
- •Contents
- •Contributors
- •Acknowledgements
- •Introduction
- •What is corporate governance?
- •Corporate responsibility and ethics
- •Role of the board
- •Is corporate governance working?
- •Contribution of non-executive directors
- •Sanctions
- •The future of corporate governance
- •Challenges
- •1 The role of the board
- •Introduction
- •The executive/non-executive relationship
- •The board agenda and the number of meetings
- •Board committees
- •Size and composition of the board
- •The board and the shareholders
- •The dual role of British boards
- •What value does the board add?
- •Some unresolved questions
- •2 The role of the Chairman
- •Introduction
- •Due diligence
- •Professionalism
- •Setting the agenda and running the board meeting
- •Promoting good governance
- •Creating an effective relationship with the Chief Executive
- •Sustaining the company’s reputation
- •Succession planning
- •Building an effective board
- •Finding the right people
- •Getting the communications right
- •Making good use of non-executive directors
- •Using board committees effectively
- •Protecting the unitary board
- •Creating a climate of trust
- •Making good use of external advisers
- •Promoting the use of board evaluation and director appraisal
- •Qualities of an effective chairman
- •3 The role of the non-executive director
- •Introduction
- •Role of a non-executive director
- •Importance of the role of non-executive director
- •Personal skills and attributes of an effective non-executive director
- •Technical
- •Interpersonal
- •Importance of independence
- •Non-executive director dilemmas
- •Engaged and non-executive
- •Challenge and support
- •Independence and involvement
- •Barriers to NED effectiveness
- •The senior independent director (SID)
- •NEDs and board committees
- •Board evaluation
- •Training for NEDs
- •Diversity
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •4 The role of the Company Secretary
- •Introduction
- •The background
- •The advent of corporate governance
- •Role of the board
- •Strategic versus compliance
- •Reputation oversight
- •Governance systems
- •The Company Secretary
- •The challenges
- •5 The role of the shareholder
- •Recent history – growing pressure on shareholders to act responsibly
- •Governance as an alternative to regulation
- •Where shareholders make a difference
- •What happens in practice
- •The international dimension
- •Progress to date
- •The challenges ahead
- •6 The role of the regulator
- •Introduction
- •The market-based approach to promoting good governance
- •Advantages of the market-based approach and comply-or-explain
- •The role of governments and regulators
- •How does the regulator carry out this role in practice?
- •Challenges to comply-or-explain
- •Conclusion
- •Perspective
- •Individual and collective board responsibility
- •Enlightened shareholder value versus pluralism
- •Core duties
- •The duty to act within powers
- •The duty to promote the success of the company
- •The duty to exercise independent judgement
- •The duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence
- •The duty to disclose interests in proposed transactions or arrangements
- •Additional obligations
- •The obligation to declare interests in existing transactions or arrangements
- •The obligation to comply with the Listing, Disclosure and Transparency Rules
- •The obligation to disclose and certify disclosure of relevant audit information to auditors
- •Reporting
- •The link between directors’ duties and narrative reporting
- •Business reviews
- •Enhanced business reviews by quoted companies
- •Transparency Rules
- •Safe harbours
- •Shareholder derivative actions
- •8 What sanctions are necessary?
- •Introduction
- •The Virtuous Circle of corporate governance
- •Law and regulation in the Virtuous Circle
- •The Courts in the Virtuous Circle
- •Shareholder and market pressure in the Virtuous Circle
- •Good corporate citizenship in the Virtuous Circle
- •The sanctions: law and regulation – policing the boundaries
- •Sanctions under the Companies Acts
- •Sanctions and corporate reporting
- •The role of auditors
- •Plugging the ‘expectations gap’
- •Shareholders and legislative sanctions
- •FSMA: sanctions in a regulatory context
- •Sanctions for listed companies, directors and PDMRs
- •Suspensions and cancellations
- •The Listing Principles – facilitating the enforcement process
- •Sanctions for AIM listed companies
- •Sanctions for sponsors and nomads
- •Misleading statements and practices
- •The sanctions: the role of the Courts
- •Consequences of breach of duty
- •The position of non-executive directors
- •Protecting directors
- •The impact of the 2006 Act
- •Adequacy of civil sanctions for breach of duty
- •The sanctions: shareholder and market pressure – power in the hands of the owners
- •Shareholders and their agents
- •Codes versus law and regulation
- •What sanctions apply under codes and guidelines?
- •Proposals for reform
- •The sanctions: good corporate citizenship – the power of public opinion
- •Adverse press comment
- •Peer pressure
- •Corporate social responsibility
- •Conclusion
- •9 Regulatory trends and their impact on corporate governance
- •Introduction and overarching market trends
- •Regulatory trends in the EU
- •Transparency
- •Comply-or-explain
- •Annual disclosures
- •Interim and ad hoc disclosures
- •Hedge fund and stock lending
- •Accountability
- •Shareholder rights and participation
- •The market for corporate control
- •One-share-one-vote
- •Shareholder communications
- •Trends in the US
- •Transparency
- •Executive remuneration
- •Accountability
- •Concluding remarks
- •10 Corporate governance and performance: the missing links
- •Introduction
- •Governance-ranking-based research into the link between corporate governance and performance
- •Overview of governance-ranking research
- •Assessment of governance-ranking research
- •Further evidence for a link between corporate governance and performance: effectiveness of shareholder engagement
- •Performance of companies in focus lists
- •Performance of shareholder engagement funds
- •Shareholder engagement in practice: Premier Oil plc
- •Assessment of the research and evidence for a link between corporate governance and performance
- •Conclusion
- •Investors play an important role in using corporate governance as an investment technique
- •References
- •11 Is the UK model working?
- •The evolution of UK corporate governance
- •Other governance principles
- •Cross-border harmony
- •UK versus US governance environments
- •Quality of corporate governance disclosures in the UK
- •Have UK companies embraced the principles of the Combined Code?
- •Do they do what they say they do?
- •Resources and investor interest
- •Governance versus performance and listings
- •Alternative Investment Market (AIM) quoted companies
- •Roles and responsibilities
- •Institutional investors
- •Shareholder rights in the UK versus the US
- •Shareholder responsibilities
- •Board effectiveness
- •Review of board performance under the Code
- •Results of evaluations
- •What makes a company responsible?
- •Is the UK model of corporate governance working?
- •Index

What sanctions are necessary?
No regime of corporate governance can ever completely eradicate the possibility of governance failures and any attempt to do so is only likely to undermine capital markets and wealth creation. So, what sanctions are necessary to ensure sufficient but not excess accountability?
The Virtuous Circle of corporate governance
To be able to review our system of accountability, we need to define which ‘rules’ constitute the corporate governance landscape and what drives companies and boards to adopt appropriate governance standards. The Virtuous Circle is a rudimentary depiction of that landscape and of those drivers (see figure 8.1).
The Virtuous Circle is divided into four segments, with the overarching, high-level reasons for boards to comply with the principles of good governance described in the outer ring of each. Consequently, we believe there are four main drivers:
law and regulation
the Courts
shareholder pressure
good corporate citizenship.
Moving in from that, the next ring shows the main protagonists: those organisations and bodies which either develop the rules or guidelines and/or apply pressure on boards.
Finally, in the main section of each segment are the means through which pressure is applied.
Ultimately, pressure is applied on boards, hence their position at the centre of the Virtuous Circle and at the heart of the corporate governance regime. The objective of this pressure is good governance, which can be summarised as:
compliance with law, regulation and best practice
a balanced board making quality decisions
focus on risk management strategies
balanced, accessible and regular assessments of the company’s position and prospects
transparency of board remuneration
good corporate citizenship.
Law and regulation in the Virtuous Circle
The law is the primary source of pressure on boards. Much of this emanates from the EU, particularly in the form of the Company Law Directives2 and,
2In particular the Fourth (Directive 78/660/EEC), Seventh (83/349/EEC) and Eighth (Directive 84/253/EEC) Directives.
147

Keith Johnstone and Will Chalk
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Figure 8.1 The Virtuous Circle of corporate governance
more recently, the Modernisation Directive3 which contained the requirement for companies to produce a business review in annual reports. The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and the Treasury also play a major part here in promoting legislation in relation to companies and financial services respectively. In addition, the BERR investigates and enforces certain aspects of the regime and has the power to appoint investigators, whereas the Treasury has largely delegated these functions to the Financial Services Authority (FSA).
3 Directive 2003/51/EC.
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What sanctions are necessary?
The intended outcomes of the Virtuous Circle of corporate governance:
BOARDS : GOOD GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE
The purpose of the Virtuous Circle :
-Compliance with law, regulation and best practice
-A balanced board making quality decisions
-Focus on risk management strategies
-Balanced, accessible and regular assessments of the company’s position and prospects
-Transparency of board remuneration
-Good corporate citizenship
KEY
ABI : Association of British Insurers
AIC : Association of Investment Companies
APB : Auditing Practices Board, an operating body of the FRC
AIDB : Accountancy Investigation and Discipline Board, an operating body of the FRC
CO SECS : Company Secretaries
FRC : Financial Reporting Council
FRRP : Financial Reporting Review Panel, an operating body of the FRC
FSA : Financial Services Authority
IMA : Investment Managers Association
LSE : London Stock Exchange (for AIM Listed companies)
NAPF : National Association of Pension Funds
POB : Public Oversight Board, an operating body of the FRC
QCA : Quoted Companies Alliance
© 2007 Addleshaw Goddard LLP. All rights reserved.
Figure 8.1 (cont.)
A small number of statutes are at the heart of the law and regulation segment in the Virtuous Circle:
the Companies Act 1985 (1985 Act) as variously amended, most pertinently by the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (Remuneration Regulations) and the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (C(A,ICE) Act), and which is in the process of being further amended and superseded by the 2006 Act (taken together, the Companies Acts); and
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).
Companies admitted to Official Listing and to trading on regulated markets also have regulatory obligations which derive from Part VI of FSMA, and which are contained in the Listing Rules and Disclosure and Transparency Rules (together,
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Keith Johnstone and Will Chalk
Part 6 Rules). These rules are overlain by Listing Principles and enforced by the FSA. For companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), as it is an ‘exchange regulated market’, pressure is applied through the AIM Rules for Companies (AIM Rules) enforced by the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
In terms of corporate reporting, centre stage in the Virtuous Circle are the Companies Acts requiring the production of annual accounts with prescribed contents. For companies admitted to regulated markets, these must now be produced on a consolidated basis in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Standards of corporate reporting are also upheld through the audit process and the scrutiny of independent auditors, who themselves are governed by auditing standards.
There are several other organisations surrounding boards in this segment of the Virtuous Circle compelling compliance, directly and indirectly, with the corporate reporting process. Most prominent among these are:
the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) whose powers were significantly enhanced by the C(A,ICE) Act; the FRRP seeks to ensure that the provision of financial information by public and large private companies complies with Companies Acts; it has enforcement functions in relation to narrative reporting, not least in relation to directors’ reports and, in due course, in relation to Business Reviews; it also monitors compliance with the accounting disclosure requirements of the Listing Rules;
the Auditing Practices Board (APB), which sets auditing standards and gives guidance on the performance of external audits and other activities undertaken by auditors;
the Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) of the Professional Oversight Board (POB), which was established following the Government’s post-Enron review of the UK accountancy profession; under the regulatory framework established as a result of this review, the professional Accountancy Bodies (defined below), continue to register firms to conduct audit work, with their regulatory activities being overseen by the POB; the AIU assists the POB in this role by monitoring the quality of audits of all entities with listed securities and other entities in whose financial condition there is considered to be a ‘major public interest’; AIU reports are sent to the senior management of the auditor in question as well as to the Accountancy Body with which the firm is registered, and consequently the AIU/POB acts as an indirect source of pressure on boards;
the Accountancy Investigation and Discipline Board (AIDB), which acts as an independent investigative and disciplinary body for accountants in the UK; like the AIU/POB, the focus of the AIDB is on cases of public interest – for example, those pertaining to larger companies with sizeable shareholder bases which have been referred to them by Accountancy Bodies with whom an individual accountancy firm is registered; other cases will continue to be dealt with by the Accountancy Bodies;
150