
- •Introduction
- •Just satisfaction
- •Award of just satisfaction by the European Court
- •Priority for award of just satisfaction by national authorities
- •Individual non-pecuniary measures
- •Reopening of domestic judicial proceedings
- •Other measures
- •General measures
- •Changes in case-law
- •Changes to the rules
- •Other measures
- •Supervision of the execution of judgments
- •The Committee of Ministers
- •The supervision procedure
- •Methods of coercion available to the Committee of Ministers
- •The European Court of Human Rights
- •Supervisory methods traditionally employed by the Court
- •The new “pilot case” procedure
- •Innovations introduced by Protocol No. 14
- •The Parliamentary Assembly
- •Limits to the effectiveness of European judgments. Outlook for the provisions governing execution of judgments
- •Problems
- •Future remedies
- •Conclusion
- •Appendices
- •Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers for the application of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights
- •Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
- •References to Council of Europe sources

Conclusion
Conclusion
In conclusion, it cannot be overemphasised that the requirements associated with execution of judgments of the European Court are the corollary of accession by European states to a system of supranational protection for human rights, which necessarily entails limitation of national sovereignty: in the words of Pierre-Henri Teitgen, “the sovereignty of the states is limited from the aspect of the law, and from that aspect all limits are allowed”.210
Although there are some flaws, the outcome of the execution of judgments has been broadly positive, so that the rare exceptions are even more unacceptable. Nonetheless, constant vigilance is called for; particularly where fundamental rights are violated by states, nothing can ever really be taken for granted.
While the European Union has relied mainly on a constraint-based model, on infringement proceedings coupled with daily fines and on a delegation or elite model of accountability to compel states to enforce the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities promptly, the Council of Europe has opted for a very different approach: that of persuasion, co-ordination among the various national and European bodies concerned, and accountability of authorities at different levels, in keeping with the participatory model of accountability.211 There is reason to believe that this approach is better suited to human rights law. This study has shown that there is also reason to appreciate the essential importance of the practice of the Committee of Ministers and states in the building of a (policy-making and institutional) system of the execution of judgments.
210.P.-H. Teitgen, Aux sources de la Cour et de la Convention européennes des Droits de l’Homme, preface by Vincent Berger, Voix de la cité, Confluences, October 2000, p. 39.
211.For a comparative study of the two models, see the author’s article, “L’exécution des décisions des juridictions européennes (CJCE et CEDH)”, Annuaire français de Droit international (2006), pp. 677-724.
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