- •Contents
- •Contributors
- •Acknowledgements
- •Introduction
- •What is corporate governance?
- •Corporate responsibility and ethics
- •Role of the board
- •Is corporate governance working?
- •Contribution of non-executive directors
- •Sanctions
- •The future of corporate governance
- •Challenges
- •1 The role of the board
- •Introduction
- •The executive/non-executive relationship
- •The board agenda and the number of meetings
- •Board committees
- •Size and composition of the board
- •The board and the shareholders
- •The dual role of British boards
- •What value does the board add?
- •Some unresolved questions
- •2 The role of the Chairman
- •Introduction
- •Due diligence
- •Professionalism
- •Setting the agenda and running the board meeting
- •Promoting good governance
- •Creating an effective relationship with the Chief Executive
- •Sustaining the company’s reputation
- •Succession planning
- •Building an effective board
- •Finding the right people
- •Getting the communications right
- •Making good use of non-executive directors
- •Using board committees effectively
- •Protecting the unitary board
- •Creating a climate of trust
- •Making good use of external advisers
- •Promoting the use of board evaluation and director appraisal
- •Qualities of an effective chairman
- •3 The role of the non-executive director
- •Introduction
- •Role of a non-executive director
- •Importance of the role of non-executive director
- •Personal skills and attributes of an effective non-executive director
- •Technical
- •Interpersonal
- •Importance of independence
- •Non-executive director dilemmas
- •Engaged and non-executive
- •Challenge and support
- •Independence and involvement
- •Barriers to NED effectiveness
- •The senior independent director (SID)
- •NEDs and board committees
- •Board evaluation
- •Training for NEDs
- •Diversity
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •4 The role of the Company Secretary
- •Introduction
- •The background
- •The advent of corporate governance
- •Role of the board
- •Strategic versus compliance
- •Reputation oversight
- •Governance systems
- •The Company Secretary
- •The challenges
- •5 The role of the shareholder
- •Recent history – growing pressure on shareholders to act responsibly
- •Governance as an alternative to regulation
- •Where shareholders make a difference
- •What happens in practice
- •The international dimension
- •Progress to date
- •The challenges ahead
- •6 The role of the regulator
- •Introduction
- •The market-based approach to promoting good governance
- •Advantages of the market-based approach and comply-or-explain
- •The role of governments and regulators
- •How does the regulator carry out this role in practice?
- •Challenges to comply-or-explain
- •Conclusion
- •Perspective
- •Individual and collective board responsibility
- •Enlightened shareholder value versus pluralism
- •Core duties
- •The duty to act within powers
- •The duty to promote the success of the company
- •The duty to exercise independent judgement
- •The duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence
- •The duty to disclose interests in proposed transactions or arrangements
- •Additional obligations
- •The obligation to declare interests in existing transactions or arrangements
- •The obligation to comply with the Listing, Disclosure and Transparency Rules
- •The obligation to disclose and certify disclosure of relevant audit information to auditors
- •Reporting
- •The link between directors’ duties and narrative reporting
- •Business reviews
- •Enhanced business reviews by quoted companies
- •Transparency Rules
- •Safe harbours
- •Shareholder derivative actions
- •8 What sanctions are necessary?
- •Introduction
- •The Virtuous Circle of corporate governance
- •Law and regulation in the Virtuous Circle
- •The Courts in the Virtuous Circle
- •Shareholder and market pressure in the Virtuous Circle
- •Good corporate citizenship in the Virtuous Circle
- •The sanctions: law and regulation – policing the boundaries
- •Sanctions under the Companies Acts
- •Sanctions and corporate reporting
- •The role of auditors
- •Plugging the ‘expectations gap’
- •Shareholders and legislative sanctions
- •FSMA: sanctions in a regulatory context
- •Sanctions for listed companies, directors and PDMRs
- •Suspensions and cancellations
- •The Listing Principles – facilitating the enforcement process
- •Sanctions for AIM listed companies
- •Sanctions for sponsors and nomads
- •Misleading statements and practices
- •The sanctions: the role of the Courts
- •Consequences of breach of duty
- •The position of non-executive directors
- •Protecting directors
- •The impact of the 2006 Act
- •Adequacy of civil sanctions for breach of duty
- •The sanctions: shareholder and market pressure – power in the hands of the owners
- •Shareholders and their agents
- •Codes versus law and regulation
- •What sanctions apply under codes and guidelines?
- •Proposals for reform
- •The sanctions: good corporate citizenship – the power of public opinion
- •Adverse press comment
- •Peer pressure
- •Corporate social responsibility
- •Conclusion
- •9 Regulatory trends and their impact on corporate governance
- •Introduction and overarching market trends
- •Regulatory trends in the EU
- •Transparency
- •Comply-or-explain
- •Annual disclosures
- •Interim and ad hoc disclosures
- •Hedge fund and stock lending
- •Accountability
- •Shareholder rights and participation
- •The market for corporate control
- •One-share-one-vote
- •Shareholder communications
- •Trends in the US
- •Transparency
- •Executive remuneration
- •Accountability
- •Concluding remarks
- •10 Corporate governance and performance: the missing links
- •Introduction
- •Governance-ranking-based research into the link between corporate governance and performance
- •Overview of governance-ranking research
- •Assessment of governance-ranking research
- •Further evidence for a link between corporate governance and performance: effectiveness of shareholder engagement
- •Performance of companies in focus lists
- •Performance of shareholder engagement funds
- •Shareholder engagement in practice: Premier Oil plc
- •Assessment of the research and evidence for a link between corporate governance and performance
- •Conclusion
- •Investors play an important role in using corporate governance as an investment technique
- •References
- •11 Is the UK model working?
- •The evolution of UK corporate governance
- •Other governance principles
- •Cross-border harmony
- •UK versus US governance environments
- •Quality of corporate governance disclosures in the UK
- •Have UK companies embraced the principles of the Combined Code?
- •Do they do what they say they do?
- •Resources and investor interest
- •Governance versus performance and listings
- •Alternative Investment Market (AIM) quoted companies
- •Roles and responsibilities
- •Institutional investors
- •Shareholder rights in the UK versus the US
- •Shareholder responsibilities
- •Board effectiveness
- •Review of board performance under the Code
- •Results of evaluations
- •What makes a company responsible?
- •Is the UK model of corporate governance working?
- •Index
Charles Mayo
transaction or arrangement in question. For this purpose, a director is treated as being aware of matters of which he ought reasonably to be aware.
A director does not need to declare an interest:
if it cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest; or
if, or to the extent that, the other directors are already aware of it (and for this purpose the other directors are treated as aware of anything of which they ought reasonably to be aware); or
if, or to the extent that, it concerns terms of his service contract that have been or are to be considered:
by a meeting of the directors; or
by a committee of the directors appointed for the purpose under the constitution.
It will be as well for boards to take a cautious and early view of whether and when a transaction is ‘proposed’. A chairman might, for example, want formally to say to the board that a particular transaction or arrangement is now proposed and remind the directors to disclose their interests (including actual or possible conflicts) as necessary. A cautious view is to remind directors who will be absent from a board meeting also to notify their interests on the same basis.
Additional obligations
The additional obligations on directors discussed below have been selected because they illustrate circumstances where, either expressly or effectively, they require boards of directors to act collectively in order to meet those obligations.
The obligation to declare interests in existing transactions or arrangements
The new law creates a new offence requiring a declaration of interest in existing transactions or arrangements. Under this new offence (section 177 of the Companies Act 2006) where a director is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a transaction or arrangement that has been entered into by the company, he must declare the nature and extent of the interest to the other directors in the manner required. (The offence does not apply if the interest has already been declared in accordance with the director’s duty to declare his interest in the proposed transaction or arrangement as described above.)
Where a declaration of interest in an existing transaction or arrangement is required, the declaration must be made at a meeting of the directors, by notice in writing or by general notice. If the declaration of interest proves to be, or becomes, inaccurate or complete, a further declaration must be made. The duty to make the declaration, or to update it, must be made as soon as is reasonably practicable. As with the duty of disclosure in relation to proposed transactions or arrangements, the director with the interest (the conflicted director) and the
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directors without the interest (the independent directors) are all treated as aware of matters of which they ought reasonably to be aware.
Although a director is not expected to disclose an interest of which he has no knowledge, or in relation to a transaction or arrangement of which he is not aware, to avoid any lapse of memory it is expressly provided that the test applied in relation to the knowledge of directors on this matter will be an objective test of reasonableness.
From the board’s point of view, what the combination of this codification and new offence does is to demand extra vigilance. This is required by individual directors to identify, anticipate, disclose and update their disclosure of actual or reasonably foreseeable conflicts and to do so as soon as is reasonably practicable. It also requires some extra vigilance on the part of the independent directors. The independent directors will want, as at present, to be sure that individual directors do comply. They may, therefore, be concerned to ask formally not just whether directors have interests to disclose but whether they have any update to make of previous disclosures. Quite possibly, one effect will be to make independent directors more concerned to ensure formally that all other directors know of the proposed transaction or arrangement and therefore can make the appropriate disclosure or update. In this way, directors have greater certainty that they are meeting the standard of skill, care and diligence required, that their actual knowledge includes matters of which they ought reasonably to be aware and that they are acting within their powers (for example, where the quorum provisions specifically exclude a conflicted director). Views and emphasis might differ on whether this was what was already required under the old law but, even if it was, it is illustrative of how the codification process is surfacing requirements latent or less obvious to the business person under the old general case law.
The obligation to comply with the Listing, Disclosure and Transparency Rules
A director who is knowingly concerned with a breach of these Rules can be fined or otherwise sanctioned by the FSA. For ease of regulatory enforcement the focus is on the conduct of an individual director. Regulators prefer not to meet the defence that as everyone was responsible, no one person alone should be liable. In substance these Rules impose significant collective responsibility on the board. A listed company (such as a Main Market company with securities admitted to trading on the London Stock Exchange) and all its directors have continuing obligations to the FSA, in particular to notify information needed to enable shareholders and the public to appraise the company’s position and avoid creating a false market.
To comply with these continuing obligations involves a high degree of collective responsibility on the part of the board. This is evidenced by the way the Listing Principles require a listed company to:
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take reasonable steps to enable its directors to understand their responsibilities and obligations as directors
take reasonable steps to establish and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable it to comply with its obligations
act with integrity towards holders and potential holders of its listed equity securities
avoid the creation or continuation of a false market in such listed equity securities
treat (broadly speaking) its shareholders equally.
The obligation to disclose and certify disclosure of relevant audit information to auditors
The CAICE Act requires the directors’ report to contain a statement that, so far as each director is aware, there is no relevant audit information of which the auditors are unaware, and that the director has taken all the steps he should have taken to make himself aware of such information and to establish that the auditors are aware of it. This requirement for a new statement in the directors’ report applies to all companies whose accounts have been subject to a statutory audit for that financial year.
For this purpose, a director takes all of the steps that he ought to have taken in order to make the statement if he has:
made such enquiries of his fellow directors and of the company’s auditors for that purpose, and
taken such other steps (if any) as were required by his duty as a director of the company to exercise due care, skill and diligence.
The care, skill and diligence required of a director are consistent with the current common law duties of directors, such that the extent of the duty in the case of a particular director is:
the knowledge, skill and experience that may be reasonably expected of the person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by the director in relation to the company, and
(so far as they exceed what may reasonably be so expected) the knowledge, skill and experience that the director in fact has.
If the statement is not made at all, the existing offence in the Companies Act 1985 – failure to comply with the provisions as to the contents of directors’ reports – will apply. If a statement is made but it is a false one, each individual director who knew the statement was false, or who was reckless as to whether it was false, and who did not take reasonable steps to prevent the report from being approved is guilty of an offence. A person found guilty on indictment will be liable to imprisonment for up to two years and/or an unlimited fine, and
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