose territory the act was perpetrated). Thus, the destructive bombings by foreign perpetrators of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 were definitely armed attacks, laying the ground for the exercise of self-defence.105

At times, an armed attack occurs beyond the boundaries of all States. As noted (supra, i), if Arcadia mines a Utopian warship on the high seas, this may amount to an armed attack (depending on the degree of damage ensuing from the explosion), bringing into play the right of self-defence. The situation would be identical if missiles, fired by Numidian armed forces, destroy a satellite put in orbit in outer space by Apollonia.

The State subjected to an armed attack is entitled to resort to self-defence measures against the aggressor, regardless of the geographic point where the attack was delivered. An armed attack need not even be cross-border in nature: it does not have to be perpetrated beyond the frontiers of the aggressor State. If force is used by Patagonia against Atlantican installations (such as a military base or an embassy) legitimately situated within Patagonian territory, this may constitute an armed attack, and Atlantica would be entitled to exercise its right of self-defence against Patagonia.106

In the Tehran case of 1980, the International Court of Justice used the phrase ‘armed attack’ when discussing the takeover by Iranian militants of the United States Embassy in Tehran, and the seizure of the Embassy staff as hostages, in November 1979.107 The reference to an ‘armed attack’ is particularly significant in light of the ill-fated American attempt, in April 1980, to bring about the rescue of the hostages by military means.108 The legality of the rescue mission was not an issue before the

105See R. Wedgwood, ‘Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes against Bin Laden’, 24 YJIL 559, 564 (1999).

106See O. Schachter, ‘International Law in the Hostage Crisis: Implications for Future Cases’, American Hostages in Iran 325, 328 (W. Christopher et al. eds., 1985).

107Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] ICJ Rep. 3, 29, 42.

108See T. L. Stein, ‘Contempt, Crisis, and the Court: The World Court and the Hostage Rescue Attempt’, 76 AJIL 499, 500 n. 8 (1982).

198

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Court.109 Yet,

the

Judgment

 

registered

the

American

plea

 

that

the

o

ation

had

been carried out in exercise of the right of self-defence,

view

to

 

extricating the victims of an

armed

 

attack

 

against

 

th

Embassy.110 In

his

Dissenting

Opinion

in Nicaraguathe

case,

 

Judge

 

 

Schwebel

called that plea ‘a sound legal

evaluation

 

of

 

the

r

attempt’.111

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Whe

n

inter-S

tate

force

 

is

emplo

yed

inside

the

nation al

boun

the

 

acti

ng

State,

one

 

must

not gloss over the rights of

the

sov

ereign

(which other States must respect) . Soverei

gn

rights

 

Stat

e

to

guard

its

borde

rs

 

from

any

unautho

rized

 

entry .

 

Th

been a number of incid ents

 

in wh

ich

na

val

forces

 

of

coa

sta

(e.g.,

Swede

n

an

d

Norw

 

ay)

 

dro

pped

dep

th

charge

s

an

d

det

bottom

mines,

in

order

 

to

 

force

to

the surface

forei gn

submari

ne

ing

 

into

 

int

ernal

or

territ

 

orial

112

 

 

 

 

14(6)

of

the

1958

 

 

 

 

watBothers. Article

Ge

 

neva

 

Convent

ion

on

the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

113

 

 

 

 

 

Territ orial Sea and the Cont iguous

and

Artic

le

20

of

the

1982

Unite

d

Nati ons Conv

ention

on

the

Sea

114

prescr

ibe

that

submari

nes passing through the territ orial se

,

requ ired

to na vigate on the

surfac e and to show their

flag’.

It

i

arg

 

ued

that,

 

neve

rtheless

,

subme

rged

passage

does

not

give

the

Stat

e

a

licenc

e

to

resort

to

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

115

 

 

 

 

ne.

force against the forei gnButsubmarithis

asse

rtion

is

uns

ustainabl

e.

The pract ice of States

amp

ly

dem

that

the

 

use of force by the

coast al State is not ruled ou t,

 

if

makes an unauthorized and submerged entry into the territorial or inter-

 

 

 

nal waters.116 The intrusion by the submerged submarine may be

 

 

 

regarded as an incipient armed attack (see supra, i), and the coastal

 

 

 

State is allowed, therefore, to employ forcible counter-measures by way

 

 

 

of self-defence.117

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

109

Tehran case, supra note

107,

at

43.110 Ibid., 18.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

111

Nicaragua case, supra note

37,

at

292.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

112For the facts, see F. D. Froman, ‘Uncharted Waters: Non-Innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea’, 21 SDLR 625, 680–8 (1983–4).

113Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, 516 UNTS 205, 214.

114United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Official Text, 7.

115See R. Sadurska, ‘Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters: The Erosion of an International Norm’, 10 YJIL 34, 57 (1984–5).

116See D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, I, 297 (1982).

117It has been suggested that the problem can be solved by excluding from the ‘proscribed

categories of article 2(4)’ of the Charter the enforcement by a State of its territorial rights against an illegal incursion. O. Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, 82 Mich.LR 1620, 1626 (1984). But in this writer’s opinion, the span of the prohibition of the use of inter-State force, as articulated in Article 2(4), is subject to no exception other

than self-defence and collective securitysupra(see, Chapter B4,). When one State uses force unilaterally against another, even within its own territory, this must be based on self-defence against an armed attack.

The concept of self-defence

199

The

stat

us

 

of

surface

warships

 

eng

aged

in non-in nocent

 

passag

territ

orial

se a

of the

 

coa

stal

State

 

is

more

118

 

 

 

 

 

 

2)

of

 

 

problemaArticle tic19(.

the

 

L aw

of

 

the

Sea

 

Convent

ion

enum

 

erates

 

a

numbe

r

 

of

act

are

 

inco

nsistent

with

 

innoce

nt

 

119

 

Butsage. some

of

these

 

activities

 

 

pas

 

 

(such

as

serious

p ollution or taking on board

 

an

aircr

aft),

while

with

inn

ocent

passag

e,

cann

ot

 

eve

n

 

remot

ely

be

cons

idered

attac

k.

The

proper

response

on

the

 

part

 

of

the

coast

al

 

St

ate is

the

 

wars

hip

‘to

leave

 

the

territ

orial

 

sea

 

120

Onlyediately’if

.the

war-

 

 

 

 

imm

ship

refu

ses

to

withdra

w,

can

 

there

 

be

an

issue

of

 

an

 

incipi

attac

k.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Whe

n

 

war

 

is

rag

ing

betw

een

Arca

dia

and

Utopia

 

,

Patagon

neutral State – is no

t

only

entitled

 

but

 

is

legally

bound

to

prev

into

its

territ

ory

by

bellig

erent

land

and

air suforcepra,

sChapter(see

 

1,

 

D, (b),i). Should

Arca

dian

aircraft

 

penetra

te

Pa tagonia’s

 

territ

breach

of

 

its

 

neutrali

ty,

their

 

int

rusion

into

 

the

neutral

 

airspac

also

be

viewe

d

as an incipi ent armed attac

k.

Pa tagonian

mili

are

 

acc

ording

ly

allow

ed

to

open

 

fire

 

on

the

Arca

dian

aircra

exerc ise

of

both

the

right

of

self-defe

nce and

the

dut

 

121

of

ne

ies

 

If

long-ra

nge

 

Arca

dian

missiles

 

transit

through

 

Pa tagonian

airsp

en

routeto

 

striki

ng

Utopi

an

targe

ts

Arcadia

is

in

breach

of

the

of

 

 

 

 

122

All

the same, as suming that Patagoni a is militari ly

Patagoni

a.

able

of

shoo

ting

those

missiles

down,

Patago

nia

cannot

be

blam

being

in

violation

of its dut y as

123

Moneutreoveral. ,

sin

ce

the

missil

a

 

are

 

m

erely

overfly

ing

its

territ

ory, it is doubt ful whet her

Pata

treat

their

 

illegal

trans

it

through

its

 

airspace

 

as

 

an

arme

d

att

invoke

the

 

right of

self-de

fence.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

iv. The target of an armed attack The foremost target of an armed attack (justifying counter-measures of self-defence) is the territory of a foreign State or any section thereof – land, water or air – including

118 See D. G. Stephens, ‘The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime Naval/Military Operations’, 29 CWILJ 283, 309 (1998–9).

119 United Nations Convention on the Law of suprathe Sea,note 114, at 6–7.

120Article 30 of the Convention, ibid., 1276.

121M. Bothe is of the opinion that the Patagonian measures are legitimate independently of the issues of armed attack and self-defence. International Law Association, Report of the Committee on Neutrality and Naval Warfare 3 (Cairo, 1992; M. Bothe, Rapporteur). But the traditional laws of neutrality must be adapted to the law of the Charter, which permits a unilateral deviation from the general prohibition of inter-State use of force only in circumstances of self-defence against an armed attack.

122See N. Ronzitti, ‘Missile Warfare and Nuclear Warheads – An Appraisal in the Light of the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, 27 IYHR 251, 256–7 (1997).

123See ibid., 257.

200

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

pers

 

ons

or

property

(o

f

whatever

type)

within

the affecte

d

area

 

obvi

ous

targe t

is

a

m ilitary

uni

t belongin

g

to

the

armed

f

vict

im

State,

statione

d

or in

transit

outside

the

nation

al

t

Ta

king

forci ble measu res agai

nst

any publ ic (military or

civi

li

ation

of

the

victim

St

ate,

located

outside the

nation

al territ

ory,

amoun t

to

an

armed

atta

ck.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D oes the u se of forc e by A rcadia against a private vessel

registered

in

Utopia

but

attacke

d

b

eyond

the

national

bound

qualify

as

an

armed

attack

against

U

topia?

The

consensus

D ef

of Aggression,

in

Article

3(d),ngsb withinri

its

scope

an

attack

on

‘marine

and

air

fleets of

another

124

 

 

g them

separately

State’(lis tin

from

‘sea

or

air forces’;suprasee, Chapter B5,). The expre ssio n ‘fl eets

was

chose

n

advisedly,

s o

as

t

o

exclude

from

the

purview

Defi

nition

the u

se

of

forceadiaby

Arcagainst

a single

or

a

few

com

mercial U topian ve ssels or aircraft, especially when they enter A

jurisdiction.12 5A

reasonable

degree of f orce (in t he form of sear

seizure)

may be

legitimate

against foreign

merchant

 

ships

even

on

high

 

 

12

6

 

e,

the

Un ited

St ates

erred

in

1975,

whe

n

i

seas.

Henc

the temporary seizure of the merchantMayaguezship

by

Cambodian

 

 

naval

units

as

an armed

attack

(invoking

s

elf-defence

to

legitimi

use

 

 

 

 

 

 

127

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of force in response).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An

other

questi

on

is

wh

ether

reco urse

to

force

by

Arca

dia

own territory) against Utopia n na tionals,

away from an y Utopia

ation or vessel , may al so

cons

titute an

armed attack

against

Uto

justifyi

ng coun

ter-for ce

as

self-defe nce).

The answ

er

is

cer tainl

tive

if

the

Utopia

n

victims

are diplom atic envo

ys

 

 

 

128

dig

or visitin g

A more intric ate pro blem

is whether Utopia may treat

as an

arm

the use of force (w ithin

the

boundari

es

of

Arc

adia)

against

Utopian nationals holding no official position. Is an attack against such

 

 

nationals tantamount to an armed attack against Utopia itself, so that

 

 

Utopia is entitled to resort to counter-force in self-defence? D. W. Bowett

 

 

upholds the thesis that the protection of nationals abroad can be looked

 

 

upon

 

as

protection

of

the

State.129

While many scholars

strongly

 

 

124 General Assembly Resolution 3314,supra note 52, at 143.

125See B. Broms, ‘The Definition of Aggression’, 154 RCADI 299, 351 (1977).

126See W. J. Fenrick, ‘Legal Limits on the Use of Force by Canadian Warships Engaged in Law Enforcement’, 18 CYIL 113, 125–45 (1980).

127See J. J. Paust, ‘The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez’, 85 YLJ 774, 791, 800 (1975–6).

128Cf. G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations’, 137 RCADI 419, 535 (1972).

129Bowett, supra note 49, at 91–4.

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

201

 

 

 

 

130

 

 

 

 

that

 

 

131

 

present

writer

agrees

in

 

disag ree, others share

conception.The

 

principle with Bowett, although much

may depend on the circumstanc

the

attack.

The

allegation

 

that

an

attack

against

nationals

abroad

can

be regarded

as

an

attack

 

against

the

132

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Stateswingsitself away from reality:

 

it carries the legal fiction

 

of

 

the

State

to

extreme

and

 

133

 

leng

 

 

illogical

Some

comm

entators

bel ieve that

a

novel

rule

concernin

g

the

tion

of

na

tionals

abroad

is

curren

tly

being

mou lded

in

the

cr

customa

ry

internat

ional

134

 

 

pro

cess is animate d by new ch

 

lawThe.

lenge s to law and order

within

the

intern ational commun ity, in

 

the remarkabl e incre ase in episodes

involving the taking of hostag

othe

r

incid ents

of

transna

tional terroris

m.

If and

when

such

a

becom es a part of customary internationa l law, the p rotection of

abroad m ay join self-de fence as anothe r (and

separate)

exce

ptio

general prohibi tion

of

the

use

of

inter-Stat e

force. Howe

ver,

 

 

 

 

 

135

 

 

 

 

 

independ ent excep tion exists in the meantAtimep .resent, any forcib le

measu res take n in a

forei gn

territ

ory

in

the

interest

of

nation

base d on self-defe

nce

in

res ponse

to

an

armed attack.

We

shall

this topicinfra (Chap

ter

8, A, iii(a).),

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

v.Support of armed bands an d terroristsIn theNica raguacase, the

Internat

ional

Court

of

Justice

held

 

tha t

‘it

may

be

consider

ed

to

that

an

armed

attac

k must be unders tood as inc luding not mer

by

regu

lar

 

armed

forces

across

an

internationa

l

 

bor der’,

but

dispa

tch

of

arme d

bands

 

or

‘irreg

ulars’

into

 

the

territory

of

State.136

The

Court

 

quoted

 

Article

3(g)

of

 

the

 

Gene ral

Assem

Defin

ition

of

Aggr

 

137

 

 

 

 

 

Chapt

er B5),

wh

ich

it

too k

‘to

ession(see supra,

reflect

customa

ry

intern

 

 

 

138

 

’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ational

law

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

130

See J. E. S. Fawcett,

‘Intervention in International Law. A Study of Some Recent

 

103 RCADI 343,

404

(1961);

T.

Schweisfurth,

‘Operations

to

Rescue

Nationals

 

Third

States

Involving

the

Use

 

of

Force

 

in

Relation

to

the

 

Protection

of

Human

 

23 GYIL 159,

162–5 (1980).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

131

See G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from

132

Standpoint

of

the

Rule

of

 

Law’,RCADI92 1,

172–3 (1957).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

See R. Zedalis, ‘Protection of Nationals Abroad: Is Consent the Basis

of

 

Obligation?’,

25TILJ 209,

236–7

 

(1990).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

133

‘[S]ince

population

is

 

one of the attributes of statehood,

 

an

attack upon

a

 

population would seem to be just as much

an

attack

upon

that

state

as

would

 

upon its territory.’ C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and

 

the

United

States’

134

Operation against Libya’, WVLR89

933,

941

(1986–7).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

See N. Ronzitti,Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention o

 

Grounds of Humanity65–8 (1985).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

135

See ibid., 64–5.

136

Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 103.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

137

General

Assembly

Resolution

3314,supra note

 

52,

at

143.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

138

Nicaragua case, supra note

37,

at

 

103.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

202

 

 

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

It

 

 

 

may

 

be

 

 

adde

 

d

 

that,

 

under

the

Decl

aration

 

on

Prin

c

Interna

tional

L aw

 

Conc

erning

 

Friendly

Relati ons

and

 

Co-ope

among

States

in

acc

ordance

 

with

the

 

Chart

er

of

the

 

United

 

adop

ted

 

unanim

ously

by

the

 

Gene

ral

Assembly

in

1970,

‘ever

has

 

the

 

dut y

 

to

refrain

from

organizi

ng

or

 

encouragi

ng

 

the

org

of

irregul

ar

forces

or

armed

. bands. . for

 

incurs

ion

into

the

 

territory

o

anot

her

 

 

 

139

The

 

Draft

Code

of

O

 

ffences

agai

nst

 

the

 

Peac

 

State’.

 

 

 

 

 

Secu

rity

 

of

Ma

 

nkind,

formulat

ed

by

the

Interna

tional

 

Law

Com

in 1954, liste d among these offence

s

the

organ ization

 

(or

the

e

men

t

 

of

 

org

anizatio

n)

by

the

 

authori

ties

 

of

a

State

of

 

armed

incurs

 

ions

 

into

 

 

the

 

ter

ritory

of

anot

 

her

State,

direct

 

supp

ort

incurs

 

ions,

 

and

 

eve

n

the

toleration

of

the

use

of

the

lo

cal

te

base

 

of

 

operati

ons

 

by

armed

bands

 

agai nst

 

 

140

r

State.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

anothe

 

 

 

 

Si

nce

 

assaul

ts

 

by

irregul

ar

 

tro

ops,

 

armed

bands

or

 

terroris

ts

call

 

y

 

cond ucted by small groups, empl

 

oying h it-and-run

pin-pr ic

the

 

questio

n

whether

the

y

are

of

‘suffi

cient

gra

vity’

 

andde

rea

minim

 

isthre

shold

 

of

an

 

armed

attack

 

or

of

the

consensus

Defin

Aggr

ession

 

is

clearly

 

141

osite(se sup

ra, ii). This is not to

say

tha

 

app

eve

 

ry

sin

gle

incid

ent,

 

scrutini

zed

ind

epend

 

ently,

has

to

m

eet

t

of

suffi

 

cient

gra

vity.

A

persua

sive

 

arg

ume

 

nt

can

be

 

mad

e

 

th

dis

tinctive

 

p

attern

of

 

behaviou

r

 

emerge

,

a

se

ries

of

pin-pr

i

might

 

be weig hed in its totality and

 

coun

 

t

as

an

142

 

 

 

attac

 

 

 

arm(seed

infr

 

,a

 

Chapt er 8, A,ii).(a),

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The

Ju

dgment

in Nicarathe

guacase

prono

unced

that

‘whi

 

le

the

co

cept

 

of

 

 

an

armed

 

attack

inclu

des

 

the

despatch

by

on

e

St

ate

ban

 

ds

into

the

 

territory

of

anot

her State,

the

supp

ly

of

 

arms

supp

ort

 

to

such

 

bands

cann

ot

be

equ ated with

143

 

 

 

 

 

k

 

 

armedTheattac

Court

 

 

did

 

‘n

ot

belie

ve’

tha

t

‘assistanc

e

 

to

rebe

ls

 

in

 

the

 

pro

 

vision

 

of

wea

pons

 

or

lo

gistical

or

other

supp

ort’

rates

as

attac

 

144

The se

 

are

 

sweepi ng

 

stat

ements

that

ought

to

be

na

k.

 

 

 

 

 

down

145

In

 

his

 

Diss

enting

Opin

ion,

Judge

Jenn ings

expr

esse

d

 

 

.

 

 

 

 

that,

whereas ‘the mere pro vision of arms cannot b e said

to

amo

armed attack’, it may qualify as such when coupled with ‘logistical or

 

 

 

139General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 25 RGA 121, 123 (1970).

140Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission, 6th Session, [1954] II ILC Ybk 140, 149, 151 (Article 2(4)).

141See V. Cassin, W. Debevoise, H. Kailes and T. W. Thompson, ‘The Definition of Aggression’, 16 HILJ 589, 607–8 (1975).

142See Y. Z. Blum, ‘State Response to Acts of Terrorism’, 19 GYIL 223, 233 (1976).

143

Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at

126–7.144 Ibid., 104.

145

See Randelzhofer,supra note 71,

at 801.

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

203

 

 

othe

r supp

146

 

an other dissent, Judge Schw ebel stres sed the

ort’.In

‘subs

tantial

 

invo

lvement

 

therei

n’

 

 

(a

ppearing

 

in

 

Article

 

3(g)

Defin ition

 

of

Aggr

ession

),

 

which

 

are

inco

 

mpatible

with

 

the

l

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

147

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

used by the maj ority.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Whe n

terro

rists

are

sponsor ed

 

by

Arcadia

 

agai

nst

Utopia

,

the

deeme ddefa ctoorg

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

148

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a

State

of

ans’ of Arca dia‘[T]he. imputa bility to

terro

rist

act

is

unqu

estionabl

e

if

evid

ence

 

is

pro

vided

that

th

such

act

 

was

a

State

 

org

an

 

acti

 

ng

in

149

Armscapaci shipty.’

ments

 

 

 

 

 

that

 

 

alone

may

 

not

be

equiva

lent

 

to

an

 

 

150

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

d

attack

is

 

 

 

arme dButattackn.arme

not exten

 

uated

b

y

the

subter fuge

of

ind

irect

agg

ression

or

by r

 

151

There

is

no

 

real

differe nce betw

een

 

the

activation

surrogat e.

 

 

 

 

coun

try’s

 

regula

r

 

armed

force s and a military operatio n carri

one

remove

 

,

pullin

g

 

the

strings

of

a

terr orist

organ

ization

(not

assoc

iated

 

with

the

governme

 

ntal

apparatus) .

 

 

Not

on

e

iota

is

di

from

the

full

impl

ications of State respo nsibility if a ‘grou

p

of

p

fact

acting

 

on

the

instru

ctions of, or unde r

the

direc

tion

 

or

cont

State

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

152

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in carryin g out the conduc t’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An

issue

 

that

 

arose

 

inNicarathe

guaJudgme

nt

 

was

the

‘d egree

o

depen dence

on

the

on

e

side

an

d

contr

ol

on

the

othe

r’

that

hostile parami litary groups with org

ans

 

of

the

 

 

153

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

forei Thegn StCourtate.

 

 

held

that

 

wh

at

is

requ

ired

 

is

‘effective

contro

l’

of

the

opera ti

State.154 In

 

1999,

the Appeals Chambe r of the Interna tional Cri

Trib

unal

 

for

the

Former

Yug oslavia

(ICTY),Tadicin casthe ,

sha

rply

 

contested the Nicaragua test of ‘effective control’, maintaining that it is

 

 

inconsonant with logic and with law.155 The ICTY Appeals Chamber

 

 

pronounced that acts performed by members of a paramilitary group

 

 

organized by a foreign State may be considered ‘acts of de facto State

 

 

organs regardless of

any

specific

instruction

by

the

 

controlling State

 

 

146 Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 543.147 Ibid., 349.

148R. Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’, [1972] II ILC Ybk 71, 120.

149L. Condorelli, ‘The Imputability to States of Acts of International Terrorism’, 19 IYHR 233, 234 (1989).

150See J. P. Rowles, ‘‘‘Secret Wars’’, Self-Defense and the Charter – A Reply to Professor Moore’, 80 AJIL 568, 579 (1986).

151See M. A. Harry, ‘The Right of Self-Defense and the Use of Armed Force against States Aiding Insurgency’, 11 SIULJ 1289, 1299 (1986–7).

152The quotation is from Article 8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as formulated by the International Law Commission, Report of the 53rd Session 43, 45 (mimeo-

graphed, 2001).

153 Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 62.154 Ibid., 65.

155Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-94–1-A, Appeals Chamber, 1999, 38 ILM 1518, 1540–5 (1999).

204

 

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

conc

erning

the

commissi on

of eac

h

of

156

 

 

 

focus

ed

thoseTheacts’ICTY.

on

the

subord inatio n of the

group

 

to

overa ll

cont rol by the fo

that

 

State

does

no t

have to

issue

specific

ins

tructions

for the

di

eve

ry

individua l operati on, nor do es it have

to

se

lect

157

 

 

concrete

Ter

 

rorists

can

thus act quite au tonomo

usly

and

stillde faremaincto

org

ans

of

 

the

cont

rolling

 

State.

 

Notwi

thstandi ng

the

disagr

bet

ween the

two

internationa

l

trib

unals,

it

must

be

 

app recia

both

actually

agree

on

the

fund

amenta

l

thesi

s

that

at

som

e

line

 

is

cross ed,

and

the

acts

of

terro

rists

can

be

imput

ed

to

a

(bb)An armed attack by non-St ate actor s

Whereas Article 2(4) of the Charter, in proscribing the use of force, refers solely to ‘Members . . . in their international relations’ (see supra, Chapt er 4, Ba)), (–i.e. State actors on both sides – Artic le 51 me a State (a Member of the United Nations) only as the potential target of

an armed attack. The perpetrator of that armed attack is not identified necessarily as a State.158 An armed attack can therefore be carried out by non-State actors.

It is true that in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice enunciated:

Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of selfdefence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.159

However, as correctly observed by Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion:

There is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates that selfdefence is available only when an armed attack is made by a State.160

Similar criticism was expressed in the Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans161 and in the Declaration of Judge Buergenthal.162 Indeed, the Court itself noted without demur Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (see infra), drawing a distinction between the situation contemplated by them (cross-border terrorism) and occupied territories.163

Of course, when non-State actors attack a State from within – and no other State is involved – this is a case of either an internal armed conflict or domestic terrorism. In neither instance does Article 51 come into play

156 Ibid., 1545. 157 Ibid.

158See S. D. Murphy, ‘Terrorism and the Concept of ‘‘Armed Attack’’ in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter’, 43 HILJ 41, 50 (2002).

159Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , 2004, 43 ILM 1009, 1050 (2004).

160Ibid., 1063. 161 Ibid., 1072. 162 Ibid., 1079. 163 Ibid., 1050.

 

 

The concept of self-defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

205

 

 

 

 

at all. An arme d attac k

agai nst

a State, in the meaning

of

Artic

some

element

extern al

to

the

vict

im

State.

Non-Stat

e

actors

 

must

a

State

from

the

 

ou

tside.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In

theo

ry,

terro

rists

can

attack

 

a

St

ate

 

wi

thin

or

from

 

an

 

the juri sdiction of all St

ates,

to

 

wit,

the

 

high

seas

or

oute

r

 

terro

rist

 

attacks

may

consti

tute

piracy

as

defined

in

Article

15

of

Gene

va

 

Convent

ion

on

the

 

164

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

101

of

the

 

1982

 

High orSeasin Article

 

UN Conve ntion on the

Law

of

165

 

 

 

 

 

 

wh en

an

attac k

 

 

theHowSea ever,.

 

launche d against Utopia by non-

State

actors

opera

ting

from

out

territ

ory,

the

violent

actio

n

m

ay

be

expecte

d

 

to

ori

ginate

 

in

 

a

(Arcadi a). Tha t does no

t den ote that the Arcadian Govern men

sarily

implicat

ed

in

the

attac

k.

 

Terro

rists

 

 

or

 

members

of

 

arme

who

do

no

t

quali defy

fas ctoorg‘

ans’

 

of Arcadia su(seepra,

(aa),i)

may

 

 

 

still use

Arcadian

te rritory

 

eithe r as a springbo ard

for

striki

 

ng

a

as

a

have n for regrou ping thereafter (or both). In

 

other

word

s,

State

actors may establi sh within

Arcadian

territory

 

their

base

of

 

tions.

The

usual

 

patte

rn

 

woul

d

 

cons

ist

 

of

terro

rists

 

or

arm

locat

ed in Arcadia – witho ut being ins pired or pro dded

by

th

Govern ment

 

(and

wh

ile

 

possibly

taking

 

evasi

ve

 

actio

n

 

again

Arcadian

 

security

forces)

emergin

g,

when

 

the

oppor

tunity

pr

itself,

for

hit-an

d-run

attacks

against

 

Utopi

a

 

and

 

the

n

return

Arcadia

f

or

 

shelt

er.

Arcadia

m

ay

actu

ally

 

be

a

 

‘fai

led

State’,

in

a

te

 

mporar y

situatio

 

n

of

to

tal

colla

 

pse

of

 

the

166

 

 

 

a

 

 

 

 

State

 

Alterna tively,

Arca

dia

cons

train

ed

by

polit

 

ical

 

or

 

military

 

c

tions

– m ay passiv ely tolerate the use

of

 

its

 

soil

 

by

terroris

ts

bands

operati

ng

agai

nst

Utopi

a,

without

activ

ely

sponsor

ing

the

ities

or

eve

n

encouragi ng

167

 

 

 

 

eve

nt,

 

if

 

self-de

fence

is

to

themIn. any

 

 

exerc ised by Utopi a against the te rrorists or the armed bands, an measures will have to take place ‘in the territory of a state where the attackers are headquartered or have taken refuge’,168 i.e. Arcadia.

In the Corfu Channel case of 1949, the International Court of Justice pronounced that every State is under an obligation ‘not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other

164 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958, 450 UNTS 82, 90.

165 United Nations Convention on the Law of suprathe Sea,note 114, at 34.

166See C. Stahn, ‘International Law at a Crossroads? The Impact of September 11’, 62 ZAORV 183, 214–5, 222–3 (2002).

167On the difference between State terrorism, State-assisted or State-encouraged terrorism, and State-tolerated terrorism, see S. Sucharitkul, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime: Questions of Responsibility and Complicity’, 19 IYHR 247, 256–7 (1989).

168See J. Delbru¨ck, ‘The Fight against Global Terrorism: Self-Defense or Collective Security as International Police Action? Some Comments on the International Legal Implications of the ‘‘War against Terrorism’’’, 44 GYIL 9, 15 (2001).

206

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

Stat

169

Ac

cordingl

y, a

State must not know ingly permit its

terr

es’.

be

used

as

a

sanctuary

for

terro rists

or

armed

ban ds

ben t

o

mili

tary

targe

ts

or

civili

an

objects in anothe r coun try.

It is

irre

the

to leration

by

a

St ate of

acti vities

by

terroris

ts or

armed

ban

agai

nst

an

other

country,

is

170

the 1954

Draft

Code

of

unlawfuUnderl.

Offe nces against the Peac e an d Securit y of Manki nd, as form u

Interna tional

 

Law Com

mission, such to

leration

eve n

 

cons

titutes

 

under

int

ernational

 

171

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

law(see sup ra, (aa), v).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In

its

Judgme nt

 

of

1980, Tehranin thecase,

 

the

Internat

ional

Court

of

Justi

ce

held

 

that,

if

the

au

thorities

of

one

 

State

are

 

requ

ired

u

nation

al

 

law

to take app ropriate acts

 

in

order

to

prote

ct

the

i

anot her Stat e, and – while the y have the means

 

at

their

disposa

compl

etel

y

fail

to

 

compl

y

with

 

their

 

obligat ions,

the

inac

tive

 

int

ernational

 

respo

nsibility

 

tow ards

the

 

 

172

 

 

 

 

a

State

 

 

 

 

 

othe

r Indeed,State.

 

 

 

that

 

does

not

fulfil

 

its

int

ernational

obligat

ion

of

 

‘vig

ilance

’,

an

its

speci

fic

duty

no t

to

tolera te

the

prep

aration

in

its ter ritor

wh ich are direc ted against

 

a

foreign

 

Gov

ernmen

t

or

whic

h

mi

ger

 

the

latter’s

secu

rity’,

 

assum

es

intern

ational

 

responsibil

ity

 

f

int

ernational

 

wrong

 

ful

act

of

173

 

 

 

 

ra,

Chapt

 

er 4, a))F,. (

 

 

 

 

omission(see sup

 

 

 

Irres

pective

of

que

stions

 

of

State

respo

nsibility,

the

pr

incipal

 

wh

ether

 

acts

of

vio

lence

 

unl

eashed

 

against

 

Utopi

a

from

Arca

d

tory

 

by

terro

rists

 

or

 

arme

d

bands

 

 

not

 

spons

ored

by

 

Arcad

amoun

t

to an armed attack within the meani ng of

Artic

le

51

 

Chart

er

(thereby triggeri ng the right of self-de fence).

 

The

simp

l

sition that forci ble action taken

against

a

State

m

ay

 

consti

tute

 

attac

k,

even

if

the

perpet

 

rators

 

are

non-S

 

tate

actors

operati

ng

forei

gn

State

al

beit

no

 

t

org

ans

of

the

latt

er

State

was

uphe

ld

in

previous

edi tions

of

the

 

p

 

174

 

 

 

 

 

 

st,

man

y

 

resentIn bookthe .pa

commentators admit tedly argued t hat t he expression ‘armed atta Article 51 does not apply to every armed attack, ‘regardless of the source’, but only to an armed attack by another State.175 However, all lingering doubts on this issue have been dispelled as a result of the

169Corfu Channel case (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, 22.

170See I. Brownlie, ‘International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands’, 7 ICLQ 712, 734 (1958).

171

Draft Code of Offences against the

Peace and Security ofsupraMankind,ote140, at

172

151 (Article 2(4)).

 

Tehran case, supra note 107, at 32–3,

44.

173Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’, [1972] II ILC Ybk 71, 120.

174See pp. 213–15 of the 3rd ed. of this book (2001).

175See, e.g., O. Schachter, ‘The Lawful Use of Force by a State against Terrorists in Another Country’, 19 IYHR 209, 216 (1989).

The concept of self-defence

207

response of the international community to the shocking events of 9 September 2001 (9/11).176

The attacks against the United States on 9/11 were mounted by the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization masterminded from within Talibanled Afghanistan but not controlled by that State (indeed, there were indications that the Taliban regime was to some extent controlled by Al-Qaeda).177 The terrorists hijacked passenger airliners within the US and used them as explosive devices, bringing about the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and causing serious damage to the Pentagon, with thousands of human lives lost. The fact that these acts amounted to an armed attack – laying the ground for the exercise of self-defence pursuant to Article 51 – has been fully corroborated by a number of legal measures taken by international bodies:

i.Both in Resolution 1368 (2001)178 – adopted a day after 9/11 – and in Resolution 1373 (2001),179 the Security Council recognized and reaffirmed in this context ‘the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence in accordance with the Charter’. Complaining that the Security

Council refers to ‘horrifying terrorist attacks’ – without mentioning specifically the expression ‘armed attack’180 – stands the argument on its head. If the right of self-defence can be actuated, this ineluctably implies that an armed attack is concerned. The whole point about the contention that an armed attack has indeed taken place on 9/11 is that this would warrant the exercise of the right of self-defence, a right recognized and reaffirmed by the Security Council.

ii.The day after the attack, the North Atlantic Council also met and

‘agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States,181 it shall be regarded as an action

176Even those who regard as ‘problematic to say the least’ the categorization of terrorist action as an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51, have to concede that the response of the international community to 9/11 has left its mark on the law. See E. P. J. Myjer and N. D. White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?’, 7 JCSL 5, 7–9 (2002).

177The situation seemed to ‘reverse the traditional formula of state-sponsored terrorism: Afghanistan was a terrorist-sponsored state’. M. J. Glennon, ‘The Fog of Law: SelfDefense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’, 25 HJLPP 539, 544 n. 17 (2001–2).

178Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001), [2001–2] RDSC 290, 291.

179Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), [2001–2] RDSC 291, id .

180See M. A. Drumbl, ‘Victimhood in our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order’, 81 NCLR 1, 29 (2002–3).

181Such a factual determination was made subsequently on the basis of additional information. See J. M. Beard, ‘America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under International Law’, 25 HJLPP 559, 568 (2001–2).

208

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

covered by Article 5 of the Washington

Tre

aty,

wh

ich

states

armed attac k agai nst one or more of

the

Allies in Europe

America

 

‘s hall

be

consider ed

an

attac

k

against182theIt

mis

all’.

notewort hy that this was the firs t time

in the history of N

Article

5

of

 

the

1949

(Washi

ngton

)

Nort h

Atlant

ic

Tre

invoked.

 

The

 

Article

,

whic h

uses

the

expres

sion

‘arme

 

d

does so

 

explic

itly

in

the cont ext

of

Article

51

of

the

UN

C

the

right

of

 

 

183

e.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

se lf-defenc

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

iii. In

a

Septe

mber

2001

meeting

of

the

Min isters

of

Fore

ig

acting as an Orga n of Cons ultation, in app lication of the 194

Janeiro)

Inter-A

merican

Treaty

 

of

 

 

Recipro cal

As

sistance

,

i

resolved

that

‘these

terrorist

attacks

against

the

United

States

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

184

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

America are attacks against all American States’This. must be

 

understood in light of Article 3 of

 

 

the

Rio

Treaty,

which

refer

fically

to

an

armed

attack

and

to

the

right

of

self-defence

purs

Article 51 (seeinfra, Chapter 9,

 

 

185

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

aB)), . (

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The

fact

that

terro

rist

attac

ks quali

 

fy as arme d attac ks

mean

are

subjec

t

to

the

full applica

tion

 

of

 

Art

icle 51:

no

m

ore

an

d

the present writer cannot accept

the

 

argument

made¨

byllersonR.

Muthat

 

wh ereas

self-defe

nce

 

against

an

armed

at

tack

by

 

a

 

State

 

m

mini

mum)

be

int

erceptive

rather

 

than

anticip ato

ry

 

purely

pr

measu res

are justified

 

against

terro

 

rist

186

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

attacks.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C.

 

Condit

ions prece dent to the

exerc

ise

of

 

self-defen

The Internat ional Court of

Justice

point

ed out,Nicaraguin theacase,

 

 

that

Article

51

‘does

 

not contain

any

 

 

spe cific

rule

wh

 

ereby

self-

woul d warrant on ly measures which are

pro

portion

al

to the

arm

and

nece

ssary

to

res

pond

to

it,

a

 

rule

well

establi

 

shed

in

 

 

 

 

 

187

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Opinion

onLegalitythe

 

of

the

 

int ernational law ’.In its 1996 Advisory

 

 

 

Thre

at

or

Use

of Nucl ear We, theaponsCourt

 

– citing the se words

ad

that

‘[t]h

e

submi

ssion

of

the

exerc

ise

of

the

right

of

self-defe

cond itions

of

necess

 

ity

and

 

propo

rtionalit y

is

a

 

rule

of

c

182 North

Atlantic

Treaty

Organization

(NATO):

Statement

by

the

 

North

Atlan

Council, 2001, 40 ILM 1267, id. (2001).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

183North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, 34 UNTS 243, 246.

184Organization of American States (OAS): on Terrorist Threat to the Americas, 2001, 40 ILM 1273, id. (2001).

185Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947, 21 UNTS 77, 95.

186See R. Mu¨llerson, ‘Jus ad Bellum and International Terrorism’, 32 IYHR 1, 41–2 (2002).

187Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 94.

The concept of self-defence

209

intern

ational

law

’,

but

‘[t]his

dua

l

cond

ition

app lies

equ

ally

to

of

 

the

Charter,

whateve

r

the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

188

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

means of force emploTheyed’two.

 

 

cond

itions

 

of

necessity

and

propo

rtionalit

y

 

were

reaffi

rmed

Court

in

its

Judgme

nt

of

2003Oilin Platformthe

case.189

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In fact, the two conditio ns of

 

necessity and pro portion ality are

panied by

 

a

third

conditio

n

of

immediac

 

y.

 

As

infrawill (Chaptebese enr

 

8, B, c)),( these

three

cond

itions

 

are

distilled

from

yardstick

s

set

the

Americ an Secret ary of St ate,

D.

Web

ster,

more

than 160

 

The

thre

e

conditi

ons

will

be

dinfrassected, in

the

cont

exts

of

the

differe nt modes of self-de fence,

 

in

Chapt8. Still,er in

broad

 

outline,

the

first

cond

ition

of

 

necess

ity

ent

ails

the

 

follow

ing

require ments:

(i)

 

It

is

 

incum

bent on

the

State

invoki

 

ng

self-defe

nce

(Utopia)

 

 

lish

in

 

a

defini

te

man

ner

 

that

 

an

 

armed

attac

k was

launc

 

 

par

ticular

country

(Arcadia

)

 

and

 

no othe r (Rurit ania). As s

 

 

the Oil

 

Platformcase,

this

is

especial

ly

true

if

during

a

war

b

 

 

Arca dia and Ruritan ia

– da

 

mage is caused to a

 

Utopia

n

ne

 

 

by

an

 

incoming

m

issile

or

 

the expl osion of a m ine: conc

 

 

den

ce

is requ

ired

that

the

 

attac

k

was

 

carri

ed

out

by

Arca

 

 

by

Ruritan

190

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ia.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(ii)

 

Utopia

must

verify

that the

use of force amounted to a genuin

 

 

attack and not to a mere accident

 

or

mistake

for

 

which

Arcad

 

 

incur State responsibility without, however, bearing the

blame

for

 

 

armed

 

attack.

In

theOil

Platformscase,

the

 

Court

took

 

the

position

 

 

that the attack must be ‘aimed

specifically’

 

at the

 

191

 

 

 

 

 

 

target Ifcountry

 

 

this

specificity

implies

that

Arcadia

does

not

incur

 

full

responsi

 

 

for an indiscriminate attack (e.g., through mine-laying carried ou

 

 

international

shipping

lanes)

 

without

due

 

regard

for

the

possi

 

 

that

a

 

Utopian

objective

can

 

be

the

eventual

victim

then

the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

192

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

went too far. But, in all likelihood, the Court’s dictum ought to

 

 

construed narrowly against the factual background of the case

 

 

Iran–Iraq War). Thus, when

in

the course of war between

 

 

and Numidia – a neutral Utopian objective is struck by Arcadi

 

 

necessary to determine whether the attack was ‘aimed specifically

 

 

Utopia

(as

opposed

to

Numidia)

and

that

 

the

Utopian

objective

 

 

not

fall

prey

to

a

mistaken

 

193

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

identity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(ii

i)

Utopia

must

ascertain

that

there

 

exists

a

 

necessity

to

rely

on

 

 

response

to

the

armed

attack

 

because

no

realistic

alternative

188 Advisory Opinion onNuclear

Weapons, supra note

1,

at

 

245.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

189 Case Concerning Oil Platformsupra,

note

40,

at

1361–2.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

190

Ibid., 1356–7, 1360.

191

Ibid., 1358.

192

See

Taft,supra note

96, at

302–3.

 

 

 

193

See C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 119 (2nd ed., 2004).

 

 

 

 

 

 

210

 

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of

redres

s

is

 

 

194

 

 

 

 

 

word

s, ‘force sho uld not be

 

 

avail ableIn. other

 

 

sidered

nece

ssary

until

peac

 

eful

m

easures have

 

been

 

f

 

ound

 

or wh en they clearly

woul

d

 

195

futiIf effortle’. s

to

resol

 

ve

th

 

 

be

 

 

problem

amicabl

y

are

m ade,

 

they

should

be

 

carri

ed

 

ou

t

 

faith an d no t only as

 

a

m

atter

of

 

196

 

punctili o’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

‘ritual

 

 

 

 

 

The

se

 

cond

 

conditi

on

of

pro

portion ality

is

 

frequ

ently

 

dep

ic

the

esse nce of self-de

197

 

 

ver,

as

corre

ctly

remarked

 

 

by

Ag

fence’Howe.

 

 

the

 

princi

ple

of

proportion

 

ality

 

must

be

app

lied

 

with

 

some

d

flex

 

 

198

W

e

shall

discuin ssfra(Chap

 

ter

8A,) the differe nt implica-

ibility.

 

 

tions

of

 

propo

rtionalit

y,

depen

ding

on

wh

ether

the

m

easures

self-de

fence

consti

tute

war

or are ‘sh ort of war’. It is perh aps

at

the

dem

and for

propo

rtionalit

y

in

the

provinc

e

of

 

self-de

stand

ard

 

of

reason ablen

ess

in

 

the

 

respo

nse

to

force

 

199

 

 

 

te

 

 

 

by

coun

Im mediacy signifies that there

 

must

not

 

be

an undue time -lag

 

the

armed

attac

k

and

the

 

exercise

 

of

self-de

fence.

 

Agai

n,

 

this

 

oug ht not to be constru ed

 

200

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ost

una

voi

 

too strictlyLapse. of time is alm

able

when

 

in

a

desire

to

 

fulfil

 

letter

and

spir

it

the

conditio

n

o

a tedious

 

 

pro

cess

of

informat

ion

 

gathe

ring

or

diplom

atic

neg

evo

lves.

The

first

pha

se

of

 

the

 

Gulf

War

is

a prime exampl e. T

of Kuw ait by Iraq took place on

2

August 1990,

yet

the

 

Securit

autho rized the use of ‘all

 

nece

ssary

means’

only

as

from

15

1991,201 namely

,

after

almost

 

h alf a yearin fra, (seeChapter

8,

A, iii(b).),

 

 

In theNica raguacase , the Court

 

rejecte

d

 

on

other ground s a c

(col

lective) self-defe nce by

 

the United States . As a result, no d

res

pect

of

 

necess

ity

and

propo

rtionalit

y

(or

imm

ediacy)

was

stri

cto

 

 

202

All

the

same,

 

the

 

Court

comme

nted

that

the

cond

sensu.

 

 

of necessity (coupled with the condition of immediacy) was not fulfilled, inasmuch as the United States commenced its activities several months after the presumed armed attack had occurred and when the main danger could be eliminated in a different manner.203 The condition of proportionality was not met either, according to the Judgment, in view of the relative scale of the initial measures and counter-measures.204 But it must

194 See Ago,supra note 17, at 69.195 See Schachter,supra note 117, at 1635.

196N. Rostow, ‘Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revisited’, 11 YJIL 437, 455 (1985–6).

197I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 279 n. 2 (1963).

198 Ago, supra note 17, at 69.

199See K. W. Quigley, ‘A Framework for Evaluating the Legality of the United States Intervention in Nicaragua’, 17 NYUJILP 155, 180 (1984–5).

200See K. C. Kenny, ‘Self-Defence’, United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, II, 1162, 1167 (R. Wolfrum ed., 1995).

201Security Council Resolution 678, 45 RDSC 27, 27–8 (1990).

202Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 122.203 Ibid. 204 Ibid.

 

The concept of self-defence

211

be

no ted that Ju dge Schw

ebel stron gly disag reed wi th these

ings

205

ion.

in his Dissent ing Opin

D. The ro le of the Securi ty C ouncil

(a)The two phases rule

The excuse of self-defe nce has oft en been

use

d

by agg

ressor

scoring propa ganda points. Brut al armed

 

attac ks have taken plac

the

attackin

g

St ate

sancti

monious

ly

as

sured

worl

d

publ

ic

opi

was

only

respondi

ng with coun ter-for

ce

to the (my thical) use o

the othe r side. If

eve ry St ate were the

 

final arbiter of the le ga

acts, if eve ry State could cl oak an arme d

atta

ck

with

the

disg

defence

,

the

intern

ational

leg

al

endeavo

ur

to

hold

force

in

che

have been an exerc ise in futili ty.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From

 

anoth

er

perspe

ctive,

the

gist

of

self-def ence

is

se

lf-h

supra, A, (a)). The

facts of life at present are

such tha t a State

c

with an armed atta ck cannot se riously

expec

t

an

effec

tive

inte

police force

to

come

 

to

its

aid

and

repel

 

the agginfraressor, Chapt(seeer

 

 

10, C). The State under attack has no choice

but

to

defend

itself

 

can.

It

must

also

act

without

undue loss

 

of

time,

and,

 

most

cer

cann ot afford the luxu ry of waiting for

 

any

juri dical

(le

t

alon

scrutiny of the situati on to

 

run

its

cours

 

e.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The

upshot

is

that

the

process

of

self-defe

nce

must

 

consist

 

sepa

rate

 

206

 

 

on e

is

when

the

opt

ion

of

reco

urse

t

stage s.Phase

defence

is

left

to

the

unfett

ered discreti

on of the vict im State

third

State

ready

to

oppose

 

the

aggres

sor).

The

acti

ng

 

St

ate

d

whet her the occasion calls for the use

of

 

forcible measures in se lf

and,

if

so,

what specific

steps

ought

to

be

ta

ken.

But

all

 

this

is

 

In the se cond an d f inal pha se, a compe tent int ernational foru

empowe red to review the whole

flow

of eve nts and to gauge

the

the force

empl oyed. Above all,

the compe tent

forum must be au

to arriv e at the conclu sion that the

banne r

of self-defe nce

has

brandi shed by an agg ressor.

 

 

 

 

The Ju dgment of the Interna tional Milit ary TribNurembeunalrgfullyat

 

endo rsed

the two stages conce

pt:

 

 

 

It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accordance wi reservations made by many of the Signatory Powers at the time of the co of the Kellogg–Briand Pact, whether preventive action was a necessity, and

205 Ibid., 362–9. 206 See Oppenheim,supra note 57, at 187–8.

212

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

making

her decision

her judgment

was conclusive.

But

whether

action

t

under

the claim of

self-defense was

in fact

aggressive

or

defensive

must

ult

be subject to investigation and adjudication

if international law

is ever

enforced.207

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Internat ional Military Trib unal for the FarTokyoEastrephat rased the sam e idea in its own word s:

The

right of self-defence involves the right of the State

 

threatened

with

imp

attack

to judge

 

for

itself

 

in

the

first

instance whether it is justified

 

in

 

re

force.

Under

the

most liberal

interpretation

of the

Kellogg–Briand

 

Pact,

the

of

self-defence

does

not

confer

upon

the

State

resorting

to

 

war

the

auth

make

a final determination upon the

justification

for

20

 

8

action.

 

 

 

 

 

 

its

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The

 

decisive

 

issue,

of

cours

e,

is

whet

her

a

 

 

compete

nt

 

int

e

foru

m has actually been assi gned

 

the

task

of

invest igating

 

the

l

any

 

forci ble measu res ta ken by

a St ate in rel iance on se lf-de

the

 

great

achiev

ement

 

s

of

 

the

UN

Chart

er

is

 

that

 

Article

 

51

e

Secu

rity

Counci

l

to

 

undert

ake

a

 

review

of

self-defe

nce

claims

Me mber

St ates.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The

 

Secu

rity

Council

 

is

the

 

sole

int ernational

 

org

an

men

in

Art

icle

51.

 

Nev ertheless,

as

 

the 1986 JudgmeNicarant inguathe

 

case

elucidated, the legiti macy of

 

recours

e

to

self-defe

nce

 

may

expl

ored – in appr opriate

circu

mstances

by

the

Internat

ional

Justi

ce. There is a general problem (to

be infradiscussed, Chapt

er

 

10,

E,

 

(b))

engender ed by the pote ntial

concurre

nt

jurisdi

ctions

of

the

and

the

Court .

The

 

Court

Nicaraguin the

acase

held

 

(in

1984)

that,

 

beca

use

self-defe

nce

is

a

right,

it

has

legal dimens ions and jud

ceed

ings

are

 

not

forec

losed

in

 

 

consequ

ence

 

of

the

au

thority

Coun

 

209

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cil.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In

 

h

is

Diss

enting

 

Opinion

 

of

 

 

1986,

Judge

 

Schweb

el

 

com

qua

shed

the

 

arg

ume

nt

(advan

ced

by

som

e

writers)

that

‘the

u

in

se

lf-defenc

e

is

a

 

politic al

que

stion

wh

ich

no

court,

 

inc

Interna

tional

 

Court

of

Justice,

shoul

d

210

 

 

 

 

 

 

gra

ppled

 

 

 

adjudgHe e’then.

 

 

 

with

a

different

(a

lbeit

related

)

view, pressed by the United Sta

the

 

capa

city

 

to

deter

mine

the

legalit

y

of

 

the

exercise

of

 

se

esp

ecially

in

 

an

on -going

armed

 

confl ict,

is

 

exclu

sively

 

ent r

Article

 

51

to

 

 

the

Securit

y

Coun

 

cil

and

withheld

from211the

 

C

Aft er some deliberation, Judge Schweb el denied

 

the

validi

ty of

 

th

tenti

on,

and

yet,

in his

opinion –

owing to

the

specia

l

circumstan

207 Nuremberg trial, supra note 78, at 208.208 Tokyo trial, supra note 34, at 364.

209Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua

(Jurisdiction), [1984] ICJ Rep. 392, 436.

210Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 285–7.211 Ibid., 287.

The concept of self-defence

213

case

the

 

issue

of

self-de

fence

was

not

just

iciable

at

the

 

Judgme

nt

was

ren

 

212

 

 

m

ajority

of

the

Court

 

refuse

d

to

a

deredThe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

213

in

part.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the claim of injustic iability in whol e or

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Anoth

er

 

pro

blem

conn

ected

with

judicia

l pro

ceeding

 

s

is

w

State

may resort to the use of force

in

se

lf-defe

nce

aft

er

the

been

submi

tted

to

 

adjudic

ation

by

the

 

Internat

ional

Court

of

This

is

wh

at

the

Uni

ted

St

 

ates

did,

in

1980,

in

the

unsuc ces

to release American hostage s from

Iranian

captivsupityra, B(see,b)).

 

 

The

Judgm

ent

in Tehranthe

case

inclu

ded

obiteran

dictumto the effec t

 

that

such

an

operati

on

may ‘undermin e

res

pect

for

the

judicia

l

intern ational

 

 

 

214

 

r

Robert

Jenn ings

admonis

hed

tha

t

‘fo

relations ’.Si

even law ful an d justifiable force, should not

be undert aken in re

matter

wh

ich subis

judi ;ce perhaps

le

ast

of

all

by

the

par

ty

which

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

215

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

exce

ptional

situ

initiat ed the Court pro ceedingHows’. ever, in so me

tions,

a

litigant

State

may have

no

practical

choice but to rel y o

coun

ter-meas

urespend

ente

 

lit(fore

instanc

e,

when

hos

tilities

are

resume

by the

othe

 

r

216

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

side) .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(b)The option s befor e th e Secu rity Council

Under Article 51, a St ate using

force in self-de fence, in respon

armed attac k, acts at

its

own dis

cretion

but

also

at

its

own risk

impl ementing

the

right

of

se lf-defe nce

m ust immediat ely be re

the Securit y Counci l. The report

cons ists, as a m inimum, of

fication of the invo cation of the

right

of self-de

fence in respon

armed attac

k.

There

is

nothi ng

in Article

51

to

subs

tantiate

occasiona lly

made,

that

the report

must

provide clear

evid

ence reg

the occurrence of the armed attack.217 A study of all the relevant facts may be undertaken by the Council.218 But the Council, too, is not

compelled to set in motion a thorough fact-finding process.219 With or without a careful examination of the background, the Council is entitled

212 Ibid., 288–96. 213 Ibid., 26–8. 214 Tehran case, supra note 107, at 43.

215R. Jennings, ‘International Force and the International Court of Justice’, The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 323, 330 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).

216See Schachter,supra note 106, at 341–2.

217See Y. Arai-Takahashi, ‘Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defense – Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus ad Bellum’, 36 Int.Law. 1081, 1095 (2002).

218See N. Q. Dinh, ‘La Le´gitime De´fense d’apre`s la Charte des Nations Unies’, 52 RGDIP 223, 239 (1948).

219On the difficulties immanent in this process, see R. B. Bilder, ‘The Fact/Law Distinction

in International Adjudication’, Fact-Finding before International Tribunals 95–8 (R. B. Lillich ed., 1992).

214

 

 

Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to ta ke any actio n it deems

fit

 

in

order

 

to

maint

ain

or

 

res

tore

peac

e

 

and

secu

rity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The

 

modes

of

actio

n

open

to the Securit y Coun

cilInteare dive

alia,

the

 

Coun

 

cil

 

can

 

(i)

give

its

retrospe ctive

 

seal

of

 

approva

exerc ise

 

of

self-defe

nce;

 

(ii)

impose

a

 

general

 

ceasesupra-fire ,

(se

e

Chapt

er

 

2,

C,

(a),iiiii) );dem(

and

withd

rawal

of

forces

to

 

the

ori

lines

220

(iv)

ins

ist

on the

cess

ation of the uni lateral actio n of t

;

 

ing

 

State,

 

supp

 

lanting

it

with

measu

res

of

collecti

ve

infrasecurity,

(s

Chapt er10); or

(v)

 

decide

that

the

St

ate

engaged in so-cal

led

self-

is in reality the agg ressor. Whate

ver

it

opts

to

do

,

a

 

man

dat

take

n

 

by

 

the Counci l in this

m atter is binding on UNinfraMemb,

e

Chapt

er

 

10, Ba)), . ( Onc e a Member

St

ate

is

instru

cted

 

in

a

co

man ner to refrain from any furth er use

of

force

,

it

must

com

Coun cil’s

 

directive .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E

vidently ,

the

Secu

rity

Coun

cil

is

not

a

judici

al

 

body .

It

is

of

Judge

 

Schw

ebel,

 

‘a

 

politica

l

org

an wh ich acts for

 

221

 

 

 

 

 

 

p

olitical

As

a

politica

l

body

,

the

Coun

cil

may be incline d to

sacri

fice

of

an

 

individu

al

St

ate

for

 

the

sake

of

more

 

gen

eral

 

interest

nation

al

 

peace

 

(as

perceived

by

the

 

222

 

 

 

 

 

cil

may

even

 

 

CounThecil).Coun

impo se an arms embargo on a State exe

rcising

the

right

 

223

self-de

 

of

The

State

 

conc erned m ay res

ent

such

a

 

decision

 

and

sincere

ly

 

the

 

Coun

cil has bee n extreme ly

unfair.

But

under

 

the

 

Chart er,

has

no

 

remedy.

 

If

it

chooses

to disob ey the decisio n, the State

the

 

brunt

 

of

enforce

men

t

m

easures

activated

by

the

infraCoun,

cil

(

Chapt

er

 

10A,).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unfort unately, in almo st six

deca

des

of

operati

on,

 

the

Secu

rit

has display ed time an d agai

n

a

reluc tance

or

inabi

lity

 

to

 

adop

ident ifyin

g the agg ressor in

a spe cific armed conflict.

 

For

 

m

peri od, the inaction of

the

 

Coun

cil

was

 

deeme d

 

to

be

 

large

ly

pro

found

 

rift

between

 

the

blocs

 

in

 

the

cont ext

 

of

the

‘Cold

 

the terminat ion of this rivalry

has not markedly tra nsformed the C

reco

rd.

E

ven

 

when

face

d

 

with an obvious case of an arme

polit

ical

 

considera tions m ay preve nt the Council from taking a

stand .

 

In

the

absence

of

an

authori

tative

 

deter

minat

ion

 

as

to

w

220

Such

 

a

 

step may be taken either separately or jointly with the preceding measur

 

resolution demanding both a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces to

internatio

 

recognized boundaries, see, e.g., Security

Council Resolution 598,RDSC425,

6

 

 

 

(1987).

 

For

two

separate

 

(albeit

consecutive)

resolutions

making

similar

calls,

 

e.g.,

 

Security

Council

Resolutions

508

and

509,ibid., 425–6 (1982).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

221

Nicaragua case, supra note

37,

at

290.222

See

Bowett,supra note

49,

at

197.

 

 

 

 

223See C. Gray, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State Conflict? Characterization and Consequences’, 67 BYBIL 155, 191–4 (1996).

The concept of self-defence

215

attac ked wh om, both opp osing parties can preten d that they are

legitima

te

 

self-defe

nce, and the hostili ties

are

 

likely

to

go

on .

furth er carnage , the Coun cil tends to bring about

at

 

least

a

ce

Article

51

se ts

forth

that

 

the

right

 

of

self-de

fence

may

be

exerc

the Secu rity Counci l has taken the measures necess

ary

 

to

maint

nation

al

peace

and secu rity. Whe never the Coun cil decrees

in

 

fashion

a

withd

rawal

of

forces

 

or

a

 

cea se-fire ,

the

legal

posit

ion

voca l: every Member State is obliga ted to

act

 

as

 

the

Coun

cil

 

o

there

 

is

 

no

 

furth

er

room

 

to

 

invo

ke

self-de

fence.

Shoul d

 

the

be

par

alyzed

and

fail to take any measu re nece ssary

 

to

 

maint

national

peace

and

security, the legal position is equally

obvious:

 

a

 

M

State

 

exerc

ising

 

the

right

of

se

lf-defenc e

may

 

pers

ist

 

in

the

 

us

But

 

what

is

 

the

legal status

if

the

Coun

cil

follow

s

the

m

iddle

and

 

refrai

ns

 

from

iss

uing

deta

iled

 

instruct

ions

to

the

par

ties,

m

ing

upon

them,

 

say,

to

cond

uct

negotiati

ons

aimed

at

 

settling

 

t

pute?

 

Doe

s

 

such

a

res

olution

terminat e

the

 

entit

lemen

t

 

of

 

State

 

to

rely

 

on

self-he

lp?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Notwi

thstandi

 

ng

cont rary

 

224

 

,is

clearly

not

 

enou

gh

(und

 

 

viewsit

 

Article

 

51)

 

for

 

the

Securit

 

y

 

Counci

l

to

adopt

 

just

 

any

 

resolu

order

 

to

dive

st

 

Member

States

of

 

the

right

to

 

cont

inue to

resor

in

self-de

fence

 

agai

nst

an

 

armed

225

 

 

 

 

wh en

the

Coun

 

ci

 

 

 

attacEvenk.

 

imposes

eco

nomic

sancti

ons

 

in

res

ponse

 

to

 

aggressi

on,

suc

h

 

by

the mselves

cann ot

overrid

e

the

 

right

 

of

self-defe

nce

of

the

side.226 The

 

on

ly

resolut ion that will engen

der

 

that

 

result

 

is

 

binding

decision,

 

whereb

y

the

 

cessation

of

 

the

(real

or

 

imagin

ed)

sive

 

action

becom

es

impe

227

 

 

 

 

 

of

an

explic

it

decree

 

by

 

t

 

rativeShort.

 

 

 

Coun

cil

to

 

desist

from

the

use

of

 

force

,

the

 

State

acting

in

 

s

retains

its

 

right

 

to

go

on

doing

so

 

until

the

Counci l

 

has

 

take

n

whic

h

have

 

actu

ally

‘suc

ceeded

 

in

 

resto ring

 

internatio

nal

 

pe

secu

 

 

 

228

Howe

ver,

the

def

 

ending

 

State

still

acts

at

its

 

own

 

rity’.

 

 

 

 

224 See A. Chayes, ‘The Use of Force in the PersianLaw Gulf’,and

Force

in

the

New

 

International

Order

 

3,

5–6

(L. F. Damrosch

and

D. J. Scheffer

eds.,

1991). Cf.

 

 

 

 

K. S. Elliott, ‘The New World Order and the Right of Self-Defense in the United

 

 

 

 

Nations Charter’, 15 HICLR 55, 68–9 (1991–2).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

225See O. Schachter, ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’, 85 AJIL 453, 458 (1991). Cf. T. K. Plofchan, ‘Article 51: Limits on Self-Defense?’, 13 Mich.JIL 336, 372–3 (1991–2).

226See E. V. Rostow, ‘Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?’, 85

AJIL 506, 512–13 (1991).

227 See Waldock,supra note 73, at 495–6.

228M. Halberstam, ‘The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes Action’, 17 Mich.JIL 229, 248 (1996–7).

216 Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

perh

aps

more

so

 

tha

n

b

efore.

Continued

hostilities

 

may

instigate

sion

 

by

the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

229

 

att

 

Council against a self-proclaimed victim of an armed

(c)

 

 

 

 

Failure

to

repo

rt

to

 

th

e

Se

curity

Council

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Art

 

icle 51 pro mulgat es that m

easures taken in exercise of the

ri

def

 

ence ‘sha ll be imme diately report ed to the Secu rity Coun

ci

ins

 

tances,

States

 

invoki ng the right of se lf-defe nce make sure

th

report to the Securit y Coun

 

cil

is

pro mptly

 

dispa

tched.

A

le t

exampl

e

is

the

 

Ame

rican

 

com municatio n

to

the

 

Secu rity

C

7

October

 

2001,

report

ing

to

the

Coun

cil

that

the

US

(toge

som

 

e

allies

)

had

initiat

ed

 

actio

n

tha t

day

agai

nst

 

Talib

an-led

in

response

to

the

armed

attack

of 9/11 (unleas hed by Al -Qaeda

but

 

 

end

orsed

by

 

the

Taliban

 

230

 

 

 

in

 

p

ractice,

such

a

 

 

 

regi However,me).

 

comm

unicatio

n

 

repre

sents

 

the

exce ption

rathe

r

than

the

rule

Stat

 

es

 

exerc ise

 

the

right

of

 

self-defe

nce,

the

y

rarel

y

resp

ect

report

ing

to

the

Securit y

 

 

231

 

 

 

 

numero

us

reason

s

f

 

CounThecil. re are

such

an

omission.

In

 

particul

ar,

Govern ments

 

do

not

always

couc

offic

ial

statement

s

in

correct

 

juridical

term

s.

 

They

are apt

to

c

wron g pleas justifyi ng their

 

acti

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

232

self-de

 

on, inste ad of relying on

The Inter national Court of

Justice, Nicain theraguacase,

held

tha

t

the

report

ing

obligatio

n

to

the

Securit

y

Coun

cil

 

pursua

 

nt

to

Art ic

not

 

 

consti

tute

a

 

p

art

of

 

customary

int

ernational

 

law

(on

w

Judgm

ent

was

 

 

 

233

 

 

the

Court

was

of

the

opinion

that,

e

 

base

d)Yet,.

‘for

 

the

purpose

of

enq

uiry

 

int

o

the

customa

ry

law

 

position,

th

of

 

a

report

m

ay

be

one

 

of

the

factors

ind

icating

 

wh

ether

th

que

 

stion

was

itself

convin

ced

that

it

was

acti

ng in

234

 

 

 

 

 

 

selfThe-defe nce

Court implied that – when the use of force is governed by the law of the Charter – a State is precluded from invoking the right of self-defence if it fails to comply with the requirement of reporting to the Council.235 When put in this light, the duty of reporting becomes a substantive condition and a limitation on the exercise of self-defence.236

229 See Bowett,supra note 49, at 196.

230Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council, 7 October 2001, 40 ILM 1281 (2001).

231See S. D. Bailey and S. Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council 103 (3rd ed., 1998).

232See J. Combacau, ‘The Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice’, The Current Legal

233

Regulation of the Use of , Forcesupra note 215, at 9, 14.

Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 121.

234

Ibid., 105. 235 Ibid., 121–2.

236See P. S. Reichler and D. Wippman, ‘United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua: A Rejoinder’, 11 YJIL 462, 471 (1985–6).

The concept of self-defence

217

Judge

 

Schweb el

disput

ed

the

 

major

ity’s

position,

m

aintainin

measu

res

of self-de fence may be

either

overt

or

covert

 

(just

as

attac

k

 

may

b

e

overt

 

or

covert

);

cov

ertex

hypacti othesions– –cann

ot

be

 

report

ed

to

the

Secu

rity

Counci

l

and

thereb y

 

237

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

publ

iclyIn espousedthe.

presen

t

 

writer’

s

 

view,

 

the

limitati

on

of

the

reporting

 

dut

y

operati

ons is not congruen t

with

the

Chart

er.

Art icle

 

51

impos

ket obl igation of report ing to the Coun

cil

wh

enever

 

the

righ

defence is rel ied on, an d the text does

no t

eve n

hint

 

at

the

making

 

an

exce

ption

 

for

cov

ert

opera tions.

Indeed,

 

a

covert

operati

on

(su

pposedly

 

undertak

en

in

self-de

fence)

 

m

ay

 

subv

authori

ty

of

the

Coun

 

cil

by

crea

ting

a

smokescr een

 

concealing

state

of

 

affair s.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But

 

Judge Schweb el did not stop here. Procee ding

to

 

probe

the

of

the

dut

y

under

discussio

n,

he

arrived

at

the

 

conclu

sion

that

to

the

Se

curity

Counci

 

l

is

a

pro

cedural

matter,

and

 

that,

theref

feasan

ce

m

ust

not dep rive

a

State

 

of

the

substant

ive

 

(and

inhe

of

se

 

 

 

 

238

 

 

nature

of

the

report

ing

dut y

is

 

the

real

lf-defenc e.The

 

Should

 

the

report

to

the

Council

be regardconedditioas sinea

 

qua , non

going

 

to

the

heart

of

the

right

 

of

se lf-defenc

e,

or

 

is

it

a

require

 

 

 

239

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ment?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Article

 

51

does

not say that non-pe

rform

ance

 

of

the

report

ing

tion

carries

irrev

ocable

 

ad verse

cons

equences

for

the

 

invocat

ion

right

of

 

self-defe

nce.

The

sequenc

e

 

of

events

envi

saged

by

the

of

the

 

Charte

r

is

su

ch

t h at

in

it

ial

ly

a

 

St

ate

 

t

akes

m

defence,

 

and nlo y

t he

re

after

d

oes

it

have

to

transmit

 

a

repo

Se

curi

ty

Cou

nc

il .

T

h e

p

roposi ti on

that

 

a

fa

 

ilu

re

to

subsequent duty (to report) undermines the legality of

 

the

 

preced

measures (of self-defence) does not fit the scheme of Article 51.240

 

 

 

 

 

It is submitted that the dispatch of a report to the Security Council is only one of many factors bearing upon the legal validity of a State’s claim to self-defence. The instantaneous transmittal of a report is no guarantee that the Council will accept that claim. Conversely, the failure to file a report at an early stage should not prove an irremediable defect. When

237 Nicaragua case, supra note 37, at 374.238 Ibid., 376–7.

239D. W. Greig has argued that ‘it hardly seems possible to have a mandatory provision in the Charter, to which there is no counterpart in customary international law, relating to the exercise of a power available under both sources’. D. W. Greig, ‘Self-Defence and

the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?’, 40 ICLQ 366, 380 (1991). But this position is unsound. As the Court explicitly pronounced in the context of selfdefence: ‘The areas governed by the two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content’supra note( 37, at 94).

240See M. Knisbacher, ‘The Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of Israel’s Rescue Action’, 12 JILE 57, 79 (1977–8).

218 Exceptions to prohibition of use of force

convinced that forcible measures were taken by a State in self-defence, the Council ought to issue a ruling to that effect, despite the absence of a report. It would be a gross misinterpretation of Article 51 for the Council to repudiate self-defence, thus condoning an armed attack, only because no report has been put on record. Certainly, if measures responsive to an armed attack are brought to the attention of the Council in an indirect manner (not earning the formal status of a report), the defending State must be absolved.241 But even if the Council is not promptly informed of what is going on, due to lack of skill in reducing complex patterns of behaviour to Article 51 phraseology, that need not doom the entitlement to self-defence. A failure by a State resorting to force to formally invoke self-defence should not be fatal, provided that the substantive conditions for the exercise of this right are met.242 It makes no sense to allow an aggressor State to get away with an armed attack only by dint of mislabelling by the victim State of an otherwise legitimate conduct.

241See J. N. Moore, ‘The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order’, 80 AJIL 43, 90 n. 189 (1986).

242See L. C. Green, ‘Armed Conflict, War, and Self-Defence’, 6 Ar.V. 387, 434 (1956–7).