Добавил:
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз: Предмет: Файл:
Учебный год 22-23 / Promises and Contract Law - Comparative Perspectives-1.pdf
Скачиваний:
11
Добавлен:
15.12.2022
Размер:
3.23 Mб
Скачать

464

Promises and Contract Law

new legal doctrines to address perceived problems not addressed in the Code,15 it hardly seems likely that they will adopt such a course in respect of unilateral promise given that its general recognition was considered but explicitly rejected by the drafters of the Code. Any step to give uni­ lateral promises wider and more general recognition in German law is thus likely to come about only by virtue of amendment to the text of the BGB. No widespread desire to effect such amendment in respect of prom­ ise seems discernible at the present time. While this doubtless reflects the fact that lack of a general recognition of unilateral promises seems not to cause any major problems in German law,16 it can nonetheless be argued that a general promissory provision in the BGB would create greater con­ sistency. This would be so because the current approach singles out some instances of seriously intended unilateral promises as worthy of protec­ tion, yet denying all other instances such protection, while demonstrat­ ing no evident reason for this casuistic approach. The only apparent defence of the present position is that the instances of unilateral prom­ ise which have been given protection in the BGB are those which most commonly arise. Yet why should frequency of occurrence of a particular type of promise determine its legal effectiveness? Are not less frequently occurring but seriously intended instances of unilateral promise equally worthy of being given effect to in law? The great unanswered question for German law is why, having accepted the principle of pacta sunt servanda, it does not apply the same logic to unilateral promises, but rather imple­ ments a principle that only some of these promises are enforced.

(e)  The development of supranational model law

The likelihood of any of the national systems studied unilaterally develop­ ing their law in a way which would give a more explicit and a greater role to promise is not great. That assessment is made on the basis that there does not appear to be any groundswell of opinion in any of the jurisdic­ tions studied pressing for such development, albeit that in some jurisdic­ tions promissory scholarship is attracting more attention in recent years than it has for some time. Realistically, it is to supranational model codes, and the possibility of the eventual adoption of such codes into law, that one must look to advance the cause of promise.

15The judicial development of the doctrine of transferred loss (Drittenschadensliquidation), discussed at p. 330, being one such example.

16As the discussion in (primarily) Ch. 4 has indicated.

Future of Promise in Contract Law

465

The references in this work to, primarily, the provisions of the DCFR (as well as of the PECL) have indicated several things about the likely role of promise in a possible harmonised law of obligations in Europe:

(1)Promise, as a type of unilateral juristic undertaking, will be recog­ nised in any future harmonised legal order. A general enabling pro­ vision of the type in the DCFR (Article II.-1:103(2)) would potentially allow promise a role in many of the specific topics considered in the earlier chapters of this work, a development which would have the potential to benefit both legal theory and practice.

(2)Promise is capable of offering a suitable explanation of unilateral undertakings to effect a donation.17 The act of transfer effecting a donation, however, while a unilateral juristic act, is not itself prom­ issory. This point emphasises the importance of appreciating the distinction between unilateral obligatory acts and unilateral acts of another nature, a point which finds a clearer expression in the DCFR and in some legal systems than it does in other national systems.

(3)It is conceivable that some sorts of undertaking may not be subject to specific regulation, an example being the option. This leaves a prom­ issory conception as one (though not the only) possible analysis of the nature of the undertaking. Such possible freedom of analysis is ­welcome, as it allows national systems a degree of flexibility.

(4)Model law is unlikely to tackle the detail of any formal requirements which may be thought necessary in instances of promise. While this omission is unsurprising given the variety of formal requirements applied in different systems, it would be regrettable if national sys­ tems continued to limit the flexible uses to which promise can be put by unduly restrictive requirements of form. Such restrictions tend merely to foster attempts at avoidance through disguising essentially promissory relationships in some other form.

(5)Importantly, there are limitations to the utility of promise. In a future harmonised contract law, promise is, for instance, unlikely to con­ tinue to stamp upon offers their traditional character of unilaterally determined undertakings to contract upon certain terms: the DCFR approach of conceiving of offer and counter-offer as proposals from which a core agreement can be distilled presents the possibility of a quite different view of the negotiation process. Promise is also unlikely to provide a suitable explanation for the challenging field of

17  See Hogg, ‘Promise and Donation in Louisiana and Comparative Law’.