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294

J.

C. D. CLARK

I750S

not

to some Pelhamite

consensus but to Pulteney's actions. The

people,

he

wrote,

were so deceived by him, that, ever since, they scarcely know how to place their

or body of men, in the Kingdom; and although

oppositions

to wicked ministers

are highly necessary, and have preserved

this constitution from age to age, yet

did he so prostitute the word,

and the thing, that they have lost no small part

of their real use, weight, and character.114

Ireland,

which

lacked

an analogy

in the

I 740s and whose

newspaper

press

seems to have

neglected in

that

decade

to draw the

moral from

the

inconsistencies

of Walpole's

ex-opponents

in England,1"5 provides

an

example

for the I 750S so clearly defined

that its subsequent neglect

is itself

an historiographical

problem

of

some

interest.

England

and Ireland

can, then,

in

several

respects,

be treated

as a single

political

arena

in

the

I 750s.

It

is apparent,

for example,

that

the

issues

of the domination

of

the

executive

over

the

legislature,

of

the defence

of whig

liberty

against

Dorset

or Armagh,

Newcastle

or Hardwicke,

were

present

in similar

forms

in

the

minds both of many English whigs and

of the Irish patriots of I753.116

Similar

models

of

government

produced

similar

problems:

Hartington

was

concerned

(as the

king's

minister

for

the Irish Commons)

about

the

reciprocal

relation

of

responsibility

and

control,

and

at one

point

refused

to answer

for

the consequences

if his

advice were not strictly followed

over Boyle's restoration.117 One difficulty

for the

lord

lieutenant,

and

one

reason

why

Ireland

provides

an example

for the

historian,

is that

constitutional

forms

and patterns were slightly

anachronistic

in comparison

with English

equivalents

evolving

in advance

of them.

'There

even existed

the

view',

wrote

Professor

McDowell

of

Ireland,

'that

it was

positively

wrong

to

dismiss

gentlemen

from

office

on account

of

their

votes

in

Parliament.'118

George

Grenville

continued

to see

a direct

political

link:

114

[J. Almon], A historyof the parliament of Great Britain, from the death of Queen Anne,

to the deathof King GeorgeII (London,

I764),

p. 306.

(Cambridge, I967), p. I73.

115

R. Munter, The historyof the Irish newspaperi685-I760

116

Cf. Fox to Hartington, 28 Nov. I754: Dev 330/28.

117

Hartington to Fox, I5 June I755:

5I38I,

fo.

i8.

118

R. B. McDowell, Irish public opinion 1750-i800

(London, I944), p. 29.

119 George Grenville to earl of Northumberland,

26 Nov. I763, in W. J. Smith (ed.), The

Grenville papers(London, i852-3), II, i66. Northumberland

(lord lieutenant April I763 to

THE

ENGLISH

MANAGEMENT

OF IRISH POLITICS

295

The full variety of ways in which the inferences

drawn from the

I750S

contributed

to the attitudes with which

English

politicians faced the

circumstances of George

III's reign lies beyond the immediate scope of

this article. Nevertheless,

it is clear that the lord lieutenant's government

vis-a-vis

Westminster,

of

that of George 11 and George 111.120

It is

therefore

not coincidental

that the policies pursued by Dublin

Castle

in the mid I750S span the range of those with which the English court

was to be held to defend

itself, or attack its servants, in the years I 755-70:

in the I75os

rather in the way in which it provoked English whigs to devise

procedural,

tactical devices to quell it. Two points may be emphasized

in summary.

120

Cf. Primateto Andrew Stone, 24

Dec. I753:

32733, fo. 54I.

fo.

121

Barrow,

Macartney, II, I28-30;

Primate to

Newcastle,

7 May I752:

32737,

I I0.

122

On Henry Pelham's instructions the attorney general did, however, draw up a

detailed

examination

of

the constitutional points

at issue in the Money Bill dispute: cf.

Dudley

Ryder diary,

I3

Jan. I754, and Doc. 35(p), Harrowby

MSS. I am grateful

to the

earl of Harrowby and the trustees of the Harrowby MSS Trust for permission

to consult,

and quote from, the Harrowby MSS.

123

Almon,

History of the parliament of Great Britain, p. 322.

296

J. C.

D. CLARK

party

supposedly

entertained

by

George

III

on

his

accession'24

and

by

Chatham

in

I766,125

the

provenance

of

that

idea

is of some

importance.

It has

been

customary

to

see

its

first embodiment

as

part

of

a party's

programme

in Prince

Frederick's

Leicester

House

opposition

of

the

late

I740S.

Yet

it would

be

wrong

to

exaggerate

the

importance

of

the

few

perfunctory

references

to the

idea

in

that

group's

surviving

papers,'26

and

to confuse

the generalized

'Country'

desire

of the I 730S and

I 740S

for

the supersession

of

party qua whig and tory with

the

technical,

tactical

plans

of

the

I76os

for

the

destruction

of

the

factional

groups

which

remained

after

that supersession

had

come

about

in the

I 750s.

It has been

denied

that George

III

inherited

such

a programme

from his father;127

and

in

supposing

that

he

did,

historians

have

needlessly

created

a

problem

out

of

the

apparent

fact

that the elimination

of party

was never

spoken

of

at

Leicester

House

between

I75I

and

I760,

let alone

set

out

as a future

basis for

its actions.'28

It seems

more

probable

that

Frederick

in the

years

before

his

death

hoped

to seize

the

leadership

of

the

Old

Corps,

just

as Pitt and

Fox

sought

to wrest

it from

Newcastle's

hands after

I 754.

It was their

actions which

partially fragmented

the

Old Corps

and

gave

rise

to

talk

of

the

destruction

of

party

in

justification

of

the

ministerial

systems

of

I756-7:

talk

closely

related

to

the

fortunes

of

patriotism

and

of

faction

in the Irish

crisis. Much

of this

passed

George

III by, and he ascended

the

throne

with

a desire,

quickly and

successfully

realized,

to discount

party

qua whig

and

tory.'29

When,

after

I 763, he was

confronted

with a multi-party

situation,

anti-party

doctrines

lay ready

to

hand

not

in

a morally

inspired

plan

previously

thought

out

at Leicester

House,

but

already

formulated

by the political

class

itself

on

the

basis

of

Irish

events

and

already

exercised,

in

part,

in

1756-7.

It is the

case

of

124

K. G. Feiling, The second tory party 17I4-i832

(London,

I938),

p.

68,

claimed

he

'dedicated

himself

to the extirpation of party'.

125 Cf. John Brooke, The Chathamadministration 1766-I768 (London, I956), p. xi.

126 A. N. Newman,

'Leicester

House politics,

I750-60',

in Camden Miscellany, XXIII,4th

series, vol. 7, pp. 90, IO9; Newman, 'Leicester House politics, I748-I75I',

E.H.R. LXXVI

(196i),

588.

Brooke, King George III (London, I972),

cf. Newman (E.H.R. i96i,

p.

127 John

p. 2I;

589): '. . the old slogans

were refurbished,

and the ideas of Leicester House

in 1759 bear

close similarities to those of Leicester House in I749.'

128 Provisional though

it must be to assert a negative, the theme is apparently absent from

the sources

for the internal history of the junior Court in the

I 75os: Hartwell (Sir George

Lee) MSS, Royal Archives and Buckinghamshire

Record

Office; Egmont MSS, British

Library; Minto MSS, National Library of Scotland; Bute MSS, Mount Stuart and Cardiff

Central

Library;

Lee-Herring

correspondence,

Corpus

Christi

College,

Cambridge;

THE

ENGLISH

MANAGEMENT

OF

IRISH

POLITICS

297

Ireland

which

demonstrates

the

genesis

of the

idea

in

the

form

it was

to

hold

in the

altruistic

whiggism

of

the

fourth

duke

of

Devonshire

and

the

managerial

whiggism

of

H. S. Conway.

Again,

the

generation

of the 1750s was deeply

influenced

in its estimate

of

the

motivation

of

opposition

and

the

genuineness

of

the

relative

contributions

of the

people

and the leadership

by the

Irish

unrest

of these

years. Fox was soon proved

to have

over-estimated

the

party

chiefs

when

he

wrote:

'The

violent

rage

of party will I fear not subside

so soon with

you as your Grace thinks

fit, and

a faction

never

wanted

leaders

though

many

who are

disposed

to

lead

have

wanted

a faction

to

follow

them,

which

is the case at present

here.'30

In

reality,

Devonshire's

tactical

success

and

the

English

ministry's

survival

of

the

quasi-patriotic

and

patriotic oppositions

of

1754-5 and 1755-6 permitted Irish

politics

to be

managed,

for

the

moment,

on

English

lines

and

with

little

regard

to

national

sentiment.

Hillsborough,

more

perceptively,

predicted

the

return

of

tranquillity

since

'Party

cannot

be

supported

long,

unless

it

rests upon

real

grievances

or upon

disaffection

:131the first, no ministerial

whig

would

concede;

the second,

no

protestant

patriot

would

assert.

To

those

of

a

ministerial

outlook,

it

seemed

that

'what

are

called

popular

questions'

were

merely

made

use of to arouse

'an ungovernable

spirit'

in a House

of Commons in order

to exploit

its potential.132

Richard

Rigby,

when

chief

secretary,

observed

that:

Sackville, too, was well

aware

of

the difficulty

of

ascribing purposive,

independent

behaviour

to

the

turbulent

populace

of

the

capital

when

both

sides

were

allegedly

intervening

to hire

its services,134

and

Henry

Pelham

considered

extending

the

Riot

Act

to

Ireland,

as

the

attorney

general

reported,

'in order

to

prevent

mobs

in

Dublin

where

they can

be raised with ease and

directed

as

the

leaders

please'*135

Yet

popular

protest

was at its least effective

when

most distantly

related

to the

course

of high

political

events.

The primate

observed:

130

Fox to Devonshire, 25 Mar. 1756: Dev 330/131.

131

Hillsborough

to Hartington,

7 July 1755: Dev 414/I.

132

Conway to Fox,

i8 Mar. 1756: 51382,

fo- 30.

133

Rigby to Pitt, 23 Dec. 1759, Chathamcorrespondence,I,

475; cf. his views on an English

mob's treatment of Bute: Rigby to Bedford,

26 Nov.

1762,

Bedford correspondence,III,

'59.

Cf. Sackville to Maxwell,

i i

134

Feb. 1754; 32734, fo. 131.

135

Dudley Ryder Diary, 27 Feb. 1754: Harrowby MSS.

THE

ENGLISH

MANAGEMENT

OF

IRISH

POLITICS

299

ministry

had

encouraged

him

to pursue)

was a powerful

inducement

to

Newcastle

to persevere

with

a policy

of inclusiveness

in the

months

from

March

1754

to

September

1755,

and

must

have

contributed

to

a

disinclination

among

the

politically

informed

to

rely

on

the

removal

of

malcontents

from

a ministry

as a solution

to its problems.144

Hartington's

initial

intentions

must

be

seen

against

the

background

of

Newcastle's

attempts

to

sustain

an

inclusive

English

ministry

and those

of

Pitt

and

Fox

to

divide

it.

But

the

disappearance

of

whig-tory

distinctions

in

Ireland

occurred

long

before

they

were

even

obsolete

in

England;

and

when

Hartington

realised

that

he

was

confronted

with

a

multi-party

situation,

his

first

reaction

was

to

seek

to

play

off

those

parties

against

each

other.

Events

encouraged

him to

carry

his

initial

generalized

dis-

approval

of

parties,

an

attitude

shared

unostentatiously

by

most

of

his

contemporaries,

to the

length

of a practical

design

to break

and confound

them:

an

approach

not

dissimilar

in its outcome

to that

of

Dorset's

final

answer.

In

the same

way,

Newcastle

found

himself

under

the necessity

of adopting

a more

vigorously

hostile

attitude

to

an

emerging

formed

opposition,

culminating

in

the

dismissal

of

its

leaders

from

office

in

November

1755.

Hartington's

first

scheme

of

accommodation

with

the

patriots

of

May

(which

could

be

represented

either

as

an

Irish victory

or as a partial

sell-out)

was similar

to the one

Newcastle

immediately

then

arranged

in England:

the

inclusion

of

Sir George

Lyttelton,

Dodington

and

others

with Fox

(cf. Kildare)

as Commons

manager.

But in Egmont,

Lee

and

Pitt,

Newcastle

did

not

fail

to

find

patriots

to

sell

out

in

the

summer

of

1755,

since

no politician

was yet accorded

the

status of patriot

in the

mind

of the

English

public;

when

Pitt

and

the

Grenvilles

did

lay

claim

to

that

title in

the

1755-6

session,

it was

apparent

-

as it never

was

in the

case

of the Irish patriots - that their

earlier

tenure

of

ministerial

office

had

itself represented

a sell-out

which

their

current

conduct

only

highlighted.

Dodington

and

Lyttelton

were

minor

successes

whose

apparently

venal

behaviour

served

to

encourage

the

view

that

all poli-

ticians

were

similarly

motivated.

Newcastle

did,

however,

as did

Har-

tington,

bring

to a position

of reliable loyalty

a whig

bloc of parliamentary

expertise

and

voting

strength.

The

Newcastle-Fox

scheme

was,

for

a

session,

distinctly

successful

in the

Commons;

and

its success contributed

to postponing

the

necessity

of

a

large

scale

act

of

patriot

apostasy

in

England

until

June

1757 (when

it could

be misrepresented

by the

oppo-

sition

as a patriot

victory).

The

question

Newcastle

had

to

face

after

the

English

dismissals

of

November

1755, and

Dorset

after

those

of

January

1754

in Ireland,

was

whether

they then had to govern

through

faction,

organized

by Fox

or

Pitt,

the

primate

or Boyle.

Dorset

did

so;

Hartington

for

a time

avoided

144 Cf. Horace Walpole to Conway, I5 Nov. I755, in P. Toynbee

(ed.), The lettersof Horace

Walpole(Oxford, I903-25),

III, 365.

II

HIS

21

300

J. C. D. CLARK

doing

so

by

employing

an

anti-party ideology; it

was

Newcastle's

achievement

that he evaded

such a dependence

without

an ideology

and,

in part, due to the practical

and

theoretical

failure

of

English

patriotism,

pari paissuwith its exhaustion

in

Ireland,

in the

winter

of

1755-6.

It is the

hitherto

unrecognized

parliamentary

collapse

of

Pitt and

the Grenvilles

in the

early months

of

1756 which

provides

the analogy

with

the

second

Irish

deal,

the

leaders'

sell-out

in

January

of that

year.

Except that the patriots and

undertakers

were

left as sharply

distinct

groups,

little

immediate

difference

was

made

to

Irish

political

life by

Devonshire's

settlement,

for

the

alliance

of Stone's

and

Shannon's

con-

nexions

with

the

Ponsonbys

in

1757 compelled

Bedford

to deal with

new

leaders

in

much

the

old

way."45 'The

parties

are

too equal',

wrote

the

lord chancellor,

'to

be

singly

useful

to

government.

'146

The

buying

off

of

patriot

opposition

had

been

shown

to be a very

different

thing from

the

destruction

of party

in its contemporary

Irish

sense;

and

the

balance

of

power

continued

for

some

years

to

alternate

between

the executive

and the

opposition.

As

Bowes

had realized,

Not

until

Townshend's

lieutenancy

were

the undertakers

irretrievably

defeated

by

a

deliberate

offensive.149

But

portentous

issues

had

been

raised in

the

previous

decade;

and,

as the

general

election

on

the

death

of

George

II

showed,150

new

sections

of

the

population

politically

mobilized.

Charlemont

recorded151 that by the struggles

of

1753

THE

ENGLISH

MANAGEMENT

OF IRISH

POLITICS

301

turn their thoughts to constitutional subjects, and

to reflect on the difference

between

political freedom

and servitude,

a reflection which for many years had

been

overlooked,

or wholly

absorbed

in the

mobbish

misconception

of Whig

principle. They were taught to know that Ireland

had, or ought to have,

a

constitution,

and to perceive

that there was something more in the character of

a Whig than implicit loyalty to King George,

a detestation of the Pretender,

and

a fervent

zeal for the Hanover

succession - excellent

qualities when they

flow

from

principle,

but trivial at best when every principle was made to flow from

them.

The

Irish

example

thus

also

highlights

the

inadequacy

of

an historiog-

raphy

of

growing

popular

political

self-awareness

which

would

seek

to

explain

it as independent

and

purposive

without

close

reference

to

the

crises in high politics which

occasioned

it and,

for

so long,

supplied

the

terms

in

which

it

was

expressed.

Hartington's

lieutenancy

reveals

the

tactical

complexities

which

underlay

both

the

managerial

task

of

the

executive

and

the

transition

from

'Country'

to

'patriot'

against

the

background

of

a continuing

political

crisis

in

England,

the implications

of which

for the

party

system

were

scarcely

understood.

Though

led and

dictated

by

high

political

evolutions

at

once

formalized,

technical

and

abstract,

Irish

events

in

the

mid-1750S

inescapably

possessed

a popular

dimension;

they

thus

present

a schematic

but

clearly defined

analogy

to

the

combined effects in England

of the ministerial

experiments

of

1754-70

and

the

public

reception

of

the cases

of

Byng

and Wilkes.