- •Contents
- •Acknowledgements
- •Table of cases
- •Abbreviations
- •Introduction to the second edition
- •1 The roots of corporate insolvency law
- •Development and structure
- •Corporate insolvency procedures
- •Administrative receivership
- •Administration
- •Winding up/liquidation
- •Formal arrangements with creditors
- •The players
- •Administrators
- •Administrative receivers
- •Receivers
- •Liquidators
- •Company voluntary arrangement (CVA) supervisors
- •The tasks of corporate insolvency law
- •Conclusions
- •2 Aims, objectives and benchmarks
- •Cork on principles
- •Visions of corporate insolvency law
- •Creditor wealth maximisation and the creditors’ bargain
- •A broad-based contractarian approach
- •The communitarian vision
- •The forum vision
- •The ethical vision
- •The multiple values/eclectic approach
- •The nature of measuring
- •An ‘explicit values’ approach to insolvency law
- •Conclusions
- •3 Insolvency and corporate borrowing
- •Creditors, borrowing and debtors
- •How to borrow
- •Security
- •Unsecured loans
- •Quasi-security
- •Third-party guarantees
- •Debtors and patterns of borrowing
- •Equity and security
- •Equity shares
- •Floating charges
- •Improving on security and full priority
- •The ‘new capitalism’ and the credit crisis
- •Conclusions
- •4 Corporate failure
- •What is failure?
- •Why companies fail
- •Internal factors
- •Mismanagement
- •External factors
- •Late payment of debts
- •Conclusions: failures and corporate insolvency law
- •5 Insolvency practitioners and turnaround professionals
- •Insolvency practitioners
- •The evolution of the administrative structure
- •Evaluating the structure
- •Expertise
- •Fairness
- •Accountability
- •Reforming IP regulation
- •Insolvency as a discrete profession
- •An independent regulatory agency
- •Departmental regulation
- •Fine-tuning profession-led regulation
- •Conclusions on insolvency practitioners
- •Turnaround professionals
- •Turnaround professionals and fairness
- •Expertise
- •Conclusions
- •6 Rescue
- •What is rescue?
- •Why rescue?
- •Informal and formal routes to rescue
- •The new focus on rescue
- •The philosophical change
- •Recasting the actors
- •Comparing approaches to rescue
- •Conclusions
- •7 Informal rescue
- •Who rescues?
- •The stages of informal rescue
- •Assessing the prospects
- •The alarm stage
- •The evaluation stage
- •Agreeing recovery plans
- •Implementing the rescue
- •Managerial and organisational reforms
- •Asset reductions
- •Cost reductions
- •Debt restructuring
- •Debt/equity conversions
- •Conclusions
- •8 Receivers and their role
- •The development of receivership
- •Processes, powers and duties: the Insolvency Act 1986 onwards
- •Expertise
- •Accountability and fairness
- •Revising receivership
- •Conclusions
- •9 Administration
- •The rise of administration
- •From the Insolvency Act 1986 to the Enterprise Act 2002
- •The Enterprise Act reforms and the new administration
- •Financial collateral arrangements
- •Preferential creditors, the prescribed part and the banks
- •Exiting from administration
- •Evaluating administration
- •Use, cost-effectiveness and returns to creditors
- •Responsiveness
- •Super-priority funding
- •Rethinking charges on book debts
- •Administrators’ expenses and rescue
- •The case for cram-down and supervised restructuring
- •Equity conversions
- •Expertise
- •Fairness and accountability
- •Conclusions
- •10 Pre-packaged administrations
- •The rise of the pre-pack
- •Advantages and concerns
- •Fairness and expertise
- •Accountability and transparency
- •Controlling the pre-pack
- •The ‘managerial’ solution: a matter of expertise
- •The professional ethics solution: expertise and fairness combined
- •The regulatory answer
- •Evaluating control strategies
- •Conclusions
- •11 Company arrangements
- •Schemes of arrangement under the Companies Act 2006 sections 895–901
- •Company Voluntary Arrangements
- •The small companies’ moratorium
- •Crown creditors and CVAs
- •The nominee’s scrutiny role
- •Rescue funding
- •Landlords, lessors of tools and utilities suppliers
- •Expertise
- •Accountability and fairness
- •Unfair prejudice
- •The approval majority for creditors’ meetings
- •The shareholders’ power to approve the CVA
- •Conclusions
- •12 Rethinking rescue
- •13 Gathering the assets: the role of liquidation
- •The voluntary liquidation process
- •Compulsory liquidation
- •Public interest liquidation
- •The concept of liquidation
- •Expertise
- •Accountability
- •Fairness
- •Avoidance of transactions
- •Preferences
- •Transactions at undervalue and transactions defrauding creditors
- •Fairness to group creditors
- •Conclusions
- •14 The pari passu principle
- •Exceptions to pari passu
- •Liquidation expenses and post-liquidation creditors
- •Preferential debts
- •Subordination
- •Deferred claims
- •Conclusions: rethinking exceptions to pari passu
- •15 Bypassing pari passu
- •Security
- •Retention of title and quasi-security
- •Trusts
- •The recognition of trusts
- •Advances for particular purposes
- •Consumer prepayments
- •Fairness
- •Alternatives to pari passu
- •Debts ranked chronologically
- •Debts ranked ethically
- •Debts ranked on size
- •Debts paid on policy grounds
- •Conclusions
- •16 Directors in troubled times
- •Accountability
- •Common law duties
- •When does the duty arise?
- •Statutory duties and liabilities
- •General duties
- •Fraudulent trading
- •Wrongful trading
- •‘Phoenix’ provisions
- •Transactions at undervalue, preferences and transactions defrauding creditors
- •Enforcement
- •Public interest liquidation
- •Expertise
- •Fairness
- •Conclusions
- •17 Employees in distress
- •Protections under the law
- •Expertise
- •Accountability
- •Fairness
- •Conclusions
- •18 Conclusion
- •Bibliography
- •Index
directors in troubled times |
703 |
whether to declare a liability to contribute and subsequent issues of quantum.139
‘Phoenix’ provisions
Personal liability for directors also arises in relation to sections 216 and 217 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the provisions designed to deal with the ‘phoenix syndrome’. These sections prohibit a director of a company that has entered insolvent liquidation from being involved, for the next five years, in the management of a company using the same name as the insolvent company or a name so similar as to suggest an association with
it.140 The prohibition covers using any name by which the old company was known141 and even a name that has not been used for trading but has
been used internally as a promotional shorthand name.142 The rule also applies to any director who has left a company within twelve months of liquidation. Breach of the rule involves civil or criminal liability and the major effect is to make the person concerned personally liable to contribute towards the debts of the ‘new’ company.143 An individual may seek the court’s leave to act as the director of a similarly named company, however, and there is evidence that the courts will be well disposed to
grant such leave where the applicant was not to blame for the failure of the initial company.144 An advantage of sections 216 and 217 to the
creditor is that these provisions allow an individual to bring an action to
139For further discussion of the wrongful trading provisions in the context of efficiency see pp. 741–3, 746–9 below.
140Archer Structures Ltd v. Griffiths [2004] BCC 156. See M. Tempest, ‘Re-use of Company Names’ (2006) Recovery (Summer) 25; T. Mayer, ‘Personal Liability for Trading in a Prohibited Name’ (2006) 27 Co. Law. 14; Carter, ‘Phoenix Syndrome’; Frith, ‘Acting as a Director of a Phoenix Company’. On exceptions to the ss. 216 and 217 rules (outlined in the Insolvency Rules 1986 (SI 1986/1925) (amended in 2007: see below), particularly rr. 4.227–4.230) see ESS Production Ltd v. Sully [2005] BCC 435; Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs v. Walsh [2006] BCC 431. In Churchill v. First Independent Factors and Finance Ltd [2007] BCC 45 the Court of Appeal adopted a literal and inconvenient interpretation of (the then) r. 4.228 and precluded its usage for notice of business transfers to successor companies unless the director in question had taken up appointment after the notice was given. The Churchill case led to a revision of the Insolvency Rules: see Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2007 (SI 2007/1974) effective from 6 August 2007.
141Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Nash [2003] BPIR 1138.
142ESS Production Ltd v. Sully [2005] BCC 435.
143On the operation of s. 217 see Thorne v. Silverleaf [1994] 1 BCLC 637; Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Nash [2003] BPIR 1138; First Independent Factors and Finance Ltd v.
Mountford [2008] EWHC 835 (Ch).
144See Penrose v. Official Receiver [1996] 1 BCLC 389; Re Lightning Electrical Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 302; Rule 4.227 Insolvency Rules 1986; Churchill v. First
