
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgements
- •Table of cases
- •Abbreviations
- •Introduction to the second edition
- •1 The roots of corporate insolvency law
- •Development and structure
- •Corporate insolvency procedures
- •Administrative receivership
- •Administration
- •Winding up/liquidation
- •Formal arrangements with creditors
- •The players
- •Administrators
- •Administrative receivers
- •Receivers
- •Liquidators
- •Company voluntary arrangement (CVA) supervisors
- •The tasks of corporate insolvency law
- •Conclusions
- •2 Aims, objectives and benchmarks
- •Cork on principles
- •Visions of corporate insolvency law
- •Creditor wealth maximisation and the creditors’ bargain
- •A broad-based contractarian approach
- •The communitarian vision
- •The forum vision
- •The ethical vision
- •The multiple values/eclectic approach
- •The nature of measuring
- •An ‘explicit values’ approach to insolvency law
- •Conclusions
- •3 Insolvency and corporate borrowing
- •Creditors, borrowing and debtors
- •How to borrow
- •Security
- •Unsecured loans
- •Quasi-security
- •Third-party guarantees
- •Debtors and patterns of borrowing
- •Equity and security
- •Equity shares
- •Floating charges
- •Improving on security and full priority
- •The ‘new capitalism’ and the credit crisis
- •Conclusions
- •4 Corporate failure
- •What is failure?
- •Why companies fail
- •Internal factors
- •Mismanagement
- •External factors
- •Late payment of debts
- •Conclusions: failures and corporate insolvency law
- •5 Insolvency practitioners and turnaround professionals
- •Insolvency practitioners
- •The evolution of the administrative structure
- •Evaluating the structure
- •Expertise
- •Fairness
- •Accountability
- •Reforming IP regulation
- •Insolvency as a discrete profession
- •An independent regulatory agency
- •Departmental regulation
- •Fine-tuning profession-led regulation
- •Conclusions on insolvency practitioners
- •Turnaround professionals
- •Turnaround professionals and fairness
- •Expertise
- •Conclusions
- •6 Rescue
- •What is rescue?
- •Why rescue?
- •Informal and formal routes to rescue
- •The new focus on rescue
- •The philosophical change
- •Recasting the actors
- •Comparing approaches to rescue
- •Conclusions
- •7 Informal rescue
- •Who rescues?
- •The stages of informal rescue
- •Assessing the prospects
- •The alarm stage
- •The evaluation stage
- •Agreeing recovery plans
- •Implementing the rescue
- •Managerial and organisational reforms
- •Asset reductions
- •Cost reductions
- •Debt restructuring
- •Debt/equity conversions
- •Conclusions
- •8 Receivers and their role
- •The development of receivership
- •Processes, powers and duties: the Insolvency Act 1986 onwards
- •Expertise
- •Accountability and fairness
- •Revising receivership
- •Conclusions
- •9 Administration
- •The rise of administration
- •From the Insolvency Act 1986 to the Enterprise Act 2002
- •The Enterprise Act reforms and the new administration
- •Financial collateral arrangements
- •Preferential creditors, the prescribed part and the banks
- •Exiting from administration
- •Evaluating administration
- •Use, cost-effectiveness and returns to creditors
- •Responsiveness
- •Super-priority funding
- •Rethinking charges on book debts
- •Administrators’ expenses and rescue
- •The case for cram-down and supervised restructuring
- •Equity conversions
- •Expertise
- •Fairness and accountability
- •Conclusions
- •10 Pre-packaged administrations
- •The rise of the pre-pack
- •Advantages and concerns
- •Fairness and expertise
- •Accountability and transparency
- •Controlling the pre-pack
- •The ‘managerial’ solution: a matter of expertise
- •The professional ethics solution: expertise and fairness combined
- •The regulatory answer
- •Evaluating control strategies
- •Conclusions
- •11 Company arrangements
- •Schemes of arrangement under the Companies Act 2006 sections 895–901
- •Company Voluntary Arrangements
- •The small companies’ moratorium
- •Crown creditors and CVAs
- •The nominee’s scrutiny role
- •Rescue funding
- •Landlords, lessors of tools and utilities suppliers
- •Expertise
- •Accountability and fairness
- •Unfair prejudice
- •The approval majority for creditors’ meetings
- •The shareholders’ power to approve the CVA
- •Conclusions
- •12 Rethinking rescue
- •13 Gathering the assets: the role of liquidation
- •The voluntary liquidation process
- •Compulsory liquidation
- •Public interest liquidation
- •The concept of liquidation
- •Expertise
- •Accountability
- •Fairness
- •Avoidance of transactions
- •Preferences
- •Transactions at undervalue and transactions defrauding creditors
- •Fairness to group creditors
- •Conclusions
- •14 The pari passu principle
- •Exceptions to pari passu
- •Liquidation expenses and post-liquidation creditors
- •Preferential debts
- •Subordination
- •Deferred claims
- •Conclusions: rethinking exceptions to pari passu
- •15 Bypassing pari passu
- •Security
- •Retention of title and quasi-security
- •Trusts
- •The recognition of trusts
- •Advances for particular purposes
- •Consumer prepayments
- •Fairness
- •Alternatives to pari passu
- •Debts ranked chronologically
- •Debts ranked ethically
- •Debts ranked on size
- •Debts paid on policy grounds
- •Conclusions
- •16 Directors in troubled times
- •Accountability
- •Common law duties
- •When does the duty arise?
- •Statutory duties and liabilities
- •General duties
- •Fraudulent trading
- •Wrongful trading
- •‘Phoenix’ provisions
- •Transactions at undervalue, preferences and transactions defrauding creditors
- •Enforcement
- •Public interest liquidation
- •Expertise
- •Fairness
- •Conclusions
- •17 Employees in distress
- •Protections under the law
- •Expertise
- •Accountability
- •Fairness
- •Conclusions
- •18 Conclusion
- •Bibliography
- •Index
insolvency and corporate borrowing |
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assignor whose receivables are so discounted receives immediate cash to the extent of the purchase price. The financier deducts an administration charge in addition to the ‘discount’, which, by being calculated on a daily yield basis, produces a sum equivalent to interest on the amount advanced to the assignor.40 The company thus receives a cash sum earlier than would have been the case had it waited for its debtors to settle their accounts.
As will be discussed below, however, it is not easy to characterise many quasi-security arrangements and the courts may face difficulties in deciding whether a transaction is, for legal and insolvency purposes, a loan secured by a mortgage or charge, a sale or an outright assignment.41
Third-party guarantees
Often a loan from a creditor such as a bank will be ‘guaranteed’42 by a third party – which may be an individual director of the debtor company but could also be a parent or subsidiary company within a group. The Government itself may also act as a guarantor and the UK offers a good deal of credit insurance to exporters through the Export Credits Guarantee Department, which, inter alia, guarantees bills of exchange purchased by banks. Guarantees may relate to specific transactions or operate on a continuing basis and relate to a flow of transactions.43
The guarantor undertakes to answer for the default of the principal but guarantors can only be sued after the principal debtor’s default. Usually the undertaking of the guarantor is to meet the monetary liability arising out of the default, but a guarantor may also assume a secondary liability for performance as stipulated in the contract agreed by the principal. The guarantor is not liable for any amount in excess of that recoverable from the principal debtor and, if the guarantee is given at the request of the debtor, the guarantor has an implied contractual right to be indemnified by the debtor against all liabilities incurred.44
40 See Oditah, Legal Aspects, p. 34. 41 Ibid., pp. 35–40.
42If A owes B a financial obligation, then instead of, or in addition to, taking a charge on A’s property, B may take a contract with a third party, C, under which C promises to meet A’s obligation to B if A fails to do so (C being the ‘guarantor’). See further R. M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003).
43See Fuller, Corporate Borrowing, ch. 11.
44In an insurance arrangement, in contrast, the insurer protects the covered party and there is no right of indemnity against the defaulter: see R. M. Goode, ‘Surety and OnDemand Performance Bonds’ [1988] JBL 87, 88–9.