- •Contents
- •General editors’ preface
- •Contributors
- •Table of legislation
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Ireland
- •Italy
- •Netherlands
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •Spain
- •Abbreviations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Ireland
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •Spain
- •Other sections
- •1 Some perennial problems
- •I. The architecture of contract law
- •B. Common law
- •II. The questions
- •2 Contemporary solutions
- •Case 1: promises of gifts
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •General principles:
- •Exceptions
- •Case 2: promises of compensation for services rendered without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 3: promises to pay debts not legally due
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 4: a promise to come to dinner
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 5: promises to store goods without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 6: promises to do a favour
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 7: promises to loan goods without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 8: a requirements contract
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 9: promises to pay more than was agreed I
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 10: promises to pay more than was agreed II
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 11: promises to do more than was agreed; promises to waive a condition
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 12: promises to take less than was agreed
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 13: options given without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 14: promises of rewards
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 15: promises of commissions
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •3 Comparisons
- •I. Gifts and favours
- •A. Promises of money or property
- •1. Obstacles to giving gifts
- •2. Exceptions for meritorious gifts
- •3. Protecting reliance
- •B. Favours that need not entail expense
- •1. Favours that can no longer be performed costlessly
- •a. Promises to loan goods
- •b. Promises to take care of goods
- •2. A broken promise to do a service
- •3. A note on the ‘intention to be legally bound’
- •C. What is left of Roman contract law?
- •1. Promises to perform contractual obligations that are legally unenforceable
- •III. The absence of commitment
- •A. Open terms and options
- •B. Locus poenitentiae
- •IV. Epilogue
- •A. The results
- •B. The doctrines
- •C. The search for solutions
- •1. Gifts and favours
- •a. Promises of money or property
- •b. Favours that need not entail expense
- •3. The absence of commitment
- •a. Open terms and options
- •b. Promises conditional upon success
- •Index by country
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Ireland
- •Italy
- •Netherlands
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •Spain
- •United States
- •Index by subject
c ase 10: paying more than was agreed ii |
251 |
Whether it matters if Vito has already bought the vacation home depends on the possible application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The conditions for this doctrine have been described above in the answers to previous cases. One particular condition is that the promisee cannot use the doctrine as a sword as well as a shield: see Combe v. Combe37 in this regard. Therefore, in the present case Vito’s purchase of the vacation house would give rise to no cause of action on his behalf.
Summaries
France: In Case 10(a), where Vito was paid more to induce him to stay, relief would be given for duress if the threat is illegitimate and induced Company to consent, but a court is unlikely to do so since French courts have been hesitant to consider economic pressure to be duress. Absent duress, the promise would be enforceable as, under French labour law, agreements by an employee restricting his freedom to change employment are enforceable if they are reasonable in time and space, and serve a legitimate interest of the employer.
In Case 10(b), the promise may be invalid as a gift which lacks the required formalities. It would be enforceable only if it were considered a gift in compensation for past services – donation rémunératoire – or an actual payment for past services, which is unlikely.
Belgium: Case 10(a) is not likely to arise in Belgium because the employee is under an obligation not to compete after his employment ends. Under Belgian labour law, however, the employee may terminate his employment before the end of the term agreed upon if he pays a certain indemnity. Since Vito is free to leave if he pays the indemnity, the employer may promise extra compensation if he does not.
In Case 10(b), the promise is enforceable even absent a formality because it is a promise to pay a natural obligation.
The Netherlands: As in Case 9, the promise in Case 10(a) is valid unless procured by an ‘abuse of circumstances’ or a threat. In either case, the question is whether the employer had a reasonable alternative. In this case, however, the court is less likely to give relief because there is an issue of personal freedom.
In Case 10(b), the promise is unenforceable because it is a ‘remuneratory gift’ which requires the same formalities as other gifts.
Spain: In Case 10(a), Spanish labour law gives an employee the right to
37 [1951] 2 KB 215.
252 the enforceabilit y of promises
terminate his employment before the time agreed upon, and while the employer has a right to sue for damages if he does, this right is almost never recognized by the courts. Since Vito therefore has the right to leave, the employer’s promise is valid if it is made causa credendi to induce him to stay.
In Case 10(b), the promise is made causa donandi and therefore it is not valid without the formality required for a gift.
Portugal: The promise is not enforceable because it is a gift and such promises must be made in writing. Nevertheless, if Vito has relied on the promise, there may be pre-contractual liability for violation of good faith since a promise was made and then broken knowing the promisee might rely on it.
Italy: In Case 10(a), the original promise to work for ten years would be void under Italian labour law, and so Company’s promise to induce him to stay would be valid.
In Case 10(b), the promise would probably not be considered a gift and so would be enforceable without a formality because Italian courts favour employees. Possibly, a court might consider it a ‘remunerative gift’ (one for past services) which does require the same formality as other gifts.
Austria: In Case 10(a), the promise will be enforceable unless it can be avoided for duress, which is unlikely since there is no indication that Vito actually threatened Company. The promise is not a gift since the employer will not be deemed to have acted purely out of generosity. Therefore the promise is enforceable without the formality required for a gift.
In Case 10(b), the promise is enforceable without a formality because it will be deemed to be part of Vito’s salary rather than a gift even though it is connected only with his past services.
Germany: In Case 10(a), the promise will be voidable for duress if Vito threatened to break his employment contract. Otherwise, it and the promise in Case 10(b) will be enforceable. Such promises are not deemed to be gifts even if made after retirement because they are related to the employee’s normal services and the employer’s loyalty to him.
Greece: In Case 10(a), the promise is enforceable since it will be considered a supplement to Vito’s salary.
In Case 10(b), the promise is enforceable even absent a formality since it is deemed a promise to perform a special moral duty.
Scotland: In Case 10(a), if the payment is made to prevent Vito from leaving, it is not gratuitous. Even if Vito had threatened to leave, the threat does not constitute duress.
In Case 10(b), the promise is gratuitous but enforceable absent a writing
c ase 10: paying more than was agreed ii |
253 |
because it was made in the course of business. If Vito bought a house, it is also enforceable because he relied on it.
England: In Case 10(a), it would once have been said that there is no fresh consideration. Recently, however, it has been held that there is consideration for a promise if the promisor receives a ‘practical benefit’ even if the benefit is the performance of a pre-existing legal duty. Here, Company gets a practical benefit if the increase in pay keeps Vito from leaving, and yet, if Vito had threatened to leave, the threat would constitute duress. A court might decide that Company did receive this practical benefit, and that there would be duress only if Vito actually threatened to leave. Vito’s reliance on the promise might influence what a court did.
In Case 10(b), the promise is unenforceable since Company did not receive a practical benefit.
Ireland: In Case 10(a), it would once have been said that there is no fresh consideration. Recently, however, an English court held that there is consideration for a promise if the promisor receives a ‘practical benefit’ even if the benefit is the performance of a pre-existing legal duty. This decision may not be followed in Ireland. If it were, a court might decide that the Company did receive a practical benefit by inducing Vito to stay. A court would not find there to be duress because Vito never threatened to leave. Even if the traditional approach were followed, the parties could make the new promise binding by first agreeing to discharge the existing contract and then agreeing to make a new one.
In Case 10(b), the promise is unenforceable because it lacks consideration. It could be made binding by having Vito promise some small undertaking in return, such as to retire early or not to compete with the company.
Preliminary comparisons
In one jurisdiction, Portugal, the reporter believed that the promise in Case 10(a) is not enforceable though there may be a remedy for violation of good faith. In all other jurisdictions, the reporters thought it would be enforceable. In three cases, the reason was that the initial promise to work for a fixed term was either invalid (Italy) or one which the employee was entitled to break though he would then be liable for an indemnity (Belgium) or for damages which, as a practical matter, the employer could not recover (Spain). The two common law reporters noted that at one time, the promise would have been unenforceable because it lacked consideration, but under the new English approach, which may be followed in
254 the enforceabilit y of promises
Ireland, it will be enforceable because the employer received a ‘practical benefit’. The Irish reporter observed that the parties could get around the traditional approach by first agreeing to cancel their contract and then agreeing to make a new one. In Italy, Belgium, and Spain, duress was not an issue because the employee had the right to leave. In Scotland, it was not because threatening to leave would not constitute duress. Elsewhere, it was not because Vito did not threaten to do so.
The promise in Case 10(b) would be considered a gift and therefore unenforceable without the required formalities in France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, although in Portugal there may be a remedy for violation of good faith. The promise would be unenforceable for lack of consideration in England and Ireland. It would be considered gratuitous in Scotland but nevertheless enforceable because it was made in the course of business (and even if it were not, if it had been relied upon). It would be enforceable as a promise to fulfil a natural or moral obligation in Belgium and Greece. It would be enforceable in Austria and Germany because it would be considered part of, or linked to, the employee’s past services. In Italy, it would be treated as a gift if it were regarded as payment for past services, but the Italian reporter believes a court would enforce it because Italian courts favour employees.
