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306

 

 

 

Hastie,Schkade,and Payne

that the

shift"was caused

by

the

between

and

 

"leniency

 

asymmetry

prosecution

defense burdensand standardsof proof in criminaltrials).However,the empirical evidence is still tentativeand the prodefendantleniencyshift would only emerge

in some cases and for

that include a substantialcoalition of

 

jury configurations

defendant-favoringjurors(see Lempert,1981, 1993,for a similarconclusionconcerningthe behavioralimplicationsof specialquestionswhen there are manyto- be-decidedelements in civil cases).

We do not have any firm basis to explainthe somewhatlower rate of proplaintiffverdictsin the Andersoncase comparedto the other three cases. We can speculatethat some of the criticaldifferencesarise from the fact that this is the onlycase in whichour mockjurorsdiscussedthe possiblecontributionof the victims (experiencedsailorswho were killedwhen theirpleasurecraftsankin a storm)to their own fate and it is the only case in which the defendantcompanydefinitely

took an actionto

 

 

the

 

 

thatwas

 

the causeof the accident

 

 

remedy

 

problem

 

putatively

 

 

 

(the

manufacturermailed a

 

 

 

 

notice to dealersand first ownersof the

 

 

the

 

recall/repair

 

 

 

across

boats). However,

patterns

of

jury

deliberationwere

 

 

 

 

 

 

indistinguishable

 

cases in termsof the content analysiswe performed.

 

 

 

 

In the cases we studied individual

 

exhibiteda

persistenttendency

to

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jurors

 

 

 

favorthe plaintiffs,concludingthat punitivedamageswere warrantedwhenjudges had concludedthey were not. These verdictsare not anomalies;they were consis- tentlyobtainedfor the factualcircumstancesandwith standardinstructionson the

law from four

 

 

 

civil cases.

 

we cannotclaimthat these re-

 

 

representative

Obviously,

format,will

 

sults, from a

sample

of

only

four cases

presented

in a

gen-

 

 

 

 

summary

eralize to all punitivedamagesjudgments.But we have establisheda consistent

 

between

andsome

 

 

for these cases.Webelieve

discrepancy

jurors'

 

judges'judgments

 

 

that

 

 

and

 

of

judge's

instructionson

is

 

poor comprehension

application

 

liability

part

of the explanationfor the tendencyto disagreewith the judges.In supportof this

we observeda correctiveeffect in deliberationsuch that the juries interpretation,

that more thoroughlyconsideredthe judge's instructionswere likelier to render verdictsin favorof the defendant.

 

 

Implications for the Civil Justice System

 

The

subject

of

 

 

 

 

is surrounded

and the con-

 

 

punitivedamages

by controversy

is intensified

by

the

high

economicstakes and the social significanceof

troversy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the issues involved.One fundamentalproblemis that there is not consensuson the foundationsof the institution:Shouldthe civiljusticesystemservethe goals of

and deterrencein additionto the traditional

of com-

punishment,retribution,

goal

 

pensatingthose who have been injuredfor their losses? This is not primarilyan

the answersreston moralandethical

aboutwhat

"empiricalquestion";

assumptions

we want, not considerationsof what is the truth.Nonetheless,we think that em- piricalresearchcan advancethe debateover the necessityand natureof a punitive

awards

some nonissuesand

the relationsbetween

systemby eliminating

byclarifying

some proposedchangesin the systemand theirlikelyconsequences.Obviouslythe present researchis most relevantto proposalsto change the proceduresin jury trials.

LiabilityDecisions

307

The proposalsto improvethe punitivedamagesinstitutionspanthe spectrum from abolitionto "it'snot broken,don't fix it" (Galanter& Luban,1993;Rustad & Koenig, 1993). The proposalsfor change can be dividedinto three categories: Firstthere are proposalsto changethe natureof the institution;these includeabolition (presumablythe functionsof the punitivedamagesawardwould be transferred to regulatorycontrols and to the criminalcourts), droppingthe goal of retributivepunishmentso that assessmentof an awardwould involveonly considerationsof deterrence,or shiftingthe groundsfor liabilityto excludesimple recklessness and to emphasizemaliciousness.Second there are proposalsto improve the appellate review process, most of these involve clarifyingthe principlesthat identify excessive awardsor provide more specific cataloguesof "mitigatingand

considerationsThird.there are

to

the

aggravating"

proposals

improve

performance

of trialcourtsincludingprovidinglimitsor caps on the awardamounts,raisingthe

standardof

proof,

and

instructionsto the

for

 

 

improving

jury.Suggestions

improve-

ments in instructionsincludeaddingmore exhortationsto performconscientiously,

more

 

 

definitionsof basic

concepts

in the currentinstructions-and

more

comprehensible

 

 

and

 

 

 

suchas the use of

 

 

specialquestions

 

controllingprocedures

 

 

 

interrogatories

verdictforms.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The pictureof the jurorsand the jurythat we developedin the present re-

searchis not

 

We believe

juries

are motivatedto

 

their task ac-

 

 

reassuring.

 

 

 

perform

cording to the judge's instructions-at least there is no evidence that they are willfully disobedient-but they do not apply those instructionscorrectly(Finkel, 1995;Horowitz& Willging,1991;Myers,1979;Robinson& Darley, 1995;Wiener, et al., 1991). The main visible departurefrom proper procedurewas that jurors simply did not consider some legal requirementsat all that would have reduced

their

to decide in favorof the

on the issueof

for

 

proclivity

plaintiff

liability

punitive

damages.The jurors'inabilityto comprehendlegal concepts,the lure of reasoning

in terms of

 

notions of

 

and

 

or

possibly

their

 

everyday

responsibility

recklessness,

 

 

for the

 

led themto

ignore

essential

considerations.

sympathy

 

injuredplaintiffs,

legal

 

 

 

There is also substantialdisagreementamongjurors(and then juries) on the verdictfor everyone of the four cases we presented.Ourempiricalresultsindicate that at least part of the explanationof this disorderis thatjurorsdo not fullyexecute theirlegallyprescribedtaskandthere is also considerablevariationin people's

of the concepts cited in the instructionson liability.Furthermore, interpretations

the cases that go to trial (fromwhichour stimuluscases were sampled)are likely

to be those whereboth partieshaveconvincingargumentsAnd,. in the background, reflectingthe controversiesover the institutionof punitivedamages,the everyday

concepts of responsibility,liability,deterrence,and punishmentthat jurors bring

into the

 

box are

topics

on whichthereis substantial

 

mem-

 

jury

 

 

disagreementamong

 

 

bers of our society.

of what is

is that

 

are faced with a

 

Our

 

jurors

very

 

 

interpretation

 

happening

 

 

difficulttask: their everydayconcepts of liability,punishment,and deterrencedo

not

map neatly

onto their

their

habits of

assessing

 

 

legal counterparts;

everyday

blame do not matchthe legal proceduresof verifyingthat a seriesof requisite"elements" have each been establishedto a specified (and unfamiliar)"standardof proof";and when they get to the jurydeliberationpartof their task they discover

308

 

 

 

Hastie,Schkade,and Payne

that there is substantial

 

theirfellowcitizensabout

conceptual

disagreementamong

 

 

 

and factualissues. Under these

 

the

fall backon their

rough-

 

circumstances,

jurors

 

 

and-readyeverydayreasoninghabits,probablyinfluencedby their sympathiesfor one partyor the other, and they fail to complete the task presentedto them in their instructionsfrom the judge.

We are not arguingfor eliminationof thejurytrialor abolitionof the punitive damagesin civiltrials.Webelievethatclarification,by authoritieslike the Supreme Court,of a theoryor underlyingpolicyfor the institutionwill have majorbenefits. The efforts to improvethe acuityof appellatereviewby clarifyingthe underlying

theory

and

 

more detailed

 

to

 

verdicts

 

by providing

guidelines

identifyinappropriate

that

shouldalso increasethe

of the

The

presentfindingssuggest

 

 

 

reliability

 

system.

 

 

providingmore directguidanceand controlover the jurydecisionprocess-for example, througha device such as requiringanswersto interrogatoryquestionson the elements warrantingeach general verdict or by returningspecial verdicts-

shouldhelp (see May, 1995,and Wigginsand Breckler,1990,for concurringopin- ions). Especiallyin cases in which there is a clear structureof conjunctiveand

 

 

 

on elementsthat must be decidedto

renderthe

disjunctiverelationships

 

 

 

 

properly

 

generalverdict,

an

 

 

 

 

could insurethat each element re-

 

interrogatoryquestionnaire

 

 

ceived some considerationin the decision

Furthermore,if, as we have

sug-

 

there is a bias in

 

decisions

process.

 

gested,

jury

 

 

defendantsand in

 

 

 

 

againstunsympathetic

 

favor of injuredplaintiffs,increasingthe requisitestandardof proof should help reduce the rate of improperverdicts.

But there may still be additionalproblemsfor the jury decidingliabilityfor punitivedamagesthatwill not be correctedby forcingjuriesto heed morecarefully

the law

given

to them in the

judge's

instructionsIt. is not

to find that

 

 

 

surprising

jurorsare confusedby their instructionson judgingliabilityfor punitivedamages given that there are few, if any, coherenttheoriesof the natureof the institution at the highestlevels of legal policy analysis.Even the juries that most thoroughly

still

rendered,"Yes,punitivedamages

consideredthe relevantlegal requirements

are warranted"verdictsabout half of the time, substantial (45%) demonstrating

disagreementamongjurorsand betweenjurorsandjudges.SupremeCourtJustice

O'Connor

the critical

of our empiricalfindings:"Manycourts

expressed

implication

continueto providejurorswith skeletalguidancethat permitsthe traditionalguarantorof fairness-the juryitself-to be convertedinto a sourceof capriceandbias"

(TXO Prod. Corp. v.Alliance ResourcesCorp., 1993, p. 2742). Here again we believe that furtherempiricalresearchcan informand focus the debate overwhetherand how we should assess punitivedamages.

APPENDIX

Jardel Co., Inc. v. K. Hughes

This case involvesthe followingtwo parties:the plaintiff,KathleenHughes, a shoppingmall employeewho was abductedfrom the mall parkinglot, beaten,

LiabilityDecisions

309

and raped;the defendant,Jardel Co., Inc., owner and operatorof the shopping mall.

The specificsof the case are as follows:

On July 18, 1980, shortlyafter the 9:00 p.m. closing time, the plaintiff,an employeeof the Woolcostore in the Blue Hen Mall,left her place of employment. She walked throughthe interiorarcadeof the mall and exited throughthe rear entranceadjacentto the parkinglot where her vehicle was located. Near the entrance to the Fox theater,the plaintiffwas accostedby two scruffy-lookingyoung men who had been denied entranceto the theaterbecauseFox personnelbelieved them intoxicated.When these individualsaskedplaintifffor a cigarette,she briefly spokewiththem,gave them a cigaretteandwalkedon. The men followedthe plain-

tiff to her

car,

which was

50 feet from the mall entrance.

 

 

parked approximately

When she attemptedto enter her car, they forced theirway into her car with her and drove away.

After being driven to a remote site adjacentto the mall, the plaintiffwas beaten and rapedby both assailants.While she was unconsciousand lying on the

ground,her assailantsattemptedto run her over with her car and later set fire to the car while she was lying in it. Plaintiffregainedconsciousnessand staggered

nude and bloodiedonto a

where a

motoristfound her and

 

nearbyhighway

passing

took her to a nearbyhospital.

Plaintiffremainedhospitalizedfor 6 days.She was treatedfor severe contusions to the face and scalp, a cerebralconcussionand a permanentskullfracture. This latter injuryhas resulted in a permanentdisplacementof her left eye and double vision. In additionto her physicalinjuriesthe plaintiff,at the time of trial

four

years later,

still suffered

 

effects from her traumatic

 

 

psychological

experience.

 

Since 1979,JardelhadcontractedwithGlobe SecuritySystems,Inc.to provide

 

for the mallexterior.Jardel

to the numberof

guardsprovided

guards

 

paidaccording

by Globe. Jardel decided to use one guardfor each nightlyshift beginningat 9 p.m. Globe personneltestified that they had suggestedto Jardelthat the mall exteriorwas too largefor one guardandthatmoreguardswere needed.Jardeldenied receivinga specific recommendationbut did acknowledgethat Globe requested, on more than one occasion, an increase in the numberof guards.In response, Jardel asked Globe to justifythe additionalexpense.

Globe said they wantedan additionalguardbecausethere was no radiocontact with the Dover police. The police allowed direct radio access only to police officers.Globe wanteda secondguardinsidethe mall,who wouldbe in radiocontact with the outside guardand could telephone the police. Jardelcounteredthat maintenancepersonnelwho alreadyworkedinside the mall throughoutthe night could contact the police if necessary.

When Hugheswas forced into her vehicle in the rearparkinglot, the single Globe guardwas in his patrolvehicle, parkedin the front parkinglot.

Mall ownersare not compelledto providesecurity.But Jardelchose to provide security,presumablyto render the mall more attractiveto its tenants, and their customersand employees.Once Jardeldid providea securityprogram,Jardel became obligatedto do it in a reasonablemanner,with a view towardthe dangers to which the programwas directed.The standardthat governsthis situationsays,

310

Hastie,Schkade,and Payne

"Apossessorof landwho holdsit open to the publicfor businesspurposesis liable to the publicwhile they are on the landfor suchpurpose,for physicalharmcaused by . . . intentionally harmful acts of third persons. If past experience is such that the owner shouldreasonablyanticipatecriminalconducton the part of thirdper- sons, either generallyor at some particulartime, he may be undera duty to take precautionsagainstit, and to providea reasonablysufficientnumberof servants to affordreasonableprotection."

A Dover police officerpresentedevidenceof the numberof police responses to the Blue Hen Mall in the 2 1/2 years precedingthe incident.Of 394 incidents

 

over 90%were

 

or

 

 

crimes.The

incidents,

reported,

 

property

 

nonpersonal

 

 

remaining

 

involveda

 

 

at

gun point,

an armed

 

a sexualmolesta-

however,

kidnapping

 

 

robbery,

tion,

indecent

and

 

 

 

 

with

 

 

one-halfof these

exposures,

 

pursesnatchings,

approximately

incidentsoccurringin the mall parkinglot.

 

 

the

 

 

The court concludedthat under the

 

 

 

protectionprovided

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

circumstances,

by Jardelwas an insufficientresponseto the knownhistoryof criminalactivity.

Hugheswas compensatedin full for her expenses,lost income,and pain and suffering.In addition,Hughesclaimedshe was entitledto punitivedamages.

PlaintiffArgumentin Favorof PunitiveDamages

Despite the historyof violent crimesin the Blue Hen Mall, and despite the repeatedrequestsfrom Globe Securityto add anotherguardbecauseof the large size of the parkinglot, Jardelchose to save money by havingonly one exterior guardon duty.Punitivedamagesshouldbe awardedagainstJardelto punishthem

for flagrantlyavoidingtheir dutyof protectingmall employeesand customers,and to deter them, and other mall owners,from such futurebehavior.

DefendantArgumentAgainstthe Awardof PunitiveDamages

we all wishcrimecouldbe

we knowit cannotbe. In

this

Although

prevented,

 

case, Jardelvoluntarilyprovideda reasonablelevel of security,consistentwith the

 

 

of crimeon theirmall

 

 

 

was not even close to the

 

 

Jardel'sbehavior

 

 

 

history

property.

for the

of othersthat is

required

 

 

 

 

maliciousor recklessand callousdisregard

 

rights

by the Judge'sinstructionsfor the awardof punitivedamages.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jury Instructions

 

 

 

 

 

 

The judge has given you the following instructionsthat you are requiredby law

to use in deciding whetheror not to awardpunitive damages.

 

 

 

 

 

The purposesof punitivedamagesare to punisha defendantand to deter a

defendantand others from committingsimilaracts in the future.

 

 

 

 

a

Plaintiffhas the burdenof provingthat punitivedamagesshouldbe awarded

by

of the evidence.You

may

award

 

if

you

 

preponderance

 

 

punitivedamagesonly

 

find that the defendant'sconduct

(1)was malicious;or

(2)manifestedrecklessor callousdisregardfor the rightsof others.

LiabilityDecisions

311

Conductis maliciousif it is accompaniedby ill will, or spite, or if it is for the purposeof injuringanother.

In order for conduct to be in recklessor callous disregardof the rightsof

others,

four factorsmust be

present.First,

a defendantmust be

con-

 

 

subjectively

scious of a particulargrave dangeror risk of harm,and the dangeror risk must be a foreseeableand probableeffect of the conduct.Second,the particulardanger

or risk of which the defendantwas

 

consciousmust in fact have even-

 

 

 

subjectively

 

 

tuated.

Third,

a defendantmust have

the riskin

deciding

how to act.

 

 

 

disregarded

 

Fourth,a defendant'sconductin ignoringthe dangeror riskmust have involveda gross deviationfrom the level of care whichan ordinarypersonwoulduse, having due regardto all the circumstances.

Recklessconductis not the same as negligence.Negligenceis the failureto use such care as a reasonable,prudent,andcarefulpersonwoulduse undersimilar circumstances.Recklessconductdiffersfrom negligencein that it requiresa conscious choice of action, eitherwith knowledgeof seriousdangerto others or with knowledgeof facts whichwould disclose the dangerto any reasonableperson.

To"establish

 

a

of the evidence"meansto

prove

that some-

 

 

by

 

preponderance

 

 

thing

is more

likely

so thannot so. In other

a

of the evidence

 

 

 

 

words, preponderance

 

in the case means such evidence as, when consideredand comparedwith that op- posed to it, has moreconvincingforce,andproducesin yourmindsbelief thatwhat is sought to be provedis more likelytrue than not true.

In your decisionson issues of fact, a corporationis entitledto the same fair trialat your handsas a privateindividualAll. persons,includingcorporations,part-

and other

stand

equal

before the

law,

and are to be dealt

nerships,

organizations,

 

 

with by the judge and jury as equals in a court of justice.

The verdictmust representthe consideredjudgmentof each juror.In order to returna verdict,it is necessarythat each juroragree thereto.Yourverdictmust be unanimous.

Upon retiringto the juryroom,you will select one of your numberto act as your presidingjuror.The presidingjurorwill presideover your deliberations.

Question

KathleenHughes(the plaintiff),a shoppingmallemployeewhowas abducted, beaten, and raped, while going to her car after work in the mall, has sued the mall's owner, Jardel Co., Inc., (the defendant)askingfor punitivedamages.You have been given a legal definitionof when punitivedamagesare proper.You must use that definitionwhetheryou agreewith it or not. Basedon that definitionwould

it be properto awardpunitivedamagesagainstJardelCo., Inc., yes, or no?

Answer:Yes No

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Supportfor the researchwas providedby funds from the National Science Foundation(GrantNo. SBR 9410288)and fromthe ExxonCo., USA. The authors

BMW of
Bray,R.

312

Hastie,Schkade,and Payne

would like to thankRichardBerk,ValerieHans, CharlesJudd,JanetKabili,Gary McClelland,and the staffof BodakenAssociatesfor assistanceand adviceon vari-

ous aspects of the research.Of course, the views expressedin this paper should only be attributedto the authors.

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