
- •1 The concept of promise
- •1. What is a promise?
- •(a) A definition of promise
- •(b) Promise: objectively existing phenomenon or human construction?
- •(c) Testing component elements of the definition of promise
- •(i) A promise is more than merely an internal mental process: promises as speech acts demonstrating commitment
- •(ii) A promise is a commitment to a performance of the promisor
- •(iv) A promise must relate to the future
- •(v) A promise must state a commitment in favour of another party
- •(vi) Things which are not components of the definition
- •2. Three crucial qualities of relevance to promises: gratuitousness, conditionality, unilaterality
- •(a) Gratuitousness
- •(b) Conditionality
- •(c) Unilaterality
- •3. Acts having some similarity to, but which are distinct from, promises
- •(a) Vows
- •(b) Oaths
- •(c) Threats
- •(d) Donation (gift)
- •(e) Warranties (guarantees)
- •(f) Agreement
- •4. Promise as a culturally universal and significant idea
- •5. Preliminary conclusions
- •2 Promises as obligations: morality and law
- •1. Introduction: promise as a type of obligation
- •2. Taxonomies of obligations in morality and law
- •3. Promises as moral obligations: the practice of promising
- •(a) Promising as moral, immoral, or amoral?
- •(b) Source of the morality of the practice of promising
- •(i) Promising as a virtuous act; the natural law tradition
- •Scripture
- •The canon law
- •Objections to the morality of promising as having a natural law/virtue basis
- •(ii) Promising as an act of the will: respect for personal autonomy
- •(iii) The ‘contract theory’ of promising
- •(iv) Consequentialism (utilitarianism)
- •(v) Reliance theory
- •A more limited role for reliance
- •(vi) Conclusion on the competing theories of the moral value of promises
- •4. Powers and sanctions relevant to breach of morally binding promises
- •3 The historical development of promissory ideas in the law
- •1. Roman law
- •(a) Formal contracts: the stipulatio
- •(b) Informal contracts
- •(c) Conclusion on Roman law
- •2. Medieval contract law
- •(a) Continental legal thought
- •(b) English law
- •(i) Debt
- •(ii) Covenant
- •(iii) Unilaterality and bilaterality in early English contract law
- •(iv) Assumpsit
- •(v) The doctrine of consideration
- •3. The Northern natural law school
- •(a) Hugo Grotius
- •(b) Samuel von Pufendorf
- •(c) James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair)
- •4. Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Scots law
- •(c) Civilian systems
- •(i) German law
- •(ii) Robert Pothier
- •5. Contract theory and practice in the twentieth century
- •6. A revitalised will theory
- •4 Formation of contract
- •1. Wasted pre-contractual expenditure following termination of contract negotiations
- •(a) A Common law solution to the problem of pre-contractual expenditure: promissory and proprietary estoppel
- •(i) Promissory estoppel: promissory or reliance-based principle?
- •(ii) Promissory estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iii) Proprietary estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iv) Conclusion on estoppel and pre-contractual expenditure
- •(b) A civilian solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: culpa in contrahendo and bad faith termination of contractual negotiations
- •(c) A mixed legal system solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: liability from an implied assurance that a valid contract exists
- •(d) Other solutions to the problem of pre-contractual liability
- •(e) Conclusion on pre-contractual liability
- •2. Pre-contractual duties of disclosure
- •3. Offer and acceptance
- •(a) Offer and acceptance as conditional promise
- •(b) The traditional offer and acceptance model as a unilateral dictation of terms
- •(c) Distinguishing offer from conditional promise
- •(d) Problem cases for a promissory analysis of offer and acceptance
- •(e) Conceiving of offers as binding
- •4. Enforcement of auction/tender conditions
- •5. The firm or irrevocable offer
- •(a) Characterising the firm offer
- •(b) Promises of reward
- •6. Options
- •7. Letters of intent and preliminary contracts
- •(a) An intent to contract
- •(b) A preliminary contract, envisaging a further contract
- •(c) An expectation of a formal contract
- •(d) An expression of intention to do something other than contract
- •(e) A genuine unilateral promissory intention
- •8. Error in formation of contract
- •(a) Choosing the policies which inform the rules on error
- •(b) Constructing workable classifications which implement the policies chosen
- •(i) Roman Law
- •(ii) The Common law
- •(iii) The mixed legal systems
- •(iv) German law
- •(v) An ideal approach to promissory error?
- •9. Extortion in the formation of contract
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Conclusion on extortion
- •10. Implied terms
- •11. Consideration
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •12. Requirements of form: unwarranted restrictions on promising?
- •5 Third party rights
- •1. The challenge to third party rights in contract
- •2. The historical legal background
- •3. Third party rights in modern contract law
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •(e) Conclusion on third party rights under contract
- •4. Assignment
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •5. The problem of transferred loss
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •6. Conclusion on third parties
- •6 Contractual remedies
- •1. The ‘interests’ protected by remedies
- •2. Mutuality of promises and withholding of performance
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •3. Specific performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •4. Perfect or substantial performance of contractual promises
- •(a) Contracts for services
- •(b) Sales of goods
- •5. Injunction (interdict)
- •6. Damages
- •(a) Contractual damages and interests other than the performance interest
- •(b) Damages for mere breach of contract, or for fault?
- •(c) English law
- •(d) Mixed legal systems
- •(e) German law
- •(f) Model law
- •7. Liquidated damages: penalty clauses
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •8. Termination of contract for non-performance
- •(a) Historical origins of the right to terminate
- •(b) English law
- •(c) Mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) Model law
- •9. Restitution following termination for non-performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •10. Good faith and contractual remedies
- •7 The renunciation of contractual rights
- •1. Terminology
- •2. Bilateral or unilateral renunciations
- •3. Characterising undertakings not to enforce contractual rights
- •4. Express contractual or promissory renunciation of rights
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •5. Forbearance, promissory estoppel and personal bar
- •(a) The Common law
- •(i) Forbearance at common law
- •(ii) Forbearance in equity: promissory estoppel in English law
- •(iii) Promissory estoppel in American Common law
- •(iv) Conclusion on promissory estoppel in the Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(i) South Africa
- •(ii) Louisiana
- •(iii) Scotland
- •(c) German law
- •6. Model Law and renunciations of rights
- •8 The future of promise in contract law
- •1. The restricted role of promise in the modern law
- •2. Future possible development of the law
- •(a) General remarks
- •(b) The Common law
- •(c) The mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) The development of supranational model law
- •3. Conclusion on the future of promise
464 |
Promises and Contract Law |
new legal doctrines to address perceived problems not addressed in the Code,15 it hardly seems likely that they will adopt such a course in respect of unilateral promise given that its general recognition was considered but explicitly rejected by the drafters of the Code. Any step to give uni lateral promises wider and more general recognition in German law is thus likely to come about only by virtue of amendment to the text of the BGB. No widespread desire to effect such amendment in respect of prom ise seems discernible at the present time. While this doubtless reflects the fact that lack of a general recognition of unilateral promises seems not to cause any major problems in German law,16 it can nonetheless be argued that a general promissory provision in the BGB would create greater con sistency. This would be so because the current approach singles out some instances of seriously intended unilateral promises as worthy of protec tion, yet denying all other instances such protection, while demonstrat ing no evident reason for this casuistic approach. The only apparent defence of the present position is that the instances of unilateral prom ise which have been given protection in the BGB are those which most commonly arise. Yet why should frequency of occurrence of a particular type of promise determine its legal effectiveness? Are not less frequently occurring but seriously intended instances of unilateral promise equally worthy of being given effect to in law? The great unanswered question for German law is why, having accepted the principle of pacta sunt servanda, it does not apply the same logic to unilateral promises, but rather imple ments a principle that only some of these promises are enforced.
(e) The development of supranational model law
The likelihood of any of the national systems studied unilaterally develop ing their law in a way which would give a more explicit and a greater role to promise is not great. That assessment is made on the basis that there does not appear to be any groundswell of opinion in any of the jurisdic tions studied pressing for such development, albeit that in some jurisdic tions promissory scholarship is attracting more attention in recent years than it has for some time. Realistically, it is to supranational model codes, and the possibility of the eventual adoption of such codes into law, that one must look to advance the cause of promise.
15The judicial development of the doctrine of transferred loss (Drittenschadensliquidation), discussed at p. 330, being one such example.
16As the discussion in (primarily) Ch. 4 has indicated.
Future of Promise in Contract Law |
465 |
The references in this work to, primarily, the provisions of the DCFR (as well as of the PECL) have indicated several things about the likely role of promise in a possible harmonised law of obligations in Europe:
(1)Promise, as a type of unilateral juristic undertaking, will be recog nised in any future harmonised legal order. A general enabling pro vision of the type in the DCFR (Article II.-1:103(2)) would potentially allow promise a role in many of the specific topics considered in the earlier chapters of this work, a development which would have the potential to benefit both legal theory and practice.
(2)Promise is capable of offering a suitable explanation of unilateral undertakings to effect a donation.17 The act of transfer effecting a donation, however, while a unilateral juristic act, is not itself prom issory. This point emphasises the importance of appreciating the distinction between unilateral obligatory acts and unilateral acts of another nature, a point which finds a clearer expression in the DCFR and in some legal systems than it does in other national systems.
(3)It is conceivable that some sorts of undertaking may not be subject to specific regulation, an example being the option. This leaves a prom issory conception as one (though not the only) possible analysis of the nature of the undertaking. Such possible freedom of analysis is welcome, as it allows national systems a degree of flexibility.
(4)Model law is unlikely to tackle the detail of any formal requirements which may be thought necessary in instances of promise. While this omission is unsurprising given the variety of formal requirements applied in different systems, it would be regrettable if national sys tems continued to limit the flexible uses to which promise can be put by unduly restrictive requirements of form. Such restrictions tend merely to foster attempts at avoidance through disguising essentially promissory relationships in some other form.
(5)Importantly, there are limitations to the utility of promise. In a future harmonised contract law, promise is, for instance, unlikely to con tinue to stamp upon offers their traditional character of unilaterally determined undertakings to contract upon certain terms: the DCFR approach of conceiving of offer and counter-offer as proposals from which a core agreement can be distilled presents the possibility of a quite different view of the negotiation process. Promise is also unlikely to provide a suitable explanation for the challenging field of
17 See Hogg, ‘Promise and Donation in Louisiana and Comparative Law’.