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Учебный год 22-23 / Promises and Contract Law - Comparative Perspectives-1.pdf
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318

Promises and Contract Law

In Louisiana, the Civil Code provides110 that all rights may be assigned save those ‘pertaining to obligations which are purely personal’, that is to say obligations which are intended to be enforceable only by a specific party or against a specific party,111 though the right to assign a right may be excluded in the contract.112 The codal provision further provides that the assignee ‘is subrogated to the rights of the assignor against the debtor’,113 subrogation being defined114 as ‘the substitution of one person to the rights of another’ either conventionally or legally. This, however, leaves unsettled the question of whether an assignment is seen as a bilateral (and possibly contractual) or unilateral juridical act. The answer appears to be that Louisiana law conceives of assignment as a contract, though such a conclusion requires to be pieced together from a number of observations: (i) the provisions on assignment are located within the title on sale, suggesting that assignment is conceived of as a kind of sale, sale being of course one specific type of contract; (ii) the current provisions on assignment derive from the provisions of the French Code on assignment115 and, while those provisions are themselves unclear on the contractual nature of assignment, the secondary commentary to them makes the contractual analysis clear; (iii) Article 2649 of the Louisiana Code makes a tangential reference to the nature of assignment as a contract when it provides that when ‘the assignor of a right did not warrant the solvency of the debtor but knew of his insolvency, the assignee without such knowledge may obtain rescission of the contract’; and (iv) there are several cases which similarly tangentially refer to assignment as a contract.116 Taken together, these observations lead reasonably to the view that assignment in Louisiana is a contract, thus requiring the consent of both parties before it takes effect.

(c)  German law

German law requires that an assignment of rights (as well as a delegation of duties) be achieved via contract. §398 BGB provides that a ‘claim may

110CC Art. 2642.

111‘Strictly personal obligations’ are defined in CC Art. 1766. As an example of an obligation which is strictly personal on the part of the obligee, Art. 1766 mentions one where ‘the performance is intended for the benefit of the obligee exclusively’.

112

CC Art. 2653.

113

CC Art. 2642.

114

CC Art. 1825.

115

Code civil Arts. 1689–1701.

116See, for instance, Succession of Delassize, 8 Rob. 259 (La 1844), in which, discussing proof of assignment, it was held that no writing was required since ‘[a]ll contracts which are not expressly required to be reduced to writing, can, we apprehend, be made verbally’.

Third party rights

319

be transferred by the obligee to another person by contract with that person’, adding that the transfer takes effect at the point at which the contract of assignment is entered into. Such a contract of transfer is separate to any preceding contract for the assignment which may precede the latter contract of transfer. The contract of transfer however merely affects the position of the assignor and assignee inter se: until the debtor receives notification of the assignment, he remains free to tender performance to the assignor.117 In other words, intimation of the assignment to the debtor is required to bring the assignee and debtor in to a formal relationship. Assignment may be prohibited by the parties in their contract.118

There is separate provision in the BGB for the transfer of duties, which again requires to be achieved under a contract,119 as well as a further provision stipulating that any such transfer requires the ratification of the party to whom the debt is due before the transfer becomes effective.120

(d)  Model law

In the DCFR, the general rule is that all rights to performance are assignable unless otherwise provided by law.121 Substitution of debtors is treated separately.122 The general rule on assignment is worked out in a quite radical way through the further provision that a contractual prohibition or restriction on assignment does not prevent such assignment.123 This puts the DCFR position at odds with the position in a number of national systems that the parties are free to prohibit assignment if they so stipulate in their contract and that such a prohibition is effective to prevent an assignment. The DCFR position may be argued to undermine the right of a promisor to determine the nature of the promise undertaken by it, in that it restricts the promisor’s right to determine to whom the promise is to be performed. A sop to the freedom of the promisor to determine the nature of the right promised is offered by way of the fact that ‘personal rights’ may not be assigned unless with the permission of the creditor,

117 §407(1) BGB. 118 §399 BGB. 119 §414 BGB. 120 §415 BGB.

121Art. III.-5:105(1). The applicability of the regime on assignment only to rights of performance is somewhat limiting. For instance, in a case where A lets property to B, and B then sublets the property to C, a right in the lease between A and B entitling B to trigger arbitration in relation to a matter (such as whether the property is in need of repair by A) by an agreed arbiter would appear not to be able to be assigned to C, even if it might be C who has a direct interest in such an arbitration, because such a right is not to a ‘right to performance’ by A.

122 See Arts. III.-5:201 to III.-5:209.

123 Art. III.-5:108(1).