
- •Contents
- •Contributors
- •Acknowledgements
- •Introduction
- •What is corporate governance?
- •Corporate responsibility and ethics
- •Role of the board
- •Is corporate governance working?
- •Contribution of non-executive directors
- •Sanctions
- •The future of corporate governance
- •Challenges
- •1 The role of the board
- •Introduction
- •The executive/non-executive relationship
- •The board agenda and the number of meetings
- •Board committees
- •Size and composition of the board
- •The board and the shareholders
- •The dual role of British boards
- •What value does the board add?
- •Some unresolved questions
- •2 The role of the Chairman
- •Introduction
- •Due diligence
- •Professionalism
- •Setting the agenda and running the board meeting
- •Promoting good governance
- •Creating an effective relationship with the Chief Executive
- •Sustaining the company’s reputation
- •Succession planning
- •Building an effective board
- •Finding the right people
- •Getting the communications right
- •Making good use of non-executive directors
- •Using board committees effectively
- •Protecting the unitary board
- •Creating a climate of trust
- •Making good use of external advisers
- •Promoting the use of board evaluation and director appraisal
- •Qualities of an effective chairman
- •3 The role of the non-executive director
- •Introduction
- •Role of a non-executive director
- •Importance of the role of non-executive director
- •Personal skills and attributes of an effective non-executive director
- •Technical
- •Interpersonal
- •Importance of independence
- •Non-executive director dilemmas
- •Engaged and non-executive
- •Challenge and support
- •Independence and involvement
- •Barriers to NED effectiveness
- •The senior independent director (SID)
- •NEDs and board committees
- •Board evaluation
- •Training for NEDs
- •Diversity
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •4 The role of the Company Secretary
- •Introduction
- •The background
- •The advent of corporate governance
- •Role of the board
- •Strategic versus compliance
- •Reputation oversight
- •Governance systems
- •The Company Secretary
- •The challenges
- •5 The role of the shareholder
- •Recent history – growing pressure on shareholders to act responsibly
- •Governance as an alternative to regulation
- •Where shareholders make a difference
- •What happens in practice
- •The international dimension
- •Progress to date
- •The challenges ahead
- •6 The role of the regulator
- •Introduction
- •The market-based approach to promoting good governance
- •Advantages of the market-based approach and comply-or-explain
- •The role of governments and regulators
- •How does the regulator carry out this role in practice?
- •Challenges to comply-or-explain
- •Conclusion
- •Perspective
- •Individual and collective board responsibility
- •Enlightened shareholder value versus pluralism
- •Core duties
- •The duty to act within powers
- •The duty to promote the success of the company
- •The duty to exercise independent judgement
- •The duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence
- •The duty to disclose interests in proposed transactions or arrangements
- •Additional obligations
- •The obligation to declare interests in existing transactions or arrangements
- •The obligation to comply with the Listing, Disclosure and Transparency Rules
- •The obligation to disclose and certify disclosure of relevant audit information to auditors
- •Reporting
- •The link between directors’ duties and narrative reporting
- •Business reviews
- •Enhanced business reviews by quoted companies
- •Transparency Rules
- •Safe harbours
- •Shareholder derivative actions
- •8 What sanctions are necessary?
- •Introduction
- •The Virtuous Circle of corporate governance
- •Law and regulation in the Virtuous Circle
- •The Courts in the Virtuous Circle
- •Shareholder and market pressure in the Virtuous Circle
- •Good corporate citizenship in the Virtuous Circle
- •The sanctions: law and regulation – policing the boundaries
- •Sanctions under the Companies Acts
- •Sanctions and corporate reporting
- •The role of auditors
- •Plugging the ‘expectations gap’
- •Shareholders and legislative sanctions
- •FSMA: sanctions in a regulatory context
- •Sanctions for listed companies, directors and PDMRs
- •Suspensions and cancellations
- •The Listing Principles – facilitating the enforcement process
- •Sanctions for AIM listed companies
- •Sanctions for sponsors and nomads
- •Misleading statements and practices
- •The sanctions: the role of the Courts
- •Consequences of breach of duty
- •The position of non-executive directors
- •Protecting directors
- •The impact of the 2006 Act
- •Adequacy of civil sanctions for breach of duty
- •The sanctions: shareholder and market pressure – power in the hands of the owners
- •Shareholders and their agents
- •Codes versus law and regulation
- •What sanctions apply under codes and guidelines?
- •Proposals for reform
- •The sanctions: good corporate citizenship – the power of public opinion
- •Adverse press comment
- •Peer pressure
- •Corporate social responsibility
- •Conclusion
- •9 Regulatory trends and their impact on corporate governance
- •Introduction and overarching market trends
- •Regulatory trends in the EU
- •Transparency
- •Comply-or-explain
- •Annual disclosures
- •Interim and ad hoc disclosures
- •Hedge fund and stock lending
- •Accountability
- •Shareholder rights and participation
- •The market for corporate control
- •One-share-one-vote
- •Shareholder communications
- •Trends in the US
- •Transparency
- •Executive remuneration
- •Accountability
- •Concluding remarks
- •10 Corporate governance and performance: the missing links
- •Introduction
- •Governance-ranking-based research into the link between corporate governance and performance
- •Overview of governance-ranking research
- •Assessment of governance-ranking research
- •Further evidence for a link between corporate governance and performance: effectiveness of shareholder engagement
- •Performance of companies in focus lists
- •Performance of shareholder engagement funds
- •Shareholder engagement in practice: Premier Oil plc
- •Assessment of the research and evidence for a link between corporate governance and performance
- •Conclusion
- •Investors play an important role in using corporate governance as an investment technique
- •References
- •11 Is the UK model working?
- •The evolution of UK corporate governance
- •Other governance principles
- •Cross-border harmony
- •UK versus US governance environments
- •Quality of corporate governance disclosures in the UK
- •Have UK companies embraced the principles of the Combined Code?
- •Do they do what they say they do?
- •Resources and investor interest
- •Governance versus performance and listings
- •Alternative Investment Market (AIM) quoted companies
- •Roles and responsibilities
- •Institutional investors
- •Shareholder rights in the UK versus the US
- •Shareholder responsibilities
- •Board effectiveness
- •Review of board performance under the Code
- •Results of evaluations
- •What makes a company responsible?
- •Is the UK model of corporate governance working?
- •Index

Ken Rushton
open dialogue among board colleagues, perhaps in those meetings between the Chairman and Chief Executive or between the Chairman and the non-executive directors. Where they cannot be resolved, they must not be allowed to fester and the Chairman needs to recognise that board changes must be made.
Finally, my Chairman in his speech proposes measures for creating a climate of trust on the board:
neutralise political cliques
insist on proper, timely reports to the board
ensure bad news travels quickly up to the board
fully brief new non-executive directors – ‘warts and all’
encourage non-executive directors to listen more
ensure board members understand the difference between dissent and disloyalty – beware ‘group-think’.
He could have added measures such as articulating the values of the company and living up to those values by your behaviour and your actions; having a code of ethics and embedding it in the culture of the company; treating employees with respect and dealing with them fairly. However, his focus on maintaining trusting relationships at board level is entirely appropriate as that is where the Chairman can have the most influence. Furthermore the integrity of the company starts with the board, which needs to set the correct tone from the top.
Making good use of external advisers
The Combined Code provides that board committees should be able to call in advisers at the company’s expense. Remuneration consultants have made a good living advising remuneration committees and, some would argue, helping Chief Executives and their executive colleagues grow rich by getting them paid ‘above median’ salaries plus generous incentives for average performance.
Nomination committees call in search firms to find candidates for board vacancies, while audit committees increasingly find themselves looking to lawyers and accountancy firms to help carry out investigations. One recalls Davis Polk and Wardwell, US attorneys, assisting the Shell audit committee with its reserves scandal or Lord Woolf investigating British Aerospace’s business practices in the light of the alleged bribes for contracts in Saudi Arabia.
One Chairman I spoke to believes boards and their committees should make greater use of advisers. His company is highly regulated, with substantial interests in the US market. As previously mentioned, another Chairman was grateful that his company did not surround him with advisers when his board was in the midst of an enormous crisis.
One risk of engaging advisers is that it increases the chances of a leak to the press. This is particularly true in the case of corporate actions such as takeover bids, where a company cannot help using advisers though the number can be controlled. Leaks of commercially sensitive information that can create
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The role of the Chairman
a disorderly market in the company’s share price are far too common in these situations. The finger is often pointed at the advisers though far from easy to prove. It is up to the Chairman to make it clear to advisers that the chances of getting future business from the company are nil if such a leak can be shown to come from them. Also, if there should be a leak, the Chairman must make sure it is thoroughly investigated. While I was Company Secretary at ICI during a period of hyperactivity on the mergers and acquisitions front, I can only recall one possible leak. I am sure it helped that our advisers knew precisely what would happen in the event of a leak being traced to their firm.
In my final years at ICI it sometimes felt that the company had been overrun by advisers. Management consultants and investment banks would be invited to many of the board meetings. This did not go unnoticed by management, who asked the question ‘Who is running the company?’
As a former regulator (after leaving ICI), I am pleased, of course, that boards do take professional advice on issues relating to their listing obligations or other technical issues where the consequences of wrong decisions could seriously damage the interests of shareholders or other stakeholders. There are many other board decisions where directors are being rewarded for using their judgement and experience. Chairmen should not easily concede the collective wisdom around the board table to the advice of a consultant, who has little to lose, unless the issue is beyond the competence of the board.
Promoting the use of board evaluation and director appraisal
The Higgs review of the Combined Code advocated more rigorous board evaluation procedures and offered guidance as to how this might be done. At the time, many Chairmen considered that such a requirement was, at best, a waste of time and, in any event, demeaning to the intelligence and experience of those who serve on boards of quoted companies. Where Chairmen supported the proposal, they were frequently met with resistance from their board colleagues.
Now, board evaluation is seen as one of the best things to come out of the Higgs review. There are many ways of carrying out an evaluation, but what is more important is that the process will not be effective unless it is fully supported by the Chairman. Indeed, in many companies, it is the Chairman who leads the process supported either by an external facilitator or by the Company Secretary. Evaluation not only is designed to review board effectiveness but also may look at the performance of individual directors, including the Chairman. One Chairman considers the idea of a peer review of individual directors’ performance as ‘cobblers’. Companies differ as to how they appraise their directors, but the Chairman’s performance will usually be reviewed by the non-executive directors led by the senior independent director.
In some board evaluations, when the performance of individual directors is being scored by their peers, these scores will be disclosed to the Chairman and
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